in them to be as active as that soul was whose p
are nay they do preserve as in a vial the purest
extraction of that living Intellect that bred them

Prof RAMESHWAR SHARMA
Principal & Controller

PART I

THE LAST VICEROY

PART II

THE FIRST GOVERNOR GENERAL

att mpt ny fi l analys s of them From my part cular vantage point I feel th cause of analy is is be t serv d if th tmosphe e n wh ch e l ved is first recapt red nd the pi to we formed the pot are d ly pp ec ated If this s hurr ed breathless n rrat e th t beca e ll wo k d at the highest pressure nd vith n cute sens of u ge cy If t appears disjo nted th t s because d l o problems dem d ng immediate solution cut cross contin ity to be ome ur d ly o t ne

Lord Mo ntbatten m thod of ng large h gh powered taff under th d t n of t ss d st in ere origin l and ge us For ev ry ho f d cuss n w th the Ind an l ad rs h llo ed q art r f ho for d ctat n before seei g th next tor C p of h nt rv ev tes were d tr buted to all th key members f h St ff H obta ned our d ice and d d h s th k g loud t th d ly St ff Me tings wh ch we all ttended alre dy kn w ng ery d that had pa sed t h p t d info m l nt rv ew the day b fo e Th s is how it will be found that on cas I h no d fficulty n q ot ng wh t Lo d M tbatt n sa d and thought t ny g en tim when as not n essarily ther mys lf

I sp te of th pace th setb cks d d st ctions the tr n fer f pow r by P rt t n w stead ly e l ed ccord ng t sch d l Vith n enty thr d y of ur rri al the Part t n Plan had een ann nced furth r se nty two days fter that a d the 'ceroyalty itself w s at an end Thr ghout Mountbatten s t n ionth as Governor Gen al the tempo never s b tant ally slack d All th s mm ns and self susta t g c ncentrat of eff rt I bel v better b ght out by ma nta n g as far a pos bl he hro l g cal qu ce rather than in th sel ct n d s pa at on f speci l th m I h e the efor s mply d ided th k int its two nat l part th pe od befor nd ft r th 5th A gust—Independe ce D y W thin that fram wo k the ia rat i a I h e lready said in ffect da ly p g es

I m d bted t M V P M non and Captain R V Brock nan R N b th f rm r colleag es on Lord Mountbatten s staff n India d to M A H Joyce Officer in Charg of Informat n t the Comm wealth R lat n Off ce f r read g th o gh my la ry narrat e n typescr pt, l o t Mr K St Pavlow tch f r heck ng refe ces, d l t but n t l t to my wife for her ccuracy d ing the long nd often lat h urs of d ctat typ ng nd proof read g

My acknowledgem nt for pe m s n to rep oduce the illustr ions are due to P ess Informat on B r au G ernment of India Nos. 2, 6 11 12, 17 nd 26) A soci ted P es (No 1) K sey Brothers New Delh (No 3) Lord Mo ntb tten Commander Pete Howes R N (No 5) Mr David W lker (No 9) *Life*

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ALAN CAMPBELL-JOHNSON

Westminster
July 1951

PROLOGUE

It may be said of the British Raj as Shakespeare said of the Thane of Cawdor Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it This Bill is a moral to all future generations it is a Treaty of Peace without a War

Such was Lord Samuel s considered tribute paid during the House of Lords debate on the Indian Independence Act, to the creation by compromise and consent of two new nations involving one fifth of the entire human race

It was certainly the privilege of a life time to be given the chance as a member of Lord Mountbatten s staff of playing some personal part in this unique transfer of power

In announcing to Parliament on 20th February 1947 Lord Mountbatten s appointment as Viceroy Mr Attlee stated that he would be entrusted with the task of transferring to Indian hands the responsibility for the government of British India in a manner that will best ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India But Mr Attlee then added that there was to be a time limit for achieving agreement if possible and for transferring power in any case by June 1948—the principle no doubt being that a time limit would induce the necessary margin of agreement between the two great Indian political parties the Congress and Moslem League as nothing else had so far succeeded in doing

In spite of the immediate controversy it provoked this time limit was in effect the logical conclusion of the policy decision of the British Government early in the war to cease recruitment for the Indian Civil Service The normal complement of that Service was never much more than eleven hundred by November 1946 it had fallen to five hundred and twenty British officers in senior positions with the remainder Indians In 1939 the Central Government Secretariat was run on the basis of approximately thirty senior administrative officers but by the end of the war the number of officers of equivalent grade had risen to three hundred

The same situation was developing in the Provinces This tremendous bureaucratic growth of work coinciding with the decline in the number of British senior officials made it clear quite apart from other considerations that it was going to be virtually impossible to hold on to India administratively beyond 1^
is doubtful whether the police establishment was strong
1947 to enforce any policy opposed by both major
is fair to say that any large military commi ments
maintain the Raj would have been wholly
British Government or people

The orig l schedule L rd Mou tb tten et h mself was to produce a plan by Oct ber 1947 d scuss it with the Brit sh G vernment an l put it to the Indian Leader by about January 1948 Whil he w s st ll at hom th s appr ch c ns d red m ch too hurr ed b t he had h dly set foot n India hen h reach d the firm co l s n that t w s n fact much too leisurely to meet the tuat n then f nt ng us We ere faced by rap dly r si g Hind Moslem t ns D rect Act n had been launch d by th Moslem Leag e n Aug st 1946 there ere ri ts a d repri ls f r riot Th s set ff the pa k and d sturbances of g eat nt n ty t k pl c n Beng l and B har The trouble spr d to Lahor and the North w t F ter Pr vinc In h s first talks w th L d Mountb tt n th Moslem Leag e leader Mr J n ah g v fra k w rning that unless an ccept ble poli t cal l tio was r h d ry q ckly he could not guara te t c ntr l th tu t n fr m his de A simil r v rning was g ven by Congress l d rs

Although it a ull offic lly n b g the so c lled Cabinet Miss on Plan neg tiated th gh t 1946 had already b oke down Th s as the last att mpt t ch eve a un t ry yst m for Ind and t was b d n an laborate three t ed structure f P ovinces d gr p f P inces Gr p A compri ed the pr se t Dom n on of Ind a while Gr up B nd C conceded the bsta ce of We t nd Ea t Pak stan respecti ely but all three Gro ps w r to suppo t w k central a thority Th Grand Des gn broke d wn s many had d e b f re on deta l—vital deta l certa ly—b t a gnifica t wa n ng for Lord Mo tbatten about the nat r of the Ind an d dl ck and how t handle t It seemed th t the Ind n pproach w s t tart v th n o erall g eement and wo k ste d ly w y from it while the Brit sh p- pr ch wa to tackl th d ff cult es first and hope to b left with some ommon gr d at the end

Un ty h d been our greatest l gislative and dmini trat ve ach ev m t in I d a b t by March 1947 th ly alternat s wer Pakistan or cl a Lord I m y l kened the po t on t taking h ge of a sh p m d oc an ith a fire on the d ck and amm it n th hold Lord M ntb tt n d sco ered from person l d cu n w th th Le ders f th Moslem Le gu th t th y w ld n t on part t t all st and fight a c il a rather th n ccept tr f r of power to H du majo ty union wh le C ngres howed themsel e hamp ons of un ty b t not t th pr ce of coerci By the sam t ken they i sisted that no no Mosl m majo ty c mm n ty hould go ag inst its will into Pak tan Pro ded that wa n t d ne th y v uld ra e no funda m ntal objecti n to part tion Afte seve ty three days f d plo- m cy by d scu on n l ng u parall l d to centr ti n of will a d nten ty of eff rt n th pa t f Lo d Mountbatt n the 3rd June Plan as in principle accepted.

The Plan had three main features First it was partition within partition The Punjab and Bengal the communal composition of which were almost equal were given the right to decide on their own partition prior to option for India or Pakistan Mr Jinnah while stressing the tragedy of this step was also unable to resist its logic For some time there was possibility of Bengal separatism expressing itself but this died away as the transfer of power drew near As a result of this partition West and East Pakistan were divided by some eight hundred miles Secondly it involved the partition of the Sikhs this was the outcome of the partition of the Punjab upon which the Sikh leaders insisted Lord Mount batten was surprised at the vehemence of their attitude in view of the price they would have to pay for it but was given no practicable alternative by them

The third main feature was Dominion Status This was a master stroke on many grounds but in particular because it made possible the maximum administrative and constitutional continuity on the basis of the great India Act of 1935 As Lord Mountbatten himself said shortly after his return to England I know of no other country in the world to day in the fortunate position of having a constitution that is already a working constitution but which can be amended by a stroke of the pen day by day to be made to work more agreeably to themselves

So much for the Plan let us turn now to some of the major consequences of the partition of British India

First of all it meant in effect an administrative within a political transfer of power Action was at once taken to meet the demand for the partition of the magnificent Indian Army A Supreme Command gave higher direction until its disbandment in Novem ber to this complex and delicate task A Joint Defence Council meeting alternately in India and Pakistan with Lord Moutbatten acting as chairman on behalf of both Governments enabled steady contact on major military problems to be maintained right up to Lord Mountbatten s departure It also provided a safety valve at more than one moment of crisis for private consideration of all outstanding inter Dominion disputes A Partition Council was formed to deal with all civil issues including transfer of assets and endless technicalities involved in partition Finally an Arbi tration Tribunal was appointed to give awards when agreement by other means had failed Considering the range of the con troversy involved these instruments of partition worked with remarkable speed and administrative smoothness

Provision was made in the Act on Mr Jinnah s suggestion for Lord Mountbatten to be Governor General of both Dom inions and for some time it seemed as if this might be
but at the last moment Mr Jinnah decided otherwise No
he was in the best position to judge but in so far as
the majority of physical assets it was arguable tha

joint G vernor Generalsh p m ght h ve b en in the best interests of Pakistan.

The second major consequence was, of c rse the violent communal reacti n n the Punj b In term of the geography nd pop lat on f Ind a h l th tro bles we e concentrat ed int a lim t d but vit l ca t r b th ntr es The people rose up ag inst th r le d rs acceptan e of partition In th s communal rrupt n tt el e mill Hindu S kh nd Moslem were involved a d m g ation f m n n m ll n people began overn ght in an rea the ze f W les A fa great r cata trophe was avo ded only by an alm t m r f u bsence f large-sc le famin and d sease. I fl cr lumn of r f gees stretch ng for more th n si ty m les cr ep g l g n road the fam l es carrying all the r worldly g d n bull ck-c rt There h d been many commun l m gr t on befor but ne r of th magni t de Moreover th s tim th re w uld be n return

For Paki tan the imm d te da ger to th key Pro nce f the West Punjab They wer ece ng impoverished Moslem in pl ce of wealthy S kh F r Ind a the d-cisi threat was to Delh wh ch was r ght in th p cent e f th s earthquake Befor long ome f ir hundr d th sand ref gees w e moving on th cap tal bringing n the r wake uffering d bitterness It was by her h ro c efforts n org s ng l ef f the ref gees th t Lady M untbatten mad h r n m mm rtal in I d a Her dy m c b t human per onal ty c mb ed with her unique Red Cros a d St. John experience h lped greatly to b ld up th m al and impro e the cond ti ns of th d n the crowd d ef ge camps

W thin three week of Independence Day the Prim Mi st Pand t Nehru, and Deputy Pr me Min ster P t l with gre t pol t cal courage in ited Lord M ntb tt n now const tut nal Go ernor-General to come d wn fr m Simla and take o er the ha rmanship of the Emergency Comm ttee f the Cab t It a umed f ll war pow rs, and Go ment House its lf becam n perat onal he d-quarter The Cab n t would meet the eac i m rn ng and go into M p Room h r the movements of the refugees and o tbreaks of d turbances were pin po nt d on wall ch rts A the days went by it becam e dent that the situat on was be ng held alo g th bound ry of the East Punjab and U it d Pro nces thro gh the f rm act n t ken both by the P nc l and Ce tral Government t halt refug e m vem nt the e If the Government had shown weakn t th t point the trouble m ght well ha e spread acros th whole of N rthern I d a

It may be ked whether all pos bl preca t ons were taken to meet th s cri s, or whether som th g wa l ft ndor In tryi to answer this ques on I w uld uggest that the following con s derations should be borne n mind.

Once the Leaders had accepted Partition it became impossible to maintain for very long the Interim Congress Moslem League Coalition Government in Delhi It was only with the utmost difficulty that this Government had been set up in 1946 and held together subsequently Ever since March the Punjab had been administered on an emergency basis under Section 93 of the Government of India Act but it was quite out of the question for the Central Government to function under that regulation as well After 3rd June the Interim Government fell apart each side wanted to take control of their respective sovereign States and they could have been deflected only at the cost of the over throw of the Partition Plan Transfer of power in the last analysis was an unconditional act

As a precaution against trouble following upon the Award of Sir Cyril Radcliffe who with the agreement of both Govern ments had been invited to draw the actual boundary lines for the Punjab Bengal and Sylhet there was the largest concentration of troops ever known in the Punjab In fact a special Boundary Force was set up in the area directly affected The task was found however to be quite beyond its resources and by October command had to be handed back to the two new Governments

In the dispersal of forces before 15th August Independence Day provision had to be made to meet the hardly less tense situation in Bengal and Calcutta But here a completely different Third Force was to succeed in keeping the peace It would have been impossible to have foreseen the miracle of Gandhi s moral influence and wanton to have relied upon it in advance of the event I have heard an expert estimate that the situation in the Punjab could have been restored only with double the amount of troops in fact employed (which would have meant some eight divisions) and even then only on the assumption that they were all communally reliable

Then there was the form taken by the Sikh rising The operations were mostly carried out by small groups with cleverly plan ned mobile attacks on trains and villages It was in fact a rank and file revolt and any action to arrest the wilder Sikh leaders—seriously considered at the time but rejected—would have been more likely to have touched off or intensified the disorder than to have brought it under control The Punjab troubles must be re garded as a cataclysm but in the context of India as a whole they were in fact limited to three per cent of the population and were hardly comparable as a human tragedy to the Bengal famine of 1943 Finally it should be remembered that Partition did not cause the communal crisis but that the communal-crisis was the cause of Partition

One of the major consequences of Partition was its effect on the position of the Indian Princely States Five hundred and sixty five of them in all ranging from Princes of States as large as

Eu pean n t ns to I ndlo d cont ll g f v th s nd acres they ruled er a th d of the Ind b ccnt n nt n area and quart r of t n popul t n Ih y st d o ts d B it h Ind a be ng in t aty rel t n hip th B ta the P m unt P v e Thus the t rm V ceroy w mpos t term c ng the dual status and function f Go C ne l f Brit h Ind and Crown Repre entat ve of the Ind St tes U ted th y m ght well ha e been a f m dabl f ct r th tu t n but h n we rrived n I d a in March 1947 we f d th Pr ces d stract d nd fatally w kened by gre t t rnal d ens On 5th July after pr lo ged efforts to hie me ty f p rpose mong them Lord M untb tten spok to them the Chamb r of P i ces for the l t t me in hi capac ty a Cr w Rep ent ti e He took the n uati e in d ng them all t accede to one r other of the two new Domi io s th ff ct s cess r I ow t the Br tish Raj

The b s c pr ncipl f Acce n w th t it was e ted in the personal d cret of the R ler ce h an tocrat B t t was recogn ed th t th d ser t ho ld be q l fied by the geogr ph cal c nt gu ty f the St t t th cce or D m'nt n the comm n l compos t on of the St te nd a pl b cit f n ce sary to scert n th w ll of th pe ple Lo d M tb tten met w th a rema k ble me e f cces d ll b t th ee f th fi hund ed nd s xty fi Sta h d a ceded by 14th Aug t They h d recogn sed the f rce of h gum t th t lunt ry mediat satio w s the r g e test ch ce f urvi l in a p dly chang ng world that the protect on f B ti h pa amountcy was n longer a pract cabl source f a th ty but th t s co tit tio l ulers th y could mak tal cont but on to the pol t cal and ocial l d nity of th tw new n t ns.

The con tructi e st tesm h p f C ngr s nd t p t cul f Sard r Patel the Deputy Pr m M n te who becam the first M n ter in ch rg of relations w th the St t mu t be acknowl edged For acceptance of the rv l f th I nces at ll meant on th part of Cong ss a majo re ersal of l ng-establ h d pol cy nd a o d nce of the t mpt t n p ov d d by n easy target

Accession was to be foll ed losely by the M rger pol y Sever l g eat Princely blocs w r f rmed O pecial importance were the Un on of th States of O Malwa (wh h cl d s Gwal a d Indore) C je t (in l g mos ic of some two hundred Pr ncel gs under th leadersh p f the Jam S h b of Nawanagar) nd th Phulk n U n f the l ad g S kh Pr nces One consequence f the settlement with the States a n ap proach suggested tr ngly by M n b tten by th new I d n Government to ind ual Princ t d rtak pol tical d d plo matic duties outsid th Sta bo nda es. A rul ng Pr nce wa appo nted Governor f M d nd n ther became one of India s d egates to th Un ed N tions. It has been a bloodless

revolution and a political achievement of the first magnitude largely lost sight of abroad on acount of more lurid and dramatic news among which must be counted events in those three States who failed to accede by 15th August

There was first of all the case of Junagadh This was not of primary importance in itself but significant for the precedents it set Junagadh was a small State of some five thousand square miles with a Moslem ruler who finally acceded to Pakistan By his action the twin principles of geographical contiguity and com munal majority inherent in Accession were both violated After various complicated negotiations India took over the State and a plebiscite confirmed popular acceptance of this action

Junagadh was a mere curtain raiser to the complex problem posed by the delayed accession of Kashmir Lord Mountbatten himself had visited Kashmir in June and armed with an assurance from Sardar Patel on the Indian side strongly advised that any decision taken prior to 15th August would be acceptable to both successor States The Maharaja however chose to ignore this opportunity and only acceded to India on 26th October when confronted by large scale tribal invasion coming largely from the North west Frontier Province of Pakistan Here was a Hindu ruler with a State geographically continguous to both Dominions and the majority of his subjects Moslem Kashmir s accession was rendered more complicated still by further special factors

There was a powerful Kashmir States Congress movement led by Sheikh Abdullah a Moslem Congressman of forceful person ality and national status in India Moreover Nehru himself descended from Kashmiri Brahmins and Sheikh Abdullah are not only political colleagues but also close personal friends

But from the military viewpoint Kashmir is an area of great strategic importance to both countries Pakistan has inherited the burden of the North west Frontier and a major conflict of interest between the two Governments along this line could grave ly undermine the security—already strained by the partition of the Indian Army—of the entire sub continent It was soon clear that the Kashmir commitment would involve a dangerous drain of manpower and money and a distraction of effort going beyond the margin of safety or the dictates of prudence For India in particular it means the deployment of her military strength to the maximum disadvantage along tenuous lines of communication and on a front where superiority of numbers and armour can rarely be exploited

Finally there was the appeal to the United Nations by India at the peak of the crisis in December 1947 which has given the dispute an international status There is no easy solution to Kashmir In one sense it symbolises the general clash of senti ment and interest which made Partition inevitable It may well be that there was inherent in any settlement of the general Con

gress M lem League onflict one outstand ng and insoluble d pute. When the f rmula wa the Cabinet Mis on Plan t s Assam in the spr ng of 1947 it seemed f om the emph s s placed upon t by both Gandh and Jinnah that t wo ld b the North west Fronti r Pro nce A t rn of th wheel and the clash m ght w ll have centred round Bengal or Calcutta Moreover b th sides ar sustained by fervent and not unf nded b l f in the trength of their cause—P k st n rely g more n nat iral just ce and econ mic neces ty and India mor on legal ght and politi cal mor l ty

Th th d and perhaps most mportant Stat of all to stand o t de Accessio vas Hyde abad Th s t as pecial ca e with a Moslem Prince (d rect descend t of the Moghul Empe o V ce oy) a d a small Mo l m ol g rchy th g ern ng caste th State ge graph cally n the hea t f Ind and the s bjects e ghty ix per ce t Hind In e of th Nizam special stat Lo d Mountbatten although now onst t tion [Governor G neral w s mpowe ed to carry on neg t t n for a Stand t ll Agreeme t w th him beyond 14th Aug t But perh ps becau of dev lopments in Jun gadh d Kashm or f expect t o of s pport from op n on abro d or from me inner compulsion the Nizam tried to st ll nd play f time

At the end of October a d ly cered t d del g tion in lud ng his Prime Mi ter nd h constit t al ad iser S r Walt Monckton accepted th sub tance of Stand till Agreem nt d ret rned to Hyder bad to recommend th Nizam s signature II Leg sl ti e Co ncil f rmally pp oved The N zam then excus d h m elf fr m gn ng for a f w hours d ring which time membe s of the deleg t d e to return to Delhi w e surrounded at their homes and s bjected to phys cal int m d t o by th Mosl m extrem t party th Itt h d l Musl m en Wh n they saw the Nizam in the m rn ng they fo d th t h had changed h s m nd and they d ly res gned Th Nizam i the kn wledge tiat he had lready secu ed th max mum conces i n fr m the Go rn ment of Ind then bla dly ppo ted n w delegat on cotsi ting ent rely of It h d members

Aft r th bizarr episod it g s m ch for Lord Hount batten s d plom t c res rce th t h as bl t keep the reg t t ons al e at all. B t h prev iled po th G ernme t of Ind a to rece th n w d legat m king t ear th t h w ld not su port the cha g f a gle c mm and N venb r it reported back t th N zam w th pr sely th sam t rms be f r Th time he s gn d II h d g d m th s r snt b t lost m h f th Gover ment of India s es enti l c nf dence n th process

There fol owed moral nd phy cal i L t s f the St d till Agr ement wh h w l d f r a yea pe d a f nal setl me t Hyderabad sponsered an s acts to d pl y her t tu as an

independent nation A loan was offered to Pakistan and State Congress leaders were imprisoned without trial But most provocative was the activity of Kasim Razvi head of the Ittehad ul Muslimeen Party and of the Razakars embryo storm troopers I met Razvi when I visited the Nizam on Lord Mountbatten s behalf in May 1948 I can only describe him as expressing the most violent race hatred I had encountered in anyone since a meeting I had with Forster the Danzig Nazi just before the war

On the Indian side there was an undoubted blockade of the State which included the stopping even of medical supplies Most of this obstruction seemed to be organised at Provincial levels but while the Central Government did not authorise it neither did they succeed in bringing it effectively to an end Then there was Communist intervention which was designed to embarrass and confuse both sides

Britain never recognised Hyderabad s title to independence and in a famous letter to the present Nizam in 1926 Lord Reading laid down that Britain s relationship was one of undoubted Paramountcy It was unreasonable to expect that the successor Power consisting of Hyderabad s kith and kin, should now concede what the British Raj had so consistently refused Right up to the eve of his departure it seemed that Lord Mountbatten might find a formula to cover Hyderabad s final relations with India but unhappily it was not to be Three months after he left a military demonstration and occupation was provided to clinch the argument

Some of the Indian diplomacy on the spot was undoubtedly clumsy and the presentation of their case throughout was generally deplorable India has been severely criticised for forcing the pace but it has to be remembered that in giving the Nizam more time they would also have been allowing Razvi and his fanatical movement fresh scope Indian intervention effectively checked the spread of communal violence and has insured political consolidation throughout South India

The Nizam with his love of diplomatic finesse left himself just enough margin to save his dynasty As the leading Prince in India his great mistake had been retirement into his State as a result of the clash with Lord Reading in 1926 and complete withdrawal from central affairs thereafter From his isolation he failed in 1947 to recognise the meaning of Partition which inevitably involved the setting up of two strong Central Governments instead of one weak one

The transfer of power was an unique response essentially to a revolutionary situation It is usual for revolutions to get out of control and defy the calculations of those who lead them
Lord Mountbatten s greatest achievement lay in producing a
tion which had about it sufficient substance and support to
the storm of the immediate revolutionary crisis and to

in sp t of P rt t n the ital links between the past and th f ture

Th sh ck f ch ge wa ntensif ed by the deaths o on after the tran fer of po er of th t o gr t nation l le ders Gandhi nd J nnah I cannot pres m to se th full measur of Ga dh s moral nd sp rit al tature b t h s pol tical p v r and personal magnet m j dg ng by the d t on h r used in m ll ns from ne end of the s b nt R t t th ther n ha e had few pr ced ts n hi tory H h d n m zing tinct f r the mas pr pag t on of d s re nf rced by th d c t c tacts h h he ss duo ly encouraged thro gh h s Prayer Meet ng and v t correspo dence with people n ll w lk f l fe

J nnah on the oth r hand der ed h auth r ty fr m remote contr l H made no co ces n t th ma se nd had n c n t ct th them. H comb ned t t cal ppl s d capacity to profit from hi ppo ts m t k th an o will d th ma nt n nc of the s ngl object e H que ph no meno i th t he co ce d of P k tan t th ag f s xty and r l sed it at se e ty Like G ndh h a te ped n th id om and outlook of British law but had rt lly n nt est n or understandi g of the adm n trati n f g mm t

Fortunat ly f r both co ntri Ja h l l N h n Ind a and Li qu t Ali Kh n in Pakist n re t t m n f the fir t rank by any tand rd f ompari o hether i th Ea t rn r W tern rld They lead m ddl of the ro d and m ddl g d Govern ments wh h are called upon to de take fa ly l t m l fe a major r orı tat n of ideas n w th t th t b s oppon nts of the C ngress and the M l m Le g e ha e d sappeared from the arena For the B t h h lped t k e the C g s together d th Congr ss the Mo l m Leagu

Ins d I dia the Co gress i assa led both from the r ght and l ft Dur g Lo d Mountbatten s tim th M h sabh —th Hind omm nal ount part of the M lem Le gu w th pirat o to em late and co teract th M lem L g s pol t cal s ccess— wa alw ys ct b t wa unabl t ca l se H d res tm nt t P rt t n s f ciently t thwart the 3 d J e Pl S bseq ently the M hasabh suff ed ser eth k the r ult f ts s pected compl city i C dh s n t n b t for all th t it em ined a f rm dable f rc

The Soci l st u d r th le der h p f J t Pr k h N r n lost aluabl t me and opp rt n ty n m k p th r m nd whether t b d f r off ce g e g p w th n the Congres or t rem gor te the Leg lat A sembly by ruct e P l a mentary Oppos t on By w r g they mply p ded fre h pen ngs for the Comm wh u d r the w r tim Cr d All nce had be l t f t o-ope t w th th Brit h R j wh e the Congres H gh Comma d la gu shed in gaol Th Part t on d ision howev r nd t particular the force of com

munal sentiment in Bengal came as a blow to the Communists who had concentrated most of their effort in the industrial slums of Calcutta and had directed their propaganda strongly against the division of India

After the transfer of power Communist effort seemed to move from Bengal to the South There was a big conference of Communists from South-east Asia under Indian leadership early in 1948 in which there were signs of the usual deviationist troubles Communism is likely to provide a dangerous threat to the Congress just so long as there is extensive misery to exploit

While Pakistan has derived its inspiration from providing a Moslem homeland the Indian Union has aimed at creating loyalty to a secular democracy With some forty million Moslems left after Partition on the Indian side of the border not to mention eight million Christians six million Sikhs and other smaller communities India is certainly something more than a Hindu State Gandhi himself was to become a martyr in the cause of Hindu Moslem solidarity

The Indian constitution which was under active preparation and discussion during Lord Mountbatten s term of office is a synthesis of the great Western charters of liberty The obvious hiatus between the vision of this document and the realities of Indian life does not destroy the validity of the vision It represents a great tribute to the liberalising influence of British thought and is a fundamental attack upon the aims and aspirations of communalism The Indian constitution offers fresh hope for the eighty million Untouchables who under purely Hindu dogma were pariahs polluting food with their shadow but are now Indian citizens with equal rights before the law It is significant that one of the principal personalities in Nehru s Government and as such a prominent personality in the preparation and sponsorship of the Constitution is Dr Ambedkar the well known leader of the Untouchables

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in sp te of Part t on the v tal link between the past a d the fut re

The hock of ch ge wa i t ns fied by the death so s on aft r th tra fer of po er of the two great at l l ders Ga dhi nd J n ah I ca not p s m t th full measure of G ndh mor l a d sp r tual stature b t h s pol t cal po r and personal mag t m j dg g by th de t n h ar sed n m ll n from o e d f th b-c nt nent t th oth can have h d fe preced nts n h tory H h d n m z ng in t nct f r the mass propag t n of deas r nf rced by the d rect ontacts hich he ss du u ly nco raged thr gh h Praye Meet ng and vast rrespo d nce w th pe ple in all lk of l f

Jinnah n th oth r h nd deri ed h autho ty f om rem t co tr l H m d no c nces ons t th m es d h d no con tact w th th m. He c mb d t ct cal ppi d capacity to pr fit fr m h s opponent m stak s with an n ill and th m t n ce of the s ngle object He wa a n q e phe o- meno th t he conce d of P k t n t the g f s ty nd r l ed t t e nty Lik Gandh he w t eped n the id om a d utl ok of B t sh law b t had tually n ntere t n or und rsta d g of th dm nistrat of g ernme t

F rt nately f both co tries J aha lal N h in Ind a a d Li q t Ali Kh n P k t n re stat sm of th first r nk by y tandards f ompa i on wheth the Ea tern r W tern wo ld. Th y l d m ddle-of the d a d middl aged G v rn ments h ch are called pon t undertak f rly lat in l fe a majo eorientat on of d as w that th t o b pponents of th Congres and th Moslem Le g e ha e d sappeared from th a n For the B t h h lped to keep th Cong ess t gether and th Co gr s th M lem Le g

Ins de India the C g ess sa led both from the r ght nd left. During Lord M untb tt n t me th M h sabh —th H nd comm nal cou t pa t f th M l m Leag with sp rat s t em l te and co t ract th Moslem Leag s pol t cal s ccess— wa fw y act b t wa bl t ca l se H d esentm nt at Partit n uff ct tly t thw t th 3 d J ne Pl n. S bsequ tly the M h sabh s ffered setb ck s the esult f t s s- pect d compl city C dh s at n b t, f all th t t em n d f rm d ble f rce

Th Soci l st d th l der h p f J i Prak h N ra l st aluabl t me a d ppo rt ty n m k g p the m d wheth r t bid for f ce g p w th the Co gress o to re n gorat the Leg l t A sembly by on truct e P l mentary Oppos t n By w ering they s mply p d d f h open ngs f r the Comm t wh u de the war t m G nd Allia ce had be l ft f ee t s ope t w h the Br t h R j wh le the Congres H gh C mmand languished in ga l Th P rt on decis n h wever nd in particular the fo ce of com

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of the great st reconcil ti n of h t ry S bord nate status h d become s hatef l to be r as t mpose

Both B ta n and Ind a a Nehru pointed t, are es ent ally Mothe ci l sat ons. W are n w f d nd equals and e o ld be w rs than fools if ve ever allo d st ng ment to creep in aga n For the impl cation of th ps ge f good ill reach o t beyond the r ckon g of our n d y nd age It t transform ti n th t augurs well for the f ture progres and sol d r ty of the world

Part 1

THE LAST VICEROY

VICEROY DESIGNATE

LONDON *Thursday 19th December 1946*

I CALLED EARLY on Mountbatten at his home in Chester Street and arrived in time for the customary Mountbatten breakfast—last minute dictation toast and tea all competing for the services of his mouth As usual the meal came off second best He had asked me to go round and see him about his South-east Asia Command Despatches As erstwhile Recorder and keeper of his war Diaries throughout his tour of duty as Supreme Commander I retain an almost *ex officio* now no more than honorary interest in these Despatches There are many teething troubles in their production not the least of which is to fit them into his crowded agenda As our business was not finished and time pressed there was as usual no alternative but to accompany him to his next appointment—a sitting for an official portrait Oswald Birley is painting of him

When we got into the car he pulled up all the windows swore me to the utmost secrecy and whispered that what he was about to tell me was known to no one outside his own family Mr Attlee he said had called for him the previous evening and invited him to succeed Lord Wavell as Viceroy of India Although I had become accustomed to associate him with surprises I was wholly unprepared for this *denouement* All was fairly set for him to fulfil his long thwarted personal ambition of resuming his career in the Navy His refresher course was in full swing He was to be Rear Admiral commanding the First Cruiser Squadron with effect from April 1947 Moreover the recent conference in London between the Indian Leaders Lord Wavell and the British Government while giving no grounds for any easy optimism seemed to imply that the Cabinet Mission Plan was still in being

From what I now heard the Prime Minister had put a very different complexion both on India s and Mountbatten s future Mr Attlee had begun the interview by asking Mountbatten whether his heart was really set on going to sea He replied that it certainly was By being put back into circulation with his own Service his whole Naval career was being saved He added that he had been both surprised and touched at the number of letters he had received from his friends in the Navy expressing their pleasure that he was going back to sea again

Attlee then switched the conversation to the Indian
Wavell he said had come back with nothing more
than a military evacuation plan The Government was

favourably impressed with the political trend affecting both the Congress and the Moslem League. If we were not very careful we might well find ourselves handing India over not simply to civil war but to political movements of a definitely totalitarian character. Urgent action was needed to break the deadlock and the principal members of the Cabinet had reached the conclusion that a new personal approach was perhaps the only hope. They had looked round in every direction for a suitable man to make it and had unanimously agreed that it was Mountbatten alone who had the personality and qualifications required.

At this point Mountbatten intervened to say he must at once make it clear from what he had seen of the Indian situation when he was Supreme Commander and from his many talks with Wavell that he had entirely agreed with Wavell's policy up to his last talk in Delhi in June. There was nothing that Wavell had done throughout that time which he would not have done himself. Attlee agreed that fundamentally it was not Wavell's general policy in the past that was in question but its implementation to-day. The hard fact was that despite his unremitting efforts it had largely broken down, and Attlee reiterated that in this new situation the problem was now more one of personality. The need for closer personal contacts with the Indian Leaders was paramount.

Mountbatten told me that he put up a stiff fight against the Prime Minister's pressure and blandishments, stressing his extreme tiredness and the folly of wearing him out too young and of diverting him from his Service career where perhaps his most likely usefulness to the State lay. Were there no other names? What about Auchinleck, who was immensely popular in India? The interview ended, it seems, on a note of indecision. Mountbatten wished to know just what Government policy he would be required to implement and he told me that before making any answer he must in any case consult the King, since a Viceroy was not only theoretically his servant and, commissioned, but as far as the Indian Princes were concerned, his Representative.

He asked what my reaction was to this bombshell. I could only reply that the Prime Minister for his part had shown considerable psychological insight and made a sound appraisal of his personal qualifications, but that he could not reasonably be asked to take on such an explosive commitment without the clearest directive. Mountbatten then said it was quite clear to him that there would have to be the earliest time limit for the transfer of power if his mission was not to be hopelessly compromised with Indian opinion from the outset. As for the British reaction, he felt that if he agreed to go there would be considerable public sympathy for him in taking on the job, that all-party popular support would probably back him up in whatever measures he saw fit to take. He was ready to run any risk but did

not in fact think that the traditional risk of his being made the scapegoat was excessive

I am afraid that when we got to Birley s studio and the time came to study the forceful but unfinished portrait my mind was on other things

LONDON *Friday 20th December 1946*

My wife and I attended the British Government s Reception at Lancaster House in honour of Pridi Panomyong the Senior Statesman of Siam who had combined the roles of Regent and resistance leader during the war

Mountbatten arrived at the party rather late On seeing me there he signalled me into a quiet corner and showed me his reply to the Prime Minister s offer It was quite brief but while appreciating the honour he had begged to be excused unless he was able to go at the express invitation of the Indian Leaders I must say I think it is extremely unlikely that Attlee will be able or willing to comply with this condition so this may well be the last we shall hear of the whole proposal He said he was going straight from the party to Downing Street

LONDON *Friday 20th December 1946*

Mountbatten s acceptance of the Viceroyalty is at last firm His early talks with the Prime Minister were inconclusive Government policy accepted the principle of a time limit but havered over the exact date The second half of 1948 was suggested but Mountbatten s conviction hardened that political success was bound up with the Government s readiness to accept the earliest possible date of British departure from India and he at once bid for second half to mean June rather than December With the Christmas week at hand final decisions were held over and Mountbatten took himself and his family away for a brief holiday at Davos He had not been there forty eight hours when he was urgently summoned to London and a special aircraft sent to bring him back This move was calculated to arouse considerable Press speculation but its meaning was missed

Mountbatten was recalled because the news from India was increasingly serious The communal deadlock and violence persisted The Government wished to announce a new policy and a new Viceroy as quickly as possible After close consideration of the terms of this draft announcement and in particular the incorporation of a phrase to indicate that his Naval career will not be prejudiced Mountbatten has finally agreed in principle to take on the job He went so far he told me as to insist that the First Lord and First Sea Lord should associate themselves with the Prime Minister in guaranteeing his return to the Navy The knowledge that the King was strongly in favour of his

taking the task helped to confirm his decision. In his discussion with the Government he warned them of the danger of giving any impression that his appointment was designed to perpetuate the Viceregal system or to impose British arbitration. This was his reason for making his acceptance in the first instance conditional upon his receiving an open invitation from the Indian parties to go in a capacity defined by themselves. Mr Attlee explained in detail, however, that this last condition was not feasible, but he fully accepted the principle of terminating the British Raj by a specified date, regardless of agreement, or earlier than the time limit if the Indian parties were able beforehand to agree on a constitution and form a Government.

His Majesty's Government had shown itself prepared to go to very great lengths to secure Mountbatten's acceptance. Sir Stafford Cripps offered to provide the necessary liaison in advance between the Indian Leaders and the new Viceroy and to do his utmost to ensure that the appointment was in fact acceptable to them before it was officially announced. Cripps went so far as to offer to enter in any capacity even to the point of accompanying Mountbatten to India. This offer was not unnaturally shelved, as Cripps's stature and experience in Indian affairs would have prejudiced Mountbatten's position and made it virtually impossible for the new Viceroy to carry on negotiations with the necessary authority or prestige.

LONDON, *Thursday, 20th February, 1947*

I once more called on Mountbatten at Chester Street, this time to see him about India and give a firm and final 'yes' to his invitation to join his staff as Press attaché.

We heard that Attlee's statement in the House of Commons had been the occasion of a lively scene and that Churchill seemed bent on making political capital out of Mountbatten's appointment and the policy underlying it.

The new Viceroy was given a very wide mandate. 'If there was no likelihood of a Constitution emerging from a fully representative Constituent Assembly by June 1948,' then, said Mr Attlee, the British Government would have to consider to whom the powers of the central Government in British India should be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of central Government for British India or in some areas to the existing Provincial Governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people. As for the Princely States, the Prime Minister made it clear that the Government did not intend to hand over their powers and obligations under Paramountcy to any successor Government of British India. While Paramountcy was to be retained until power was actually transferred, it was contemplated

that for the intervening period the relations of the Crown with individual States may be adjusted by agreement

Churchill at once jumped up to ask a number of barbed questions about the reasons for Wavell s removal It must be confessed that Attlee s reference to Wavell had been sufficiently cold and perfunctory to provide Churchill with this particular opening The time limit also came as a considerable emotional jolt to the Conservative Opposition What threatened to be a major show-down however petered out through the House of Commons time honoured technique of passing on to other business

CHAPTER TWO

DEBATES AND BRIEFINGS

LONDON *Wednesday 26th February 1947*

THE GREAT TWO-DAY Debate in the House of Lords has ended with Lord Templewood withdrawing his motion of virtual censure on the Government for its announcement of 20th February This was one of the occasions when the opinions of the House of Lords were not unjustifiably regarded by many as carrying greater political weight than those of the Commons In the first place in as far as the Lords were discussing the new situation in advance of the forthcoming Commons Debate it was appreciated that the final attitude of the Conservative Opposition might well depend upon the tone set by their Lordships Moreover they were debating not so much in their hereditary capacity as in the role of elder statesmen specialists and experts

A galaxy of names famous in the annals of Indian administration for over a quarter of a century addressed themselves to Lord Templewood s stern declaration that the time limit was a breach of faith imperilling the peace and prosperity of India Coming from Lord Templewood who as Secretary of State while still known as Sir Samuel Hoare had spent the better part of seven years in steering through the great Government of India Act of 1935 against the most violent and sustained opposition of Mr Churchill and the Conservative right wing this motion was indeed a formidable challenge to the Government and if widely supported calculated to render a united national approach to Indian Independence impossible By the time Lord Listowel had wound up the first day s Debate for the Government there seemed very little prospect of avoiding a division and a defeat

Th s danger loomed larger to-day when Lord Simon of S m n Commi ion fame resumed f r th Oppos tion He spoke for j t ov an hour It v as an ess y in closely reas ned n gation a d for b d ng The accum l ted b rden of the Government s problems as enough to break dow the del ber te c ns der tion of a y man o body of men However I am bound to say he con lud d th t I adly fear that the end of this busin s is n t g g t be th establ shment of pe ce n India but r ther th t it go ng to d grad th Br tish n me

Aft r yet an ther highly critical peech this time by Lord Trench rd Lord Hal f x—the o ly ex Viceroy tak ng part in the Debate—ro e t m k hi last great decisi e int rvention in Indian affa rs R ch ng o t far bey nd th confines of party f th or disc pl ne h de lared —

W th s h kn wledge as I ha e I am not prep red to say that v h tev else may b right or wrong th s step mu t on all unts c rtainly be j dged t be wrong for the truth is that for I d a t -day th re 's no l t n that is n t fraught with tl e g a est objection w th the grav st danger And the conclus on that I each—w th ll that can be sa d ag nst it—s th t I am not prepar d to condemn wh t H s M jesty s Go ernme t ar do ng nl ss I can honestly and nfidently recomme d a b tter solu tion I sho ld be sorry f the only m sag fr m th H e to Ind a t this m m t w s one of co d mnation bas d on what I mu t f lly rec g ise are ery natural feel ngs of fa l re fru tr t on and f boding

Lord Sam l told m after rds th t it wa the mo t per uas e spe h he had er heard d l red in th H use of Lo ds nd that is mpact was ch that m y Cons rv t e P ers wh b f r h rose h d firmly decided to ot ag t th G ernm nt changed th r m nd while he was speak g and f ll i w th h s ppeal to Templ wood to pare th House the n ces ty of go ng to a D is on Th rest of the Deb t was an anti-cl max The tide of opin on had turn d and Templewo d wh le main t n g hi criticisms d ly withd ew his motion

LONDON *W ed esday 5th Mar h 1947*

Alth ugh the open ng of the two-day D bate in the House of Comm wa ob iously great Pa l mentary occasi n I co ld n t help feel ng when I saw Cripps rise to expound the Govern ment s case w th h s c t med po and l cid ty that the key battle for the new pol cy h d already been w in the Lord Cr pps speech are lways so losely reas ned a d beautifully rranged th t the em tional t mperat r lmost immed ately d ps when h speaks. He w ld ne r dream of appeal g to your heart w tho t first trying t persuad y ur m nd B t on thi occas on I detected a d per n t of pa on to conviction than u ual

Already Cripps contribution to India s forthcoming Independence was assured of its place in history As Lord Halifax had pointed out the Cripps Mission of 1942 was the decisive act from which there could be no turning back In 1946 he was the dominating figure of the Cabinet Mission In both negotiations he had been on the verge of complete agreement and unqualified success only to see his efforts thwarted at the last minute In proposing the Government s new approach he must have known that he was in fact confirming the effective eclipse of his own elaborate master plan to transfer power to a united India

He was at pains to stress that it was administratively and militarily out of the question to stay on beyond 1948 Otherwise he laid no special emphasis on the time limit and he made no reference whatever to Lord Wavell This last omission was undoubtedly a pity as it tended to confirm the ill disposed gossip about serious differences of opinion between the Government and the returning Viceroy Cripps throughout did his utmost to leave the door open for a revised Cabinet Mission Plan Now is the time he said in his final peroration when the wider good of all India throughout which both communities are widely dispersed must take precedence over the narrower claims of single communities or single parts of that great continental area

Sir John Anderson moved a detailed amendment on behalf of the Conservative Opposition which he supported with a ponderous oration The formula was in effect an elaborate attempt on Sir John s part to reconcile what Lord Halifax had said last week with what Mr Churchill was likely to say to morrow But this was a formidable task even for one of Anderson s drafting calibre As was perhaps to be expected he largely confined himself to an exhaustive condemnation of the Government s time limit proposal Under cover of a dense dialectical smoke screen he worked his way towards a position of proposing a final date for an agreed central authority failing which the Government should resume freedom of action to transfer power to convenient separate authorities as speedily as possible Anderson is a disappointing Parliamentarian This aspect of his career has been superimposed upon too many other distinctions too late in life The result is *a pomposity of manner and a heaviness of expression which* weaken both his arguments and influence in the House

The more persuasive performances to day came from backbenchers speaking from their own experience sometimes against the party line Perhaps the most original suggestion under this heading was put forward by the Socialist rebel Zilliacus who saw India as the classic problem of national minorities who are distrustful at being left to the tender mercies of the majority In this instance however the Moslem community was more than a national minority but somewhat less than an independent nation He cited the example of the U S S R to suggest that India

njoy mult nat nal memb rsh p f th United Natio s which would enable the Mosl m to h e the s me t tus as the Ukrain and become epar t m mb r

LONDON *Tl d y 6tl March 1947*

When Chu ch ll res med th D bate to-d y w vere regaled th the long v ited f w k d play O e the year Churchill h s remained ery l y l t h pet ers ns a d hat may perhaps best be termed h l d a n t p cla ms probably the most rig d nd unb nd ng f ll h op n pon the p bl s ues of our tim

He tarted off by tak ng h s t d th Cr pps M s on of 194. Although the ffer had n t be n ccept d t th time b th s des of the H use e e st ll b d by t He de u ced the pr s nt pl n a in ol ng g d part from the scope and nt g ity f it prin ipl There as t la t ref r nc n th s deb te to W ll b t t f f m c d al The Vice roy Lord Wa ell ha be n d m ed I hold no bri f f r Lord Wa ll He has b n th ll ng unwill ng g nt of the G vernment in ll th errors a d m tak nt h ch they ha e been I d But h cont n ed to s rt th t h d d n t kno why W ell h d bee ca t asid t th j nctu nd t pr ss for a pers l statem nt fr m h m n h return

A for the new V ceroy I he t mak new effort t r store th s t on or i it mer ly Ope t Scuttl on hich he and other d st ng hed offic rs ha e b en despatch d I m b nd to say the whol th ng we rs th a pect f a ttempt by th Go ernm nt to make u e of brill nt w f g res n rd r to over up a mela h ly a d d str u tr n t n

He then entered the field of p ophecy Ind a s t be subject d not mer ly t part t on but to fr gm ntat n and t haphazard fr gmentat on The t me l m t f f om bri g ng the Indian parties to th r senses was calcul ted t mak them tep up th r demand Thes part es cla ms t repr nt the I d n masse ere fi titious I h nding er the Gov rnment f I d a t these so-called pol t cal cla es we a ha d g o er to m n of tr w of wh m in a few yea s n trac w ll rema Th s Gov rn me t by their latest ct n th fifteen m nth l mitat n crippl th new V cer y and destroy th p ospect f ev n g g throu gh the bu nes o the ge d wh ch h to be ettled

He found wh lly incomp h n bl th t me l m t f r I dia b t the lack of it f r P lestine Co ld the House b l that there were three or four t mes as m ny Brit h troops in l ttl petty P lestine a in m ghty Ind t the present t me? He could h d no sense in th d t but n of f rces H only pos tive proposal were that th r t o should b r e sed a d—a typical Churchil an surprise—that Z ll cus s gg st n sh ld be tak up and the problem of th Moslem m n r ty ubmitted to the

United Nations And so to the funeral conclusion Many have defended Britain against her foes none can defend her against herself But at least let us not add—by shameful flight by a premature hurried scuttle—at least let us not add to the pangs of sorrow so many of us feel the taint and smear of shame

When Attlee rose at last from the Treasury Bench there was an air of expectancy which had somehow been missing before Indeed one of the things which surprised me while Cripps was speaking yesterday was the thinness of the Labour ranks After Question Time they had trooped out not to return again en bloc until the Prime Minister brought the Debate to a close the following evening He certainly did not disappoint them Although I have often listened to Attlee on various themes this is the first time I have heard him on India which is undoubtedly his special subject His two years ervice as a member of the Simon Commission was clearly one of the most formative experiences of his life and historically speaking probably the most important thing about the Simon Commission Those who are interested in working out the contrast between Churchill and Attlee should not overlook the Indian motif

On this occasion Attlee brought to bear on his famous adversary a debating armament of a calibre which I for one had no idea he possessed He put aside his notes spoke straight from the heart, and the result was a genuine eloquence His style did not change but he simply ceased to be commonplace This man burns with a hidden fire and is sustained by a certain spiritual integrity which enables him to scale the heights when the great occasion demands Churchill was raked with delicate irony It was close in fighting which is sometimes lost upon the general public but which scores points with the judges and wins bouts in the Parliamentary ring

Attlee firmly rebutted the doctrine that Wavell was under *some* necessity to make a personal statement on his return to put it colloquially if a change of bowling is desired it is not always necessary that there should be an elaborate explanation As for the attack on the admission of the Indian politicians into the Government and the desire to continue with the caretaker administration— the essence of the Indian problem is to get Indian statesmen to understand what are the real problems they have to face A very grave fault of the reforms that we have carried out over these years is that we have taught irresponsibility instead of responsibility All Indian politicians were permanently in opposition and speaking with long experience it is not good to be always in opposition

He then turned to our responsibilities to the minorities Here he made the shrewd point that in so far as the existence of the scheduled castes (Untouchables) and their position was part of the whole Hindu social system the British Raj had lacked

the w ll but the powe to ais the e people W th one or two pecial excepti ns ur policy had been to accept the soc al and e onom c system v e h d f und Why are we t ld now he asked at the ery nd of o r rule th t v e mu t cl ar up all the e thing b f r e go oth rs se we shall betray ur trust? If that trust s there it ought to ha e b en fulfilled long ago Essentially th d nger of d l y the dange s of hang ng n v ere as gre t the danger of going forv rd He oncl d d by say ng he was ure the hole H se o ld w sh Godspeed to the new V ceroy n his great miss on It s a m ssi n not as has be n suggested of b t ayal on ou part t s a mis on f fulfilment

The Prime M n ster speech and in part cular h s pe orat on r u ed h back be ch supporter ho normally d play a some v hat parochi l and pas e tt tud to a ds I d'a to a h gh p tch of enth s a m When the House d ded the vote was thre h nd ed nd thr ty e en n fa r f th G rnment s pol cy and ur m s on nd e h ndred and e ghty f e aga nst Al tho gh M Attlee s appe l that there ho ld be a un ted message of good ill from the H u to the Ind an Le de s and pe pl had f led to prevent a D vi i n n strictly Party l es one co ld not h lp com ng aw y f om this h st r c Debate with the sens th t th gulf b twe n Go ernme t and Oppo t on was f r na rower th n some of Mr Ch rch ll s more sombre polem cs m ght suggest.

LONDON *Monday 10tl Ma ch 1947*

In general t can be sa d that Mou tbatten briefing himself for the pol tical ta k that l es ahe d of h m starting from scratch B t he ha f co r e sted Ind befo fir t as n A D C. to the Prince of Wales on h s tour n 19 1 Th n between October 1943 and Apr l 1944 N w D lhi was his h adquarters as S preme All ed C mmand r but th post had been formed for the xpres purpose of separating th respon b lity for the prosecut o of the wa in So th-ea t As a from that of th inte nal defence and security of Ind a and it adm n strat n as a bas M reover although th scope of h s dut s r ged bey nd strictly m litary ope at n h s parapol t cal inter ts d d n t include India He used to se a lot of Lord Wav ll and off cially the Viceroy s relat on h p to him as Suprem Commander was that of Min ster f State appo nted w th a speci l d rect ve to ad is and represent the G ernment th e ct qu vale t p st e tab l shed in the M ddle East theat e of war

Towards the end of h t m in So th-east A a C mmand Mou tbatten h d hi fir t meet ng w th Jawaharlal N hru the occa ion of Nehru s t to Malaya at the s ggest on of Lord Wa ell to see the la g Ind n m n ity ther It a mo t successful and happy enco nter I was pre sion

of it and it was quite clear that the two men made a deep personal impression upon each other

From the moment his appointment was announced Mountbatten has been caught up in a hectic sequence of meetings and interviews He has seen the King whose constitutional position is vitally affected and has been in almost regular session with the India Burma Committee of the Cabinet which includes Attlee Cripps Alexander and Pethick Lawrence and is concerned with the detailed elaboration and control of the Government s Indian policy There have also been detailed discussions with the Chiefs of Staff and India Office experts They have ranged over the whole field from the terms of the Government s directive to the Viceroy to compensation for the Indian Civil Service from the movement of British civilians from India with its effect on world shipping capacity to the future of the Gurkhas and the strategic defence of the Indian Ocean

First and foremost has been the consideration given to the amendment of the so called Governor General s Instrument of Instructions the official standing directive which it is his duty to try to implement Mountbatten has had an important part to play in the issue of new instructions to himself The existing Instrument is in effect the execution and fulfilment of the intentions of Parliament as embodied in the great Act of 1935 and although its provisions do not directly conflict with His Majesty s Government s new policy they are not by now fully consistent with it Strictly there should be a new Instrument but as there will be no direct inconsistency until new legislation for the actual transfer of power is passed the Government agreed to let it slide Mountbatten however has insisted on a directive of some sort to amplify the Instrument feeling it is essential that the object of his appointment should be clearly set out by the Prime Minister He has asked for it in the form of a letter to himself from Mr Attlee

Once this was approved he had a lot to do in the drafting of the text which contains the following major points of policy for his guidance —

(1) The definite objective of the British Government is to obtain a unitary Government for British India and the Indian States if possible within the British Commonwealth through the medium of a Constituent Assembly set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet Mission Plan He was instructed to do the utmost in his power to persuade all Parties to work together towards this end The insertion of the phrase if possible within the British Commonwealth is at the special request of Mountbatten who feels that he must strive for a solution which leaves such good feeling that the Indian Parties will want to remain within the Commonwealth

(2) S nce however the Cab net M sion Plan can become operat ve in respect of British Ind a only by agreement between the two major Part es there can be no questi n of compell ng either Party to accep t If by the 1st October Mountbatten cons ders there is no prospect of reaching a settlement on the bas s of unitary Go ernment he is to report to the Br tish Government on th steps he cons ders sho ld be taken for the *handover of power on the due d te*

(3) For guid ce n his rel t ons w th the States Mr Attlee la d down that he wa to do hi best to persuade Rulers of St tes n whi h pol t cal pr gress had b en slow to go forward rap dly tow rds the ntroduct on of some form of more de *mocrat c government in th States and towards the formula t on of f ir and j st arrangem nts w th the le d s of Brit h* Ind as to their future el t nships

(4) As f r as hi adm nistrat on of Brit h Ind a was con cerned the k ynote of th was to be the clo est co-operation w th Ind ns

(5) Transfer of power was to b in accord nce w th Ind an Def nce requ rement nd he as to impress upon the Ind an lead rs the mport nce of a o d ng a break in the co tinu ty of the Ind an Army and to point o t the need f r cont nued col l boration n the security of the Ind an Ocean

Attlee s letter certainly embod es the most formidable terms of reference ever gi en by a G vernment to a V ceroy

LONDON *Tuesday 11th March 1947*

In the w lter of engagements M untbatten has been careful to include the Oppos t on lead rs Some of these d scu s ons h ve been qu te private and informal T n ght he came round to my flat for the first meeting h h ever had ith Lord Samuel Lord *Samuel arrived a few minutes e rly and Mou tbatten on t me* It came as quite a j lt to see the Adm ral in pla n cl thes—teddy bear coat and bowler hat perch d on the top of his head I understand the Adm ralty Fleet Orders descr be h s l test appointment as Rear Adm ral etc., seconded temporary d ty *V ceroy' !*

He was at pa n to stres that as far a he was concern d h s appointment had the cordi l appro al of the K g who had per sonally appealed to him on ground of national duty t accept it. Attlee had observed ll the propriet es and th Oppos t on *were qu te wrong n saying that t wa s mply the Pr me M n ter s* appo ntment He co ld not see what alt rnative there was to a time lim t June 1948 m ght not be long enou h but Wavell h m self had advi ed this dat on th grounds that the adm nistrat ve services would have run down by then Speak ng from the purely

personal view point he said it was probably better to take over when the situation was at its lowest ebb Bihar and Bengal had been in a sense inoculated after their recent outbreaks but he felt the present Punjab crisis was inevitable The situation in the Punjab had been very tense for some time The Moslem Coalition Prime Minister had for the past five months been compelled to move from house to house each night to avoid the threat of assassination at the hands of the Moslem League Mountbatten felt there would probably also be trouble from the north in the North west Frontier Province

He recalled the warning he had given to Sir Hubert Rance before Rance left to become Governor of Burma It was that he should wait until the situation was at its worst but he had gone out from a sense of duty a bit too quickly and instead of arriving while the big Rangoon strike was on did so a few days before it began thereby incurring some of the blame for it Mountbatten felt that in his own case it would not be possible for anyone to hold him responsible for the present troubles in India and that this in itself would be a great advantage in the negotiations ahead of him He asked for advice on the lines he should pursue Answering his own question and thinking aloud he said he favoured a week s private talk with the key leaders in Simla This should supply occasion for a completely frank and uninhibited exchange of views Samuel was content to do most of the listening but stressed the need for maintaining the constitutional link with the Crown after the transfer of power perhaps even through the retention of the Viceregal title

I was very glad to have been able to arrange this meeting as in spite of obvious disparities of age and outlook the two men have much in common Samuel s influence in the Lords is very great and his goodwill in the coming months may be of value out of all proportion to the Liberal voting strength

LONDON *Monday 17th March 1947*

A crowded day In the morning I saw Lady Mountbatten who is extremely kind and cordial about my joining the party I mentioned that at dinner last night with the Laytons Lady Layton had referred to the great influence in Sardar Patel s household of his daughter Maniben who was reported to be very suspicious of British intentions Lady Mountbatten agreed adding that Jinnah s sister no less influential was also reported to hold strong views and to be a formidable factor in the situation Mountbatten I know has asked her to establish early contact with the women who matter in India and who have hitherto had no relations with Viceroy s House

I went on to 10 Downing Street where I had a most helpful talk with Francis Williams the Prime Minister s Public Relations Officer He has given me a number of useful introductions

(2) Since however the Cabinet M ssion Pl n can become operati e n respect of B it sh Ind a only by agreement betw en the two major Parties there can be no questi n of compell ng e ther Party to accept t If by the 1st October Mountbatten conside s there is no prospect of reachi g a settlement n the basis of unitary G ernme t he is t report to the Brit sh Government on the steps he con de s should be taken for the ha d ver of power on the d date

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has shown himself keenly alive t the scale of the Public Rela t on problems confronting me I leave fortified by th kn wl edge of his firm upport I have also rece v d invaluable help from A H Joyce th able and experi nced Officer n ch rge f Inf rm t on at the India Off ce who is most co-operati e and full of so d doctr n

In th e n ng to I d House f r a recept on given by the H gh Comm one S r Samu l Rung n dha From the Pre s point of v ew t was a ver table bear garde and a mo t useful omm ntary on the pape I ha e ju t p t n rn g Mo ntbatten ag inst large cale I ss conf ren es n Ind a We h d no id a that th Pre wa go ng to be l t l os on him at th s part cul r g ther ng The wh le place was floodl t f r a newsr el interview nd Mo ntb tten a vayl d by bo t a do n London co res pondent of Ind n papers who buzzed ro nd h m like a s arm of bee rk g ert me No attempt as made by th host to re cue h m One part cularly pers ste t report r a ked h m f he had e er ead K rl Marx and a l ttle l te a ured h m that he appr ed h s appo ntment s it vould no d ubt b be t f r a Adm ral t deal with the Br t sh e acu ti n by eal I left the party v th Mountbatten wh was I th nk much ch stened by h s experience His only comment was We l ve and learn

MALTA *Wedne d 19tl M rcl 1947*

It has been arranged for Mountbatten and h s staff to fly out to Ind a n the t o Yo k aircraft *MW 101* and *MW 102* which were allotted respect ely to the K ng and to Mountbatten s Supreme Commander South-east As a during the war Mo nt batten Lady Mountbatten nd P m la with Ronn e Brockman and Peter Howes do not leave unt l to-morrow They will be flying r ther mo e ruthles ly th n urselves a d v hen e reach Delhi they will be only two hours fly ng t me beh nd us Fortu nately I am n Ismay plane who mad it clear that he proposes to tra el to a comf rtable schedule arriv ng at the vario s stag ing points at c il ed hours

After being obl g d to hed some of our luggage we took off at 11 30 a.m abo t half and hour late Th first leg of the journey was uneventful and the route d fficult to foll w We passed over P rp gnan and Per geux, and then mad a wide sweep taking the course of a following wind along th North

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Lieutenant-Commander Peter Howes D.S.C R.N previo sly nominated as Lord Mountbatten s Flag L utenant in the F rst Crui er Squadron and now to become his senior A.D.C. in India He included among h s A.D C s three Ind an erving officers, one from each Service appointed on a full-time basis and the first to hold such posts

African coast We came finally to Malta from the south by way of Cape Bon—dark purple in the sunset On arrival at Luqa Ismay and Mieville drove off to dine with the mighty while the rest of us were graded as V I P 2 which as Martin Gilliat Mountbatten s new Deputy Military Secretary wryly observed meant that we were low life mere parasites of the great it also meant bare beds in bare rooms

After dinner one member of our party became very learned on Maltese culture customs and history—their stone masonry their goat economy etc He explained that some British official in his wisdom had laid down a hundred years ago that all ships had to pay their harbour dues by bringing in earth This ruling which would seem sufficiently creative and unorthodox to have earned instant dismissal for its perpetrator has in fact helped to give an arable top dressing to an otherwise bare rock Ended the day with some good Naval rum to counteract the frosty air

CHAPTER THREE

THE FIRST WEEK

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Saturday 22nd March 1947*

LEFT KARACHI PROMPTLY at 9 15 a m after some fitful sleep on a very hard Indian bed for the last eight hundred miles of our journey over the deserts of Sind and Rajputana to Delhi This was my seventh flight between England and India and the abiding impression is desert four thousand miles of it without an appreciable break from the sands of Tunis to the foothills of the Himalayas We touched down at Palam airfield exactly to schedule at 12 30 p m We were met by the Commander in Chief Field Marshal Auchinleck—a very nice gesture on his part as two hours later he was due back to join the much larger party *receiving Mountbatten s aircraft We were whisked away without* luggage worries in Viceregal cars and the year s high living had begun

Immediately on arrival at Viceroy s House we were told that we were due to lunch with the Wavells It was to be their last lunch party as Viceroy and Vicereine It was served on the terrace of the Moghul gardens under the shadow of the south west wing of Lutyen s vast imperial palace While waiting for Their Excellencies to arrive Ismay engaged in a friendly chat with some of the senior *kitmutgars* who remembered him when he was here as Willingdon s Military Secretary

Dur ng the afternoon there was much preparation and bustle in the ma n courtyard and up the steps lead ng to the great Durbar Hall of V ceroy s Hou e At 3 45 p m the Mountbattens duly arrived in the open landau with the Governor G neral s escort and outrider They ere conducted up the long flight of steps—red-carpet d for th occas n—by Colonel Douglas Currie the M l tary Secretary and an A.D C. At th top they were rece ed by the Wa ells Lady Mountbatten curts ed and M untbatten b wed h s head to the Viceroy for the first and la t time on th s miss n They stood talk ng f r quit a while long en ugh for the ub qu t us cam ra men to take s me pleasant shots of th m

Vern n Erskin C um tells me th t Europe n sentiment here is definitely anti Mountbatt n on four grounds —

(1) that he knows noth ng about India

(2) that he is b inging a staff who know noth ng about Ind and wh are doing g od men out of good j bs

(3) that he is a pl y boy

(4) that Wav ll ha been treated abom nably and there is no good rea on for his remo al

Mountbatt n can be trusted to deal by h s presence and act ns with (1) and (3) w thin a matter of d ys ( ) clearly can ot refer to I may or M eville—so that le es the rest f us! We are not of course doing anyone out of jobs but are merely ad d tional to th normal V ceregal set up But we shall h ve to tread carefully and avoid tender corns (4) is pr mar ly the respons bil ty of Attlee who has fa led to say the generous word

All th s may be the view of the Brit sh about u but on our s de it is all too easy to start off with the feel ng that Mount batten has been called in after the situation has b come hopeless and that the Government ha propounded a tran fer of power without know ng how it can be eff cted We ha e inherited *int r al a* communal rioting wh ch is spreading as though by cha n reaction the key Province of the Punj b with its threefold Hindu, Moslem and S kh Communal problem go erned by em ergency decree a Viceregal plan which is nothing more nor less th n a phased mil tary evacuation a Congress formula for an Independent Sovere gn Republ c with a Direct Action campaign by the Moslem League to res st it Param untcy wh ch returns i the Indian Princes but c ntains no m chinery for direct negotia ti n to prov de a new relationship with our successors in British Ind a or indeed with anyone el e

So n h rt, we h e the people rioting the Princes falling out among themselves the ent re Indian Civil Service and Police running down and the Brit sh who are left scept cal and full of forebod ng. I detect in Mountbatten hov ev r just the same opti mism that uplifted us all when we arrived here in Delhi some three and a half years ago on the then imposs ble task of crea

ing South-east Asia Command out of the ashes of defeat and depression

Mountbatten has wasted no time whatever in sending off two simple and straightforward letters to Gandhi and Jinnah expressing the hope that it will be possible for them to come and see him soon In Gandhi s case he appreciates his preoccupations in Bihar where he is carrying out his repentance tours through the areas of the worst communal disturbance Incidentally Gandhi is so preoccupied that it is still doubtful whether he will attend the great Pan Asian Conference which is due to be held under the shadow of the Old Fort on Monday Mountbatten s immediate approach to Gandhi and Jinnah in this way even before Wavell has left is typical of the man and his methods

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Sunday 23rd March 1947*

The Wavells left promptly at 8 15 in the morning It has certainly been no day of rest for us There has been much administrative panic in connection with the publicity for to-morrow s Swearing in Ceremony It has never before been photographed or filmed and now is the last chance I went round to Mountbatten s suite and had a discussion with the Viceroy designate clad in his underpants and vest on the implications of letting in all the local news reel and camera men twenty two altogether or leaving some out He proposed that a large platform should be built for them at triforium level near the circular dome which I am quite sure will not be acceptable to any of the interested parties He showed me this morning s masterpiece on the front page of *Dawn* It is a photograph of Ronnie Brockman and Elizabeth Ward Lady Mountbatten s private secretary in which they are described as Lord and Lady Louis arriving !*

The reaction of the Indian Press to Mountbatten on his arrival is satisfactory He is pleased at the tributes paid to Wavell and says he would have hated to be written up at Wavell s expense In any case he prefers to start off on a low note

He has decided on another innovation—a brief address as part of the Swearing in Ceremony He read out George Abell s first draft to me I think the speech is well conceived and well timed for he must seize the initiative quickly and this calls for imaginative and unusual action During dinner a draft revised by Mountbatten himself was handed to me It contained one sentence which worried me After commenting on the British Government s resolve to effect the transfer of power by June 1948 he proposes to add in fact a solution must be reached within the next six months if there is to be adequate time for it to be im

* As they were Lord and Lady Louis Mountbatten before he received his Viscounty for war services they are still ly called Lord and Lady Louis

plement d I felt th s wording \ as likely to be misinterpreted d e en taken to mply an escape cl u e from the Government s h thert unqual fied time l m t Mountbatten s first react on is *that he has the Go* ernment s authority to r port progress by October so hy not say so now? But this is his specially chosen *first bo v* *If he* starts off by unw ttingly throwing doubt on the Government *s t me limit pledge* I can imagine nothing mor d sastrous

It s just after 1 a.m and an A.D.C. h s *come through to say* th t *His* Excell ncy has r vised his speech and wh t *is he to do* about giving t to th Press? The amb guous *sentence I am* rel eved to say is out

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Monday 24th M cl 1947*

Up bet me for the Swearing in Ceremony It as s m lar in *form to* Wavell s *fir t nvest ture which* I had attended in the Durb r Hall in 1943 *the am trumpets fr m the roof acting* as shatter ng prelude th n the A.D.C. *in still proces ion* lead ing Th ir Excellenci s towards the thron s In all thi royal spl nd ur the Mountbattens indeed sh wed th ms lves to be to th manner born Mountbatt n himself *looked* uperb w th th d rk blu r bbon of Knight of the Garter and the o erwh lming array of ord rs and *decorat ons* acro s h s ch t In add tion to the Gart r th y were headed by no fewer th n three Grand Crosses the K.C.B and D.S.O

Lady Mountbatten for her part, was the ep tome of grace with her new ord r of the Crown of Ind a besides all her war med ls and other decorations on her dress of iv ry brocad The red and gold thrones were set *in bold relief* by the l ght ng con cealed in the rich *red elv t h ng ngs* Arc l ghts played down upon the scene as Sir Patrick Spens the Lord Ch ef Just ce of Indi adm n stered the oath and Mountbatten repeated t fter him

The film cameras whirred and the flash bulbs went off for the first time n the confines f the *Durbar Hall* I r mained n guard with the photograph rs to ensure that there were no ugly ru hes but they all behaved adm rably Mountbatten s responses and *his address although* del ered with gre t emphasi were almost inaud ble at the back of the hall the acoust cs wer abom nable even quite near to him it was most diff cult t catch what he as saying

The whole ceremony wa compl ted in exactly a qu rter of an hou the address taking four m nutes On each sid *of th thrones* were *flanked* the Leaders of the new India upon whom w ll rest such terrifying respons b lity in the com ng weeks *I noticed* both Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan listened with the ut

most attention to the speech which of course came as a complete surprise to them

There were two important and as far as I know unexplained absentees—the Nawab of Bhopal and the Maharaja of Bikaner George Abell darted up just before ten past ten to see if Bhopal had taken his place but he had not and the seat was removed Considering that both Bhopal and Bikaner are Mountbatten s two oldest personal friends in India and the importance attached by the Princes to ceremonial etiquette in general and the Viceregal connection in particular their failure to be present to day is a good indication of disunity and crisis in their ranks

Mountbatten had three hours with Nehru and two with Liaquat this afternoon They discussed Liaquat s Budget the immediate bone of contention between the two Parties Wavell has warned Mountbatten that he will find this a very awkward opening problem to tackle when he presides over his first Executive Council Liaquat as Finance Minister in the Interim Government by proposing heavy taxes on all large incomes has put the Congress into the invidious position of being called upon to protect its big business supporters and of seeking relief for them apparently at the expense of its own progressive and equalitarian declarations The feeling is that some compromise will be found for there is a limit beyond which neither the Moslem League nor the Congress can go in taxing wealthy subscribers

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Tuesday 25th March 1947*

I attended Mountbatten s first Staff Meeting which took place in his dark air-cooled study and consisted of Ismay Mieville George Abell Brockman Erskine Crum and myself It is Mountbatten s intention that these informal round table moots should be held on a day to day basis enabling him to think aloud without any mental reservations They are to be a direct continuation in a far more intimate form of the staff techniques he instituted at Combined Operations and developed in South east Asia Command Mountbatten started off with a lively account of yesterday s interviews with Nehru and Liaquat as well as with Bikaner and Bhopal who both came round to explain *their absence from the Swearing in Ceremony At the end of all* these sessions six hours in all he confessed that he felt like a boiled egg

The Bhopal and Bikaner interviews revealed the full scale of the split among the Princes This is a great grief to Bhopal who feels that Bikaner and the other dissidents by allowing themselves to take part in the Constituent Assembly are becoming the tools of Congress and undermining the whole bargaining
tion of the States—hitherto they had succeeded in standing their own outside the communal fury Bhopal thought the

him t was quite impo sible and if enforced must involve blood shed and ch os He asked Mountbatten earnestly whether there was any po ble e cape from it Mountbatten said there was of course one and only o way out nd that as an invit tion fr m all the Ind an part es to us to remain—a most unlikely con t ngency B t Bhop l was not so ure that as the time drew on such an offer might not be made

B kan r wh m Mountbatt n quest oned on th s po nt was not so sangu ne He argued f r the o-called diss dent' Princes, and while ag ee ng that the split was most unfortunate stressed that it was Bhop l who by his attitud to the Int rim Go ernment, had caused the communal issue to be raised among them The dissid nts by taking part in th Constituent Assembly would immeasurably strengthen the new central regime and help to ensure that it w s not in f ct a p ely *Congress set p*

Mountbatten s first interview with N hru w s ill minating In expansi mood Nehru ran thr ugh his inte pretat on of the major devel pment from the per od of the Cab n t Mi sion on rds Mountbatten consid red it was ubstanti lly acc rate and t llied with information he h d g thered in London In Nehru s view Wa ell had made one ious bl nder in invit ng the Mos lem Le gue to ome into the Interim Government i tead of waiting a little l ng r for them to ask to b brought in. H spoke of a private Moslem League meeting at which Jinnah had n fact already capitulat d on th issue

Mo ntb tten ask d Nehru to gi e h m his own e t mate of J nn h Nehru recalled that he h d done s in his recent book but this did not pre ent him from g ing a further penetrat ng impress on Nehru said the essent al thing to real se about Jinnah is that he is a man to whom success h s come very late in life—at over s xty Before th t he had not been a major figure in I dian politics He was a successf l lawyer but not an especially good one and Nehru stressed the neces ity of making this part cular distincti n in Jinnah s case The secret of his success—and it had been tremendous if only for its emotional intensity—was in h s capacity to take up a permanently neg tive attit de Thi he had done with complete singleness of purpose ever s nce 1935 He knew th t Pakistan co ld ne er stand up to constructi e criticism, and he had ensured that it should never be subjected to it.

Mountbatten next asked what Nehru thought was the biggest single problem facing India to-d y and he repl ed at once the econom c one There pon Mountbatten asked him whether he was satisfied with the way the Interim Government was tackling it. N hru said he was n t but the position was made imposs ble by the League who ere det rm ned to sabotage any *economic* plann ng from the centre Such planning if t succeeded would *ipso facto* undermine the case for Paki tan with regard to th

Punjab Nehru put forward a proposal he has made before of a tripartite administration of the Province divided up on communal lines with a central authority to deal with certain major non-communal subjects He was convinced this was the only way to break the intolerable deadlock of Government under Section 93 * which Wavell had had to impose at the beginning of this month

The vexed question of compensation for the Indian Civil Service on the transfer of power was raised at this interview Nehru thought we were crazy to want to compensate civil servants to whom the offer of remaining on in their jobs was open The new Government would pledge itself to offer them the same conditions of contract as they had previously enjoyed Mountbatten said there could be no question of the British Government going back on its word and he could not think Nehru was suggesting that it should Nehru admitted that as far as the British were concerned it was of course purely the British Government s affair But even so why compensate them on such a lavish scale? This could only encourage them to leave their posts And what about the Indians? Here it was a question of their continuing in the service of their own countrymen The proposals really were crazy as they stood Mountbatten however firmly asked for his support on them He thought Nehru had misunderstood British psychology The more lavish and clear-cut the compensation the greater was the likelihood of the British civil servants remaining on

In Mountbatten s view Nehru was extremely frank and fair and astounded him by actually suggesting at one point an Anglo Indian union involving nothing less than common citizenship—in effect a far closer bond than Commonwealth status which Nehru felt was psychologically and emotionally unacceptable

At the end of the interview as Nehru was about to take his leave Mountbatten said to him Mr Nehru I want you to regard me not as the last Viceroy winding up the British Raj but as the first to lead the way to the new India Nehru turned looked intensely moved smiled and then said Now I know what they mean when they speak of your charm being so dangerous

During his talk Liaquat asked a leading question about Mountbatten s Swearing in speech He wanted to know who was responsible for the idea Mountbatten said he could answer that at once It was entirely his own and produced at nobody s request Indeed some of his own staff had been against it I

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* A reference to Section 93 of the Government of India Act of 1935 which under conditions of civil disturbance enabled Viceroy and Governors of the Indian Provinces to invoke ı powers and govern by decree

am pleased to hear th t sa d Liaquat for no fewer than three highly placed and well nformed sources had assured me that you had made the peech at the req est of Congress This little in cident is a good example of the preva ling communal suspicion and no time h s been lost by eith r side n pressing home all possible points t can against the other

Pe haps the most significant comm ntary on Nehru s Punjab proposals was a teleg m fr m S r E an Jenkins the Governor of the Punjab to wh ch Mieville drew attent on at the Staff Meet ng J nkins reported that G ani Kartar S ngh an nfluential S kh leader had stated that n the absence of an agreement between Congress and th Leagu accept ble to the S kh the Sikhs mu t ns t on the partitio of the Punjab nd ould resist with all their resources any ndea ou to s t up a Mosl m League M nistry th re n th meanwh le Th speech ha dd t on l uthority in that the S khs have alr ady persuaded Congres to put up re ol t on—accepted inc dent lly by Wa ll only a week before Mountb tten a r ved—in fa ur of pa t t oning the Punjab

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI W *d esday 26tl M h 1947*

Mountbatten beg n th s morning s Staff Meet ng with nother vivid *sum* of ye t rday interviews Quite part from k p ing notes he has ph tograph mem ry and the jour ali t s pe ception of human deta l Ye terday he aw Dr John Mattha *M nister for R lways Sir Conrad Corf eld S cretary to th P l* tical Department and last but not le st Vall bhbh i Patel Mat thai who is a Chr sti n and in no sense a P rty man ga e in Mountb tten est mate a first-class apprec ati n in very way bal anced and reasonabl Matthai stress d that a horr fy ng feature of the s tuati n was that all th se who were trying to st er an hon ourable straight course were gradually los ng their influence and becomi g increa ngly d sl ked d d tru ted by both s des Mat tha sa d th t he had done his b st for i tance to back L aquat s Budget only to find h mself bjected to bitter attack by *D n*

Corf eld who is con t tut onally ad iser to the Viceroy in h s capacity as Crown Representat e on all matters affect ng the Indian States argued w th s me b tterness that B kaner by tak g h s place in the Constituent Assembly had ser ously weakened the barg ining power of the Princes Corf eld is clearly o Bhopal s side in th s contro ersy nd eems to see the Princes s a potential "Th rd Force in the tran f r of pow r

Mountb tten had been somewhat app hens ve about h first meeting with Patel who has the reput tion of be ng the strong man i th Congress High Command but he ery qu ckly de tected a twinkle in the Sardar s eye H s approach to the whole probl m was clear and decisi e India must get rid of the Mos

lem League The League was actually boasting about the developments in the Punjab They must be mad All was serene until they touched on compensation At this point Patel raised his hand and vowed that if any Indian accepted compensation he would never be employed again

In the evening I dined with Maurice Zinkin a very clever young Indian Civil Service man whom I first met in Delhi in 1943 He is now working as an assistant secretary in the Finance Department and as an official has been fairly closely involved in the framing of Liaquat s controversial budget which soaks the Hindu rich and is calculated to widen the breach between the millionaire and four anna subscribers to Congress Maurice had also invited K M Panikkar whom I was particularly anxious to meet Panikkar sports a small imperial beard He is an historian politician and journalist a man of prodigious learning and profound judgement and no mean practitioner in the dying art of good conversation

I gave him a clear run by asking What would you do if you were in Mountbatten s place? He replied at once that Mountbatten as a Naval strategist must realise that British interest was best served by the creation of a solid centralised State based on India s seaboard on more than three hundred millions of the people and on geographical and religious unity Hindustan is the elephant he said and Pakistan the two ears The elephant can live without the ears He admitted frankly that Jinnah could make an essentially reasonable case In a four roomed house he asks for only one room but he wants that room to be his own He is unwilling to entrust local Moslem majorities to a strong Hindu-controlled central government Panikkar s thesis was in effect that we should not try to impose a larger unity than India was fundamentally seeking Nehru s tripartite proposals for the Punjab were the first sign of Congress acceptance of the Hindustan Pakistan division Jinnah s experience with the Sikhs must have made him realise that the unity of the Punjab was physically impossible

Historically speaking Panikkar asserted the Punjab is a British myth and no more the special home of a fighting race than anywhere else in India Over the centuries the historical greatness of India was never identified with a strong Punjab The British should beware of the Punjab myth and of the larger Central Asia myth which had dominated so much of their thought and policy in the past It was necessary to think in post war terms

He then turned to the problem of the Princes As Bikaner s Dewan or Prime Minister and principal adviser Panikkar* oc

* Some of Panikkar s most constructive and far seeing ideas are to be found in his monograph The Basis of an Indo Treaty (Oxford University Press 1945)

cupies a key pos tion He and S r V T Krishnamachari Dewan to the Maharaja of Jaipur have seized the in tiat ve on behalf of the Rajputana Prince Pan kkar adm ts that Bhopal th present Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes i in a d fficult position as a Mosl m Prince of a H ndu State But as Chancellor he is eally enunci ting—although he may not fully realise it—a new doctrine of Param untcy by asserting that no act on should be tak n by State indi idually but only collect vely and by agreement with th Chan ellor Pan kkar said that his con c pt of Param untcy allowed it to be no bu iness of the Chan cell r as t whether or no nd idual Princes opted to have r pre ntation in th Const tuent Assembly This v a a matter as bet veen each ndi dual State and Brita nd only a d rect instruction fr m the Crown Rep es ntat e would affect his action

Some t n of the s xteen big States had taken the r places in the Con t tu nt Assembly P st va thinking in the case of the Princes was l necessary on B ta n s p rt As long as they were instrument n Brit sh D ide and Rule r g m they ve o powerful fact s in the m nten nce f the Raj but once Brit sh rul s relaxed the P nces powe is automat cally in decl n a d they m st s ek ecurity w th n the f mew k of th d minant pol tical tructure hich is l kely to t ke its place The pos tion of the northe n group of Princes—Jodhp J pur B roda P ti ala and B kaner—was particul ly d fficult Pat ala wa only a hund ed and forty m les from Delh

Although Nehru during his seven days negotiat ons with the Princes in F bruary h d stressed no fewer th n five times the voluntary nature of any agreement with the Congress and Con gress ref sal to coerce any unwilling partner the decis on facing the Princes was none the less to jo n n or perish Th Nizam of Hyderabad was a special case and h le it was h ghly des rable to bri g him into the fold and to h ndle him firmly P nikk r recommended no ctual coercion Hyderabad the Prem er In dian State w th its Moslem ruler was in the h art of H ndustan and had e ghty six per cent of it tot l popul tion of se e teen m ll o H ndus It would be imposs ble for her to rema n out The largest State f all n area Kashmir was in a d ff cult pos t on and th Mah raj would no doubt be tempt d to throw n his lot w th Jinn h P nikkar s d th t a key moti e for the Princes to jo n the Constit nt A sembly is to pr vide a reinf rce ment of the right w ng f Co gress and a co nter we ght to J Prakash Nara n and h s Socialist grou p who h ve m de consider bl headway in Bengal

Finally I asked P n kka bo t the soc al structure of the t o Part es a d h confirmed the ew to wl ich Mountbatten b scr bes th t the Congres w s n d e co rse l kely t spl t Th Moslem League he felt was more losely integrated lacking as

it did the extremes of industrial wealth and poverty The few Moslem magnates were mainly land owners and the exploitation of Moslem poverty was mostly at the hands of Hindu capitalists

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Friday 28th March 1947*

During his first week as Viceroy Mountbatten has set the tempo he proposes to maintain By the time March is out he will have held comprehensive individual interviews with every member of the Cabinet as the Viceroy s Executive Council is now colloquially called with Auchinleck and the other Service Commanders in-Chief with the key Princes and Dewans and with the leaders of the British community and Scheduled Castes He approaches each of these conversations with a completely open mind and handles them without any formality The objective is to establish personal relationships where none have existed before All this is extremely hard work The interviews are of rarely less than a half hour s duration

As he is seeing the Leaders in such close sequence the volume of opinion and information which he is absorbing is very heavy So he has established a procedure that as soon as a Leader leaves the room there is a fifteen minutes interval before the next appointment while he dictates to his stenographer a *resume* of his last conversation These interview notes are given reference numbers and are circulated immediately to his staff enabling us to follow every move he makes

An opportunity to introduce himself to a wider circle has been presented by the great Asian Relations Conference which has been meeting near the Old Fort in Old Delhi all this week. This evening the Mountbattens gave their first garden party for all the delegates members of the Legislative Assembly and senior officials in Delhi numbering in all some seven hundred guests The Moghul gardens and the State rooms were crowded with a great number of Congress and other leaders who were seeing the inside of Viceroy s House literally for the first time This was psychologically a very important party In the first place it was a clear token of the new Viceroy s goodwill towards Nehru s most ambitious move to assert Indian status in Asian affairs But beyond that it enabled the Mountbattens to reveal from the outset their splendid social sense and invoke the Indian gift for friendship As I mingled among the guests I gained no sense of hostility but only of reserve struggling to suppress curiosity The Mountbattens did much to night to break down that reserve

Afterwards Lady Mountbatten and Pamela and a party from Viceroy s House went on to an At Home in the garden of Nehru s house at 17 York Road where we saw an exquisite display by the famous Chhau or Masque dancers of

GANDHI AND JINNAH

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI M nday 31st Ma cl 1947

I LEFT EARLY f r breakfast with the Nehru household There was an informal tmosph e and we sat down to a European bre kfa t of eggs and tom toes tea nd coffee toast and m rma lade Mrs P ndit N hru s charming and br ll ant si ter w th one of her daughters had just rri ed from the Unit d Nat ons se sion in New York Kr hna Meno of Ind a Leag e f me one of Nehru s clos t fr end to whom he ha g ven a ro ng commiss n t th s crit cal t me was ther aquil n and ntens The e wa nother fr end present— *Mr P tel a tractor manu* f cturer who was plead ng th Nehru to pen a new f ct ry of h in Bombay Nehru was *weighing n hi m nd* whether he co ld combine such mat ali t c cerem ny w th hi principal d ty dur ng his next Bombay sit—nam ly the hand ng over of som B ddh t relics Nehru i ery qu t spoken a d all his reactio s in h s own home se m to be *p ls mo*

After breakf st I had an earnest t lk with Krishna Menon who stre sed —

( ) The Ind an des re for common citizensh p but not *Dom nion Status He v ants what he calls reciprocity Such* are the suspic ons about Churchill that if he i prepared to accept Domin on Status t cannot me n real f eed m.

(*b*) The l mit of Nehru s pat ence th the present s tua t on in the Cab net The pers tent refu al of th Moslem Le gue m mbers to accept him as leader was intole abl

(*c*) Pre alent cr tici m f the Vicer ys I C.S st ff and n part cul r f G org Abell I spok strongly in fa our of Abell s h gh cal bre and patent objectiv ty Menon ad m tted that the attacks ag inst him were probably unjust fi d but mu t be recognised by Mountbatten as a pol tical reality

He said Mountbatten started with an ad antage *vis-a i* G ndh who *reg rded him as n honest man but he* gi e warn ing that a con rs tion with the Mahatma was lw ys unp e d ctabl There was lways th d nger that it m ght be s de-tracked through Gandhi involving himself in some special s b ject.

I arri ed back just in t me for the ten o clock Staff Meeting where plans for Mountbatten s first interview w th Gandhi this

afternoon were fully discussed Press interest in the meeting is naturally immense When the Mahatma duly arrived at three o clock I must have had every accredited camera man in the sub-continent waiting with me in the Moghul gardens outside the Viceroy s study

After the initial greetings were over the Mountbattens conducted him out to face this battery He underwent the ordeal with great good humour joking with the Mountbattens and generally doing his best to meet the conflicting requests of the cameramen all trying to secure the perfect shot As it happens this was achieved by Max Desfor the brilliant Associated Press of America photographer who waited until the frenzied scramble for the posed shots was over and then with the perception of the artist saw that Gandhi on turning to go back into the cool study had placed his hand on Lady Mountbatten s shoulder The picture was his Gandhi by his action was doing no more and no less than treating Lady Mountbatten in the same manner as his own grand daughters on his way to his Prayer Meetings Every gesture he makes has consciously or otherwise symbolic meaning and this afternoon it was spontaneous friendship

Today s talk lasted for two and a quarter hours At the end of it Mountbatten called me in introduced me to Gandhi to discuss the immediate issue of a Press communique Gandhi who spoke with a very soft voice and a slight lisp said he would be happy to leave the wording to the Viceroy As soon as he had left Mountbatten told me that the whole interview had been deliberately taken up with reminiscence the first hour and a quarter with Lady Mountbatten present to help produce the air of friendliness and the last hour on their own He had deliberately avoided all reference to the immediate political situation to allow time for them to progress along the path of understanding and friendship Gandhi had gone back to his early life in England and South Africa and to his meetings with former Viceroy s Mountbatten told me that the talks are likely to go on for the remainder of Gandhi s week s stay in Delhi He is quite determined not to hustle him All this is admirable in itself but not so easy to explain to the Press who will find it difficult to believe that momentous discussions have not in fact taken place

I hammered out a text with all speed secured Mountbatten s approval and then went out into the courtyard where a large crowd of correspondents were waiting to take it down I started to read Their Excellencies met Mr Gandhi at Viceroy s House this evening and they had a most friendly talk with him lasting for seventy five minutes Before I could take breath an eager correspondent protested that this could not be true He knew that the Mahatma had been there for over two hours There was a murmur in the ranks But when I continued with 'There-

after His Excellency and Mr Gandhi had an hour s t lk alone in th same c rdı l eın t was generally acknowledged that the statement might after all bear some relation to the truth

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Tuesday 1st Ap il 1947*

Mountbatten h s had h s second talk with Gandhi It lasted for two hours only a quarter of an hour of which was taken up with sol d business There w s a furth r long excursi n into the Mahatma s life story nd then an aston shing propo al by him to sol e the whole problem It was nothing less th n to di m ss the present Cabinet and call on Jinn h to appoint an all Moslem administration M untbatten asked 'What will Jinnah s reac tion be? Gandhi replied Jinnah will say Ah it is the ly Gandhi ag in Mountbatt n asked with sm le And won t he be right? 'No Ga dhi replied I am being abs lutely sincere He told Mountbatten th t h had got to be f m and face the c nsequ nce of the sins of his predecessors The Br t h system of D ıde and Rule h d cre ted a situat on in which the only alt rnat es were a c ntinuati n of Brit sh rule to keep l and order r an Ind an blood bath The blood bath must be faced nd accepted

Wa ell had been irritated by th time consumed in these in terviews but Mountbatten a d he ı dy t gi e ten hou s to him if neces ary He is deeply impres ed w th him and thinks he s still of the first import nce

To-day Mountb tten called me in to act as an unoff cial *apporteu* at a very ten e and difficult meeting involving the final liquidation of the vexed Ind an Nat onal Army q estion A number of former I N.A men were still in prison for war crimes—that is for specif c brutalit es as ag nst purely polit cal offences The Go ernment was being subjected to considerable pressure to release them, b t Auchinleck as Commander in-Chief was adamant that these sentences were to be served if discipline was to be ma ntained In Bengal the I N.A were widely regard ed as heroic liberators largely because they had been command ed by Subha Chandr Bose who had once successfully defied Gandhi s oppos tion to become Pres dent of the Congress and who carr ed h s enmity of the British Raj to the po nt of link ng up w th the Axis and providing the Japanes with the Indian National Army as an auxil ary force f r their offensi e on India

By the t me Mountbatten arri ed on the scene there was a widespread feel ng that this is ue should be d sposed of but in so f r as it touched the Nat onal st nerve and had not been too happily handled in the past a reasonable solution became more d fficult to obtai as each day passed Wa ell had actually used his Viceregal authority to veto discussion of the matter and had handed it over as one of the outstanding conundrums.

Mountbatten decided to have it out in a completely frank conference with Nehru Liaquat Baldev Singh and Auchinleck The meeting my first direct experience of the prevailing political climate at the highest level is not likely to be in character with most of the crises which Mountbatten will have to face For once Congress and the Moslem League are on the same side of the fence One or two of the I N A. men in question were Moslems Although the Moslem League had been careful to avoid identifying itself with the Congress Civil Disobedience policy of 1942 or any direct challenge to the Allied war effort it was significant that as soon as there was any suggestion that the issue was one involving national aspirations their differences with the Congress vanished at once

Nehru was clearly anxious to be rid of the whole problem but was naturally worried at the possible strength of the Legislative Assembly s reaction Liaquat on the other hand developed arguments which were I felt calculated to draw heavily on Auchinleck s limited reserves of temper and provoke a breach between the Government and the Commander in-Chief None the less underneath the surface tension it was clear that there was a tremendous respect for Auchinleck and genuine dismay at the threat of his resignation which had brought the actual crisis to a head After three hours of intense discussion a formula was found Auchinleck was prevailed upon to write it out himself It invoked the Federal Court as an adviser on the merits of each particular outstanding case

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Wednesday 2nd April 1947*

At our morning Staff Meeting Mountbatten was busy hammering out the I N A formula The snag now centres round the status of the Federal Court which apparently is not in a position to render reports to the Commander in-Chief

On Mountbatten s instructions I attended the Legislative Assembly sitting discreetly in the Governor General s box to listen to the I N A debate A Moslem back bencher moved the resolution demanding the release of the I N A men and started breathing fire and slaughter His oration then suddenly tailed away It looked as though the Congress Whips had given him some friendly advice half way through his speech

Then Nehru replied His speech was a splendid effort He backed Auchinleck to the hilt as he promised he would The speech required great moral courage before a potentially hostile House The I N.A he argued was subjected to different pulls There was the pull of loyalty to the Army there was the pull of a larger royalty to what one imagined was the good of the country when loyalty is in conflict the result is an inner conflict in the individual 'When this happens the best man suffers lesser man is insensitive Not all the I N A men were m

as w th everyone else there were some good some bad and some in the middle The resoluti n was ult mately withdrawn The outcome of this d ngerous incident is M untbatten s first success at med ation and an encourag ng example of N hru s steadfast ness

VICEROY S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Frid y 4th Apr l 1947*
The newspaper limel ght continues to be on the North west *Front er Ismay spoke* at to days Meeting of what he call d the bastard s tuation there—ninety seven per cent Moslems with a C ngres M nistry

The q est on arose of Travancore wh ch is in the far South and the only Ind n State w th a sizeable sea board Uranium deposits have been f und there so the lapse of Paramountcy now assumes new str tegic s gn ficance

Ther was full and frank d scussion of w ys and means of evacuat ng European should th s be necessary A reg ster i to be prepared of those who w h to leave by June 1948 Passeng r sh p shortage is such th t any fleet of ships however m dest will be o t of the quest on Mountbatten s d recti e is th t shipping losses as a result of the wa should be stress d to all co cerned and that i all plann ng any impre s on f pan c move *ment must at all costs be a oided*

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *S turd y 5th April 1947*
Gandh s master plan was d scus ed nd was described as an ld kite flown w thout d sguise Mo ntbatt n however h d been the first person suff ciently intell gent to pay attention to t The vital po nt was th t Mou tbatten hould not all w h mself to be drawn into negotiati n w th the M hatma but should only listen to advice

Now at the end of the first fortnight, the m in strategy of Mountb tten s plan together w th its tact cal appl cati n h s al ready tak n shape He has had to start from scratch but no t m has been l t His primary aim is to achie e a soluti n which nsp res s ff cient good feel ng to enable the Indi n part es to rema n within the Commonwealth structure f om the outset He is bend ng e ery effort to keep the Cabinet M ssion Pl n al ve b t n the as mpt on that Jinnal power and p rpose e sustained the facil t es for part t on will ha e to be all ed for He appr ciates th t the l g c of partition g the centre invol es similar treatment f r those Provinces where the two commun ties are evenly *b l nced*

Whatever shape the Plan takes Mountbatten has been convinced from the outset that the need f r the pol tical s lution is mu h more press ng than was apparent when w were in London and that the June 1948 t me l mit far fr m being not long enough,

is already too remote a deadline He senses the danger of political collapse the various contending factions—Congress Moslem League and Sikhs—being strong enough to stake their respective claims but unable unless an agreement is reached at once to prevent the Chinese situation being repeated in India The quick political solution carries with it the proviso that its difficult administrative implications should be met during an agreed interim period afterwards

In preparing the way for the acceptable plan Mountbatten is resolved to take all the leaders along with him step by step but he proposes to do so separately on a personal basis and not by formal and forbidding conclaves Mountbatten hopes that the diplomacy of discussion will have the effect of playing down the communal tension which the committee method as can be seen at the Cabinet meetings of the Interim Government undoubtedly stimulates In the meanwhile at our Staff Meetings all possible concepts are examined

This morning the possibility of achieving a solution which leaves something at the centre was considered Mountbatten mentioned as alternative concepts an alliance on the lines of the League of Nations autonomy within the USSR and the federal structure at Washington The argument was thrown into the arena that the only chance of a unitary solution would be for a decision to be taken as soon as all data was available if possible within two months It would have to be in the form of a decision and not an agreement—unilateral from which there was no appeal The approval of His Majesty s Government would be needed at once together with the earliest possible legislation and implementation so that the scheme could be completed before the end of 1947 This would be the most honest approach and could be presented as the best means of getting out by June 1948 If a scheme was required without a centre then clearly we could not go so quickly

The whole of this discussion was a form of mental exercise in preparation for Mountbatten s first vital encounter with Jinnah to day

The morning Meeting went on up to Jinnah s arrival There were not quite so many photographers as for the first Gandhi interview and Jinnah was obviously far more formal and reserved in his attitude to the Press Immediately after the meeting was over I got in to see Mountbatten to have my communique approved There was only one minor alteration

Jinnah and his sister are dining at Viceroy s House tomorrow evening instead of to night The reason is simply that Mountbatten felt he could not sustain another session with him to day Jinnah as he left said he would put himself entirely at Mountbatten s disposal Mountbatten s first reaction was My he was cold It took most of the interview to unfreeze

I went straight in to lunch where the guests were Nehru and his daughter Indira and Sjahrir the Indonesian Premier with his buxom blonde Dutch wife Sjahrir must be the smallest statesman since Dollfuss the Austrian pocket Premier Mr and Mrs Winkelmann the Dutch Attache and his wife were there also I sat next to Indira She told me she was in some of the worst blitzes in London and still has an air raid warden's hat which was lent her one evening while she was trying to put out incendiaries in Piccadilly She has kept the helmet ever since as a trophy

After lunch Krishna Menon and I may at Mountbatten's request had a prolonged talk about Gandhi's proposal It was agreed to-day that it was essential to make it clear to Nehru before Gandhi got to work too hard on the Congress that Mountbatten was far from committed to the Gandhi plan and that it would need careful scrutiny At Mountbatten's said at the morning Meeting Gandhi has come out definitely for inviting Jinnah to form an administration and pledged himself to get Congress support for it. Mountbatten thinks Gandhi's proposals and outlook similar to those of the phenomenal Mr Pyke once a scientist at Combined Operations and author of Habakkuk, the floating self propelled airfield made of ice—far fetched but potentially feasible

At a tea party to-day at Western Court I was entertained by Sir Usha Nath Sen President of the Indian Correspondent's Association Associated Press of India's special correspondent and a more than usually well informed source. He introduced me to some twenty leading Indian correspondents who for about an hour and a half gave me a fairly intensive grilling I got off to a good start by introducing myself as a member of the Liberal Party on temporary leave from party politics and as one who therefore understood the meaning of minority problems. Considerable interest was shown in Mountbatten's personal hobbies There was a happy almost child like belief among them all that a solution will be found within the next fortnight and it was difficult to divert them from that

In the evening I dined with the Mountbattens alone and heard details of the remarkable interview with Jinnah who started off the conversation quite blankly— I will enter into discussion on one condition only Mountbatten said I interrupted him before he could finish his sentence Mr Jinnah I am not prepared to discuss conditions or indeed, the present situation until I have had the chance of making your acquaintance and knowing more about you yourself' Jinnah was completely taken aback by Mountbatten's attitude and for some while did not respond, remaining reserved haughty and aloof But in the end his mood softened and he duly succumbed to Mountbatten's desire to hear

him recount the story of the Moslem League s rise to power in terms of his own career

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Monday 7th April 1947*

The Jinnahs dined with the Mountbattens last night Jinnah harped on Moslem massacres and described the horrors at length A quick *decision was called for— It would have to be a surgical* operation Mountbatten replied An anæsthetic is required before the operation Mountbatten emerged from this second encounter reasonably confident Jinnah can negotiate with me but my decision goes Jinnah stressed that Gandhi s position was mischievous because it entailed authority without responsibility To prove this point he went through the history of negotiations with Gandhi ending with the rejection of the Cripps Plan and the launching of civil disobedience in 1942 which he described as the Mahatma s Himalayan blunder 'The Congress want to inherit everything they would even accept Dominion Status to deprive me of Pakistan

Mountbatten is using his Staff Meetings to exercise half-considered ideas He hammers out his thoughts on the anvil of discussion It is most exciting to be a part of this creative process Ismay read out Gandhi s latest letter which contains the germs of a Gandhi Mountbatten Pact conjured up out of nothing more than Mountbatten s sympathetic interest in Gandhi s proposal to let Jinnah form a Government Mountbatten feels that Jinnah must be brought into the Government, but is not clear how it is to be done

Apparently while the Mountbattens and Jinnah were being photographed before the first interview Jinnah in an effort to be gallant to Lady Mountbatten spoke of a rose between two thorns Unfortunately it turned out that he was in the middle himself! Walt Mason of Associated Press of America came round to see me and wants me to be quotable as an official *source which frightens me a bit in this whispering gallery*

This evening at the end of their latest meeting Mountbatten called me in to meet Jinnah who stared at me with eyes like gimlets and said nothing However at Mountbatten s prompting he told me he would be very pleased for me to call on him and discuss Press problems After he had gone Mountbatten indicated that they would be having a difficult talk to morrow

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Tuesday 8th April 1947*

At to-day s Staff Meeting a letter from Liaquat was read which alleged the inadequate representation of Moslems in the Armed Forces He wanted these reorganised forthwith so that they could be more readily split up between Pakistan and
at the proper time Ismay stressed that to take any action

L aquat s letter would be to prejud ce the pol tical ı sue Unt'l and unless the Viceroy reported othen ıse to H s Majesty s Gov rnment the Cab net M ss on Plan held tho field and that Plan envisaged one N tıon l Army

Mo ntb tten agre d that there could be no splitt ng of the Ind an Army before the ıthdrawal of the Brit sh for t o rea ons 'The mecha cs wont perm t ıt and I wont H sa d he was re ol ed to t ll Jinnah th t he must ma ntain l w and order and ould not help th P rties at the expen e of either Even if ıt was decided to demit power t ınd vidual Pro nces t v ould still b e sential to k ep central control f Defence Ismay said the Brit sh Army stays unt l Command passes The 1935 Constitut on remains ın force M untb tten spoke on N hru s v ew of Gandh s plan—th y sho ld not l t g a tr ng Centre unt l the e was someth ng to h nd over to Abell said the k y qu st on was I the Cab net Miss on Plan dead? Tell J nn h what be will get f he refuse t He wont b re on ble unt l th s has b en cl ıfed

VICEROY S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *W dn sd y 9th April 1947*

At to-day s M eting Mountb tt n said that he ra sed yesterd y with J nn h th q est on of an appeal by both of the m jor Par t es for a truce in th comm nal d sturba ces and had bluntly asked J nah wh ther he really wanted these d st b nces t be st pped or hether the s ue of such an appeal would put the Mo lem Le gue at a pol tical d sad ntag J nnah had utimate ly agreed to jo n

I was asked to g e the Press a backgro nd wa n ng that since the Viceroy was exam ning a la ge number of differ nt plans for the future f Ind a the Press sh uld be on their guard agaı st assum ng th t the plan known and bel e ed t b under discus s on on any day was th one mo t l kely to be decided n The pl n which was receivı g m st careful exam nation \as of course the Cabı et M s n Plan

We had another pol cy dı cı s on Ismay spoke of a talk he had had w th Jı n h He sh ws him elf wholly u aware of th ad m ıstratı e impl cat ons of h s pol cy The British were l qui d tors All w uld be well if Pak st n as conc ded but J n ah spoke of his fear th t all h would get wo ld be a m th-eat n Pakistan

After the Staff Meet ng I went r und a d saw J nn h at h s home H s hou e at 10 A ngzeb Road look r th r l ke a m sque and ıs f ll of ed and bla k ınlay On h s mantelpiece wa a s lver map of Ind a n an o k pl que Pakistan wa m rk ed ın green H was much m re cord al th n on the first en c unter We d cussed the Pres s t t on. The All Ind a Edı tors Conference he sa d wa ent rely H nd Of the Moslem papers there was only *Da* wh ch was under h s proprietor

ship Although you may not believe it I have never exercised direct influence over its policy and have always regarded that as the Editor s job and within his competence The Editor he added without a smile has always been in agreement with my views He spoke at length on the completely false reports of the Noakhali killings of Hindus by Moslems These were first described as a massacre of many thousands but he claimed they turned out to be little more than a hundred killed and a hundred wounded Background talks with the Press in India were almost impossible He spoke of his experience in London where his off the record remarks were completely respected

In a note of the interview for Mountbatten I wrote as follows —

In view of the inaccurate and inflammatory nature of some recent Press comment I said that I had in mind to recommend that you should send a message to the All India Editor s Confer ence urging the need for restraint etc. I wanted to see what his reaction would be It was not particularly favourable If I may presume to advise he said 'His Excellency should press on with his work, reach a decision quickly and avoid exhortations It is above all his sacred duty to uphold law and order The interview was helpful in so far as it will enable me to make contact with the Moslem Press under favourable auspices but discouraging as indicating that the chances of any working ar rangement between the Hindu and the Moslem Press are very small indeed

I had tea this afternoon with the Nehru household Indira and Krishna Menon recalled the origins of the Moslem League and its leadership—pointing out that Jinnah himself was a Hindu by birth The League Krishna said only began to mean some thing when Congress became a Direct Action movement It grew he alleged under British encouragement Krishna wants me to go to the States Conference at Gwalior where Nehru is handing over the Presidency to Sheikh Abdullah the Moslem Congress leader in Kashmir who is at present in gaol there It is not only the political temperature that is rising The thermometer reached over 100 F yesterday As Nehru aptly remarked to me 'The trouble is we get hot by thinking about the heat

In the evening we had a big State dinner for the British Resi dents in the Indian States who have been called to Delhi for consultation with Mountbatten in his capacity as Crown Repre sentative The State rooms were opened up and the cobwebs dusted off Lady Willingdon s Persian ceiling Eighty four guests sat down to dinner and the silver plate was brought out which somehow did not improve the flavour of the food Portraits of former Viceroys—Minto Mayo Halifax and Reading—look down upon the swelling scene The string band plays a strange ____ of Gilbert and Sullivan and Indian rhythms

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Saturday 12th April 1947*
Mountbatten reported on his latest meeting with Jinnah who was apparently much shaken when Mountbatten failed to react in any way to his offer dramatically presented to bring Pakistan into the Commonwealth In our general discussion to-day the alternatives of Plan Balkan versus Plan Union were frankly and fully discussed Mountbatten went to the root of the dilemma and put the proposition that he should try to get Congress to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan in full and then confront Jinnah with coming in or accepting truncated Pakistan George Abell was sceptical of Congress changing its policy It had already forced the Moslem League to retreat by the pressure it had exerted on the northern Groups

Gandhi has written to Mountbatten that his own plan is not acceptable to Congress and that he is personally handing over all future negotiations to the Working Committee Mountbatten says he will try to get Gandhi to stay on and exert his influence in favour of full Congress acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan. He feels that deep down desire for union still exerts a powerful pull on Congress

Incidentally there was a charming postscript to Gandhi's proposal that Mrs Asaf Ali should meet Lady Mountbatten Lady Mountbatten at once wrote off an invitation which Mrs Asaf Ali duly declined *The next day when Gandhi came for a meeting with the Viceroy Mrs Asaf Ali was with him* I hear she refused he said so I have brought her with me

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Monday 14th April 1947*
The Press speculators have been busy An article in the *Hindustan Times* this morning has forecast the issue of the Peace Appeal on which Mountbatten has been working It indicates that it will shortly be issued over the signatures of Gandhi Jinnah and Kripalani *as the President of Congress One of the big* points at issue is Congress's insistence on including Kripalani and Jinnah's unwillingness to do so Ismay and Mieville consider that the *Hindustan Times* article may well have wrecked the chance of persuading Jinnah to sign the document which has been prepared Mountbatten gave strict instruction to me to point out that the article had of course been published without his knowledge and had caused him great annoyance as indeed it has. He is also writing to Nehru to find out how the leak occurred

After many spasms of uncertainty Mountbatten's patience and will power have prevailed and this afternoon I have been able to take round to the Ministry of Information the original document over Gandhi's and Jinnah's joint signatures. Jinnah has gained his point over Kripalani who has not been invited to

sign Actually Gandhi wrote his name twice once in English and once in Urdu

The tone and timing of this Appeal are a great personal triumph for Mountbatten and give impetus to his whole effort to produce an acceptable political plan It enhances his prestige and it exploits to the maximum the initial good will surrounding him It is designed to create a *detente* without which no political solution will be worth a pin s fee It is the first victory for his open diplomacy

The message is couched in stern and forceful terms which are urgently needed The call for avoidance both in speech and writing of any incitement to acts of violence and disorder is particularly timely As each day passes certain of the more communally minded Press commentators become increasingly provocative in their language stirring up hatreds they cannot control and heroics they are never likely to perform At Mountbatten s request I have gone very carefully into the Ministry of Information s proposals for disseminating the Appeal The engine of All India Radio will be at full throttle and at my suggestion tonight s release will include a photostat copy Ambitious plans are in hand to show it at cinemas and to distribute it by leaflet from the air over the disturbed areas

The planned pattern of events now centres round a Simla house party early in May—the probable guests to be Nehru Jinnah Patel Liaquat Kripalani Baldev Singh and the possibles Gandhi Bhopal and Bikaner

To-morrow the Governor s Conference is due to take place following closely upon a useful session with the Residents Mountbatten is not likely to put his Plan into final shape until he has heard the Governors full and frank views on the draft which he has already sent for their consideration On the eve of the Conference the broad principles of Mountbatten s Plan are

(1) that the responsibility for Partition if it comes is to rest fairly upon the Indians themselves

(2) the Provinces generally speaking shall have the right to determine their own future

(3) Bengal and the Punjab are to be notionally partitioned for voting purposes

(4) the predominantly Moslem Sylhet district in Assam is to be given the option of joining the Moslem Province created by a partitioned Bengal

(5) General Elections are to be held in the North west Frontier Province

Some of the Governors have arrived at Viceroy s House and Mountbatten has already had talks with Sir Frederick Bourne (Central Provinces) Sir John Colville (Bombay) and Sir Archi

bald Nye (Madras) By the time they are all here the Mount batt n will be entert ning und r one roof eleven Go ernors their w ves private secr t ries and A D C s—a formidable gath r ing even fo Viceroy s H use with its three hundred and forty r ms and one and a half m l of co r dors t hold

S r M rza I m l the Prime M n ster f Hyderabad was call d in for the t lk th B ne when they d scussed the very tr cky quest o of the st t s of B r r Th s is part f the N zam f Hyder b d hered t ry dom i — ndeed h s he r is entitled the P ce f Ber r—b t dministe d by the Central Province Co g e s w ll rta nly lay cl m to Ber r as part of the Central Prov nc h le th N zam ill rta nly want Berar back M za I m l intim t d th t the N zam may h rtly b seeing J nn h As for h mself h says th t h i r pidly los ng th Nizam s confid ce and does n t expect t be ffice much longer

I sat n t to I m il t the Mo tbatt ns lunch party He i a M lem of mod r t opin n s ber j dg m nt and high in tell t ho is the ef e n a somew h t isol ted p st on H poke qu t fr ely t me b t the e sy le of Prem er to the Nizam The max m m peri d f power o could h pe for w s ab t f ye The o ly exception t th s had b en ld S r Akb r Hydari who had clung n for n ly fourteen ye rs The Nizam s st t cr ft c t d larg ly of weaving mpl x con pi racies g nst h own Pr me M nister d ultimately d p i g th m of the power he had wr ted f them It w s by Ismail s account a depress ng cy le of self-d feat ng intrigue Als t the l nch was C mpton Mack nzi who co er ng th world s b ttle fronts to p d ce an offcial ccount of the Indian Army s cont bution to the war

Colville it eems began by off ring to res gn but has been prevailed upon to stay n a little longer Mountb tten s id that Colville was likely to be b th wrong and r ght in his object ons to the present policy Wrong becaus only short not ce and a t me limit could make the Indian leaders f ce up to r l ty d right because there was n t enough time to l nch new constitution.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE GOVERNORS AND THE PLAN

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Tuesday 15th April 1947*

THE GOVERNOR S CONFERENCE opened to-d y with the boost of encouragement provided by the banner he dlines announcing the

Gandhi Jinnah Appeal I attended the first session which took place in the sombre panelled Council Chamber It was an impressive spectacle with the eleven Governors seated in anti clockwise order of precedence round the large oval table Mountbatten s opening speech was a very fluent and persuasive appeal for loyalty both to the letter and spirit of the British Government s decision He stressed just in case there was any doubting Thomas in his midst that June 1948 was a firm departure date

There was full and frank discussion on the evacuation of Europeans Colville and Nye Governors of the two Senior Presidencies were both robust on this issue but Sir Evan Jenkins the very brilliant Governor of the Punjab—George Abell s predecessor as P S V to Wavell—said he felt bound to draw attention to the seriousness of the situation in the Punjab Sir Hugh Dow Governor of Bihar said there were only fifty European officials in his State covering a population of forty million So it was not surprising perhaps that there was little law or order in his part of the world Sir Andrew Clow the retiring Governor of Assam spoke about the planters and said there were more young wives than ever before enjoying the sunshine food and servants

J D Tyson Secretary to the Governor of Bengal Sir Frederick Burrows (who was ill and unable to be at the Conference) reported that there were twenty thousand Europeans in Bengal and that he was seriously worried about the five thousand in the outlying districts He felt that the chances of maintaining law and order in the Province were very slim Communist agitation—stronger here than anywhere else—was definitely anti European and he believed that the Europeans were not looking ahead

Mountbatten stressed that there was little chance of any support from the British Cabinet for any legislation to prevent people coming to India The final vote on this delicate subject was in favour of using persuasion with regard to the movement of Europeans with the Punjab asking for enforcement powers later

There followed detailed consideration of the vexed question of compensation Mountbatten gave the history of the negotiations to date Colville— George the automatic pilot as he called himself to cover the various occasions he has served as acting Viceroy—confirmed what Mountbatten had to say about the difficulty of getting compensation for Indians past the Interim Government Trivedi and Hydari both felt Indians would on purely patriotic grounds wish to remain on and let compensation go Mountbatten had some interesting things to say about the ambiguities and uncertainties of the Commonwealth link referring in particular to Eire Sir John Maffey had told him that the Letter of Credence of the Irish representative to Hitler during the war was actually signed George R I

In the afternoon session discussion was broken down to allow for reports by Governors on their ind idu l Provinces Sir Ol f Caroe speaking about the North west Front er wh ch at the moment se ms to be the point of most acute political cris s wants an elect on Dr Khan Sahib the Premier who with h s more f mous br ther Abdul Gh ff r Kh n the Frontier G ndhi l ds the pro-Congress Red Shirt group does not All the pro M lem League Mosl ms ho would stand to g in most *from an elect on a e in gaol Mo intbatten s ad ice s hold yo r* hand f p ssibl but Ca oe looks t nse and tired and is clearly we gh d down by his hea y *respons bilit es*

J nkins ga e a l c d analysis of the implications of Punjab partit n howing just how the Moslem v rsu non Moslem issue was compl cated by S kh and Hindu Jat claims Tyson s m larly examined the prospects f r Beng l if under partition East Bengal h felt, would becom rur l lum Th e were s m twenty fi e million Hi dus in Bengal—forty five per cent of the popul tion—and th y all wanted to be abs rbed into H nd stan The concept of East Beng l was unacceptable t many l cal Moslems The *relat onsh p between Jinnah and the prese t M slem Premier* of Beng l S hrarwardy as far from c rdial Suhrarwardy is *frightened of partit on nd s ready to pl y w th the H ndus* Jenkins too spoke of the po sible growth of anti Pak stan opini n in the Punj b and Beng l The local M lems would be satisfied to run Beng l as a Moslem-controlled Pro i ce

The Go ernor of Bihar drew attention to th concentrati of wealth m ner l and iron Th industri l d velopment of Ch ta Nagpur was part of Suhrarwardy's concept for the bu lding up of an independent Bengal Provincial dev lution would he felt, in the cas of Bihar ha e wide repercussions In the general d s cuss on it was felt th t a S nd Punjab Pak stan was economically feasible Mountbatten cons dered however th t East B ngal *m ght contract out and that also the North west Frontier was* l ability

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Wednesday 16th April 1947*

At the resumed Governors Conference to-day Jenk n spoke about the need for an Operation Solomon for the Punjab and *p t forward the po b l ty of a st tistical boundary comm ss on* There was a big d scussion on the hole draft P rtit on Plan which Mountbatten had put tog ther n time for the Conference It s clear from what the Governors have to say, that by far th g eater part of the sub-continent is calm and q iet and ready to accept a y reasonable s lution

I had lunch at the Imperial w th Pan kkar who stressed that the Constitution of the Moslem League had been weighted hea ily in favour of Moslems living in minority areas This simple fact he claimed had enabled Jinnah to bring extra pres

sure on Moslem members living in majority areas Bengali loyalties he said were increasingly cutting across those of Hindustan and would require careful handling He also argued strongly the need for an Indian equivalent to the British Privy Council to which unpredictable political and judicial problems could be referred

Mountbatten has had a talk with Baldev Singh the Defence Minister who in the presence of Jenkins the Governor of the Punjab denied being the treasurer of the Sikhs appeal fund which is undoubtedly being subscribed for warlike and unconstitutional purposes

Baldev sought advice on the Army nationalisation scheme What chance was there of British Services remaining on after June 1948? Mountbatten replied that it all depended on whether India wants to be in the Commonwealth A face saving formula is needed to cover the Congress resolution passed prior to 20th February to set up a sovereign independent Republic Baldev's general attitude goes to confirm that partition is now the only solution acceptable to all parties

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Friday 18th April 1947*

Mountbatten was in buoyant mood at to day's Staff Meeting He had an interesting talk with Krishna Menon who took upon himself part of the original responsibility for the Independent Sovereign Republic formula The search however for another formula which will ensure a close link with Britain is being actively pursued by him and some of the Congress leaders Menon has explained how initiative on Congress's part is impossible even the semblance of it would lose them their position it must come in some way from us In the course of the discussion I said I felt that at the military level the analogy and advantages of the Combined Chiefs of Staff procedure in the war should not be overlooked and Mountbatten agrees that this should certainly be kept in mind

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Saturday 19th April 1947*

Mountbatten gave us an alarming but none the less amusing account of his interview with the Sikh leaders He found himself confronted by some very scruffy old gentlemen with long beards and large *kirpans* who put on their glasses looking just like benign professors full of peaceful intentions but telling a few fibs in the process They all insisted that he must partition the Punjab and said the Sikhs were the principal victims in the Rawalpindi riots

Mountbatten mentioned the interview he had yesterday with Dr Matthai who had stressed that although responsible Indian leaders were now generally making dispassionate and temperate speeches the Press was causing much trouble and was in his view

an irrespons bl and infl mmatory element in the s tuation Matthai suggested that the V ceroy should call t gether all ed t r and appe l to them to t ne d n thei comment and impl men n their wn way the Gandhi J nnah Appe l Dr Matthai though th t this v ould ha e tremendous effect Mou tbatten asked fo my comment I said that I doubted hether thi approach wa e the feas bl or e en desir ble It ould be phys cally er dif cult to br ng n all the ed tors c ncern d from d stant parts and when they h d arrived at Vicer g l requ st they o l expect to be told e s f some firm decis on They w uld t say the least, be deflated at r cei ing only an exhortat on More o er I uggested the des rab l ty f t k ng th matter up v th P tel n th f rst nstance n his capacity s M n ster of Informa tion

At h s meet ng yesterd y v th Dr Khan S hib the sugg stion was mooted th t Mo ntbatten should pay an early vi t to the North w st Fr nt r Pr vince Th dea h thert had been t postp ne t ur until the m jor Ila h d b en c mpleted an appr v d but the Fr nt er tuat on eems to call for speci t eatment b foreh nd In ur gen al policy d cu on the Domin on Status ss e wa furthe thra hed ut Mountb tt n po nted out th t Naz mudd the M lem Leag e lead r n East Beng l as just as dam nt as Jinnah ab t Paki tan Isma stressed that we wer engaged n cr at ng two Pak st ns h h *drew from M u tb tten th c mme t th t wh te er ts impl ca* t ons h was beg n ng to th nk Paki tan v s nevit ble

In the e ni g the M untb tt ns g ve a mall d nce the walled garden by th wimm ng pool for Pam la ghteenth b rthday The f ll of f u ta ns d the gl mmer of f r y l ghts the r s ft a d fresh the dark gr en cypr trees red roses cl mbing on wh te walls d the red and gold of th V ce g l servants—her w s all one could a k f an enchanted garden

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Monday 21st Ap l 1947*

Mountbatten rehearsed hi aftern o meeting w th Li qu t ind cat ng that h s fin l d ci on a to whether there sho ld b a fresh el ct on in the N rth we t Front er Pro nce wo ld depend *upon h s estimate of the Mo lem Leag e s ab l ty to f rm a* respons ble M nistry He said he wo ld m ke t abundantly clear that in sp te of appe ran es he wo ld n t in fact y eld to force r to the threat of f rce

I have been a ked to prepare a Pres n t announcing the forthcom ng Fr nt er t ur

The M untb tten ga a sm ll d nner t th Ho e for th Brockmans N cholls nd urselves *wh h was directly preced d* by a garden party t the Viceregal establ hment Mountb tt n told u th t h had been much sh ken to learn th t th three hundred and se enty fi guests were all of the offcer cadre and

that there were in all some seven thousand persons on the Vice regal estate He said he had told some of them that they ought to have a Mayor and had then added that he supposed he was their Mayor! This seemed to go down well with the guests and showed he felt that the Indian had a sense of humour or at least the good manners to laugh at the right time

While we were in the drawing room before dinner Lady Mount batten confessed that she found herself continually trying to move the heavy teak framed chairs and sofas only to be no less continually discovered by the servants in this undignified attempt! In this connection she quoted the experience of Lady Linlithgow whose dog had had an unfortunate accident on the Viceregal carpet shortly before the guests were due to arrive It took so long to find a servant of sufficiently low caste to clear up the mess that she was finally obliged to deal with it herself and was caught by her guests and servants in the act!

During dinner an officer s name was mentioned and Lady Mountbatten exclaimed Let us see him by all means but don t let him arrange any more tours for us She then told a story of a trip in the Arakan when the said hapless officer forgot that the river was tidal and she and Elizabeth Ward had to leave their jeep and swim for it to keep their engagement!

Mountbatten told me that the interview with Liaquat had been very interesting Liaquat had spoken with much frankness about Wavell saying they all knew that he was a very great soldier but he had undoubtedly made his political position impossible for himself with the Indian leaders when they all went to London last December On that occasion he had apparently taken an apologetic line by asserting that he was merely a soldier and that he had made mistakes After such a confession it became obvi ous Liaquat said that he could no longer carry on and it was immediately after this that the idea of a successor began to come into the picture

Mountbatten told us he felt it was a very great pity that if he had to have this job he could not have taken it on eighteen months ago He might then have been able to influence events but now with the time at our disposal this was almost impossible There had been a catastrophic deterioration in the situation during the past few months and political solutions must be found within the time limit and therefore before one could really hope to influence events

In a general talk about the Press I used the occasion to stress the importance of hard news ahead of time which enabled us to control speculation and mentioned in this connection our success with the Governors Conference I also underlined my conviction of the importance of Patel in the situation Altogether Mount batten was in very good form throughout the evening

VICEROY S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *T i e day 22nd Apnl 19*

Mountb tten said to d y th t rep esentatives of approxima h half of th nhabitants of India h d already asked t be al e to emain w thin the Commonwealth They included the M s Le gu the Sched led Castes nd the I d States— lthou h all th Stat s ubjects might not be of the same pinion as R lers All these appl cants he added seemed to thi k t y were doing Gre t B itain a favour by asking to stay in. Mount b tt n ent on to nquire hether t was cons dered that there was any po ib l ty of granting some form of Dom n n Sta s to Ind a s a h le r more probably t the separate parts of India n th n ar fut re He nv s ged the s tting up of a De fence Counc l and a Go rno -General as chairman th a ca g vote Ismay thou ht e should n t rule out unil teral application by Pak stan for Commonw e lth membersh p Mountb tt n d rect ed th t pl nn n for the grant of Dominion Status to India, w heth r un ted d ided befo e June nd poss bly by January 1948 hould continue oncurrently w th the Pla for the ma n decision

He has come round to the v w to-day that the Cab net Mis s on Pl n can s m l ov be resu rected n new form and name. A o g nally p es nt d it as psychologically ron If the principl of t o o re gn Stat s could b accepted r on might be ach eved thro gh so ereig ty We had t recogn se that the Mosl m League were prepared to gi e up the B nd C G o ps (full P ki tan rea) a d to accept a truncated Pak stan if a real f ee centre w ent w th t

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Wedne d y 23rd April 194*

Th s m rn ng Mountbatten l a had a thr e h ur sess on th J n ah

He seem d to be res gned to the part t on of the Punjab and Beng l He d d not sk w hat the boundar es would be and Mountbatt n d d n t tell him He is putt ng out an appeal to reas n n the North w est F ont er Prov nce and is clea ly re l e ed t n t be ng asked to call off D rect Act on H told Mountb tt n Trankly Your Excellency th H ndus re im po s ble Th y l ays want sevent n anna for the rupee.

M lan Azad th leading Co gre s Mo lem has put forward a new formula It that M untbatte personal nterpreta on of the Br tish G rnment s statem nt following the Lo don meet ing w th the Ind n Le d rs and Wavell l st December on t e right of Provinces to opt ut f Gr ups would be acceptab He ba es this on a d ct m of Gandh s 'The sole referee of hat s or is not in the interests f Ind a a h le w ll be Mount batten in his personal capacity

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Friday 25th April 1947*

At to day s Staff Meeting the first draft of the Plan was con sidered but no clear concept for its final projection on the Parties and the public emerged Ian Scott raised an important debating point favouring the widest publicity for it prior to its submission to the Working Committees of the two Parties who would then have the searchlight of world attention focused upon them This technique might have the effect of drawing the more moderate elements in both Congress and Moslem League together again to preserve the bare essentials of unity

Mountbatten agreed that it was most important that with the issue of the announcement the impression should not be created that partition was a foregone conclusion but that the question had been referred for decision to the will of the people To im prove the chances of a return to a united India he felt that an escape clause should be included in the announcement and he would consider as counting as a form of union any plan in which the centre dealt with the same subjects as in the Cabinet Mission Plan—namely External Affairs Defence and Communications The crux of the matter eemed to him to be that in the Cabinet Mission Plan the Hindu majority at the centre would be able permanently to outvote the Moslem minority and use the reserved subjects to subdue them The alternative was that the representa tives of Pakistan and Hindustan should come together on the basis of parity If this form of a united India could be obtained it might be possible for the Punjab Bengal and Assam to remain united Abell pointed out that it would not be real parity which depended on the relative strength of the two sovereign States Mountbatten replied that he realised this point My object is to create the effect of two sovereign States or separate blocks negotiating at the centre rather than having a system of majority voting

Among the various points raised by Mountbatten whose mind ranged over the whole problem with much vigour and originality were forebodings about the future of Calcutta He felt that the Moslems would be bound to demand a plebiscite for it and that its fate would become a major issue It would however be most undesirable to lay down the procedure of self determination here which might well give the wrong answer

He reports that Patel has been complaining You won t govern yourself and you won t let us govern But in fact we are aiming at a date as early as 19th May for the decisive meeting with the Leaders

VICEROY S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Saturday 26th April 1947*

Mountbatten has decided to send Ismay and George Abell back to London with the first draft of the Plan to hammer it out clause by clause with the Government and officials concerned

g ing background guid nce bout this trip I am to expl n th t one of Mountbatten prine pal objects in h v ng I m y a d M eville on h s staff is in rder to improve li ison th Wh t hall and to enable them to sit London alternately at approximately two-monthly intervals It is understood that the first to return w ll be Lord Ismay

The Comm nwe lth issue is l oming large There has been a f ir i d cat on of Pat l s policy on this subject in the lead ng article of to-day's *H dustan Tim s* Ism y drew attention to the relevant extract wh ch run as f llo s —

If there is a settlement between the Congress and the League as a result of wh ch the M l m majority are s are all ed to const t te themsel es into eparate o re gn State we h ve no d bt that the Un on will not stand in the ay of Brita n estab l shing contacts th those States. It must be cle rly understood howe r that the Ind an Union w ll cons der it a host l act if the is any attempt by Brita n to concl de any treaty or all ance invol ing m l tary or pol t cal clau s

Mountb tten s line on thi that he ha ecei ed no instruct ons as to the att tud h hould dopt n the eve t of ne or m re parts of I dia expr ssing a des to r main w th n the Common realth But H Majesty s G ernment had clea ly enjo ned him n t t enter into any d sc ssion n thi matt r s h h might im per l the ch nces f Ind n un ty to att in hich had always been nd would rem n h fir t ambit n and d term nat o

Bob Sim on the B B C s special corre po d nt in Ind h s shown me h l test cr pt rel yed thr ughout the day all the B B C news bulletins One most important f ct he sa d n the Ind n t t n h ch tend to be o rl oked n the ru h of d y to-day nev s s that Ind att tude towa ds Br tain has und rg ne a f ndament l cha g n th last t vo m nths Tl e good w ll establ hed by Br ta n s Qu t Ind statement h been consol d ted by the new Viceroy i five industriou weeks

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI S *day 27th April 1947*

George Abell is back fr m h s trip to Lah e where he reports a serio s situati n Jenk n p bably the ablest adm ni trator in Ind con ders there s a gra e d nger f ci il war When asked by Georg wh ther there was anyth ng else we could do b t lea in Jun 1948 Jenk n admitt d th t there was no lternati but there was a real pe l that we ould be h nd ng over t chaos.

From Calcutta com the news th t John Chri t e J i t Pri ate Secretary to th V er y has f iled to sell th Be g l sect n of the Plan to Bu rows who w s stand ng o t f r the d ctrin of a free city of Cal-utta He describes its in tall tion after J ne 1948

as mandatory This seems to be a strange word to apply to a situation over which we shall have no control whatever at that time

CHAPTER SIX

FRONTIER VISIT

GOVERNMENT HOUSE PESHAWAR *Monday 28th April 1947*

EARLY THIS MORNING I set off by air with the Viceregal party for Peshawar It was a bumpy journey and Pamela and myself in particular were both feeling somewhat green on arrival The most impressive spectacle on the way up was the mighty Nanga Parbat which we could see from the air over a hundred miles away to the north rising in perfect symmetry to some twenty five thousand feet overtopping by at least ten thousand feet the surrounding peaks We touched down just after midday

On arrival at Government House where we were anticipating a nice quiet lunch prior to an afternoon of steady conference we found ourselves confronting a situation of crisis bordering on panic Sir Olaf Caroe the Governor in a state of some agitation advised us that there was an immense Moslem League demonstration less than a mile away which was to place its grievance before the Viceroy and was ready to risk breaking the law by forming a procession and marching on Government House The only alternative according to Caroe was for the Viceroy to forestall this plan by marching on them and showing himself to the multitude The demonstrators were estimated at well over seventy thousand and had been gathering from the most remote parts of the Province many of them having been on the march for several days Montbatten had a brief council of war with Caroe and the Premier Dr Khan Sahib and it was agreed that the Viceroy should show himself without delay

Mountbatten thereupon drove off to the demonstration Lady Mountbatten with great courage insisting on going with him The crowd confronting us was certainly formidable We climbed up the railway embankment close to the historic Fort Bala Hissar and looked down upon a vast concourse gathered at Cunningham Park and stretching away into distant fields There was much gesticulation and the waving of innumerable but illegal green flags with the white crescent of Pakistan accompanied by a steady chant of Pakistan Zindabad

Within a few minutes of our arrival however the bro[illegible] tension lifted The slogan changed Mountbatten [illegible] could be heard and cheers were raised Sullen faces [illegible]

nearly half an ho r Mountbatten in h s khak b sh sh rt a d Lady M untbatte also in a bush sh rt stood wav ng to the crowd vh ch had a surprisingly large number of women and children in it midst. Any sort of speech wa out of the que tion But the impact of the r friendly conf dent personal ti s on that fanat cal a sembly had to be seen to be beli ed

As we swarmed down th embankm nt and drove back t a well-e rned lunch the rel ef of th Go ernor nd local off tals could not be conceal d They told us that it ould have been q te beyond th reso ces of the local pol ce and m lit ry t have deflected the cr wd peaceably if they had made up their collective mi d to invade Go ernment House As t w s after seeing the Mountb tten they struck camp and returned to the r homes

After lunch Mountbatt n began se es of ex cting nt rviews I was pre ent f r t vo of them on vith Kh n Sah b and his Cab net of four Mini ter and the oth r with a deputat on of local H ndu res dents He lso met th local Mosl m Leag e leaders f r whom speci l d spen t n was made to lea e gaol in order to e h m. S per mpo ed upon th s c nfl ct wh ch was in it elf suff ci ntly seri us t become th focal point of the w d r struggle between Congress nd the Moslem Leag e was the ery diff cult relati nsh p b twe n the Go ernor nd h s Congr ss Pr me M n ter This fr cti n als had wider impl cations at the nat onal l vel

Mountbatten s d plomat c res l en wa hown to good ad ant age n h encou ter with Khan Sah b and h coll agues t v hich th G ern r was ls present He b gan by say ng h w g ateful he was for the oppo t n ty f meeting th m in person H w uld a k them and they could a k him questi ns He appreciated Khan S hib publ c-spir t d advice that he sh uld go to meet the d m n trat rs H h d n f ct d e n th ng but stand n the emb nkment. H h d pre i sly ref ed J nah perm s o to org ni e a procession to G ernment Hous Kh n Sah b n h s de was t pa ns to co firm th t h had called off a process on of Red Sh rts—th Congres mas mo ement in the Pr ince and co nterpart of the Moslem League G ee Sh rt rga sat n

Mountb tten dded th t h h d come to t rn o r I d t Ind ans t tran fer pow r n acc danc w th the will of th pe ple He w al eady dev s ng mach nery f r dealing w th the Punjab and Bengal but he added "Th Front r po t on vol es particular d ff culty f r m I sh ll be t ll ng the Moslem Leag e that I w ll n t yield to I nce I t ll y u pr tly th t I th nk el ct ons ar nece sary but I can mak no f rm guarantee to the Moslem that ther will be any J nn h s prom se s that if there is any election there w ll be no vi lenc You must trust my i t grity J nn h accepts th pos t n and is asking h s f l lowers to call off civil d sobed ence Mountbatten ask d about

the general control exercised by the Moslem League High Com mand The reply was that the local Moslem League had run riot and taken charge At the last election the Moslem League had definitely been defeated on the Pakistan issue and even Rab Nishtar a Moslem League leader of the first rank at the national level was not returned Then the Congress policy of Quit India had won but that cry no longer held the people together and many who had originally supported Congress were now look ing ahead and wondering whether they would come under Hindu control

When Khan Sahib turned to the question of Pathanistan the discussion became somewhat disjointed and explosive Gandhi has for some time been actively interested in this concept and has lately been stressing its virtues with renewed vigour If it were to prevail it would create a new frontier nationalism cutting across the Province s communal and political solidarity with Pakistan If you destroy the Pathan nation warned Khan Sahib terrible things will happen

Mountbatten went on to ask why there was no coalition govern ment in the North west Frontier Province Khan Sahib replied heatedly If Congress want a coalition I shall not remain in Mountbatten hastened to add I was asking for information only Our people are very poor Khan Sahib continued The Moslem League here represent only self interest and a very privil eged class of Khans Caroe pointed out There are some very wealthy Congress supporters as well

Mountbatten inquired about the state of communal feeling in the Province Caroe replied The Moslem masses are protecting Hindus and Sikhs except of course in Hazara The hearts and minds of the Moslems are sound Khan Sahib alleged that Moslems had been allowed by officials to break the law Caroe replied firmly that he knew of no single instance where officials were not trying to do their duty but they were always blamed

Following a discussion on constitutional procedure with com plaints from the Governor of unjustifiable executive pressure on the part of the Prime Minister and from the Prime Minister of interference in the Government on the part of the Governor Mountbatten intervened to say I am out here to do a job with no axe to grind I want to transfer power in terms of the will of the people Ideally I would have a plebiscite here but there i no time He then discussed the implications of demission to the Pro vinces partition generally and in relation to the North west Frontier Province and the solemn duty placed upon him My problem he added is whether to hold an election before we go or whether law and order are sufficient for the Government to hold on He suggested a joint committee of the two High Commands to advise on elections The British he said always carried the rap but he reiterated that his mandate was [illegible]

ty. Altogether it was a tense and taut session which tested Mountbatten's resources to the full.

No sooner was this meeting with the Ministers over than we entered into a session with local Hindu representatives. They explained that their deputation was more communal than political or anti-Moslem League, and they made it clear that they were not concerned with the fate of the Ministry but with the life and security of innocent Hindus and Sikhs. Mountbatten: "I am trying to get at the facts. Do you support the Government?" The Hindus: "We are prepared to live at peace under any Government." Mountbatten: "I am glad of this sensible attitude. I am trying to act constitutionally." There were complaints about the lack of police, who were stretched to the utmost. Four Brigades were there, but there were murders in Peshawar and lack of any effective police action. Mountbatten stressed the danger of using soldiers in place of police. The two had different functions. He added that there were at this moment more troops in the North-West Frontier Province than anywhere else in India, and Caroe added that more use was being made of them than at any time in his twenty-five years experience, even in 1930-31. Mountbatten said that he was out to get the larger [illegible] and the uncertainty, but it would have to be a solution acceptable to all.

I was not able to stay on for the third meeting, this time with the Moslem League leaders, specially released from gaol for the occasion. Among the delegation were the young and fanatical Pir of Manki Sharif and Khan Abdul Quayyum Khan. I understand from Ian Scott that they spoke at great length and with the utmost vehemence. Mountbatten has wisely given instructions that they should all be lodged in one gaol so that they can meet and consult each other. He also agreed with their proposal that they should be allowed to go to Delhi on parole for consultation with Jinnah.

I was for some time heavily engaged in drafting and securing approval for Press notices covering the day's activities, and was only able to come in at the tail end of a reception given by Dr. Khan Sahib. Later in the evening there was a dinner party at Government House attended by all members of the Government and leading civil and military officials. Paying his tribute as one of the guests at this last bout of Viceregal splendour in Peshawar [illegible] will see was Brigadier Sir H[illegible]muddin Khan, a famous local landowner and personality, more Anglophile than the British. Mustering all his medals and dressed in archaic regimental uniform, he made a brave showing and recalled past glories. He told me that the first Viceroy he had served was Curzon, and that his first assignment was as a very junior officer of the guard outside the great man's bedroom. It was not an easy job, for Curzon was such a light sleeper that

the officers of the guard and the sentries had to put felt over their boots to avoid disturbing him

GOVERNMENT HOUSE PESHAWAR AND RAWALPINDI
Tuesday 29th April 1947

After an early breakfast we set off for a tour of the Khyber and for the *Jirga* at Jamrud We passed the famous Islamia College where a few years ago Ian Scott had been the Principal On the way back we were regaled by cries of Pakistan Zindabad" from a number of the students who were perhaps alive to the important role their college could play in the training of much needed officials for the new State they were so fervently hailing. We passed the fort where the Guru Hari Singh is buried and were told how on his death his body had been propped up in Jamrud for all to see We then came to the great Jamrud Fort hewn out of the rocks—the garrison of the Khyber Rifles

All the way on our twelve mile journey the *Khassidars* were spaced out guarding both sides of the road from nearby hillocks They were a tribal police force about one thousand six hundred strong who were encouraged to keep order among their warlike brothers through sharing in Government benefits The Afridis have apparently squatted on the Pass ever since the days of classical Greece Their system of rule was described as being one of heredity based on character which if it is accepted is as stable a system as any Mr Lowis explained that we were moving up into the heart of the Pathan kingdom which had two ethnic boundaries—the Hindu Kush and the Indus We reached the top of the Pass at Charbagh and from there we looked out into Afghanistan Lady Mountbatten told me she first came to the Khyber as a girl of nineteen and was very much of a pioneer in doing so Each detail of the rugged route had remained vivid in her memory

We then turned back to Landi Kotal where Mountbatten met the tribal *Jirga* of *Maliks* (elders) representing the Afridi Shinwari Zakahe Malikdin Sipah Salmani and Kullaghori clans The scene provided an extraordinary contrast with the bleak austere grandeur of the Pass itself Landi Kotal camp indeed was just like a leafy Sussex village in summer time The *Jirga* itself was a colourful assembly Many of the tribesmen squatting in the shade of the trees looked very old and benign and it was difficult to imagine that they were some of the toughest warriors in the world

Their spokesman one Khan Abdul Latif Khan who spoke in Pushtu translated by Caroe put forward at some length and with occasional supporting interjections from his fellow leaders, the various demands Several of these were of a local character but on the wider front he pleaded that in the event of the British

Government vacating India the Khyber should be returned to them. Moreover he made it clear that while they belonged to no particular party their sympathies were with their Moslem brethren. Indeed he indulged in a considerable anti-Nehru and anti-Hindu diatribe. Nehru, who was actually stoned when he visited the Frontier last year, had warned Mountbatten to expect a hand-picked *Jirga*, but I must say that this one seemed to be genuinely representative.

Mountbatten's reply dealt with all the specific points raised, advising that it was up to them to negotiate their agreements with the successor authority. He added a characteristic personal point. "As I expect you know," he said, "I am a sailor and had the honour of fighting in a battle in the North Sea in company with H.M.S. *Afridi*, called after your tribe because of its famous warlike qualities. Although the British have had to fight you Afridis in the past on occasions, we respect and like each other. Your *Jirgas* have a reputation for wisdom and foresight. For the last sixty years you have abided and stuck to your agreement. In this critical time, when power is to be handed over, do not lose that reputation."

As tokens of good will Khan Abdul Latif Khan then presented the Viceroy with a number of gifts, including a haversack, Pathan dagger and *chappal*, and a rifle of splendid craftmanship made somewhere in the Khyber caves. After a short break for coffee, which only helped to heighten the home-from-home feeling, we again set off in our single file of cars down the hill back to Peshawar.

On our return a second but smaller *Jirga*, this time of Wazir and Mahsud tribesmen, was waiting us in the grounds of Government House. They too were very outspoken in their attitude to a Hindu raj. Mountbatten assured them, "I have taken note of what you have said about Pakistan and I have taken action about the release of prisoners from gaols. Arrangements are being made among themselves as to when they will come out. The sooner the present tensions can be relieved the better for all concerned." There followed short talks with Hindu and Sikh minority delegation, who not unnaturally spoke with much more moderation.

Immediately after lunch we left by air for Rawalpindi, arriving there an hour later. We had hardly touched down and set foot in Command House before the Governor, Sir Evan Jenkins, whisked us off to Kahuta, scene of some recent severe communal rioting. Dusty and with parched throats after a twenty-five mile car drive we arrived to find that the havoc in this small town was very great. Picking our way through the rubble we could see that the devastation was as thorough as any produced by fire-bomb raids in the war. This particular communal orgy involved the destruction of Sikhs and their livelihood by Moslems

who were proving difficult to track down The Moslems in the area seemed to be quite pleased with themselves and to be unable to appreciate that the local Sikh trade s were one of the principal sources of their own prosperity Economically the ruin which the two communities inflict upon each other is complete and horrifying both in its immediate and long term implications

After a thorough tour—and on such occasions no detail escapes their eagle eyes—the Mountbattens sat at a small table and listened to various local leaders and representatives explaining the situation and putting forward their grievances One Dewan Pinki Das Sabharwal regaled us with a highly coloured address some five pages in length which was not on the agenda Jenkins was not unnaturally annoyed as the remarks were full of gross accusations against himself as Governor and gave various strange statistics including a reference to three thousand one hundred and ninety nine forcible conversions

On our return to Rawalpindi I met some Indian and British Press friends at the local hotel and went into some of the difficulties they are having in filing stories from here I got back only just in time for the dinner at Command House where I sat next to Colonel Still an intelligent man who engaged me in an interesting talk on Parliamentary democracy and the need for the cunning good man to run it He gave a definition of barbarism as an absence of values to which appeal can be made Propaganda was thus to be seen as a concession to if not an actual by product of barbarism

VICEROY S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Wednesday 30th April 1947*

Our party split up—Mountbatten returning direct to Delhi and Lady Mountbatten carrying on with her tour of the riot areas I found myself busily engaged with correspondents who were anxious to receive background guidance on the result of the visit. It was necessary to tread warily The full force of Congress and Moslem League interest was temporarily focused on the Province and the air was full of speculation

My first job was to deal firmly with Altaf Hussain the Editor of *Dawn* who published a shockingly inaccurate story from his Peshawar correspondent under the following banner headlines Mountbatten Confers with Frontier Leaders—Manki and Quayyum Refuse to be Released on Parole—Huge Demonstration by Pathan Men and Women—Viceroy Flying to Jamrud In so far as Mountbatten had spent over two hours with Manki and Quayyum who had both been the chief spokesmen of the Moslem delegation his first reaction was to make a personal protest to Jinnah but I dissuaded him from doing this on Hussain assurance that the story would be corrected to morrow This ticular correspondent s imaginative powers reach their

the reference to the Viceroy s fl ght to Jamrud \ here there is no a rfield

Cle rly there e e f tangible results to report but in br ng ing the local Moslem leaders into t uch w th J ah and there by the w der conte t of ent Mo ntbatte ce ta nly h lped to take the dge off the immed te cris s The only ch nce of calling off the ci il d obed nce campa gn rests \ith J nnah h mself The Front r leaders re ild m n \ho if left to the r own dev ces h ve neithe the \ ll nor esource to achie e a reasonable s ttlem nt The whol v s t h s brought home to u the need f r chie ng the w der gr eme t on India s fut re as quickly as poss ble If we do n t th re will be a ompl t d s ntegrat n f wh t rem ins f l w and rd both in the Front er nd the P njab not t speak f th th r n rthern Pr vinces It is cert ly a gre t d pensat n th t s th a d central Ind h uld be r main g s calm

Doon Campbell f Re ter telephon d t m dn ght to tell me f t o very stro gly w rd d st tem ts ju t p t out by J h nd Dr R jendra P sad J n h h said was in effect l unch ing h s rredenti t campa g g t a tru cated or m t lat d m th-eaten P k tan nd d m d ng a n t on l h me of m e amb t ous d mens ons n fact of all Pr nce ncluded i Groups B a d C f th Cab net M n Plan reg rdles of the r com m n l majorit (i S nd the P njab North est Frontier Pro nce B l h sta B ng l nd Assam) Pras d s tatem nt t seems draws att nt n t the h st c Moslem League resol tion t Lah r n 1940 wh ch l unched the c ncept of P kist n but wh h spoke f t compr ng a ea wher Mosl ms ere n m cally n the m jor ty 1 th third ses n of the Con stit nt As embly wh ch pe ed ea l er th s \eek Pr sad spe k i g a ts ne P e d nt h d l eady pr pared th m nd of members f r the part t n of I d b t as a p t of the proce s for the d i n of om of the P s a well

Pra d i one of the most nflu t al f th Cong es h gh command and has bee h ld ng th key Mi istry of Food and Agricult re in the Inte m C er ment Whe I h d tea \ th him at h s home the ther day I wa impre ed by h s seren ty and undoubted d pth of mind a d st ngth of character He is es ent lly mod rat and c ncil t a man of the people whose good reputation h ttle to do th the dem gog c arts but s the outcome of long nd loyal service to th Nati n l st cause He \ill und ubt dly h e a k y rol to pl y in the ne\ reg m wheth r n n t d or d id d Ind a

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He was in f ct to become the fir t Pr d nt of th Indian R publ c following the adopt n of the Ind an Con t t t n in J uary 19 9

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday 1st May 1947*

I was present at the lunch party to day and sat next to Mr Bardoloi Prime Minister of Assam quiet spoken and unassuming as are so many of the front rank Congressmen

At to-day s Staff Meeting we had a further discussion on the problem of the retention of India within the Commonwealth We have received a reminder from London that in any consideration of the granting of Dominion Status the Indian States are not at present British territory at all and could hardly be incorporated as part of the British Commonwealth

As far as British India was concerned Mountbatten came down heavily against the concept of allowing only a part to remain in with the consequent risk of Britain being involved in the support of one Indian sovereign State against another He personally favoured the formula that only British India as a whole should be permitted to remain in the Commonwealth In the meanwhile a completely non committal attitude on the question should be maintained Ismay s personal view however was that it would be virtually impossible both on moral and material grounds to eject from the Commonwealth any part of India that asks to remain in If Pakistan were involved relations with the entire Moslem bloc extending from the Middle East had to be considered British backing if not of the whole then of a part of India might be the one way to avoid a civil war Ian Scott subscribed to Ismay s argument

George Abell while agreeing that the British would have a continuing moral responsibility felt that the worst way of fulfilling this might be the unilateral support of Pakistan I said that I agreed with George and felt that support by Great Britain of one part of India only would result in the sub-continent becoming the centre of international tension and intrigue Mieville raised the important question whether under the Statute of Westminster all members of the British Commonwealth would have to be consulted about the inclusion or ejection of the whole or parts of India He added that V P Menon Reforms Commissioner and as such an *ex officio* member of his Staff had advised him that Patel might be ready to accept an offer of Dominion Status for the time being

We are turning our attention to the Bengal situation and Sir Frederick Burrows who was unable to be present for the Governors Conference owing to illness arrived yesterday for a twenty four hour visit Mountbatten has enjoyed meeting him again and found him congenial company Burrows made his reputation as a member of the Soulbury Commission which duly recommended Dominion Status for Ceylon and was taking evidence in Colombo a few months after Mountbatten had

lished h s S.E.A.C. Headquarters in K ndy He certa nly provides an int r t g contrast to mo t of h s pred cess rs at Government Hou Calcutta For h is ry pr ud of his years of service a a ra lwayman d n one occa on s said to have startled Calcutta soc ety by decl ring that the main d fference betw en himself a d prev ous Govern rs of Bengal as that wh le they we accustomed to hunt n and sh otin he was accustomed to shuntin d h t n ! He del ght d n exchang ing m l tary memor s w th M ntbatten strictly as between sergeant major a d Adm ral

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *F day 2 d M y 1947*

I have put out th ann ncement that the Mountbattens will be leav ng for a hort v s t to S mla Mountbatten nx s to make it cl r th t no inter upt n f b iness s nvol ed and th tatement explain th t he h s now come t the nd f p *l m ary m eti g th represent t Ind n lead rs and w ll* b lea ng fter the weekly C b net meet ng on th 6th r t rn ing n t me to p d er the next o

I ha l released an cco nt of Lady Mountbatten s adventurous thre day t d ring wh ch sh o d early one th sa d f e h ndred m l by pl n bes des con derabl d tances by car a d on f t She left Lah t s e th morn i g the V ce y s Dakota r ng o er Mo ltan th l st place on her long t erary j st befo e 8 30 Sh as ble to l nd th e was a d t t rm e n are of abo t t ve ty m les rad s d b l ty as ery poor Th pl n c rcled left a d ght t ary g he ght d wn t b t thr h d ed feet but fa led to ght the a rfeld Muriel Watson h d th utm t d fficulty n ind cing her to call off th ear h a d she ly greed to do o ft r h h d sent a message t the Mo lt Comm ss e xp e s ng her regrets and her resol e to et rn t th e l est pos bl d t

I set off to-n ght by the Delhi Ma l f r a qu et long eek-end with my fam ly at M h b p to th r l of the ma V cereg l party in S ml on T e day

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In f ct t wa on the d ice f Lord Mo ntb tten aft r he h d called a meet g w th Ther Excell nc the Go ern nd *Comm der in Ch ef Ceylon in M y 1944 that a C mmis n* was ent out

CHAPTER SEVEN

CRISIS AT SIMLA

'THE RETREAT' MASHOBRA SIMLA *Monday 5th May 1947*

FOR THE PAST forty eight hours I have been able to relax and from our mountain aerie drink in the splendour and solitude of the Himalayan landscape For days on end mists and cloud act like a vast backcloth allowing one a vista of no more than the valley below and the neighbouring peak of Shali a mere twelve thousand feet high and snowless in the spring Then suddenly the curtain rises and stretching before one in an uninterrupted arc of over ninety degrees is the eternal snowline range after range sixteen thousand feet and more No doubt there are many other vistas of the main Himalayan range as impressive as this for the roof of the world covers over two hundred and fifty thousand square miles and includes at least forty peaks of over twenty four thousand feet But the splendid and awesome vision from Simla serves as a symbol of this immensity

During my brief respite here in Mashobra the pace of political events in Delhi quickened Ismay and George Abell left for London on the 2nd May taking with them the draft Plan for the British Government s consideration

On Saturday there was the first major Indian Press attack upon Mountbatten significantly enough from the *Hindustan Times* to which some weight has always to be given in so far as it is edited by the Mahatma s son Devadas Gandhi and owned by his wealthiest supporter G D Birla At any given time it is the mouthpiece of Nehru or Patel or of the Mahatma himself

The article began by saying For the first time since Lord Mountbatten assumed the Viceroyalty the feeling that he may not be playing fair has come among Congressmen and Sikh leaders There then followed revelations of the Viceroy s main conclusions which were sufficiently accurate as to indicate inside knowledge and some no less well informed but somewhat threatening Congress reactions These included a demand for special terms for the Sikhs in the Punjab There was also an ominous unwillingness to concede a fresh election on the Frontier The Congress Working Committee according to the writer has made the Frontier question a test case It has made clear to the Viceroy that any proposal to dismiss the Frontier M and hold fresh elections will make the Congress change attitude towards the British Government

I understand that yesterday Mountbatten had two important interviews with Gandhi and Jinnah the net effect of which made Mountbatten wonder whether Ismay's departure had not been premature. By a freak of chance the interviews overlapped, and Mountbatten had the political insight and social finesse to bring the two leaders together for their first meeting in three years. But once the formalities of greeting were over the encounter baffled Mountbatten's calculations. For Gandhi and Jinnah with their chairs far apart were quite unable to raise their voices sufficiently so that they seemed to be like two old conspirators engaged in long-distance dumb show. Although Mountbatten strained his ears much of the conversation escaped him. However his primary purpose was amply achieved if they agreed to have a full discussion with each other at Jinnah's house.

Before leaving for Simla Mountbatten had been gathering in the views of the Governors of the Punjab, Bengal and North West Frontier Province on the desirability of the partition of India for their Provinces. Briefly Caroe was in favour for the North West Frontier Province; Burrows non-committal for Bengal, although on balance against; and Jenkins took an extremely gloomy view of the situation created by its acceptability to the Jinnah or the Sikhs. Mountbatten however held firmly to the view that in the last analysis Jinnah would acquiesce and that the only way the Sikhs could improve their position was through negotiation.

'THE RETREAT', MASHOBRA, SIMLA, *Tuesday, 6th May 1947*

Jinnah and Gandhi met for three hours at Jinnah's home in Aurangzeb Road. An agreed statement was issued which read as follows: —

We discussed two matters. One was the question of division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, and Mr Gandhi does not accept the principle of division. He thinks that division is not inevitable whereas in my opinion not only is Pakistan inevitable but it is the only practical solution of India's political problem.

The second matter which we discussed was the letter which we both have signed jointly appealing to the people to maintain peace. We have both come to the conclusion that we must do our best in our respective spheres to see that that appeal of ours is carried out and we will make every effort for this purpose.

Although the meeting in itself was clearly abortive the balance of tactical advantage—as the smoothly worded text suggests—undoubtedly lies with Jinnah. Another nail has been driven into the coffin of the Cabinet Mission Plan. The unresolved question is just how far Gandhi can or will resist the tidal flow of events towards partition.

THE RETREAT MASHOBRA SIMLA *Wednesday 7th May 1947*

My brief respite came to an end to-day when I was summoned to Viceregal Lodge Mountbatten has brought up with him V P Menon who was closely involved in all the 1945 Simla and the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan negotiations Although he has suffered a period of eclipse he is still the trusted confidant of Vallabhbhai Patel

On arrival I was plunged into two successive Staff Meetings the first without Mountbatten and the second with him At both we considered fully the desirability of an alternative plan based on the assumption which V P held was more than possible that Jinnah would not accept the Plan in the draft announcement Mountbatten said he had always borne in mind the possibility of rejection by Jinnah and in all the interviews he had had both with him and Liaquat he had watched carefully for any sign pointing to such an intention but none had been given Every test he had applied led him to the belief that they intended to accept and he could see only two possible suppositions for Jinnah not doing so—the first if his real aim was to keep the British in India and by prolonging the bargaining to make it more difficult for the British to leave in the hope of obtaining thereby a more favourable award the second if he had reached the conclusion that Pakistan was not practicable

But he seriously doubted whether either of these considerations was in Jinnah s mind None the less he agreed with V P s thesis on the advisability of having available a clear alternative in his dealings with Jinnah The second line plan would involve demission of power under the present constitution It would not in the last resort require the agreement of the Indian leaders Provincial subjects would be demitted to existing Provincial Governments and Central subjects to the existing Central Government but it would put the Moslems under the Hindu majority

A telegram has been drafted for dispatch to London giving them the background and asking for approval to hold such a plan in reserve We also went further into the possibilities of retaining India in the Commonwealth and V P confirmed both Patel s and Nehru s positive approach to the subject and the need for dropping the terms King Emperor and Empire to which so many Indians objected V P was finally asked to prepare a paper setting out clearly the procedure whereby a form of Dominion Status could be granted to India under the alternative Plans of Partition and Demission

THE RETREAT MASHOBRA SIMLA, *Thursday 8th May 1947*

At to day s meeting a problem of some moment affecting our relations with the Indian and world Press was on our agenda Ever since our arrival the Foreign correspondents have seeking an off the record interview either with M

with Ismay on his behalf. The political negotiations have been so intensive that it has been necessary to protect Mountbatten from any commitments other than those directly concerned with the formulation of the Plan itself and now Ismay is away for at least another fortnight. On top of this the *Hindustan Times* article last week only confirms that the leading Delhi editors and their correspondents know far more than would be available to them through normal channels. The clamour for some sort of access to the Viceroy for background guidance is more insistent than ever.

My feeling is that while an interview with Mountbatten himself remains out of the question at this time and would involve discrimination against the Indian Press, it would be wise and equitable if Miéville were to stand in for Ismay. I am convinced that the effect of such contact will be to dampen down speculation, particularly in the editorial offices of London and New York, during the critical ten-day hiatus between now and Mountbatten's proposed presentation of the Plan to the Leaders. Whether it is 'yea' or 'nay' to the Foreign correspondents' request, it will in either case involve a calculated risk. No decision was taken to-day. Most of the staff would, I think, like Mountbatten to say 'no' out of hand, but while he is rightly adamant that he personally should not take any part, he shares my view that Miéville should fill the breach.

'THE RETREAT', MASHOBRA, SIMLA *Friday 9th May 1947*

The Dominion Status question was discussed at great length this morning. Mountbatten began by saying he thought it most desirable that if Dominion Status was to be granted to India before June 1948 the grant should in fact take place during 1947. He went so far as to say that he would like to see Dominion Status by 31st December 1947—giving as his reason the startlingly apt precedent of a plenary session of the Quebec Conference during the war. The meeting had been asked to approve a directive that the war with Japan must be ended by 1948. To this President Roosevelt had said he would never agree. Hopkins intervened, 'Well, make it 31 December 1947'—President Roosevelt: 'Agreed.'

Nehru and Krishna Menon have arrived and much will depend on Mountbatten's powers of persuasion with them if the Dominion Status concept is to come to light. Already Krishna indicates resistance to any splitting of the Army if early Dominion Status is accepted. Miéville was inclined to think that there would be more advantage to India than to the Commonwealth from India remaining in, but Mountbatten considered that the value to the United Kingdom both in terms of world prestige and strategy would be enormous. For India as a whole the immense asset of

constitutional continuity He appreciated the many administrative difficulties particularly those facing Pakistan but these were inherent in the situation anyhow What are we doing? he asked Administratively it is the difference between putting up a permanent building a nissen hut or a tent As far as Pakistan is concerned we are putting up a tent. We can do no more

He told us that in the rush of business yesterday he had missed his thirty fourth anniversary of joining the Navy as a twelve years-old cadet

This afternoon there was a brief respite from the intensive discussions The Mountbattens brought Nehru out to tea at The Retreat But for the mountains surrounding us it might have been a typical English garden tea party To begin with there was a certain tension which stifled small talk Fay sitting next to Nehru managed to elicit from him his views on the sugar shortage (they had actually brought their own sugar with them) and his antipathy to Simla This characteristically was derived from his aversion to the spectacle of the rickshaw coolies whose labours he thought were an affront to human dignity

Mountbatten asked Nehru if his responsibilities as Minister for External Affairs covered communications with Burma and if so what had become of the great road and airfield projects which had been built during his S E A C days at immense cost There had been clamour for years for a land link with Burma —were these being kept up? Nehru showed some interest but felt that the cost of maintenance would be very heavy

After tea Nehru said he would like to see our children Mountbatten introduced our son Keith as his godchild exclaiming He stands up so straight he will fall over backwards! We then went on a grand tour of the house and Viceregal orchards

The Mountbattens fell in love with the place and are quite determined to come back again During our walk up and down the orchard terraces Nehru was very agile and confessed to a liking for hill-climbing He gave us a demonstration of a new technique by walking uphill backwards This he said made breathing easier at high altitudes and rested the calf muscles

'THE RETREAT' MASHOBRA SIMLA *Saturday 10th May 1947*

At our Staff Meeting to day Mountbatten reported on a breakfast conversation he had had with Krishna while V P spoke of contact he had made with Patel The impression grows that the Dominion Status formula increasingly appeals to both the Congress leaders Krishna Menon takes credit as the first to have suggested an early transfer of power to India on this basis He thinks Nehru is attracted to the concept if only because it may give Mountbatten opportunity to bring his influence to bear on the more recalcitrant Princes V P suspects that likely in completing the Indian constitution may also encourage

to look tov a ds Dom n on Status as an interim device to fill up the time The ma n d fficulty on the Co gress side seems to be the f r of the left wi g exploit g D minion Statu as a ell out to Br tain

To-day I put out the momentous comm n que ann ncing that the Viceroy had invited the fi e Leade s *to meet h m at* 10 30 a m and th I d an States R pre ent t e in th afte n n, next Satu day 17th M y th p pose be ng to pre nt to them the Plan wh ch *H s Majesty s Go* ernment h s nov made for the transf r of po ver to Ind an hands

At six o lock this e en ng fter a p eliminary run through with Mountbatt n M ille met the Fore gn correspond nts for the long-delayed background talk h s o n h s He brought out th mportant point ry ell—the need f r a qu ck pol t cal sol t on b t a d mocrat e als h n a matter I such magn tude the nus of cho ce must fall pon the peopl th m el or the r elected present ti e ho the Leaders v e be ng brought st p by step t ards g eement Th s was d plomacy by d scuss n a d n t by *d kt t*

I gath r from E c B itter h is stay ng w th us th t the talk h s h d e y ste dy ng eff ct nd n p rticular prov ded enl ghtenment fo the *Am can P e s*

'THE RETREAT' MASHOBRA, SI ILA *S nd y 11tl M y 1947*

Mountb tten has h d a sh tt ng d y He rang me p at Mashobra j st b f re e were d *to entert* in a party of Pre s correspo d t m t of wh m had be n at ye t rday s talk w th M e ille to tell me ju t this—th t it would be neces y t postpone the meet ng w th *the Le d rs ann un ed I st n ght* in our c mmunique as du to take pl ce n 17th May Would I prepar eco d commun q *Th s s certa nly* the st ffe t req est in pol t cal Publ c Rel t ons I h e e rec ved and hav ng done my best t onceal my iety d mental t rmo l f m our tea party I arr ed at *Vice egal Lod*, at 6 30 in the ev ning to fi d de pendency n t t say al m

It seem th t la t n ght M untbatten ga e N hru th ch nce of re ding the draft Plan as rev ed and approved by London and that N hru h ng r d it has ehemently turned t d wn He i conv nced th t t in ol es a maj r *depart re in principle* fr m th or g n l draft prepared by M ntb tt n a d h s taff which Ismay and George Abell t ok back with them to London at the begin g of the *m n h*

Nehru was sat sf ed that both in the Cab net Mis on Plan wh h he wa t *m s t stres is t l* not dead and in the Mountbatten dr ft h c ncept f Ind a a cont ng ent ty had been preserved In the Lo d n draft h w ver the b eak down seem to h m t *am unt to l ttle les* than c nn an at Balkanisation H really wants t to b fully establish d that

India and the Constituent Assembly are the successors to and Pakistan and the Moslem League the seceders from British India Many of the detailed objections he raises are trivial and could in themselves be easily disposed of He will have nothing to do for instance with the proposed procedure for Baluchistan This is no doubt an over estimate but the changes have aroused in him all the old suspicions of London as the home of an alien Civil Service whose hearts are hard and understanding strictly limited when it comes to handling India to day

The one immediate result of his attitude is to make it neces sary for Mountbatten and his staff depleted by the absence of Ismay and Abell to push ahead at once with a second revised draft at the highest speed for transmission to Ismay who by the time Mountbatten s telegrams warning him of this *volte face* reach him will be a somewhat confused and frustrated Viceregal envoy

Having scratched my head over the second communique I went up with Mieville to see Mountbatten in his study to discuss the publicity difficulties and dangers before us His hair was somewhat dishevelled but he was still marvellously resilient He told us that only a hunch on his part had saved him from dis aster Without that hunch Dickie Mountbatten he said would have been finished and could have packed his bag We would have looked complete fools with the Government at home having led them up the garden to believe that Nehru would accept the Plan He said that most of his staff with natural caution had been against his running over the Plan with Nehru but by following his hunch rather than their advice he had pro bably saved the day

I stressed that it was out of the question for us to put out any postponement announcement without ensuring full clearance and consistency with London After some urgent exchanges it was agreed that the announcement should read as follows Owing to the imminence of the Parliamentary recess in London it has been found necessary to postpone H E the Viceroy s meeting with the Indian Leaders announced to begin on Saturday 17th May until Monday 2nd June

The wording of this communique coming so closely upon our Press party and within twenty four hours of our firm announcement to the world of the earlier date has caused me more anxiety than any Press statement I have issued in the past or am likely to issue in the future I have visions of the whole structure of confidence and good will we have so carefully built up falling to the ground and an unrivalled feast being provided for the hungry Press speculators

The weakness of our position is that at a moment of
we have told the truth but it is not the whole truth and
but the truth No one in Delhi is likely to believe

was the source of the postponement and if they do th t in it elf ll only help to oke old suspic ons E eryo e kno s that Nehru h s been stayi g w th the V ceroy and from the str ctly Publ c Relations point of vi I bel ev t o ld have been pre ferable to b se th po tponement on the g unds of drafi ng deta l Ho e r th re as certa nly no time to argue o t th publicity refinem nts of the d l mma w are in The essence of the matter is that we ha e put out with the utm st speed a firm d ci on no less firmly postponed nd ha e secured Londons pproval for t Textual adornment in olv ng d lay are un cceptable

'THE RETREAT' MASHOBRA, SIMLA *Mond y 12tl May 1947*

Mountb tten wh ha now h d a hance t sle p on yester days d vel pme ts d th t altho gh h se ms to have be n able to tabl h h ov n int grity w th th Ind n Leaders undoubt dly a ph bia pers ts ag nst any document or proposal is u ng fr m Lond n Cl a ly any re-drafts ll h to be m de by his o i staff in Ind He h dec d d that ne re s n mu t b to t ke aw y any opt on f r nd pend nc e ther for Be gal or for any other Prov nce He felt that t ld lway be pos ble t r cons der this d ci on f the w t any tim a que t fr m both part s f Pr c l ind pendence Nehru has h s o n plan s m l r t our proposing an early demi n of pow r t tl e Interm G ernm nt a Dom n o St tu b s s

After the meet g F y and I wer gue ts t a mall fam ly lunch party wh h t ok place under cedar tree n th garden Krishna Men n who ha stay d n to patch up me of th rents in th Pl n caused by N hru t was there Mo t of our d scuss n a t ken p w th the Ind an Boy Scout mov me t in which Kr hn is intere t d H re gain pol t cs and intrigue eem to dom nate the cen After l n h M untbatt n held forth n th trateg c problem f cing Ind a hether united r part t ned It i nt est ng t not h t revelat on ch d scu on are to the Congre l d whose h le l ves have h therto centred round purely pol t cal co iderat ns

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PLAN REDRAFTED

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW D LHI *Th sd y 15th M y 1947*

MOUNTBATTEN HAS HAD court us but firm mmo to return to London f r cons ltat on At first he reacted strongly aga n t

the proposal saying that there was nothing for him to go home for but the alternative proposal from the Prime Minister that a member or members of the Cabinet should come out was even more unacceptable to him

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday 22nd May 1947*

Nehru and Patel have asked Mountbatten to add Kripalani Congress President to the invitation list for the Leaders meeting They feel that his presence would help them in carrying Congress as against purely ministerial opinion Moreover they point out that Kripalani s status as President is the same as Jinnah s *vis a vis* the Moslem League Mountbatten has decided to write and say that while he recognises Kripalani s importance he cannot agree to having him at the meeting itself but would be ready to see him privately either just before or just after it This is a typical teasing problem which is deceptively trivial at first sight but which can so easily develop into a major crisis If Kripalani is not asked Congress nurse the sense of grievance that they have had to make yet one more capitulation to Jinnah If he is asked Jinnah is duly offended

V P has drafted very brief but cogent Heads of Agreement There are eight in all It is a bold effort to get round the difficulty of the Leaders refusing to take the full burden of unpopular decisions and hiding behind their inability to decide on behalf of their respective Party machines The Heads of Agreement press for early Dominion Status as an interim arrangement based upon the Government of India Act of 1935 with modifications and envisaging one or two sovereign States If one only power should be transferred to the existing central Government. The sixth Head asserts that the Governor General should be common to both the States Finally it attempts to cover the problem of dividing the Armed Forces It proposes that units should be allocated according to the territorial basis of recruitment and placed under the control of the respective Governments It makes a special provision for the distribution of mixed units

Mountbatten has failed in his efforts to get Jinnah and Liaquat to sign the document or even a letter agreeing to it According to him they appeared absolutely to accept its general principles but were not willing to state their agreement in writing V P said that Patel s and Nehru s main concern was that Jinnah should accept the Plan in such a way as to make it clear that it really was his last territorial demand and not just an interim arrangement He felt it would satisfy Congress if Jinnah made it clear that he himself accepted the announcement and would use his good offices to put it into effect

Mountbatten said that he had cautiously tested Jinnah s reaction to the threat failing agreement of demitting power to the Interim Government on a Dominion Status basis Jinnah had

apparently been very calm and had said simply that he could not stop such a step in any event. In some respects this may well turn out to be the most delicate and decisive moment for Mountbatten's and Jinnah's diplomacy. Mountbatten felt that Jinnah's reaction was both abnormal and disturbing. It was certainly shrewd. The *ballon d'essai* has gone up and come down again providing only the evidence that Jinnah has a very steady nerve. Mountbatten feels that Jinnah is well aware of his potency as martyr butchered by the British on the Congress altar.

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Sunday, 18th May, 1947*

The Mountbattens left Palam this morning at 8.30 for London. A large party was at the airfield to see them off, including Colville, who as Senior Governor is temporary Acting Viceroy for the fourth time. Mountbatten is taking V. P. and Vernon back with him.

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Thursday, 22nd May, 1947*

Jinnah has dropped a carefully timed and placed bombshell. He demands an eight-hundred-mile 'Corridor' to link West and East Pakistan. The technique of releasing it seems to have been copied from Stalin. Doon Campbell of Reuters, to whom the story was given, told me that it was in answer to a questionnaire which he had lodged with Jinnah some days previously. No one was more surprised than he to find himself with such a scoop on his hands. In a telegram to Erskine Crum in London I reported Jinnah's answers were not verbal but written out. As soon as Reuters released the story Jinnah's secretary specially rang up Foreign Correspondents drawing their attention to it. Correspondents informed me privately that Jinnah offered this interview to several of them. They considered he was determined to make the statement anyhow and merely used Reuters' request as a peg to hang it on. Reuters was of course a well-chosen instrument for Jinnah's purpose to exert the maximum pressure on London at this critical stage in the Viceroy's deliberations with the Government, for through the exclusive use of this source he was ensuring for himself the greatest possible coverage in the British Press.

In spite of a lot of inspired speculation to the contrary by the London correspondents of the Indian papers, Mountbatten's negotiations seem to be proceeding smoothly. His presence in London has already done much to restore the confidence of the Cabinet and official and general circles in their proceedings. He has already had valuable meetings with the Opposition leaders, without whose support the timing of the whole operation based as it is upon the quick passage of the Independence Bill through Parliament would be frustrated. In the present delicate situation Mountbatten's personal authority and guidance were needed to secure their vital co-operation and to set their legitimate doubts at rest.

Mr Attlee who throughout has assumed full personal control of the Government s India policy and any action arising from it has successfully injected a sense of the utmost urgency into his colleagues The strain falls particularly on the Lord Chan cellor s and India Offices To meet Mountbatten s vital timing problem the Lord Chancellor promised to have the necessary Bill ready for presentation to the House by the first week in July which will involve surely the fastest drafting of a major Parliamentary Bill in our history Indeed its scope is without parallel or precedent in the proceedings of any Parliamentary Government There was of course considerable concern on the defence aspect of Partition but otherwise I may was able to send us optimistic and encouraging news Dominion Status as elabo rated by Mountbatten and V P Menon had been warmly wel comed and only a few editorial amendments and clarifications were required

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Monday 26th May 1947*

Jinnah s Corridor demand has produced delayed but none the less definite reaction The flames of controversy are being fanned and this whole affair is characteristic of the mounting tension which will be relaxed only with a quick political decision The reserves of good will which Mountbatten has so assiduously built up over the past two months are rapidly running out during his absence in London I have advised Vernon —

Prasad and Deo (Congress Secretary) have made forceful statements—Prasad says Jinnah s demands will not merit a moment s scrutiny and Deo considers that they are increasing under the illusion that the British can still help him The country however cannot be intimidated with such bullying tactics and the demand for a Corridor cannot be granted

Dawn has of course hit back at Prasad and Deo with a provocative leader under the heading Cranks All the key pass age of which runs as follows The demand for a corridor is not a new one Quaid-e Azam Jinnah has many times in the past raised that point which is so vital in the context of Pakistan If Pakistan is to be real solid and strong the creation of a corridor linking up its eastern and northern areas is an indispensable ad junct Be that as it may we have no doubt however that if Muslims can win Pakistan—as indeed they have already won it —they can just as well build a corridor somewhere for the link ing up of the two segments of Pakistan Mr Deo knows that too well

On Saturday Nehru gave an interview to the United Press of America which contains his first public reference to the extra territorial issue Mr Jinnah s recent statement he said is pletely unrealistic and indicates that he desires no

ny k nd The demand for corr dor i fantast c and ab u d We sta d for un on of I d a \ th the right to part cular area to opt out We en sage n compulsion If there s no proper settlement on th s ba s w thout furthe l ims being ad nced then we hall proceed w th making nd mplement ng th con titut on f r the un on of Ind a

Nehru conf rmed th t h att tu de a h d n ng by int m t ng to M ev lle th t he s fallin b ck th alternative Dem on Pl n n es f J nnah j ct n of the ma n p po als of the draft an ncement H wo ld l ke the Inte im Go ern ment to be tre ted imm d tely by c n ent on as a Dominion Go rnme t Jinnah w ll never comm t h m lf Nehru all d th t h accepts h t he gets and g sk ng for more There c uld be no o s ded commitme t

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *S nd y 1st J* *1947*

I wr t t my mother —

We ar n the eve of g t e ents he e nd I am p to my eye i the la t m t d t ls of pl ng the public ty for Mountbatten s m m t us ann c m t n the tr f r of po er wh ch is d t be made o Tuesd y The atm sphere is ery ten and f the erd ct f r P rt t on—a t almost c rt inly w ll be—con derabl ommunal u t can be expected b t any decis on w ll b preferable to th p sent uncerta nty It sho ld be n t d th ugh that th f ry nternal and fratr cidal and that the Br tish are p b bly m re popular w th b th H ndu and Moslem th t ny t me n l ing mem ry

'The m n effect of the G rnm t 20th February Announce ment ha been to b g the C ng s H gh Comm d round to the acceptance f the partit on of Ind a as n vit ble G ndh ref ses to al gn h m elf th th pt and is putt ng up a fierce rear gua d ct g i t t H f r he will carry th oppo it one of the b g mponderables

N hru and V ll bhbh P t l th t b g Congres men n the Interm G ernm t ccept P rt t on on the u d rstand ng that by conced g P k stan to J nnah they will h ar no m f h m and el m t h n i e al o Nehru p t it pr ate ly th t by cutt ng ff th head we w ll get r d f th he d ch In th s they are be ng rather s g ne fo J nnah s appet t shows gns of gr ng w th h t t feed and h s late t dem d f r an e ht h nd ed-m le corr dor to join West a d East Paki stan s a good xample f h s edent st tact es Agreement th refore t bet g approached from both s des with the orst pos ble grace Part t' is ndo btedly a trag dy b t a worse tragedy would b t try to mpose a unity un cceptable to the great majority of the hundred mill o Moslems

CHAPTER NINE

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Monday 2nd June 1947*

THE GREAT MOMENT has arrived The Leaders drive into the North Court in their large American cars I was in the Viceroy s study which is now duly transformed its dark panels painted a pale green It is quite a small study with an informal almost intimate atmosphere compared with the Council Chamber and even the adjoining reception rooms The painting of Clive in the entrance hall looks down upon this apotheosis of the Raj Jinnah was the last to come a few minutes late Mountbatten did his best to promote some friendly small talk but it was clear that the atmosphere was electric The problem of including Kripalani has been solved by conceding to Jinnah Rab Nishtar so the Big Five have become the Big Seven

The conference lasted for just on two hours Vernon reported that Mountbatten did most of the talking and was in masterly form giving a closely reasoned analysis of developments His opening remarks were a challenge to them to rise to the level of the events they were creating He said that during the past five years he had taken part in a number of momentous meetings at which the fate of the war had been decided but he could frankly remember no decisions reached likely to have such an important influence on world history as those which were to be taken at this meeting He made it clear that he was not forcing the pace against their will A terrific sense of urgency had been pressed upon him by everybody to whom he had spoken They had wanted the present state of uncertainty to cease therefore the sooner power was transferred the better for all

Having made his last formal attempt to resuscitate the Cabinet Mission Plan and Jinnah having for the last time formally rejected it Mountbatten then turned to the dilemma presented by Partition Congress he said did not agree to the principle of the partition of India but if this were unavoidable insisted on the partition of Provinces to avoid the coercion of Moslem or Hindu majority areas while on the other hand Jinnah resisted the partition of Provinces but demanded the division of India

Mountbatten was at pains to stress the backing of the British Conservative Opposition The Plan he said was not a Party issue in London He spoke of his distress about the position the Sikhs and disposed firmly and finally of the referendum whether Calcutta should become a Free Port

With characteristic finesse he introduced th new Pa graph .0 of the Plan und r its head ng Immed ate transfer of power and defend d the result ng Dom ni n Status not from the im putat n of Brita n s des re to ret a footh ld beyond her time but from the poss ble charge f qu tting on he obl g tions There fore he sa d it was ab ndantly clear that B tish n tance sh uld not be thdrawn premat r ly if it as st ll requ d

Ji ah n one f the ea l er interview had startled Mountbatten by making a d st nct n between h s agreem nt w th and ccept ance of a cert n p oposal M untbatten nv ked this particul r p ece of pedantry to h own d ant g to-d y

After c p of the Pl n had been h nd d round he said he f lt it wo ld be a k g the Indian Le ders t g agai t their co ciences if he requested the f ll gre m nt He a mer ly asking them t accept the Pl n in a peacef l spir t Wt en Nehru asked for a f rther def niti n f the d ff nce betw en agre ment and acceptance Mo ntb tten at o ce repl ed th t greement wo ld mply b l ef th t the r ght pri ciples were b g employ d but he had to viol t th principl s f both d co ld t a k for complete agreement Wh t he ask d for was acceptance denot ng b l ef that th Plan was f nd sincere ol t on for the g d of the c untry N hru th n sa d th t while there o ld neve be compl te appro al of the Pl by Congress n bal nce they acc pted t Nishtar ro nd d off these d u d al ct cs by po nt ing out that ccepta ce of the Pl n really impl ed agreem nt to m ke it w rk Mo ntbatte cordally greed and fr m that moment knew th t th ess nt l b ttle was w

J nah th n emb rked upon elabor te xplanation as to why he the ll pow rful Q d-e Azam ld not take a y decis on h m lf H entered nto the pr t of the proposal he s id b t both he nd h W rking Committee w uld ha e t go before the r mast rs the people pr r to a fi l deci n Mountb tten ob rved th t th e were t m s when l aders h d to make vital dec on w th t con lt ng their f llowers and trust to carrying them with them t a l ter tag A de on taken at the top a d aft rward confirmed by the peopl would be in ccordance w th democr t c proced re

J nn h then went a near to the brink of ffrmat e deci i n s co ld r n bly be e pected from one who had p t o far by say g n so often He emph sed th t h wo ld go to h s ma t rs the people w th no ntent of wreck ng the Plan b t with the s ce e des to per uade them to accept t He co ld only g h pers al a ra ce th t he w ld do h s be t He w ld try n h s own way t b ng und his own peopl

Mountb tten w nted th r act ons of the Cong es and Moslem League Work ng Comm ttees and f the S kh by m dn ght Kripala and B ld S ngh greed to send letter th t e ening J nah felt unabl to report the opin ons of hi Working Com

mittee in writing but agreed to come and see the Viceroy and make a verbal report This satisfied Mountbatten

To crown his success he secured the agreement of Nehru Jinnah and Baldev Singh to follow him with broadcasts to the people over All India Radio to morrow evening Mountbatten said he would let them see his script in the morning Patel who had said very little pointed out with a wry smile that the general rule was for the scripts of broadcast speeches to be submitted to the Honourable Member for Information (i e himself) before they were used Jinnah without a smile retorted he would say in his broadcast what came from his heart

Never was Mountbatten s genius for informal chairmanship and exposition more signally displayed His natural talent for this procedure had been enhanced by three years of almost daily discussion as Supreme Commander Vernon told me he had never seen him more alert keeping the discussion within his chosen terms of reference The atmosphere at the outset was undoubtedly tense but his opening speech soon brought with it the sense of sweet reasonableness and genuine goodwill underlying his whole sponsorship of the Plan Not even Mr Jinnah s formality and stiffness could resist Mountbatten s urgent will to succeed

As planned beforehand Mountbatten asked Jinnah to stay behind partly to counterbalance any Moslem League criticism that he was about to see Gandhi who never comes in company with Congress leaders in a separate interview and partly to apply more personal persuasion and form a clearer judgement of the ultimate attitude he is likely to take But Jinnah made no comment All will now turn on his midnight visitation

Then at 12.30 the Mahatma arrived In one sense he has been present throughout the whole proceedings and uncertainty as to his ultimate reaction to the formal presentation of a Partition Plan undoubtedly had an inhibiting effect on the Congress leaders earlier in the morning They were only too well aware of Gandhi s unpredictable response to the promptings of his inner voice There have been widespread fears that he will at the bidding of his complex conscience go to extreme lengths to wreck the Plan in one final effort to prevent the vivisection of India Mountbatten faced this interview with considerable trepidation Imagine his amazement and relief when the Mahatma blandly indicated on the backs of various used envelopes and other scraps of paper that he was observing a day of silence

When the interview was over Mountbatten picked up the various bits of paper which he thinks will be among his more historic relics On them the Mahatma had written I am sorry I can t speak when I took the decision about the Monday silence I did make two exceptions i e about speaking to high functionaries on urgent matters or attending upon sick people But know you don t want me to break my silence Have I said

word against you during my speeches? If you adm t that I have not your warning is s perfluou. There are one or two things I must talk about but n t to-day B t if we me t each other ag n I shall speak

Beh nd th s quaint procedure lay a great act of pol tical r n nci t n of elf-effacem nt nd f elf-control When I v ent in to h ve a few v ords v th Mountbatten about the Press com mun que at the end of th s mom ntou morn ng I too collected a trophy from th small ro nd table—n thing oth r than a "doodl " by Mr J n ah extr cted from h s subconsciou at the mom nt of his greatest polit cal ct ry I am no psycholog st but I think I can d tect the symbol of po er and glory here

At four o clock e had a St ff Meeting a d h d a complete run through of the paper on 'The Adm n str ti Conseq n s f P rt t on This s masterly d cument of me th rty foolscap pages larg ly *prepared by* John Chri t e and it w ll certainly not be po ible f r poster ty to say that we found a polit cal *answer at th xpense of an dmin strat v one H re is th* mast r plan wh ch under the umbrella of Dom ni n Status should *make poss ble es ent al cont uity for the ne regim s*

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *T esday 3 d J e 1947*

Mountb tten beg n the d y w th an early m rning St ff Me t ing t wh ch he t ld u of h dramat c m dn ght ncounter w th *Jinnah As J nnah h d cat g r cally ef sed to g e ny an wer* to the Plan in writ ng I m y j t d Mountb tten as sec nd *u tnes of h t h* was eady t say *He began by re t ratin,* at gre t length the em rks he h d m de round the conference *t ble in the morn ng nd no am u t of pres ure from Mount* b tten uld make him agree to firm acceptan e f om the *M sl m Le gue C nc l* wh n they met All h would ndertake wa th t he wo ld e h s best nd ours to persuade them in a *onstitut nal manner t* accept nd that h s *Working Com* m tteo wo ld upport h m

Mou tb tte then em nd d *J nn h* that the *Cong ess Party* ere terr bly su pici us of th pa ticular t ctic, h ch he always used wher by he w ed until the *Cong ess Party h d made a* f rm d ci on b ut m pl n and then left h m elf the right to make whate r d cis o s ted the *Moslem Le gu* se ral days later Mountbatt n warn d h m that Nehru Kripolani and P t l had made a absol t po nt that they would rej ct the Plan u less th M slem Leagu accept d it s m ltaneou ly with them s l es and furtherm accepted it as a fin l settlement

Noth ng Mo ntb tt n c uld y wo ld move him he once m r t ok refuge behind th xcuse that he was not on t tuti nal ly author ed to make d cis on without th oncu rence f th full Moslem League C nc l and po nted out that he could not

in any case call this Council Meeting for several days Mountbatten then said If that is your attitude then the leaders of the Congress Party and Sikhs will refuse final acceptance at the meeting in the morning chaos will follow and you will lose your Pakistan probably for good What must be must be was his only reaction as he shrugged his shoulders

Mountbatten then said Mr Jinnah! I do not intend to let you wreck all the work that has gone into this settlement Since you will not accept for the Moslem League I will speak for them myself I will take the risk of saying that I am satisfied with the assurances you have given me and if your Council fails to ratify the agreement you can place the blame on me I have only one condition and that is that when I say at the meeting in the morning Mr Jinnah has given me assurances which I have accepted and which satisfy me you will in no circumstances contradict that and that when I look towards you you will nod your head in acquiescence

Jinnah s reply to the proposition itself was to nod his head without any verbal undertaking Mountbatten s final question was Did Jinnah consider that he (Mountbatten) would be justified in advising Attlee to go ahead and make his announcement to morrow? To this he replied Yes On this last assurance Mountbatten and Ismay both felt that the maximum possible measure of acceptance had been wrung out of him prior to his meeting with the Moslem League Council in a week s time

Shortly after Jinnah left Kripalani s letter arrived It makes certain reservations of detail but constitutes a firm general acceptance of the Plan on behalf of the whole Congress Working Committee

At their second meeting Mountbatten resumed by duly reporting on Jinnah s visit to him last night and his acceptance of Jinnah s assurances and proposed action Jinnah confirmed this by the appropriate silence and nod of the head He then referred to the three Parties grave objections to different specific parts in the Plan and was grateful that these had been aired But since he knew enough of the situation to realise that not one of the suggestions would be accepted by either of the other Parties he did not propose to raise them at this meeting He accordingly asked all the Leaders to signify their consent to this course which they did thus voluntarily but almost unwittingly disposing of every substantial point of controversy

After Mountbatten had pronounced that the Plan seemed to represent as near to a hundred per cent agreement as it was possible to get Jinnah Kripalani and Baldev Singh all added that they considered that the Viceroy had correctly interpreted and recorded their views Mountbatten said the Plan would now be announced officially and none of the Leaders raised any objection

It looked therefore as though all would be plain sail ng b t when Mountbatten appealed for restra t on the part of subord nate leaders and the bu al of the past n order to open up the prospect of bu lding a f ne future Li quat could not res st the temptat on to suggest th t restra nt was ne ded not so much from bord nate s from super leaders f r e ample Mr G ndh at h s Prayer Meet ngs Th s touched off all the old bitterness of feel ng

Jinnah and Liaquat ns nu ted that Gandhi was inciting the people to do as they l ked nd lo k t other uth r ties than the Leaders t th s conference hle Kr p lan retorted th t all Gandh act ns ere de ted to non ole ce nd l atel con idered th t Candh w uld ab de l yall by any d c si n taken Mountbatten w s bl ged to br ng th d er u d cussion t a halt by ay ng he tho ght th subject had been ntil ted s ffe ently He accepted M G ndh special posit on on the o e h nd nd on the other v s e the C ngre Leaders would appreci te th po nt of wh t h d been said

Mountbatten then w th a dram t c g stu lift ng t abo e h s head nd b ng ng it do n n the t bl p esented The Ad mi trat ve Con eq ences of Partit on t the startl d Leader Th high powered St ff p pe wh h Mountbatten h s had m d ready for this d y contain th rty four l ly typed pag f fool cap nd i already m ste piece f comp ess o Th s br gs th Le der w th n th h ur ight up aga n t the h rd executi e real t e of the r pol t cal deci on As Mountb tten sa d afterward the sev re hock that ts appe rance g to every ne pres nt wo ld ha e been amus ng if the general at m sphere f dm nistrat e nd fference er not so s r ous

H e agn n a l p f the t g e the m re t moleh ll wa bu lt p characteristically if u w tt ngly to mou t in us p oport o Mountb tt n suggested that ther m ght b prelim n ry cons dera t on of th paper b for t was s bm tted to a Cab net m et ng Liaqu at and J n h at n ra sed el b rate bject ns to th Cab et n the United K ngd m b ng the decid ng thority Se eral minutes h d pas d b fo e t became clear that J nnah h d understood Mountb tten t be referr ng to the B itu h and n t th I d n Cabinet r I terim G e nm nt He then com pl ned that he h d been m sl d You mean the V e oy s F ecuti e Co ncil A spade h uld be called a spade H mind he sa d work d in on t tution l terms.

Liaquat then ked wh th maj r ty vot wo ld decide th is e in the i te Party P rt t on Comm tt e wh ch it w proposed the paper t et p Mou tbatten sa d no ne ot at on wo ld be on the b s of what was f r H rel ed on a new pir t enter g nt the d cu n now th t the i s e of Part t on had been finally ettled Liaquat repl d sharply that t was not

a matter of a new spirit there was difference of opinion on the critical issue *of the division of the Armed Forces*

The discussion surprisingly perhaps moved into calmer waters It was quickly agreed that division should be made on the basis of citizenship which in its turn would be based on considerations of geography Jinnah declared stoutly that it would be his intention in Pakistan to observe no communal differences and those who lived there regardless *of creed* would *be fully fledged* citizens

At four o clock the members of the States Negotiating Committee assembled in the Council chamber to be given in advance of to night s official announcements and speeches the background to the decisions reached by Mountbatten and the Leaders It was a difficult meeting Once again a photographic circus provided light relief and enabled Mountbatten to get off to a friendly and informal start

Round the big oval table were seated the cream of the Princely counsellors Their Highnesses of Bhopal Patiala Dungapur Nawanagar and Bilaspur Sir Mirza Ismail Dewan of Hyderabad Sir B L. Mitter of Baroda Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar of Mysore Kak of Kashmir Srinivasan of Gwalior Sir C P Ramaswami Aiyer of Travancore Sir V T Krishnamachari of Jaipur Panikkar of Bikaner Sir Sultan Ahmed and D K Sen representing the Chamber of Princes

It is interesting to note how many of the finest Indian minds from British India are Prime Ministers of the States Many of them are front rank lawyers which aids them in their approach to such constitutional conundrums as the lapse of Paramountcy Their relationship to the Princes they serve is very much that of a barrister with a valuable brief

After another very skilful and persuasive explanation of the origin and purpose of the Plan Mountbatten was subjected to some acute cross-examination on its application to the Indian States They were all particularly anxious to know whether it would be possible to arrange for Paramountcy to lapse before the actual transfer of power in British India—the assumption being of course that the States would then be in a better position to bargain with the successor governments

Mountbatten did his best to inject a sense of reality into the meeting The creation of two new States would inevitably mean two strong central governments which could not afford to delegate their powers instead of one weak one for the whole sub-continent which could On the other hand he felt that the acceptance of Dominion Status by them both offered a measure of protection as well as compensation to tho e Princes who had stood so loy-ll by their alliances and friendship with Britain Whatever they reached he advised them to cast their minds for

yea s and to con der what the tu t on in India and the wo ld w s likely to b by then

I accompan d Mountb tten in the V ceregal Rolls to All Ind a Rad o \ he e offcial \ ere lea i g out of all the w ndo s and cramming the b lco es A sm ll cro d had also gathered ro nd the ntr nce to th bu ldng F y ho \ as on a balcony told me aft rv a ds that a sm ll group of *S dl s* d st ct e i the r bright caps f holy orange b g n shout g t slogans just as we were entering th building No s ner h d they started to d mo str te than they re sc oped nto o r f llo g pol c car The n atness of the operat n m d th as embl d Ind ns others i p vely pol t cre m with la ghte These *S dl us* ha e m from vario parts f the country and have p tched the tents on the ba ks of the J mna there t protest aga n t the b trayal f H du l fe d custom h ch they con need ny form f Part t n m st n ol

After brief ce t t M unth tten pok th a sl and del b rate d ct on n contrast t th q k fre del ery of h s pri ate c nversat n It wa ell balanced orat on with ut hyperbole r ly ng f t mpact f nyth ng n i d statement. Th s undo bt dly the ght n t f M ntb tten to str ke Hi messag w s s bd ed and bject c t the mom nt of per on l tr umph

We w e f ddl g w th l ght and o ce turn ng throughout N hru s mov g ddres wh ch wa mpell ng lik n its m d and e p n He c w e ther r g nce nor pology but a tru r flect on f the sadness h ch accompa e all succes —the fru tration n ict ry P h ps N h g e t st strength th t alth gh he h ached the he ght s a pa t san campaigner he ret i s d t chme t f p t The a t t d th ch lar n h m are always n the s rf ce S t th l m ct c m me t h w s able t say We are l ttle men ser g great causes but beca s the cau i g t omethn f th t g tnes f ll pon ls

Th f llo ed J n h The experts in Moslem League d alectic a sured m th t h s peech was m t p ece A of them p t t t me imm d t ly aft rwa d This the l nguage that will be nderstood n th b za rs and t m n peace By b- ject e stand d I co ld n t d t ct th m g c H seemed t me o th s occa n to be well bel w the l el f ev ts h ch he had d n s much t cre te

Nehru s l t word h d be J i Hind J nn h l ed with Paki t n Z ndab d Th s he s d s ch l pped ce that some startl d l t rs th ht at fir t that the Q a d-e Azam had thr wn d gn ty to th w ds and pr n nced Pak t s n th bag

Baldev S gh spoke la t and n v ew f th unm t g t d los which P rt t on mea t f the S khs nd the ntense b tt rness it wa l kely to gender mong h s co-r l gionist h w rd were

eloquent and courageous He gave a clear call to India s Defence Forces to uphold their high standards of discipline particularly against the pressures of unpleasant internal security duties In contrast to Jinnah he saw the Plan not as a compromise I prefer to call it a settlement

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Wednesday 4th June 1947*
This morning to an audience of some three hundred representatives of the Indian and world s Press in the Legislative Assembly Mountbatten has given the most brilliant performance I have ever witnessed at a major Press conference He began without note or loss of word expounding for some three-quarters of an hour a political Plan of the utmost complexity both in its detail and implication It was a speech which must have cleared many lurking doubts among that audience of professional sceptics about the Plan s substance and purpose

When a correspondent tried to draw him on the Moslem League s demand for a Corridor —and thus on a point never discussed in the Plan—he replied Which paragraph in the Plan are you referring to? He was questioned about the Sikhs—their prospects and attitude—and he made it clear that the whole Sikh problem under the Plan had given him probably more concern than any other single issue He was pressed in particular about the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission which is to work out the actual lines of demarcation in the Punjab and Bengal and the Moslem majority district of Sylhet in Assam When a Sikh correspondent asked whether a property qualification would be a factor Mountbatten smilingly replied His Majesty s Government could hardly be expected to subscribe to a Partition on the basis of landed property—least of all the present Government.

During the Conference he gave the first informal indication that 15th August would be the likely date for the actual transfer of power to the two new Dominions Actually it was on this issue of Dominion Status that he was subjected to the most searching scrutiny of all and was involved in an encounter with Devadas Gandhi who has a most disarming manner and who by the persistence of his inquiries gave a possible clue I felt to his father s state of mind

Mountbatten did not at first quite follow the drift of what Devadas was asking but it was in effect that the British should reject any offer on the part of any single individual State to become a Dominion and should insist on India as a whole reaching a decision on the question of membership of the Commonwealth He said he felt there was a great potential for mischief in allowing the respective Constituent Assemblies the ultimate decision on this matter Behind the inquiry was the suspicion that Dominion Status was something less dependence together with the new one that if Pakistan

to remain in and India to go out, Pakistan might become a base for British imperialism.

Mountbatten's last words on this subject were: "From all the questions that have been asked there is one thing which I sincerely believe is not yet clear to the people. Somehow people seemed to have some doubts about this word Dominion Status. It is absolute independence in every possible way with the sole exception that the Member States of the Commonwealth are linked together voluntarily. In fact they look for support, mutual trust and in due course affection."

Whether or not Devadas was wholly satisfied with the answers to his particular points, the enthusiasm of the correspondents as a whole, judging from the spontaneous applause when Vallabhbhai Patel, who was in the chair, called the proceedings to a close, was remarkable from such a case-hardened body. I spoke to some of them afterwards. Andy Mellor of the *Daily Herald* described himself as stunned by the performance, saying that he had never heard anything like it and did not expect to do so again. Eric Britter called it a *tour de force*, while Bob Stimson drew attention to its impact on the Americans who had been deeply impressed by the argument—which was for them a revelation—that Dominion Status provided the best constitutional means for transfer of power and spelt genuine freedom for India and was not just a device for enabling the British to hold on.

Mountbatten on his return to Viceroy's House soon had indications that there was more underlying Devadas's doubts than had pre ed at the Conference and all was not well with the Mahatma, who was proposing to make highly critical comment on the Plan at his Prayer Meeting this evening. Indeed last night, just before the Leaders were due to broadcast, he had indicated that they were not to be above or beyond criticism, and had gone so far as to single out Nehru for a double-edged comment. After referring to him as "our King," he added, "We should not be impressed by everything the King does or does not do. If he has done something good for us we should praise him. If he has not, then we shall say so."

Mountbatten wisely decided that the time had come to clear the air with Gandhi and to prevent his apparent misgivings taking firmer and more dangerous shape. So just before the Prayer Meeting he invited him to come round to Viceroy's House. Gandhi was clearly in a state of some distress, feeling under the first impact of the Plan that his lifelong efforts for the unity of Hindus and Moslems had fallen about him. But Mountbatten, summoning all his powers of persuasion, urged him to consider the Announcement not as a Mountbatten but as a Gandhi Plan. In all sincerity he had tried to incorporate Gandhi's major concepts of non-coercion, self-determination, the earliest possible

date of British departure and even his sympathetic views about Dominion Status

Once again Mountbatten carried the day just how decisively can be seen by what Gandhi said to night The British Govern ment is not responsible for Partition he told the Prayer Meet ing The Viceroy has no hand in it In fact he is as opposed to division as Congress itself but if both of us—Hindus and Moslems—cannot agree on anything else then the Viceroy is left with no choice The Viceroy had worked very hard and had tried his utmost to bring about a compromise This Plan was the only basis on which agreements could be reached The Viceroy did not want to leave the country in chaos hence all his efforts Never surely had a Viceroy achieved such swift and decisive conquest over Gandhi s heart and mind

I had a personal telegram of yesterday s date from Joyce reporting A packed House of Commons listened with intense interest to Prime Minister s announcement this afternoon Pro posals and first reaction from India undoubtedly created profound gratification among all Parties Sense of unity and recognition of tremendous issues and possibilities involved were comparable only with most historic moments during war After referring to the splendid B B C reception and coverage he ended This has been a great day for us all

Mountbatten held a Staff Meeting at 7 30 this evening Having broken the deadlock of a generation there is still to be no respite for him or indeed any of us

Already I detect the first sign of a storm over the States Bhopal has resigned his position as Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes and cannot be deflected from a course of personal isolation and independence which runs counter to all the current developments

Nehru is not reacting favourably to the Paper on the Ad ministrative Consequences of Partition and there will clearly now be much more acute difficulty in maintaining the structure and existence of the Interim Government

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday 5th June 1947*

George Jones the *New York Times* correspondent who has been very ill and is due to leave India in the next few days came round to see me this morning to ask for my personal impressions of Mountbatten in about three hundred words as he wants his last feature to be an appreciation of the Viceroy Mount batten in three hundred words? It is not easy at close range But I have dictated this note —

Perhaps the most abiding impression is his tremendous crea tive energy by which I mean not only the energy which is in himself but which he injects into all about him

to remain in and Inda to go o t, Pakistan might become a b e for Br t sh impe l sm

Mountbatten s l t w rds on th subject were From all th quest s that have be n ask d ther s one th ng wh ch I s n cerely bel s not yet cle r to the people Somehow peopl seemed to hav som doubts about this word Dominion Stat It s abs l te independence in e ery p ss ble way with the sole xcept n that th Member St tes of the Common ealth re l nk d t geth r l nt r ly I f ct they look for support, mutual trust and in d e ou se affection

Whether or not De adas wa h lly sat sfied w th th ans ers to his particul po ts the enthusi sm of the correspondents as a whole judg g f m the spontaneou appl use w hen V ll bh bhat Patel wh as n the chair called the proceed ngs to a close wa rem rk ble f om such a ca e harde ed body I spok to omo f th m fterwards Andy Mellor of the *Daily Herald* descr bed himself to me s stunned by the perform nce, saying that he had ne er heard anything like it and d d not expect t d so g in Eric Britter called it a *to de f rce* wh l B b Stimso d ew tt t on to its impact on the Americans who had been deeply mpre d by the argument—which was for them a r l t on—that Dom n Status provided the best con titut oral means f transfer f p er and spelt genu ne freed m for India, and w s not ju t device for enabl ng the British to hold on

Mountbatten n his return to Viceroy s House soon h d indi cat ons that there w mor nderlying Dev da doubts than h d appea ed at th Confer nce nd all was not well with the Mahatm who wa pr pos ng to make h ghly critical comment o the Pl n at h Prayer Meet g th even ng. Indeed last n ht j t before the Le ders w du to broadcast he h d d cat d that they were t ab v or beyond criticism, nd had e en g s f r a to s ngle out N hru for a double-edged comment Aft r ref rr ng to h m as our K ng he added W e sh ld t be mpr ssed by erything the King does or does *not d* If he h de s d s mething good for us we should pra se h m If he has ot than we shall s y so

Mo ntb tten wisely d cided that the time had come to clear th a r w th Gandhi and to pr ent his pparent misgiving fal in f rm nd m r da ger us hape So just before the Prayer Meeting h inv ted h m t c me round to V c roys House. G ndh as clearly in a tate of som distress feeling under the first impact f the Pl n that his l felong efforts for the un y of H du d Moslems had fallen about him B t Mountba en summ n n all h s powers of persua on urged him t consider the Annou cement t as a Mountb tten but as a G ndhi Plan in all s ncerity he had t ed to incorporate G ndh s major pre cep of n n-coercion self-determ nation the earliest poss ble

and largely unaware of their meaning Jinnah was at great pains to explain that both States would be independent and equal in every way while Nehru was equally insistent that India was carrying on in every way as before and that Pakistan was the outcome of permission to dissident Provinces to secede which must not be allowed to interrupt the work of the Government of India or the continuity of its foreign policy In this atmosphere of recrimination Mountbatten made it clear that he would not accept the continued requests of both sides to act as arbitrator on all outstanding matters in dispute They have agreed to try to find a mutually acceptable judge for this thankless task

The Plan now forty eight hours old has undoubtedly led to a *detente* throughout the country as a whole but among the Leaders in Delhi it has induced no brotherly love The situation here is still very tense and is such that the most trivial incident could touch off a major crisis

CHAPTER TEN

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Sunday 8th June 1947*

THE CORE OF Mountbatten s problem remains political and the most immediate danger is of the dissolution of the Interim Government caused by the resignation of one or other of its component parts It was always a feeble instrument Now that the principle of Partition is effectively accepted there is not even the pretence of inner loyalty and purpose to hold it together Mountbatten realises only too clearly however that if one or other of the Parties were to resign from it before Partition is ratified by Act of Parliament in Westminster the prospects of the 3rd June Plan would be gravely imperilled and his own position hopelessly compromised

To-day it seemed that this very peril was upon us for the Cabinet meeting was only just saved by a desperate diversion on Mountbatten s part from breaking up in complete disorder In an effort to narrow the controversy by limiting its duties he suggested a moratorium on all policy decisions and high grade appointments

A formula was found for submitting these matters to Mountbatten direct to avoid contentious issues being decided by t inevitable Congress majority vote in the Cabinet At this Nehru sought Mountbatten s a for ce tain diplomati

pointments which he asked him to agree were not the concern of Pakistan. Liaquat at once objected, saying that he did not, for instance, wish to see an Ambassador appointed to Moscow. Unfortunately just such an appointment was envisaged and the nominee was none other than Nehru's sister Mrs. Pandit.

The ensuing scene was babel, with everyone talking furiously at once. Nehru asserted that rather than tolerate Muslim League interference in the Government's affairs he would insist on a majority vote being taken, and that if the Government was to be turned over to the League he would immediately resign. Mountbatten had finally to call each member of the Cabinet individually to order, deferring further discussion of the particular issue and adding, "We are not going on with the next item until the two warring factions are out of me." This had the intended effect. Everyone laughed, the tension was broken. But the incident shows by how thin a thread the success of the Plan hangs. Critical days and decisions lie ahead of us.

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Monday, 9th June, 1947*

At our Staff Meeting to-day there was a prolonged discussion on the implications of Dominion Status, and in particular of Mountbatten remaining on after the transfer of power to serve for a limited period as joint Governor-General of both Dominions. This concept has been encouraged on the one hand by Congress's willingness to propose him without condition either in this capacity or as Governor-General of India alone, and on the other by Jinnah urging that he should definitely stay on to see the interim phase through in the capacity of a unifying head of the two States.

Mountbatten's first assumption was that Jinnah also had in mind a common Governor-General, but only when he was in London did it become apparent that Jinnah wanted three Governors-General: one of India, one of Pakistan and one Mountbatten himself in an overall position as Supreme Arbitrator for the division of assets, most of which of course are in India. This was quickly ruled out by the British Government as impracticable. Mountbatten also told him frankly that it would be quite impossible for himself to assume this supranational role; but at the same time he has been pressing the advantages from Pakistan's point of view of a joint Governor-Generalship as the best guarantee of a fair physical transfer. He has frankly advised us, however, that he is most averse to staying should the invitation come from only one side. Jinnah so far has been careful to conceal his final intention. If it is in favour of a joint Governor-Generalship, some special provision will be needed, however, in the Independence Act, and a decision from him within the next three weeks is essential.

The All India Moslem League Council met to-day in the ball room on the first floor of the Imperial Hotel. Towards the end of its deliberations there was a sudden but apparently carefully planned eruption of *Khaksars* who came in through the garden at the side of the hotel and startled peaceful residents during tea by rushing through the lounge brandishing *belchas*, or sharpened spades. With these formidable weapons they wrought the maximum of havoc in the minimum of time and, shouting 'Get Jinnah!', were half way up the staircase leading to the ballroom where Jinnah and the Council were still in session before Moslem League National Guards could grapple with them and turn them back. It took police with tear gas to bring the disturbance to an end.

Jinnah behaved with great composure. Sidney Smith of the *Daily Express* saw him afterwards, and told me that Jinnah had no doubt but that the assault was an attempt on his life. The only previous attempt to assassinate him—in Bombay in 1943—was made by a *Khaksar*.

The *Khaksars*, or 'Servants of the Dust', are a group of militant Moslem fanatics with much the same storm-trooper ideology as the far more formidable Rashtrya Swam Sevak Sangh offshoot of the Hindu Mahasabha. Led by Inayatullah Mashriqi, they have been engaged on terrorist activities ever since their foundation in 1931. Their demand is for an undivided Pakistan stretching from Karachi to Calcutta, and to them Jinnah is as much the betrayer of Moslem interests as Gandhi is in the eyes of Hindu extremists of Hinduism.

A party from Viceroy's House going along later in the evening for dinner found the place in the utmost disorder. The large grill room was a shambles. Its air-coolers were smashed and its furniture broken up. The forces of fanaticism and revolution are on the move, and this incident confirms that the crust upholding order from the depths of chaos is dangerously thin. Under the present tense conditions all the leaders provide far too easy targets for far too many would-be assassins.

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Tuesday, 10th June, 1947*

The Moslem League Council has passed a resolution in phraseology designed to infuriate the Congress, but in terms which mark the nearest approach Jinnah is likely to make to a substantial acceptance of the Plan. After expressing satisfaction at the abandonment of the Cabinet Mission Plan, it qualifies its refusal to agree or give consent to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab by deciding that it had to consider the 3rd June Plan for the transfer of power as a whole, and by giving full authority to Jinnah to accept the Plan's fundamental principles as a compromise.

Dominion Status and the joint Governor-Generalship was again the main theme at our Staff Meeting to-day. Jinnah makes no move and gives no sign. In the course of our discussion, which became somewhat discursive and hypothetical, Mountbatten said he believed there was considerable confusion in Nehru's mind about the magic date of June 1948. Nehru was apparently working at immense pressure to complete the new Constitution before that date, and had emphasised very strongly that this was his objective, that Congress prestige might seriously suffer if they did not succeed. Mountbatten pointed out that the date of June 1948 now had no significance whatever, and he was anxious that I should stress this in all the background information I gave to the Press.

"THE RETREAT", MASHOBRA, SIMLA, *Saturday, 14th June, 1947*

George Nicholls, Fay and I left yesterday for Simla shortly after 5 a.m. to cover as many miles of the parched plains as we could before the full heat of the sun beat down upon us. In these early hours there was a life-giving freshness in the air, and it is easy to understand why many Indians—Sardar Patel among them—are up by 4.30 in the morning, completing nearly half a day's work before breakfast.

We reached The Retreat by tea-time—the beginning for me of a week's withdrawal from the Delhi ferment. Our Simla visit last month was no respite, but on the contrary the most critical and exacting phase of all the negotiations leading to the 3rd June.

In the Himalayan stillness, where no phone rings, it is possible now to pause and take stock of the progress to date and the task ahead. I wrote this in a note to my mother to-day:—

Mountbatten's diplomacy has succeeded for several reasons, but primarily because of his own personality. He is a wonderful talker and able to put across his own essential sincerity. The outward expression of the man is his amazing energy. He never lets up, and never allows a situation to harden against himself. When towards the end of April the situation looked more than usually dark and uncertain, [illegible] roused my spirit by saying, "I like working for lucky men." No reflection, of course, was intended by him on Mountbatten's ability. On the contrary, it is borne in on all who work with him that he induces success and offsets failure by the range and variety of his initiative.

He is very sensitive to the different temperaments of those with whom he has to negotiate, and has as a result won the complete confidence of Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru and Patel, who in spite of their close identification with the struggle for independence are as diverse a quartet as it is possible to imagine. He is, in short, my idea of a political thoroughbred.

I must stress the importance of Patel in the agreements so far reached. He has a rough exterior and uncompromising manner. His achievements tend to remain below the surface but he was probably the first of the Congress High Command to realise that the 20th February statement implied Partition if a political settlement by June 1948 or before was to be achieved. Having absorbed that vital implication he has never wavered and has stood firm against the inner voices and neural indecisions that have sometimes afflicted his colleagues.

Patel's realism has also been a big factor in the acceptance of the Dominion Status formula for which Mountbatten has worked so hard. This is inevitably a delicate plant. Personally I wish we could evolve an even looser Commonwealth concept which did not so directly involve the King's Sovereignty but could take in a Republic. This needs close consideration because I believe the present symbolic ties of the British Commonwealth are not really applicable to a Congress-controlled Indian Union and should be modified to include for the first time on equal terms peoples of different races.

We are in the heart of Sikh country here and the prevailing atmosphere is one of tension and foreboding. Since the beginning of June sentries have been on all round-the-clock guard at The Retreat for the protection of our families and Moslem servants. Undoubtedly both Nehru's and Jinnah's speeches on the 3rd June helped to calm Hindu and Moslem fears and to avert the immediate outbreak of a major communal conflict and, taking the sub-continent as a whole, the popular reaction has in fact been remarkably calm. Nevertheless Sikh unrest in the Punjab is growing hourly. The implications of the 3rd June are now all too clear to the Sikh people. They see that the Partition of India means substantially and irrevocably the partition of the Sikhs, and they feel themselves to be sacrificed on the altars of Moslem ambition and Hindu opportunism.

Lying along the perimeter of Hindu and Moslem power the Sikhs number some six million—no more than twenty per cent of the total Punjab population—but they succeeded in achieving influence out of all proportion to their numbers by maintaining their own unity and holding an effective balance of power within a United Punjab. With Partition, however, they are trapped and no juggling of a Boundary Commission can prevent their bisection. They react accordingly, and their leaders, hopelessly outmanœuvred in the political struggle, begin to invoke more primitive remedies.

Sikhism, which is based on a most complex religious and social structure, does not encourage or at the present moment enjoy leadership of high quality. Baldev Singh, Defence Minister in Nehru's Government, is, as his speech on 3rd June showed, a man of high character and wide vision, but he is a

in the ild mess Nor does Pat l the leading Sikh Prince and Ch cellor of the Chamb r f Pr nces in succe s on t Bhopal ha e a decisi e infl nce P wer s pas ing to th wilder m n such s M t T ra S gh nd some of tho y ung r I.N.A officers R gh v e ther l es head ot us n spit ot all that h b n lre dy ach e ed the outlook is still st rmy and unsettled

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Mo day 3 d June 1947*

During the pa t ten d y Mo tb tten nd the staff h ve been eng ged in inten i e ope t ns r d front h ch may b said t add p to ge l pr g es in the campaign to cl nch acceptance of the Pl Th p p l d l pment has been the All I d a Co gress C mm tt l nd m t of Part t on In sp te of e b l er fire nd n bort e effort to ach e e a Co c rd t s gned j tly by K palan and J nnah the ma n pol t cal deci n f the tw I t s c n n longer b sa d to be ously n d bt

At th d s e m ment G ndh came d v n n favour of acceptance and th l t pp t m ng the more c mmun lly m nded members f th C ng ess H gh Comm d co ld not t ke h pe g n t th fr l l ttl ma m e thor ty

A f th P es d ectly fl ct d by the Plan th Refere d m f the N rth west F t er Pro n h aft r much heart ea ch g nd m c ct b en ccep ed by Cong ss At f rst Dr Kh n Sah b th t ed t b ycott t, but on G ndh d ce the local Red Sh t m vem t is to p t t pass e res t ance pr ciples int pr ct e nd peacefully bsta n Ca oe t ret ri g on l wh l the r fer d m b g h ld Th l tters exch eed b t e M tb tten nd Car we e d ly rele ed p t before I left f S ml M ntb tten ly decided to entru t the P nce to m l tary r g me and L ten nt G r ral S r R b Lockhart G O C n-C S uth Command Ind h knows the F t r well s t t ke C e s plac G em r t upervi e th ry d l ct pe t N rth less I th k we ca say th t as f a pol t cs at th nt e re o cern d the peak f the Fr t r cr ha l e dy pa d

O er Bengal J nn h s b part cul ly d ff cult V h e d mand n port f l o th I terim G ernment the centre f r h s o n Moslem Leag e as ce t nu g r ght he r f es them in the I te m Adm at n f r th V est B gal Congres me

The P jab L g s t ve Assembly has to-d y f mally ont d for Part t on foll wi g on a m l r d ci n in B ngal th ee d ys ago where S hr wardy s m to a h e e an aut m u d u ted Pr nce f ally d d away before the d sf ur cf th o great P rt es S the wheel t rns f ll circle d Cong ss wh ch n an earl er gen ratt n had b tt rly opposed Curz n s

partition of Bengal now forty years later sponsors the self same policy

The Leaders have taken a basic decision about their policy towards the States in agreeing to the establishment of a States Department in Delhi which will deal with all matters of common concern and with the formulation of their final relationship In the meanwhile it was agreed that the new Department should take over everything short of Paramountcy from the existing Crown Representative s Political Department

That Paramountcy after the transfer of power is a problem bristling with political and legal difficulties has been brought home to Mountbatten from various discussions which he has had during the past ten days with the Leaders with his old friend Sir Walter Monckton constitutional adviser to the Nizam and with Bhopal and his adviser Sir Zaffrullah Khan * They have been stressing that what was good enough under the Cabinet Mission Plan is far from satisfactory under Partition which is essentially a communal solution substituting two strong central Governments for one weak one So they were pressing the claims of Dominion Status for some of the States

Mountbatten has also seen for himself the paralysis of Princely uncertainty during his visit to Kashmir from which he has only just returned to-day Both Nehru and Gandhi have been very anxious that the Maharaja of Kashmir should make no declaration of independence And Nehru himself descended from Kashmiri Brahmins has been pressing to visit the State himself to seek the release from prison of his friend Sheikh Abdullah now President of the States Congress Last year when Nehru visited the State he was himself placed under arrest by the Kashmir Government Gandhi s view was that he himself ought to prepare the way for Nehru The Maharaja has made it very clear that he does not welcome a visit from either Mountbatten succeeded in deferring both visits by saying he himself had a long standing invitation from the Maharaja and would like to see him first

When he got there he found the Maharaja politically very elusive and the only conversations that took place were during their various car drives together Mountbatten on these occasions urged him and his Prime Minister Pandit Kak not to make any declaration of independence but to find out in one way or another the will of the people of Kashmir as soon as possible and to announce their intention by 14th August to send representatives accordingly to one Constituent Assembly or the other He told them that the newly created States Department was prepared to give an assurance that if Kashmir went to Pakistan this would not be regarded as an unfriendly act by the Government of I
He went on to stress the dangerous situation in which K

* Subsequently the Foreign Minister of Pakistan

wo ld f nd tself if t lacked th support of one of the two Domi n n by the d te of the transfer of po er Hs intent on s to g th nd ice p vately t the M haraja l ne and then to repe t it in the presence f h s Prim M nist r v ith G rge Abell nd the Res d t Col el Webb n attend nce at a small meet ing where minutes ld be kept

The M h raja uggest d th t the m t ng should tak place n the last d y of th vi it t which Mountb tten agreed feel ing that th o ld all h m the m ximum hance to make up h m nd but when th time cam the M h r ja s t a mes g that he wa n b d w th c l c and wo ld be un ble to attend the meet g It seems th t th s h s us l illness when he wishe to a d difficult d cus on

Needl ss t say M ntbatt ery d ppo nted at this t m of e ents

To-days St ff Me t g had no f er than el en item on a gend ncluding Rec n t t n f th Ex cut e Co ncil and Go n r C n r l J n h tre t b th s bject with racul r serve a d w th n ex spe ting k ll nce Is h s intent n Je m C gr s nd M ntb tten pe to make th fal e mo e N th r C n the Moslem L ag e a sho ing any reil a n ss of the dm n tr t m gn t d nd urge cy of the pr blem f cing them

Ne ly thre w ks ha p ed s the Le ders r ce ed the mem r dum on the Adm t at e Co q ence of P t ton nd accept l pr nc p e th proced re t l id do n by appo nt ing th ecessary P rt t n Comm t Vern h wo k d o l ng l t f t d g t m call g f ct on r de ision e the p rt f full p g e s t be mad to h h they h e so far f ed t pr v d a y embl n e f an ans e

The al eight fall n p n Ste ing C mmittee of two m n appo t d h r th I rt n C mm tt f t m tt g r 13th J Nom t d by the C gres nd M lem Le e r e entat es e pecti ly they re H M P t l th C l n t Secreta y nd M h mm d Al F c l Ad s r the M l tary F ance Department B th re Ind n C l Se v ce m n n m d ca er and f t d ng al t ty

W h t e st e f e pert s b-comm tt es h ch t ha been w sely g eed sh ld c t of P l only both P t l and M hammed Al a e p rm t e that the adm trat e pr nciple f P t t on can be settled q kl d m t f the act l s para t n effect d by the deadl n f the 15th A g st In the mean h they ne d r th r m e dynam c pol t cal s pport tha ha so f r been f rth m ng

VICEROY'S HOU E NEW DELHI T esd 24th J ne 1947

In spi e o Gandh s c rageous nd d ci e nterv nt n at the All Ind a Congress Comm ttee in fa our of the 3rd June

Plan one can never be quite sure when this volcano of non-violence will erupt

I spoke to Devadas Gandhi on the telephone this morning asking when he was proposing to call the next meeting of the All India Editors Conference of which he is the Chairman In the course of the conversation he drew my attention to a Reuters *report from London describing the forthcoming Parliamentary* procedure for the enactment of Indian Independence This was nothing more than an account of the traditional ceremonial in both Houses covering the passage of all Bills into law the introductory paragraphs of which were worded as follows The British Parliament in thirty minutes of solemn ceremony will next month give Dominion Status to nearly four hundred million people of Hindustan and Pakistan The Bill creating the two new nations inscribed on vellum and parchment will be drawn from a magnificent wallet embellished with the Royal Arms in colours and gold thread and read to both the Houses of Parliament

Devadas said the reference to the creation of two new nations had very much distressed his father whose view was that such a report emanating from Reuters must have Government authority behind it and that this two nation theory was wholly repugnant to the Congress outlook In fact it had provoked the Mahatma into issuing a special message at his Prayer Meeting on Monday in which he had said The papers to-day talk of a grand ceremonial to take place in London over the division of India into two nations which were only the other day one nation What is there to gloat over in the tragedy? We have hugged the belief that though we part we do so as friends and brothers belonging to one family Now if the newspaper report is correct the British will make of us two nations and that with a flourish of trumpets Is that to be the parting shot? I hope not

Devadas urged me to take the earliest opportunity to draw the Viceroy s attention to all this and expressed the hope that Mountbatten might see his way to make some private disavowal of it and further that I might be authorised to make a disclaimer that would be published He added that his father felt so strongly about the matter that it could be taken for granted that he would raise it at his meeting with the Viceroy to-morrow I spoke I hope with sufficient suavity for I was frankly amazed that such a great man could see fit to make so much of so inoffensive a story I told him that I was sure much more was being read into it than it could possibly carry

I have reported on the whole thing to Mountbatten whose reaction to this kind of psychological pressure is very healthy It may perhaps be best summed up as the application of the guid

slogan of Ismay ho told me the other day th t e ch morning when I get p I y to myself Pat nce a d proport on

The vis t planned s me t me ahe d and ithout regard to polt tical d lopment has i fact turned ut to be ery well timed Montgomery has been able to form h s own impre s on of the pr gress o fa made o er the part t on of the Ind an Army and to h lp deci ely n solv ng th problem of the ithdrawal of Br t h f ces from I d a W th regard to Br ti h troops a com p om agr ment has b en reach d la gely cond tioned by th h pp ng a ailable th t the r thdraw l from Ind a should be phased over period f x month from the d te of t ansf r of power M untb tt n h s had Montys pport n r s t ng a y ugg st on th t they h ld during this t me be used in any opera t n l rol *He ppre tes that i i not pos ible to hedge* a political tran f r of pow r with m l tary reservations

VICEROY S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *W edn sdav 25tl Ji e 1947*

M evill spoke t m n ery stro g t rms ab t the delay over any deci on n the G rnor-G n ral i e and consider it to be part fr m anyth ng el rank d court y on the part of J n h who continues t play the role of D lphic oracle and de l in riddles

J sleyn H nn ssy corr spond nt f the *S nday Time* and Kem ley Press, told me thi morni g that J ahs Secr tary Kurshid h d gi n him *for* publ cat on th story that Paki t n does not w nt th sam Go ernor-G ner l a H ndust n b t that t ll be impos ble for Mountb tten to leave d r ng the next fe mo ths there so m ch f him to do Bob St mson *also came round to tell m that K rshid h d sa d m ch th sam* t h m, b t with th decorat add tion that P kistan s Governor General must be of Royal blood

VICEROY S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *F id y 7th J e 1947*

Now that the Punjab and Beng l ha e decl ed in favour f th r wn part t n and s a res lt half f each ill be t k ng their h re in the f rm t on f a new nd s par te Const tu nt Assembly the f ll ma h nery f r acm te ing P rt tion set i mot on The Part t on C mmitte wh ch w s l mited t Con gre s a d Moslem Le e members of the Inter m G vernment n g es w y to P rtit Cou cil of wider authority wh ch incl de J nn h nd can take final pol cy decis n

The new C uncil m t f r the f st t me to-day w th M unt batten once g n in th chai nd one gain ref ng arbitral status. *But th e now no need f him to do so a it accepted* with surpri ing speed and n m ty J nah s propos l th t S r Cyril R d lffe should be in t d t serve s ch irm of th Pu jab and Bengal Boundary Commis on with the casting vote on both.

Nehru on his side secured agreement for the Boundary Com mission to work to very simple terms of reference which are to demarcate the boundaries of the new parts of either Province on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Moslems and non Moslems and in so doing to take account of other factors This was a compromise which met the desire of both parties—the Moslem League hoping that wide terms of reference in Bengal would improve their chances of securing Calcutta and the Congress and Sikhs calling for the inclusion of property and other qualifications to give them a better chance in the *Punjab*

The original intention was to put the vexed problem of bound ary demarcation in the hands of the United Nations but Nehru objected on the grounds that this would involve cumbersome procedure and unacceptable delay Radcliffe s colleagues will be four High Court Judges on each Commission two each nominated by Congress and two each by the Moslem League It calls for no special prophetic gifts however to suggest that the onus of unpopular decision will almost certainly fall on Radcliffe himself I am sure Mountbatten has been absolutely right not to involve his present or future functions in these Awards

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Saturday 28th June 1947*

At our Staff Meeting to-day Mountbatten s attention was drawn to a leading article in *Dawn* casting doubt upon the Viceroy s methods and impartiality in the handling of the Referendum under the 3rd June Plan to be conducted in Sylhet The com plaint is that he has not arranged for military supervision similar to that provided in the North west Frontier Province Referendum Mountbatten was at first taken aback on this point of fact say ing My God the fellow is right! and adding that in the general rush of business he had not fully appreciated that the Referendum was under his ægis in the same way as in the North west Frontier Province The implications of the attack in *Dawn* were wholly misleading for no irregularity had occurred or was intended

I was given the somewhat delicate task of explaining to Altaf Hussain that the matter was being suitably dealt with Hussain whose gifts of self-expression are primarily in terms of invective had closed his leading article with the threat that If no satis fac tory announcement is made within the next forty-eight hours we shall be compelled to return to the subject and indulge in some plain speaking This was my opportunity to do the same with him at once I then took him in a more reasonable frame of mind to see George Abell and on the understanding that we would not be subjected to further threats and time limits we assured him that we would keep him posted with the steps Viceroy proposed to take

We parted good frie d It must be confessed h ve er that Hussain is do g l ttl more th n r flect the current h uteur and t ch es of th Lead r O ly to-d y Mountb tten rece ed a lett from Jinnah whi h pr ked the str ge t reaction I h ve e er he rd f om th usually bland and urbane Ismay It as l tter he said which I would n t t k from my Ki g or send to a coolie

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Mo d y 30th Ju e 1947*

The Partit on Co ncil l g ly a result of Mountbatten s in p rati n has m st s rpris ngly greed without del y or d spute to the proced re f th d s o f th Ind n Armed Forces

Gr t pra se d b th t A h l k nd Ismay for pro ding the framework n wh ch rec nst tution —as A ch l ck has hrewdly t rmed it—ca tak place B t M tb tten h mself at the cr tical m m t h d the g od en to nject into the d s cu on Tr ed th G ern r of Or ssa ho as Secr tary of the Dufe ce Department d g the w th nly Ind an civil servant w th ny exper ence of h gh le el defence org n sation He ce d d in q kly i g th fid ce of Nehru and S rdar P t l s w ll s enjoy ng the d antage of a long stand g fr end h p th L quat Al Kh n. T di by intensi person l ne t t n o er the pa t week h s ucce ded n smoothing the way to conce s by b th d es It g n g mp m

Th b s principle adopted i th t Ind a and P k t n shall each ha e th r wn t r t res Arm d Forces pr dom antly n Moslem a d M lem re pect ely h ch a from 15th August are to be und r the r wn ope t l o trol Both sid s ha e hemently t d complete mil tary nd pe d ce s a con d tion of ettlem nt J nnah nd Li quat Ali Kh n openly as ert ing th t th y ot p epared to take er th reins of Go ern ment tho t the wn Arm d F rce in be ng

Both des too hav d st g bject n to any form of central sed dm n strat e c ntrol fter th 15th A gu t but h e Mountb tt h o ce g t rve d deci ely hy insi t ng th t the adm n strat n of the Armed F c s h ld co t n u d r Au h l k tl th P rt t n f per on el and phys cal a ts complete B iefly he to rema n n Ind in adm i tr t e c nt l f I ia Arm d F ces f r th t me be ng u der a J nt Defe ce Co cil to cons st bes d h m elf f the c mbin d Covern r G ner l or separat G ernors-General and the tw Defence Min ters

To a d confus on w th th w Commanders n-Ch ef of both Dom n on A ch l k ll b called Supreme Comma der fr m 15th A gust unt l h s t sk s complet d The target d t s l t Apr l 1948 but in th me wh le he is to have no respo bil ty f r law and order or ny operat onal co t l o r any un ts sav those in transit from Dom n to another

It has never been possible to isolate the partition of the Indian Army from its wider political context In all the circumstances of suspicion ill will and communal clash it is doubtful whether human ingenuity could have avoided this tragic necessity or achieved a more workman like formula

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Tuesday 1st July 1947*

The tension in the Punjab grows as 15th August approaches A straw in the wind is a letter which Auchinleck has received and forwarded from a Sikh refugee in Delhi He complains that the Seventh Sikhs are still in the Basra area protecting the Persian oil zone but that during these twelve months tragic events have occurred in their home land which have upset the minds of our brave Sikh brothers abroad When India is being divided our men should be home with their kinsfolk I trust you will issue orders for their speedy return to their home before the August drama unfolds itself

Jenkins reports that the situation in Lahore and Amritsar gives ground for grave concern The violence takes the form of scattered but widespread arson and stabbing carried out by cloak and dagger techniques which are very difficult to suppress by normal police or military action Having discovered how easy it is to burn down an Indian city the incendiaries are particularly dangerous Throwing fireballs through windows and skylights and making full use of roof tops and narrow city lanes they are almost impossible to catch in the act

CHAPTER ELEVEN

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Wednesday 2nd July 1947*

CONGRESS AND MOSLEM League leaders have been sitting in separate rooms at Viceroy's House poring over the terms of the Draft Dominions Bill the title of which incidentally has been strengthened to that of Indian Independence Bill Jinnah had been excusing himself from taking any formal view about the Governor Generalship until he had had a chance to scrutinise the Bill and delayed his decision for a few more hours under cover of a desire to consult with certain close colleagues who were engaged on the Referenda

He has at long last come clean and Jinnah's verdict goes in favour of Jinnah He still professes to nurse the illusion

t would be poss ble f r Mountbatten t superv e a fair Part ti n by r ma n ng in s me strat spheric capac ty abo e the two n Heads of State J nn h d cat d th t he had tak n the decis on s me h t gainst h ll on the ins t nce of h clos friend b t t wo ld b teresting to know who tho friend are a it w uld seem th t his s r c lleagu s and ell wi hers have been advi ng h m strongly t the co tr ry fe l ng he w o ld have mor pov r in his h nds as P m M n ste They were only too well a are that n the d v s n f a et Ind a starts ith the t al advantage of h v ng the o h lming pe centage of them n her phy cal po session a d th t ccord ngly an e ght m th spell w th Mountbatte as jo nt Gov no General must be of prim ry advantag to Pak stan

Wh n Mountb tt sked h m frankly vheth r he reali ed wh t h s decision w uld cost the State of h creat on Jinnah cand dly adm tt d that t w uld po sibly cost sev ral cr s of r pees n ss t but th t he wa nable t ccept any pos t on oth r than th t f G e General f Pak stan on the 15th August N ne-the le s he add d that he part cul rly h ped M tb tt n w uld st y s G ern r G neral of Ind a as h f lt that th s w ld help r l ti bet een the ty o Dom n

A em rgency meet g f M u tb ttens staff w held at I m y s h u t 0 30 thi m rn ng The pu po was to consider v rous poss bl urses open to th V ceroy who s placed in a m t n d o nd d l cat p s t n I m y thought it ad able f r the t ff t x m ne the fact f the situ t n nd cl rify r wn iews n o d t pro de Mo tb tte w th obj ct e adv ce bef w xposed rsel s t h s wn inev tably subject e react on

Ji nah has certainly ma nt n d the element of su pen e and s rpr e o th s s t the last m m nt W ll assum d that h wo ld be bound to p f the at and powers of P r me Mi t r to th se of constitut on l C rn Ge eral and n the b is of th first a s mpt e w nt farther a d g es d th t he would want to take ad ntage of Mountb tt n as c mm n G ernor-Gen ral F rtl est fr m our th ughts wa what ha n fact h ppened—J nn h s elf elect n nd M untbatten ins ta ti n from Cong ess l ne

Aft r a car ful con d t n the general consensus of op nion wa that in these unf reseen c rcum t nces Mo ntbatt n sh uld be strongly ad sed t ccept the uncond t onal Congre s offer to h m and rem n on G rn r General of th Dom n on of Ind a The pos bl rses f act on reduced themsel es t th —

(1) T agree to J nn h becom n Go ernor-General f P k is n, and f r Mountb tten to s ay on as G ern r-Gener l of India alone

(2) To agree to Jinnah becoming Governor General of Pakistan and to ask Congress to nominate someone other than Mountbatten as Governor General of India

(3) To devise a formula whereby Mountbatten would be enabled to remain as Governor General of both Dominions while at the same time substantially satisfying Jinnah's wishes to control Pakistan

In the meanwhile I have sent a wire to London suggesting that the Editor of the *Evening Standard* be invited to send a representative out to India to study a few of the elementary facts of the situation here. This proposal has been prompted by an unusually reckless piece of Beaverbrookese. The proposition put before the *Evening Standard* readers in a leading article is 'If it was possible to set up two Dominions in India then plainly had the requisite statesmanship been available it would have been possible to convert India into a single Dominion owing an undivided allegiance to the Crown.' *There are also some slap happy references to* 'Balkanisation' and 'an utterly reactionary step' and the whole of our efforts are denounced as 'political auction'.

What a pity that Beaverbrook, who genuinely believes in a liberal Empire in the Western and Southern Hemispheres, does not seem to understand what men of goodwill who also seek a similar dispensation are trying to do here in the East.

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Thursday 3rd July 1947*

We had our Staff Meeting with Mountbatten this afternoon and he asked for our views on the Governor-Generalship round the table one by one. All but one of us urged upon him that in the interests of India, Pakistan and Britain it was his clear duty to accept the Congress invitation. Our virtual unanimity and the obvious strength and sincerity of our collective opinion took him by surprise, for previously, before being confronted by the firm reality of Jinnah's decision, we had taken the view informally and as individuals that it would be undesirable for Mountbatten to lose his objective and almost judicial status. But now it is clear to us that Jinnah, by identifying the Pakistan Governor Generalship with himself, has created a wholly new situation.

When my turn came to speak I read out the note I had prepared. I was careful to confine myself to the publicity implications of the three courses considered. 'It has been a political commonplace,' I wrote, 'that with the transfer of power Pakistan would become the last outpost of British Imperialism and that the anti-British bias of Congress would quickly prevail. Congress invitations to His Excellency, Colville and Nye knock that criticism on the head. From the view point of British prestige it is a tremendous thing that Congress at the moment of victory

nty years strugg! s th the Brt h h ld spo t neou ly in te E gl hm n t stay on in th s ay

S ch an in t t n gets o r relat s w th the new Ind a off t a start good b y d all xpect tion At the same time th i gest n th t H E ha old o t to the Co g ess i m t by ob o d c th t I k tan d Jnn h ha e g t xactly wh t they ask d for I f ct H E s pr sence t th head f the new I d n State wo ld n t r lly b nterpr ted th b st gua ntee that it relations with P k i n o ld b carr ed n in a f iendly and co structive manner d a buff r gainst excessi Congress cla ms.

The rgument that w th Jinnah n h s present mood and en j y ng f ll power nd s th H E mply s constitutional Gov rn r Gen l H E ould t be ble to exer is ny s b st t al fluen e o I d Pak sta relat on i a majo con s d rati n b t n t d ctly p bl c ty p blem Wh le no doubt t w uld b a l m ting f ct r t H E s s f l es I th k t s ld b w dely re l d th t n e else uld b bl to do more nd n s ex of h clos oci t th J ah at th crit cal t me o th Co v rn Ce l ld be l k ly to be n po tion to do s mu h Th g ment th t l mb d n i in ol d f m V cer y of ll Ind to G r G n r l of I d les P k i n can t l s bm t be ta ned r ho ld t be strongly str ssed—cl mb d n fr m h t Th whole emph s s of H I m here h been the f t e—on th beg nn ng of a ne ch pter r r l t n w th I d and not n the last V ceroy

If H E t h nd to ccessor 15th Augu t he wo ld ob sly b l g the crest of the v a e b t once it wa app eci t d that H E h d be n t d by C g ess un cond t n lly and h d t rned d w th r n it t I bel e e ther wo ld be a con d rabl l me f r t c m b th mmed te nd l ng term, th t h as lea ng the j b h lf do and maki g a q k get away

Am ng the m cell n u item we c n dered wh ther a part ti ned India mea t also a part t n d Kennel Cl b Th was only test ca e for th M l t ry Secret ry s office is be ng n und ted th q es from v All Ind a bod e s t wh t th y sh uld do n xt

VICEROY HOUSE NEW DELHI *F id y 4th J ly 1947*

Mo tbatt n h to-day d ert d the cr s over the future of the Inter m G ernm t by call ng n ll the members—Congress d Moslem le g l ke—to res g and then in i g them to carry on unt l the actual pa ng f th Indian Ind pendence Bill at Wes m n ter B h nd th act wh h pl ys f r t me and i not of c urse a f n l s l t on of the p blem l es a compl cat d a d da gerou wrangle Br fly ev s nce th accepta ce f th

3rd June Plan Mountbatten has been subjected to two conflicting pressures On the Congress side it is largely a repetition with greater insistence of Patel s complaint You won t govern your self at least let us govern To this Jinnah s reaction is that if any Moslem League Ministers are removed they will resign en bloc making it clear that they are withdrawing from all co-operation and washing their hands of the whole Partition scheme Mountbatten is well aware that any such action on their part would once again wreck the prospects of peace and of Pakistan

Nehru tired and overwrought and subject to these increasing Congress demands to become master forthwith in his own house has been on the verge of resignation on this issue over the past week Jinnah first of all rejected outright any formula which involves the actual handing in of portfolios by the Moslem League members as being an insult to the League When Mountbatten evolved a scheme and actually drafted a Press announcement to meet his susceptibilities under this heading Jinnah changed his ground saying that he would resist the scheme as illegal under the 1935 Act This gave Mountbatten an unexpected opening for on inquiry in London he found that there was sufficient foundation in Jinnah s legal complaint to make it impossible for him to proceed with reconstitution of the Government in advance of the passing of the Act

At the Staff Meeting to day we argued out at great length the possibility and consequences of Mountbatten staying on beyond 15th August as Governor General of the Dominion of India only We have not as yet succeeded in removing his grave misgivings He fears the loss of objective status will be a crippling handicap to his usefulness and may well dissipate the good will he has won from Hindu and Moslem alike

Mountbatten now wants to have authoritative advice from London from the King and Prime Minister downwards before reaching a final decision He also suspects that the Government may feel—not unjustifiably—that he has misled them and put them in a false position by over selling the likelihood of a joint Governor Generalship

So he has decided that Ismay should leave for London at once officially to be available to the Government while the Independence Bill passes through Parliament but in addition to secure confidential guidance at the highest level as to whether he should stay on or come home I am to go as well and I will use the opportunity to make a parallel check on Press and other informed reactions to the new situation

LONDON *Monday 7th July 1947*

We left Palam in the Viceregal York on Saturday afternoon touching down at Northolt by tea time today My whole vision of Indo British travel has been foreshortened by my sequence

high speed and e n h gher priority flights ver the p st three ye rs. E gl d ha never looked l el r than when v e flew lov o er Be hy Head The cl ffs of Do er and Cala s stood o t so learly and close t g ther th t from ten thou and feet they seem ed to be part of th same mainland the straits appe ring as the ntr ce t some m ghty ri r or gr d h rbour The green f Engl h f elds from the a h soft c l ed qual ty not to be fo d in th d d rk hues of land ashed by mons o

I may was n splend d form on th fl ght He h th Roman rtue of *eq l im ta* H bl d *b l ml* s a perfect fo l to M ntbatt n with his m re inten e and unc en moods Ismay had taken g e t pa n o r t e ary and s arrang d th t at our vari us l nd ng po nts—K r ch H bb n y M lt —we land~d in good tim f d er a d left t a comfortable hour n th morn ng H s d the j ney b ck to Ind a ith the Mo ntbattens in M y had been an o de l he uld ne er underg gain I a ff rt to beat th lock all they had succeeded n d i g was play ng h c w th e ery n d g t o

By x o' lock th g I m y s in close conference w th the Prime M n ster t 10 Dow n ng Stre t Th Prime M n st r d d not tak l ng t h th n lus n that th n a d dfl cult s tuat n in n way lessened b t th enhanced the ne d f r Mo tb tt n t tay on n India

LONDON *Tuesday 8tl J ly 1947*

After d nn r yesterday Ismay att ded me t ng t 10 Down ing Street wh ch l ted bey nd m dnight Although ther r som doubt expres ed bo t M untb tten pe so al pos t rising f om th cha ge f m arb tral to a p rt an status pa t cularly in the event f d put bets en the two Domi i ns M n ter w re g rally n fa o r of Mountbatten accept ng th Ind an offer Attl e it eems went s f s to say that M unt b tt n co ld ee th s th gh and no one lse co ld d s The G mm nt w re deeply mpr ed by th Moslem Leag e s pport for the pr pos t n wh h I may was bl t con ey t them n writ g from Li quat Th pos t n in f ct th t b th des have n w request d M tb tten to rem n on ith one d

Th s mor ng the P me M n ter call d n the follo ng Oppos ti n lead rs S l sbury M cm ll n B tler Sam l nd Cl m Da e I m y put the p oblem bef re them Lord Samu l as rath r anx ou t r the dea wh ch he had or gin lly ex pre sed t M untb tten my flat of Vicer y p es d ng over th two Go ernors-Gen ral B t the general ens of th me t was that such sugg t on was now too l te to put nto p cti e and in a y case l k ly to be un cceptable t th Congres The Liberals were wh le he rtedly n fa our of M u tb tten

r act on to y do ng so ll be f vourabl nd sympathet c Fra k O en sa d th t if y r p e tige stood at n nety when you l ft in M rch t h d no r en to o e hundred and n nety n! that ny d cisi n you t ke simply on the gro nds that you l d t ken t ld be rega d d g od and s ff cient by the Briti h p bl c Lord Layt n said that n hi iew J n hs decision o ld b w d ly ega ded a n elf sh d amb t o s act and that t ould l a marking d wn her w th the Br t h Pre of h s reputat on h ch w at ts peak du ng h s vi t to Engl nd n Decembe la t Th he h d made a ery con d rable impress on

HABBANIYA *Si d 0th J ly 1947*

On our j r y back e ar tak g ith us Major B lly Short h h ry gr t fl ence th the S kh He a attached t the C h et M n d va t B ld S ngh s right h d l t D cemb r H ll n t be a mmb r f th V c r y s taff a uch b t ll be sec nd d to ad se I m y ho ha de p and w ll fou nd d f bod ngs b ut S kh re ct ns n th P j b Short d l ghtf l compa n a m n f w de hum n sympath es d of cr t f sl htly ecc t r g n lty for whom Ind a seems t ct b th as l e nd as le se

Du ing th fl ght, ce aga n ca f lly t m d to avo d all un ecessary con n ence I may h s d ct t d to h d f t g ble cr t ry B tty C n a pers l p g ess repo t f admir bl l cid ty d j dgement Wh le tle f t t adm t M ntb tten gre t per l t mph n sec ng the Le d d rsem t f the 3rd J P and th sen e f m m nt ry el ti n it pro duced h nfessed he felt th t we were o r Bech s Br ok f t t m r d nd not more th n that He eferred to the conf d ce nd e rag f gn ce h ch e bled the Leaders t d m from th r m nd the immen adm ni trati e p b ems the wer cre t ng

The b ggest crime and the b ggest h ad che h f lt wa the part t n of th Arm d Force B it he can tak most of the cred t f r the m t r plan wh h h s been l ed t ch e e a mooth tra t o I d bt wh th any n el e c ld ha e beg n to un er mbl th g H ca y th truth It j t pos ble that two really good rm es w ll emerge from th proces It i tr th t they w ll t n s m t tal be equ l t th ngle army out of h ch they h been f sh ed Pro ided the J nt De fenc Cou c l can be kept be ng t en that the tr n g equ pment and d m strat o f the two arm e re on un f rm l es d that they ct cco d ce w th n fed pol cy h f lt that the damage f d sect n would be substant lly reduced

He was abl to report f ably n the pr sent pr gre h eved by var us sub-comm ttees deal ng w th th P t t on f the manifold asset and l b l t es Th s had meant that the pre

m ki g x thousand m les by a r a refresh ng xperi nce and fter th hect c temp f e ents in London ve em rg d f irly l mp to take our part in the vit l l st l p of th p l tical transfer

In ur b on cr s— nd from th reports we received from Mountbatt when we ere in London the se erest f ll so f in its ons t and imm diat mpl cat n —h been offic ally d p s d f lth gh tensi n s st ll cut Mountbatten h reconst tuted the Inter m Go ernment so that it no amounts n ff ct t two P n l Admin t t n f r I d and one for Pak stan each dealing th t n bus nes and consult g th th nly n m tte f mm n concern The ad antag of the plan vas that it d d not n l y res gn t on f the M sl m Le g e m mb

Th order ss ed last Saturd y m t ty f ur hours aft r th R y l A t to the I d an Independ nce Act pok f the Governor-General ppr g th d str but on of portfol os N hru d Patel re ith great diffi lty ec n led to th new formula As f r J h wh n M untbatten pres t d th pro p l t him he s id yet aga n that h w ld g ve them h car ful atte t n But thi tim Mo ntbatten w fo once in p u n to t ll him that h s v w d dvice were n t eq ed as he nte d d n his w int t and p b l ty to is n der b ging the new arrangem nts into force f rthw th

W th characte t c ing nu ty Mountbatten h p pared for h Staff nd ll the M n ters nd ffi l concern d in the partit n arr ngements a m ll tear off calend r g g the day f th m nth d u der it n bold type X Days left to p p e f th T ansfer of P u til D Day tself hed Th Part t on Coun il however h s l eady t k n the hint f n t ng sm thly nd k ping p to sched l

Mountb tt n n w n th th ck f th States p bl m A w th h d pl m cy pr or t th 3rd June Pl n, he took th cal cul ted risk nd personally sp n r g the I trument of A es n d u d rtak ng to get all th P nce into th par t l r bag wh le V P ld the p j ct t Congres He em barked w th th a rance f P t l s deci s pport g n n m t t tesman l k pe h ina g t g the nev States De p rtment the d y w l ft f L ndon Th most t ctabl p obl m h w er s Hyd b d v h h will u d bt dly call for special act on M untbatten y he s r dy t go th t h rt n tce nd feels th t the nly h nce f s cu ing a reasonabl s ttlement to see th N zam pe ally

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Th d y 24th J ly 1947*

I pe t m t f th d y dealing with the l f th import a t Part t on C unc l stat m nt wh ch unce th tt g up of a B d ry Force n th Punj b P rt tion areas This pec al m l tary command will cover tw l e of the f rteen d stricts

He used very pon in his armoury of persuasion making it clear at the outset that in the proposed Instrument of Accession which the V P Menon had devised they were being p ded th political off from the Congress which was not likely to be repeated Indeed it was not even firm off a yet and the m n ch f t being n r st d on his capacity to pr d Patel th full basket of c pt nce H t m d d them that after the 15th August he would no longer be in a p t n t med t on their behalf C n R pr nt t e r d d th e Pr s h e hoping to build up their own t of arms that the e pons they would be likely to get would n y c b bsol t On p t n p rticul made with perf t t m g nd mph s d d t fal t fi d ts m rk with Their H hn If h d the I tument of A cess o s pt d h had g d r a n t think that Patel and the C gr ld n t nterfe th th ce g h n u a d t t l fr m th K g d r D m n n St t which he knew meant much t th m p n t f th mo h cal d In th s ct t h s u d bt dly b n o rc f str n th i h elat th th P th t M ntb tt n h s b n able to pe k t imply Cr n R p t t e b t as u n f th King F these h d ta y r l th blood Royal ca es ts wn uth ty Th c r of h m s g th ft o n t d n th g nt ph a Y u cann t n y from th Domin on G mm nt which y ur ghb u ny m th n y u n run away f m th ubj ct f r h se w lf r you resp ble

I cannot imag h e er mo d ff lt a mbly f any man t h e t dde th n th on Her in f ct an udience f her d ta y heph rds n the un nviabl pos t n f l t sh p O e ag n M untb ttens m r ler ng t lent w s n t full d nt ge F r h som h ma g d to f ct th m w th h o n pont o th a m a d po r f d cis n In th proce s what b g as an cca n of h gh ser n o n d el ped int one f fl ppa cy and b nter a Mou tb tten be n to d l th the m ss f quest ns cog nt nd obtuse wh h v er th o n t h m

Thu rtain Mah raj ab nt from h s St t and f om I d at this t cal m ment d d n t eem t ppr ci t th mp rt nce ther f com g h m elf to the meet ng even f b fing h D w n F the Dew n h d been sent no instruc t on what Su ly M untb tt sked y u must kno y ur Rul s m nd and ca tak a decis on n h s b h lf? I do n t kn w my R l m nd the hapless Dew n r plied nd

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Lord Mountb tten h m lf nvest d the M h r j s f Jaipur and B kane w th th Gr nd Cross f the Star of Ind (G.C.S.I.) after the t ansf r f po er



Airfield Arrival 22nd March 1947 Lord Mountbatten Viceroy designate on arrival at Palam airfield is introduced by Mr (now Sir) George Abell to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck




Viceroys Meeting 22nd March 1947 Lord Mountbatten and Lord Wavell greet each other at the top of the Viceroy's


M h m Gandhl t k hl M r l g M l t Vi y H f
he f t t m in hi L l 2 Ap il 1947

I t d c o to J n h V c r y H 5th Ap il 1947


C R with Lord and Lady Mountbatten 8 March 1948

Departure in State New Delhi 21st June 1948 Lord and Lady Mountbatten leave Government House for the last time





H m m g L d 23 d J 1948 L f t ght th D k f Ed
L d M tb tt M Ch tty F M f th G m
I d M Attl L dy M b tt d th th i th b kg



G dh l Jo y 31 J y 1948

C m t t R j Gh t



of great distress about it all The result was that V P rushed up to Mountbatten s bedroom this morning full of alarm

Mountbatten was of course able to explain the whole thing and hopes in the next day or so to be able to laugh it off with the Congress leaders but he regards the incident as revealing and points out that if he had not established clo e relations with V P and if V P had not felt himself able to go straight to his bedroom this morning this petty misunderstanding could easily have developed into a major crisis and may still involve a con siderable expenditure of time and effort to explain away to the satisfaction of all

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Monday 28th July 1947*

There was a colourful reception at Viceroy s House to night in honour of over fifty Ruling Princes and a hundred of the States Representatives The splendour of it only seemed to strengthen the sense of unreality and pathos surrounding the Princely order at this time When unity of purpose was of overwhelming im portance for them they were to be seen uneasy and obsessed with their own problems of precedence each anxiously watching what the other was doing—and as a Dewan remarked of one of them wandering about like a letter without a stamp

Those of Their Highness who had not already signified their intention of signing the Instrument of Accession were duly shep-herded by the A D C s one by one for a friendly talk with Mountbatten He in his turn passed them on in the full view of the company to V P who conducted them across the room to see Patel There were Maharajas three deep in a semi-circle watching this process

One veteran Prince was heard to remark 'Who s H E getting to work on now? Craning forward to see he added with relish 'There s no need for him to work on me I m signing tomor row' Fay overheard the following exchange between an old Prince and a young one The old Prince asked How are things in your State? The young prince replied We have been having *trouble in one place (which he named)* but we have reached a settlement now We have trouble everywhere the old Prince exclaimed but I don t let it reach the stage of a settlement

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Wednesday 30th July 1947*

Mountbatten left at first light this morning for Calcutta where he is to make a rapid last minute survey of the critical situation there

During the brief lull provided by his absence I have to-day had my long p omised interview with Gandhi arriving at midday for an appointment at his home among the Untouchables in the Bhangi Colony

I f und him on a platform raised a few inches off the gro nd a d repos ng on som cushio v th a very large bolster at h s back During ou convers t on two secr t ries cam in lently nd b hav d as w ll tra ned acolytes a e expect d to do

As I nt red Gandhi sa d sm l ngly You ll not expect me to g t up I wa off red ch ir but I cho e—almost sub n ou ly—t st d wn c s I gg d in fro t of h m I b gan by rec ll g th t the last t m I had th p lege of m et g h m v as seventeen ye s go wh n I was a boy t Westm ter School H had com v ry unexpect dly to spe k to us and we h d ll b n deeply impr ssed by th event He id h h lf remembe ed th occ s o a d dded th t he had been nv ted by m ry kind Canon I recalled th t t v d ys fterw ds L d Hal fax h d ls om to the Sch ol to add ess us and that n that ye r f the Irw n Gandhi P ct the b d g memory of the o dal t rm n h ch each h d poken f th oth r B th had left n u ch lboy m ds th mpe on that here the es nt l h man go d ll fr m wh ch ge u n ag e ment could spring I as ery cl e t Lo d H l f x in thos d y Gandhi d lmo t v tf lly n t th t I m not so no

I id th t I had just come b ck fr m Lond v h re I h d v t e ed the Ind n I depend ce B ll pas th ugh both H ses of P l m t I t k th ca n to p e t G ndh with th e op es f th Hans rds f th se Deb tes—a gest r th t se med t plea e h m— nd d e part la atte tion t Lo d S mu l s t b t to h m in th Lo ds He s d h h d n t c d it and th t it v a very k d of him t ha e m de thes rem rk He had ce h d m co sp de e w th Lo d S muel a d in the argum nt L d S m l had been m g a m s nough to dm t h mself in the v rong That Gandhi bserved w s ve y g d s gn in a man

Turning t the gen al s tu t on ar ing fr m the Act he s id th t w th th ting off of Brit h dom at n the mo t t men dou re p ns bil ty had been th o v n upon th Cong es le d rs who h d b n brought p n ly a f l khs f r pe and no had the ast re ources f a St t the d po l B th G ernment need d t m bre th g pace n v h ch to est b l sh thems l es H regard d Part t on as an ev l b t was ady t dm t th t out f v l ould om g d if nly th t Gov ernm nts w uld pl y f r ith e h th r I sa d th t t v s not mply the fut e of I d th t a at st ke but th t f the v hole of A a Th c unt es f So th-east As in part cul r we e lo k ng t Ind a and the Chinese c il war o ly enh c d I d p t nt l fl e ce He agreed mphat cally Th wh l w rld he sa d lo king to s Ind a s under the m cro- scope

When I turn d t my part cul r busine nd nte est here— the Press—I m nt o ed the ne d for Ind an p pers to b gin

taking a world view and for Indian journalists to gain new experience in overseas assignments He agreed that the need existed but this particular contention inspired him to take up a favourite theme of his There is he said a dangerous tendency for Indians to look to others for salvation We must keep our self respect and help ourselves Look at the case of medicine and doctors I do not know of a single Englishman who has come to India for treatment but one is always hearing of Indians going abroad to be treated by this or that famous European surgeon It is not right that India should only be a place for Indians to die in There are many splendid surgeons including Dr Ansari Admittedly he added mischievously Dr Ansari is concerned primarily with rejuvenation and offering one the chance of becoming thirty again and having a harem!

The core of his argument was that with India now having won her political freedom it was the duty of Indians to show their faith and pride in their country not only by words but also by deeds They had to realise that the amenities and assets which they had assumed were the monopolies of the outside world were not inevitably so at all This was the real challenge of Indian Independence

VICEROY S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Friday 1st August 1947*

I was given an account of to-day s luncheon at Viceroy s House to several of the leading Princes After paying their bread and butter respects to Their Excellencies they ran the gauntlet of A D C s who helped to form virtual Aye and No lobbies on their attitude to Accession Patiala and Bikaner entered into the spirit of the thing by passing through the No lobby and then roaring with laughter

Apart from Hyderabad and Kashmir which present special problems Mountbatten s advice is having a decisive effect and only two or three of the senior Princes seem to consider there is any advantage or merit in holding out against Accession Unfortunately Mountbatten s friend Bhopal is the leader of this group which includes his close and important neighbour the Maharaja of Indore As the ablest Moslem Prince I would guess he is not averse to playing an important role in the higher politics of Pakistan He has for some time been one of Jinnah s closest advisers Unhappily for him his State is predominantly Hindu and in the heart of Indian territory

The burden of work falling upon Mountbatten and his staff seems if anything to increase as each day brings us nearer to the transfer of power I have enough Public Relations and Press problems calling for immediate decision and implementation to keep a whole Central Office of Information busy Very careful thought has to be given to the planning of the elaborate ceremonial in Karachi and Delhi Jinnah has raised difficulties about

the degree of precedence to be accorded to Mountbatten in Karachi on 13th August. It has been politely but none the less firmly made clear to him that His Excellency's visit will be in his capacity as Viceroy, and any proposal that he should sit below Jinnah at the special meeting of the Legislative Assembly is therefore out of the question.

My tasks included submission of drafts for the King's messages to the two new Dominions and assistance in polishing the texts of Mountbatten's formal Addresses to the two Legislative Assemblies, which all involve delicate problems of emphasis. Mountbatten would prefer to speak without any notes, but we have all prevailed upon him to admit somewhat grudgingly that this would be inappropriate on such historic and formal occasions, with the world's Press and radio picking up every word.

VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Tuesday, 5th August, 1947*

Following today's Partition Council and Joint Defence Council meetings, Mountbatten was in secret conclave with Patel, Jinnah and Liaquat, having decided to introduce them to an officer of the now depleted Punjab Criminal Investigation Department, sent down by Jenkins to give him a verbal report. This officer told of various statements made by investigators of detainees arrested after incidents. These interrogations and intelligence from other sources implicated the Sikh leaders in a number of sabotage plans, including a plot to assassinate Jinnah during the State drive at the Independence celebrations in Karachi next week. Jinnah and Liaquat immediately demanded the arrest of Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders. Patel, however, was strongly opposed to this course, arguing that it would only precipitate a crisis already beyond control.

Mountbatten said he was prepared to support the arrests, but only if the authorities on the spot felt that this would be a wise step. He has therefore written off to Jenkins to consider with Trivedi and Mudie,* the Governors designate of the East and West Punjabs, as a matter of urgency the desirability of arresting Tara Singh and his more hot-headed colleagues shortly before the 15th August.

Mountbatten has a very high opinion of Jenkins, who has held the fort in the Punjab under conditions of intolerable strain and slander. No man could have done more to preserve the last vestiges of order in the distracted Province. He deserves, but is far from receiving, the gratitude of both sides for his unremitting labours.

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* Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of Sind until the transfer of power, subsequently accepted an invitation from Mr Jinnah to serve as the first Governor of West Punjab.

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday 7th August 1947*

We have our lighter moments The Minutes of the sixty eighth Viceroy's Staff Meeting held this evening begin as follows Item 1 Astrology The Viceroy said that he had just seen Mr Mangaldas Pakwasa the Governor Designate of the Central Provinces and suggested that he should go down on the 13th rather than the 14th August to start taking over from Sir Frederick Bourne thus enabling Bourne to leave to become Governor of East Bengal by the 15th Mr Mangaldas Pakwasa had said that this was out of the question on astrological grounds The Viceroy pointed out that there was a complete lack on his staff of high level advisers on astrology This would be remedied forthwith H E the Viceroy appointed Press Attache to the additional and honorary post of Astrologer to the Governor General

Following the Staff Meeting I met the cause of my astrological appointment Mangaldas Pakwasa at a small lunch party given by Vallabhbhai Patel to which Fay and I were invited The occasion was informal In addition to Pakwasa and ourselves there was only one other guest an American visitor Mr Dall Shankar Patel's Private Secretary who was a contemporary of mine at Oxford and Maniben the Sardar's devoted one might almost say dedicated daughter brought the lunch party up to seven Patel's home is nearly next door to Nehru's and is if anything smaller and even less pretentious than the Prime Minister's residence

It is a commonplace to draw the political contrast between Nehru and Patel who after the transfer of power are likely to provide India with a virtual duumvirate but the variations in personality and appearance are hardly less striking Dressed in his *dhoti* Patel conjures up the vision of a Roman Emperor in his toga There are in fact Roman qualities about this man—administrative talent the capacity to take and sustain strong decisions and a certain serenity which invariably accompanies real strength of character

He lacks Nehru's world reputation and world outlook and he has deliberately confined himself to the tasks that involve surveillance of domestic politics Here his powers and responsibilities are as wide as they well can be they include control over all Government Information Internal Security the Police and last but not least the vital problem of relations with the Indian States The completion of his Accession policy should bring into the Indian Dominion more citizens than will be lost to it through the creation of Pakistan for (excluding the twenty millions in Hyderabad and Kashmir) there are some ninety million States subjects involved which is considerably more than the population of Pakistan he also holds in his hands nearly all Congress patronage This is a formidable concentration of per-

sonal power under any reg me In sp te f all these preoccupa tions Patel h a shrewd grasp of Ind a s strateg c position in the world at large

Off d ty as he was to-d y he i indeed the embodime t of the gentl Hind full of bene ole ce a d smiles He w s in t ested to h ar my first-ha d account of th pas ing of the In depend n B ll in Lond d in the course of conversation the general subj t f pe h mak ng cr pped up He and Manib n l gh d when I ask d whether h nj y d m king pee h s Man b n mind g me th t her father wa gre t t r in G j rat

Thr gho t most of the me l M ben who is on the ins d of all th S d offici l and t p-secr t ct it es r m d th l nt acolyte D e d n the austere s mpl city of h r Khad and e ring at h r w t g nt bunch of keys she gave th impress n t an effic ent and h lly bs rbed comptroll of th domest c h h ld

Nearly ll th I d n le der re s ro ded by women mem be f the r f m ly h th as ves s te daughters wh exercise n t m ly p e f l nfl nce on th r ca rs I h d com o t to Ind a nd th naive impres o that Ind an v omen w e compl t ly bmerged nd h d no say t r st in m t ters f St t Th s rt nly not the t the summ t f aff rs M s Fat m J h Mrs Vijayalakshm P d t Beg m Liaqu t Al Kh n nd Mrs Kr pal n f rmidable per o l t e ho e amb t ons a d t ts me sure up to th s of the r respect ve m nf lk. Not all f them w ld be ontent to mai so q tly in the b ckgr nd s Man ben b t it is doubtful whether the nfl of any of th m in their respecti house h lds xce ds hers v th h father

More ver Lady Mo ntbatten h I kno b n deeply m pr d by her cont ct w th Ind n w me in th wh le fi ld of soc al s rvic Not only the r capab l t s outst nd ng but th y a e cast ng off th h ckles f bord nat status An important f cet f Ind n Indepe dence s th emanc pat n of Ind n w men Lady M tbatten s l dersh p t this time is givi g a great fill p to this l be ting proce

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Frid y 8th A g t 1947*

Mountbatt h had se l reque ts to bro dcast to Am rica a d en one propo l that he h uld h ld eryth g to vis t the U.S.A. s th star guest t a b g Pr s-spon ed con nt In v w f the trem d s pre upon h s time nd energ e it has been nec s y autom tically to turn d wn ll requ ts but my d ce he h agreed to speak n a pecial progr mme wh ch is b g b o dcast th gho t the Un t d Stat s to ele br t the second ann rs ry of V J d y d will i l de the recorded v c of the lead s of ne ly all the Un ted N t ons

Although he will be on the air for only three minutes I feel this presents a splendid opportunity to drive home the double meaning of the 15th August He asked me to prepare him a draft which he has substantially accepted

After approving the elaborate arrangements for him to broadcast a recording of his message from his study his words were beamed from All India Radio via the B B C. to America for actual transmission on the 15th Two years ago to-day, he declared I had just returned from the Potsdam Conference and was in the Prime Minister's room in 10 Downing Street when the news of the Japanese surrender came through Here as I speak to you to-night in Delhi we are celebrating an event no less momentous for the future of the world—India's Independence Day In the Atlantic Charter we the British and Americans dedicated ourselves to champion the self-determination of peoples and the independence of nations Bitter experience has taught us that it is often easier to win a war than to achieve a war aim so let us remember August 15th—V J Day—not only as the celebration of a victory but also as the fulfilment of a pledge

VICEROY'S HOUSE NEW DELHI *Saturday 9th August 1947*

At our Staff Meeting to-day we had a full discussion on the Punjab crisis Over and above reports from Jenkins of a most serious situation in the boundary area and urgent requests from him for more army air and police reinforcements Mountbatten was confronted with a Public Relations problem of some magnitude which had a direct bearing on the maintenance of morale and order

It is rumoured that Radcliffe will be ready by this evening to hand over the Award of the Punjab Boundary Commission to the Viceroy Following the expected but none the less complete failure of his Hindu and Moslem colleagues to reach any semblance of agreement Radcliffe under the terms of reference has had only to consult himself Responsibility for publication however rests with the Viceroy Mountbatten from the outset had given his staff the most explicit directions that they were to have no contact whatever with Radcliffe while he was engaged on his difficult and delicate arbitral task and has himself kept clear of him after the first welcome We had accordingly no firm knowledge how far or by what route he had proceeded

Various points of view about publication were put forward On administrative grounds it was argued that earliest possible announcement would be of help to Jenkins and would enable last minute troop movements to be made into the affected areas in advance of the transfer of power Alternatively it was suggested that in so far as the Award would in any case be bound to touch off trouble the best date to release it would be on the 15th August Mountbatten said that if he could exercise some

d scretion m th matter he vould much pref r to postpone t appe rance until after the Independence Day celebr ti n feel ing that the pr blem of its t m ng s really n of psy hology nd that the contr ersy and gr ef th t t s bound to ar us on b th sides hould n t be all w d to mar Independence Day itself

With th s i I wh lly concur and vould go further and ay th t f r th R d liff A rd t prec de or coin de with In dependenc Day w uld be to r k destr y ng at ne stroke the h le symbol c gn fica ce f freedom to Hindu Moslem and S kh l ke The Ind an f cil ty f r fr end h p can be s sly fru trated h s xpect t on nd en r ment alik m ke the mar gin betwe n h pp n s and m urn ng dang r usly narrow Th cond t on of h y is that t hould b u confin d nd th t h should h e temp ry r pr from h s eternal f rs

No fin l decis n wa tak n t our meeting to day and Ab ll va nstructed furth r to d scuss the t m ng probl m with Jen kins To underl n the nd pendent t tus of th c mm s n Mountbatten de d d that th anno nceme t hen t as m d hould not be i th f rm f mmuniq e f m V ceroy s Hous but hould b publi hed Gazett Extra rd nary

Jenkins h s firmly r j ct d any sugge t on that the S kh leaders hould b rrested befo 15th Augu t H has adv s d Mount b tten th t he thoroughly d scu s d the ugg t on w th Mud e and Tr ved and th y were all unan mou n recomm nd ng th t su h trest w uld b m l k ly t ndanger th n mpr e the p e ent p car ous tu t All three h d ther f re decid ed that n arrests should b mad Mountb tt n feels th t s he has arrang d to d e w th J nn h in the State proce s n h h s the occas on m nt ned for th po ible attempt on Jinn h l f he can accept the r dec s n w thout p rson l r proach

VICEROY S HOU E NEW DELHI T esday 12th A gu t 1947

Three day h pa s d s nce th first warn g and the Award s st ll not re dy At th aft noon s St ff Meeting—our seven ti th and probably th l t—Mountbatten agr ed n iew of th uncertainty nd ou mpend ng d parture for Karach th t J hn Chr t e nd I should call on R dcl ffe mm di t ly to find out h n ve m ght xpe t th A a d t be n the Viceroy s hands

F r th d rat on of hi tay n Delh R dcl ff s g n th Compt llers Hous n th V g l e tate wh e he o ld w rk in i olat n Chr t e nd I hurry ng ound at ery h rt not ce arr ed t find th t h wa h ng ng for d nner When h appeared on the sc ne t w s lear th t ur int rv v would n t be an easy one, and that h wa ju t much al to th proprieties of the s tuat n as we e H e pla n d that b th

the Punjab and Bengal Awards were complete and ready but that the Sylhet Award was not

It seemed therefore that unless Mountbatten was to make a major issue of the matter it would be physically very difficult for all three Awards to come into his possession before his return to Delhi on the evening of 14th August or for the texts to be printed and available before the 16th—Independence Day itself being a national holiday We returned at once to Viceroy s House and advised Mountbatten of the position who was greatly relieved to have this ready made solution at his disposal

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

GOVERNMENT HOUSE KARACHI *Wednesday 13th August 1947*

MOUNTBATTEN LEFT FOR Karachi this morning to perform his last official duty as Viceroy of a united British India This is appropriately enough to convey His Majesty s and his own greetings to the new Dominion of Pakistan on the eve of its inception As we stepped off the aircraft Their Excellencies were greeted by Hidayatullah the benign Governor elect of Sind There was also the usual bevy of photographers As they drove off to Government House Colonel Birnie Jinnah s Military Secretary told Mountbatten that he had been given information of a plot to throw a bomb at Jinnah during tomorrow s State procession and that there had been discussions as to whether to cancel the drive or alter the route Jinnah however had taken the view that if Mountbatten was ready to go through with the drive then so was he Mountbatten at once agreed that there should be no change of arrangements

Jinnah and Miss Jinnah were awaiting the Mountbattens in the entrance hall which had been decked up to look just like a Hollywood film set and all four were subjected to takings and re takings under the dazzling light and sizzling heat of the arc lamps I made contact with Colonel Malik the Government Information officer at the Palace Hotel and met some of the Foreign correspondents who were rather critical of the Karachi proceedings to date Some argued that Mountbatten had been insulted by *Jinnah not being at the airfield to meet him* but I at once explained that I was sure Mountbatten did not consider that there had been any lack of courtesy or breach of etiquette involved At yesterday's Constituent Assembly there had been

they said an atmosphere of complete subservience with every one vying to outdo everyone else in verbal prostration before the Quaid-e-Azam.

In answer to my explicit inquiries Malik gave me clearly to understand that Jinnah was not proposing to make any set speech for publication at tonight's banquet, and I advised Mountbatten accordingly. Imagine my surprise when towards the end of the banquet, before all the assembled notabilities, comprising not only the Pakistan elite but a far from negligible nucleus of a Diplomatic Corps, Jinnah rose, adjusted his monocle and began reading with deliberation and somewhat laboured emphasis from a set script. The speech turned out to be one of considerable political significance, in particular for its cordial reference to the new Dominion's future relationship with Britain and to Mountbatten's contribution to the creation of Pakistan.

If Mountbatten felt any dismay at being caught in this rhetorical ambush he certainly did not show it, and by a fine feat of improvisation gave the impression of being even more word perfect than the Quaid-e-Azam with his notes. For ten minutes the appropriate phrase and thoughts flowed from him in smooth sequence. He is a born raconteur, and his informal but quick firing eloquence is ideally adapted to after-dinner speech making.

This was not the only hazard triumphantly surmounted tonight. About a quarter of an hour before we were all due to take our places at dinner a young Lieutenant Ahsan, whose first day it was as A.D.C. to Jinnah following his transfer from Viceroy's House, discovered that three distinguished guests high up on the table plan had failed to arrive. Bill Birnie and the wretched A.D.C.s were thus left with the decision whether to leave gaps in high places or undertake the revision of the seating plan throughout. With stout resolve they chose the latter course. Mountbatten and Jinnah were at once advised of the dilemma and played their part in the operation by maintaining pomp and small talk for over half an hour while the staff made feverish rearrangement.

After dinner we were merged in a larger reception and to an accompaniment of soft drinks and sweet music played by a band of bearded warriors in kilt the party ran its appointed course. Considering what lay behind all these arrangements—the hurried last minute arrival of so many officials, the creation of a Government and regime almost overnight—the reception was an administrative triumph. Jinnah himself as the host and hero of the occasion was an aloof, almost lonely figure, which may have helped to create a somewhat subdued atmosphere at the historic moment. He was to be seen with his slender, hard and immaculate white *ashkan* towering above most of his guests and talking to very few of them. They for their part did not presume to

button hole him Here indeed was the apotheosis of leadership by remote control

I had never dreamt that the creator of a nation at the moment of reaching the promised land could when surrounded by his devoted followers be at such a distance from them Finding him standing alone I spoke with him for a few moments I tried to find suitable words of congratulation but they died away before his mood of preoccupation almost of reverie

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, KARACHI AND GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday Friday 14th 15th August 1947*

Accommodation at Government House Karachi is strictly limited The number of V I P s here for to-day s ceremonies has taxed Bill Birnie s resources to the utmost Housing and hotel shortage is acute but by dint of dispersing and doubling up we were all successfully accommodated

We were up early this morning for the ceremonies at the Legislative Assembly I arrived about half an hour before Jinnah and the Mountbattens passing along part of the official route Neither the scale nor the enthusiasm of the crowds was anything like as great as I had expected It did not seem to be on a higher pitch than some annual opening of Parliament In the grounds facing the Assembly however with its small semi-circular shell shaped chamber every available inch was occupied The Mountbattens as they drove up were given the same cordial reception as the Jinnahs who had arrived a few minutes ahead of them Cordiality too was the key note of both Mountbatten s and Jinnah s speeches and of the reaction o the assembled Members The precedence problem died a natural death Lady Mountbatten pressed Miss Jinnah s hand affectionately as Jinnah sat down after giving his address

If Jinnah s personality is cold and remote it also has a magnetic quality—the sense of leadership is almost overpowering He makes only the most superficial attempt to disguise himself as a constitutional Governor General and one of his first acts after putting his name forward was to apply for powers under the 9th Schedule rather than Part II of the 1935 Act which gave him at once dictatorial powers unknown to any constitutional Governor General representing the King Here indeed is Pakistan s King Emperor Archbishop of Canterbury Speaker and Prime Minister concentrated into one formidable Quaid-e Azam

The proceedings were over within the hour and Jinnah and Mountbatten drove back in State together Once again the greetings of the crowd apart from some lorryloads of hilarious sailors of the Pakistan Navy and the usual excitement of children were decorous rather than ecstatic As they turned in at the gates of Government House Jinnah put his hand on Mountbatten s knee and said with evident emotion Thank God I have brought you

tryst with destiny and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge not wholly or in full measure but substantially At the stroke of the midnight hour when the world sleeps India will awake to life and freedom

Weary but happy having escaped from the greetings of tremendous throngs Prasad and Nehru finally arrived In the little scene that ensued friendship completely burst the bounds of formality The Press correspondents flanked the room photographers stood on the circular table Although Nehru had given approval that the Press should be there I think he must have forgotten that he had done so Whether it was the presence of an audience or just the normal reaction after the great scenes in the Assembly neither of them seemed to know quite what to do

Finally Mountbatten and Prasad stood facing each other with Nehru half sitting on Mountbatten s desk between them Prasad began murmuring a formal invitation However he forgot his lines and Nehru played the role of benign prompter Between them they explained that the Constituent Assembly had just taken over and had endorsed the request of the leaders that Mountbatten should become the first Governor General To this message he smilingly replied I am proud of the honour and I will do my best to carry out your advice in a constitutional manner

Thereupon Nehru handing over a large and carefully addressed envelope said in ceremonious terms May I submit to you the portfolios of the new Cabinet? The ceremony was all over in less than ten minutes but there was more humanity and hope in this unrehearsed encounter than in most of our Te Deums and victory parades

I was once more alone with Mountbatten. Just to satisfy his curiosity and remind himself of the exact names of the Government to which he had previously agreed and which he would be swearing in in a few hours time he opened the large envelope but he was not to see his Prime Minister s submission that night for by sublime oversight Nehru s envelope was empty

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Friday 15th August 1947*

I doubt whether it will be given to me to live through a more crowded or memorable day than this

At 8 30 the trumpets and the scarlet and gold which had heralded in twenty Viceroys summoned the State entrance of the newly created Earl Mountbatten of Burma into the Durbar Hall the first Governor General of the free India The strangeness of this great occasion lay not in its points of contrast with Mountbatten s earlier Viceregal installation but in its essential similarity to the March ceremony Now of course it was the function of an Indian Chief Justice Dr Kania to administer the Oath to the Governor-General and for an Indian Secretary of the Home

Truman's message—a lapse which was remedied only after Dr Grady the American Ambassador had expostulated in a loud whisper

To the usual accompaniment of photographic barrage, Mountbatten then rose to address the Assembly He began by reading out the King's message which was cordially received and then proceeded to speak with far more emphasis and spirit than he usually does when he has to keep to a script Although the words had been carefully chosen their underlying sincerity quickly drew the sympathy and applause of the packed Assembly References to the success of the Accession policy to his request to be regarded as one of yourselves and to the leadership of Nehru and Patel were all acclaimed But his solicitude for Gandhi drew the most prolonged cheers and it was some time before he could proceed

In appearance he looked magnificent but approachable As one Indian put it His gift for friendship has triumphed over everything It was psychologically sound for him to stress that he would definitely go when his work was completed in April He also succeeded in convincing his audience that no pressure would be put upon them to stay within the Commonwealth They were entirely free to make their own choice Many told me afterwards how delighted they were that his speech had been so substantial That it was in effect a policy declaration undoubtedly came as a welcome surprise

Prasad followed with a long address which he spoke first in Hindi and then in English In both languages he was almost inaudible Of the Congress elder statesmen Prasad is a moderate by conviction and temperament Where some of his colleagues may be lured into the pursuit of dialectical points beyond the bounds of good sense or self interest Prasad rarely indulges himself in outbursts or over statements To day he spoke from the heart Let us gratefully acknowledge he said while our achievement is in no small measure due to our own sufferings and sacrifices it is also the result of world forces and events and last though not least it is the consummation and fulfilment of the historic tradition and democratic ideals of the British race After tributes to the Mountbattens as representatives of that race he added The period of domination of Britain over India ends to day and our relationship with Britain is henceforward going to rest on a basis of equality of mutual good will and mutual profit

After the speeches the National flag was unfurled on the Council House and a salvo of thirty-one guns was fired The Mountbattens drive home was only the second of several tumultuous rides during the day and all the way back to Government House the cries of Jai Hind were mixed with Mountbatten Ki and even Pandit Mountbatten"!

that he could neither get on with his journey nor get off his machine Fay Marjorie Brockman and Pamela Nicholls were all trapped between the stands and the dais but cheerful people shouted Make way for the memsahibs! Fay finally reached the B B C recording van where Wynford Vaughan Thomas was frantically engaged on one of his most vivid and spectacular out side broadcasts He told me afterwards that it was the greatest crowd scene he had ever witnessed

Suddenly the cheering swelled into a roar and from where I stood I could just catch a glimpse of the A D C s in white followed by the fluttering lance pennants of the Governor General s Body Guard then the Governor General s carriage and more Body Guard The carriage and escort moving fitfully at last reached a point about twenty five yards from the flagstaff I could see the Mountbattens standing up waving to the crowd which was cheering and waving back at them Nehru made some last frantic efforts to call for order and clear a little space but his pleas were in vain so there was no alternative but for Mountbatten to stay in his carriage, and while the flag was being hoisted take the salute from there

Just as the flag was unfurled light rain began to fall and a rainbow appeared in the sky matching the saffron white and green of the flag If Hollywood had added this last touch we would all have complained that once again they were overdoing it as it was it would seem to provide a dramatic omen to refute the gloomier astrologers I must confess it would have taken a man of iron scepticism to be unimpressed by such an augury at such a moment

Mountbatten s return journey to Government House was the final triumph of friendly informality Nehru was unable to get back to his car so Mountbatten pulled him into the State carriage where he sat on the hood En route four women a child and a Press photographer in grave danger of being crushed under the wheels were duly rescued by Mountbatten and joined the party helping to swell the numbers in the carriage to twelve —shades of Curzon and his Durbar!

Then as grand finale to this historic day we repaired to the State banquet at Government House which was attended by most of the Cabinet Diplomatic Corps and military and civilian leaders One or two of the Princes who felt uneasy about their degree of precedence when in the company of members of the new Government were the only notable absentees The climax was reached when Nehru rose to propose the health of the King and Mountbatten replied with the toast of the Dominion Government Both speeches delivered without notes were for the benefit of the assembled guests alone There were thus none of the restraints imposed by the demands of world publicity

Munshi s comment on Mountbatten s appointment as Governor General —

No power in history he writes but Great Britain would have conceded independence with such grace and no power but India would have so gracefully acknowledged the debt.

Part II

THE FIRST GOVERNOR-GENERAL

WAR OF SUCCESSION

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Saturday 16th August 1947*

VERY EARLY THIS morning the National flag was hoisted over the Red Fort in Old Delhi and Nehru addressed a crowd estimated at some half a million stretching I am told all the way to that other monument of Moghul splendour the mighty Mosque of the Jama Masjid But the rejoicings of the morning were all too soon tempered by the depression of the leaders this afternoon when Mountbatten handed over to them the Radcliffe Award He allowed them two hours in which to digest its terms before summoning a formal meeting in the Council Chamber of Government House Liaquat was there and not the least of Mountbatten s achievements in Karachi this week was in securing Jinnah s reluctant agreement for Liaquat to make this visit at all coming as it did within twenty four hours of his assumption of the Premiership of Pakistan I was present at this sombre and sullen gathering where the only unanimity was in denunciation of this or that communal injustice The field was thus left clear for Mountbatten to point with well timed emphasis the moral that in so far as it was impossible for all the parties to be equally satisfied with Radcliffe s verdict the best evidence of its fairness seemed to rest in the undoubted equality of their displeasure

We were given the first shots of what will undoubtedly be a prolonged and passionate controversy Liaquat s dismay at the inclusion of the Gurdaspur District in East Punjab was offset by Patel s anger over the Chittagong Hill Tracts passing to Eastern Pakistan while the resentment of both was blanketed by Baldev s dumb depression None of the Leaders however saw fit to carry their criticism to the point of repudiating their unconditional pledge made in advance to accept the Award whatever its terms might be

Even as we met momentous news was coming in from both the partitioned Provinces which provided at once a warning and an example of the need for bold leadership In the Punjab the people are taking the situation into their own hands What Jenkins has aptly termed the war of succession has broken out in full fury in the land of the five rivers This afternoon Auchinleck gave a terse and terrifying situation report to the Leaders which has caused them to decide on an immediate reinforcement of the Boundary Force

ary Force and the Press attacks being made upon it both in the *Hindustan Times* and the *Indian News Chronicle* V P said there was a growing feeling on both sides that the new Governments should have more direct military control over their respective areas Mountbatten agreed that although the Boundary Force was undoubtedly the best military answer to the problem he was ready to concede that in this instance psychological rea sons might outweigh purely military ones His mind was moving in favour of retrocession of the Boundary Force s area

We then discussed the Press situation V P thought we should not take the Delhi Press too seriously as the big Provincial papers were all very steady on the issue The *Hindustan Times* this morning carried a direct attack on Rees and a most objectionable cartoon implying that the Supreme Command s Headquarters were deliberately depriving the Dominion Armies of good officers in order to retain big jobs for themselves As a result of our talk Mountbatten has decided that he will see Devadas Gandhi and Sahni the *Hindustan Times* and the *Indian News Chronicle s* editors this afternoon and has instructed me to arrange the meeting

Devadas and Sahni duly arrived at four o clock anticipating I suspect a chilly reception but Mountbatten was in his best form delivering his disapproval from behind a smoke screen of engaging frankness He has the rare knack of combining vehemence with *bonhomie* He started the session with a general homily on the need to avoid attacking the military who cannot answer for themselves If soldiers begin answering back you get a situation he said as in Mexico where they throw out the editors As against this dangerous example he stressed the recent case of General Barker in Palestine where Press criticism of the General s conduct was levelled not at the General himself but at Bellenger the Secretary of State for War and the Minister answerable to Parliament for the General s actions

Mountbatten then turned to a general account of what was happening in the Punjab The Sikhs he said had launched an attack just as Giani Kartar Singh and Tara Singh before the 3rd June had told him they would Mountbatten had expostulated with them at the time, stressing that the British would have gone It would be Indian fighting Indian But they were adamant, and had in fact observed that they were waiting for us to go The situation was now out of their control In an area less than two hundred by one hundred and fifty miles containing some seventeen thousand inhabited localities and only about the size of Wales some ten million people were on the move At this moment through the withdrawal of all the Moslems the police in the East Punjab were suddenly and catastrophically seven thousand under strength

taken to disband the Boundary Force Pete Rees received very few thanks from either side for his efforts to carry out a task of unparalleled difficulty Without the whole hearted backing of the Governments and Press on both sides the position of the Boundary Force and its Commander became rapidly untenable and otherwise steady and experienced troops began to feel the tug of communal loyalties deeper even than their military discipline

Now that the Punjab Boundary Force and the Joint Defence Council s authority over it are at an end Mountbatten s last executive responsibility lapses He considers that as a matter of policy he should confirm his new constitutional status by freeing himself from day to day contact with the executive or from any direct administrative interference in the Government s action to restore the immediate situation He has accordingly decided to go ahead with earlier arrangements and visit Simla for ten days of well-earned and badly needed rest

Meanwhile Ismay has gone for his much needed rest to Kashmir and has been asked by Mountbatten to do his best to get the Maharaja to make up his vacillating mind and accede without further delay to whichever Dominion he and his people desire thus ending the uncertain and dangerously unstable position in Kashmir

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Saturday 6th September 1947*

WE WERE ON the road early yesterday morning arriving at Government House during the afternoon where we found V P awaiting Mountbatten with a message from Patel hoping that he will grip the situation firmly without delay Nehru came round immediately to enlist his active and overriding authority to deal with the emergency followed by Patel

The decision of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of the new India taken only three weeks after the exhilaration of Independence to recall Mountbatten in this way is a great tribute to the quality of their character and leadership For by this act they have shown themselves big enough to recognise that Mountbatten s experience in high level administration is something which they have not yet acquired

After Mountbatten had had two or three h[illegible]
himself fully of the scale of the crisis he p[illegible]

gency Comm ttee should be set up Th s v s at once agreed to by Nehru nd Patel and at their n t nce Mountbatten accept d th cha rmansh p Noth ng les w ll meet the case for e ar n f ct confr nted with the d adly perils f war em rg ncy w thout h ng vail ble the n rm l nstruments or priorit es of r to untera t t W th the spre d of commun l fears and frenz wh ch re w tne g in the Punj b the scal of the k ll ng nd the m ement f r fug e b come en m re exten s th n th se cau ed by the m re f rm l confl cts f ppo ing rm s As th n rly ll the g e t migrations of h story the pe pl th ms l s h ld s y nd create cond tions which many an e pl t but n ne n mm nd

The f t th t Delh ts lf s n th p centre f this arthquake aut m t ally c n ert pr cs l nt a n t on l cr In th re pe t the Punj b cat t ph pe haps e n m re deadly f r Ind th n for P k st n ho capital Kara h is at a s fe d s tan fr m the d turb n s N n th l J nn h on h s s de has lready m de n urg nt br dca t appeal t h people to h lp n r tor ng pe nd in bu lding up th n w State E en f the Bound ry Aw d unjust n mpr hen bl nd e en perv M lem h d agreed to ab de by t The n v n t on sho ld se t t th t what h d b n won by th p n was n t lost by th d

It e y t f rget h w f r to the n rth D lh l —n rth e en of Mount Ever t Th r r th e wh rgue th t it h alw ys b en to f r rem d from the hub f Ind an l fe and th t th P rt t on th s bj ct n re nfor ed but a l nt ry ch nge of cap tal s on th ng a mpul ory ev cu t on by the n w Go ern ment th n a m nth of tt ning Ind pendence qu t anoth r And th s t u d ubt dly th ue for n a ly half a mill n re fug s re m g t w rds the c ty already o rcrowded bring ng n th tr in d rd and d wh lly beyond Delh s ad m st at e res urces t ntrol

Mountb tt n h d n e hau t e d u on th h own staff in dv n of th first meet ng f the Emerg ncy C mm tt of th Cab*net* er wh ch he w to pres de later in th ftern on We vere all sk d to m ke re mm dat ns and we e all t be t th d sp l of the Comm tte Ism y is be ng r call d from Kashm r

My own suggest on t help m et the Press and Publ c R la tions s de of th probl m n lud d p oposal to secur th earl e t poss ble publ city l nk up w th Pak tan the re nam ng and re gard ng of the Comm tt e to Coun l of State the *appo* ntment of a Publ c Rel tion sub-Comm ttee to c ns t if po s bl of a repre entative from the Min try f Informat on the Commander *in*-Ch ef s taff and myself the *firm* av d nce of censorsh p wh ch the Go *ernm* nt may be tempted to impose and finally the importance of pl ying down Mountb tten s role as cha rman

With this last concept Mountbatten whole heartedly concurred as also with my views on the dangers of censorship The Council of State concept was not seriously discussed and owing to the tempo of the day's events can be said to have been still born The Public Relations sub Committee was no sooner mentioned than it was approved and I was commissioned to promote it at once with the Ministry of information and the Commander in Chief

Mountbatten's reaction to the crisis was to set in motion procedure already tried and proved both at C O H Q and in S E A C He said his objective was to convert the Emergency Committee into a daily staff meeting at which spokesmen from every department of the command (in this instance Government Departments) could raise and answer questions Out of these meetings priorities as between departments would be established Once again Mountbatten showed himself a firm believer in the sovereignty of discussion Only by this means does he consider that the snags can quickly be uncovered and the solutions found

He also resolved to resume his old war and map-room procedure to provide the Cabinet and himself with the maximum factual information by visual aid both with regard to the number of disturbances and the movement of refugees To this end he has decided to call in Pete Rees whose Boundary Force Command closed down last week to become head of a small Military Emergency Staff operating inside Government House Pamela who with her medical and welfare work and her Presidency of the Caravan Club (an Indian youth movement) has already done her full share to keep the Mountbatten flag flying is to be his personal assistant

The first Emergency Committee met in the Council Chamber of Government House at five o clock and sat for over two hours Nehru opened the proceedings by turning to Mountbatten and saying "I will only take your advice on one condition—that you will take the chair And Mountbatten accepted under another condition that the fact is not to be published Complete secrecy will be difficult but as I stressed at an earlier Staff Meeting there could be no keener advocate of Press and Radio silence on this assignment than myself and I am determined to do all in my power to maintain it

It has been agreed that the Committee should consist only of essential Cabinet Ministers and other vital people such as the Commander in Chief the Supreme Commander's representative the Chief Commissioner of Delhi the Chief of Police, the Director General of Civil Aviation Medical and Railway representatives Everyone else is to be co-opted as required The Ministers who are to join Nehru and Patel as permanent members are Baldev Singh (Defence) Matthai (Railways) and Neogy (in the

newly created post of Refugee) Altogether fifteen of us were there for the initial meeting

The general mood at the outset was of dazed bewilderment and aimlessness before the unknown Nehru for whom all the horror of the first month of Independence seemed to come as the crucifixion of his life's work looked inexpressibly sad and resigned Patel was clearly disturbed with deep anger and frustration But for Mountbatten weighed down by none of these inner misgivings the occasion called forth all his powers of objective and dynamic decision and he at once radiated confidence and a sense of purpose where none had existed before

As soon as the actual constitution of the Committee had been decided we promptly plunged into a number of most immediate items The Ministry of Refugees had still to be set up The Committee wanted to know by the next morning the name of the person appointed to be secretary to the Ministry It then proceeded to tackle the difficult but urgent problem of accommodating the wholly new Department I myself was given the task of acting as a liaison party between the Emergency Committee and the Pakistan Government

In the general [illegible] our newly fledged Public Relations Committee [illegible] to attempt to improve the [illegible] of reporting of the Delhi newspapers on the communal [illegible] On this occasion I think the result will be limited [illegible] that everyone feel good [illegible] and that [illegible] the crux of the matter

There was then a short discussion on the imposition of martial law Mountbatten considered that [illegible] for it in the Punjab but only if all four Governments concerned are ready to back it As this seemed on the whole unlikely the Committee called for urgent examination of [illegible] to stiffen existing acts in force in the East Punjab Altogether some twelve items [illegible] from the setting up of a relief committee under Lady Mountbatten to the control of R A F transport and the dropping of leaflets from the freezing of assets to the disposal of jeeps Everyone left [illegible] on somewhat breathless

To-morrow [illegible] the East Punjab Government with the Prime Minister Gopi Chand Bhargava and Home Minister Swaran Singh are to attend the Committee

From Calcutta comes news of Gandhi's miracle His initial partnership with Suhrawardy did not achieve all that he had hoped isolated stabbings and acts of violence continued So on Monday he began a fast to end only if sanity returned to the city On Thursday he was able to call it off after leaders of the various communities had given guarantees that the masses had already responded to the Mahatma's appeal through soul resistance for a change of heart

After one of his Prayer Meetings Hindus and Moslems by their thousands mingled and embraced in the Maidan. Hardened Press correspondents report that they have seen nothing comparable with this demonstration of mass influence. Mountbatten's estimate is that he has achieved by moral persuasion what four Divisions would have been hard pressed to have accomplished by force.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Sunday, 7th September, 1947*

Our meeting began at eleven, but Trivedi and the East Punjab Ministers failed to arrive on time. Mountbatten started off by reporting that the situation in Delhi had worsened very considerably during the previous twenty-four hours. There had been a large number of incidents, including the stabbing of employees on the Government House estate, and far too many refugees were coming through before there was any organisation to receive them.

He turned at once to the question of banning the carrying of all weapons, which of course raised in its turn the problem of the *kirpans* or swords worn by the Sikhs. Patel felt that any suggestion of banning *kirpans* would raise great difficulties, as they had been recognised by the Government as religious weapons for many years. Mountbatten argued that the unqualified right of Sikhs to carry *kirpans* at this time stood in the way of precautions for law and order taken by every city in the world, but he agreed that the basic question was, which decision would lead to fewer people being killed—the banning of the *kirpan* or the safeguarding of Sikh religious feeling?

"If we go down in Delhi," Mountbatten warned, "we are finished." Ismay suggested reinforcing the police with a cadre of special constables. Patel was doubtful, but Nehru in favour. Trivedi finally arrived at ten to one, starting off with an impassioned speech which was clearly based on the mistaken assumption that the Emergency Committee was nothing other than a Grand Inquisition on himself and his Government. In answer to Mountbatten's inquiry about the East Punjab's capacity to preserve law and order and suggestion that this was the problem of top priority, Trivedi replied that the most urgent issue confronting him was the evacuation of refugees.

In view of the late arrival of the East Punjab contingent it was decided to meet again later in the day, and we resumed at 6 p.m. It was a rather better meeting this time. Nehru and Patel stood firm about the Sikhs, and there is to be a ban on all weapons. "I will not tolerate Delhi becoming another Lahore," Patel declared, and Nehru added, "I am certain in my mind *kirpans* may have to be taken away." Jeeps also are to be stopped from plying the streets—Nehru speaking of them as a source of much mischief.

The reports coming in which show the Delhi situati n to be r pidly dete ior t ng call fo coolness and str ngth There h s been a m s cre at W llingdon i field and the Sikhs ha e deli e ed thr ats to the Au tr lian H gh Commiss oner and to the United State Amb s ad r Mountbatten wa ned the meeting that the wh le ep tat on of I d a s ı ol ed in pro iding complete physical s cu ity for ts d pl mat c r presentatives

As token of h s r sol e to b k his ord th ction M unt batten ha p t h s B dy G ard at the disposal of the Garr son Comm nd r N rmally th D lhi Garrison is of br gade str ngth B t it ha been p sh d ut battal on by battal on into the riot torn Gu g on distr ct to t y to ke p the t ouble out f the city it elf Wh n the efo the tr uble came in there as simply no Garr n a labl The Body Gua d certainly a *corp d l te* d n rd r to p o la m the pe fect non c mmunal d s cipl n they h e been pat olling the str et n secti ns f arm u ed ca ach c ns st ng l one manned by Punjab Mus sulmans and on by Sikhs operat ng in c ncert

GOVERNMENT I OUSE NEW DELI I *Mo day 8th S ptember 1947*

Less th f rty-e ght hou fte ur retu n Mountbatten M p Room n cti n S t ated in the anter om ext to the C uncil Chambe it d gned to p o d m mbe s of th Emer ge cy C mm tt e befo the m rn ng me tings w th t ll gence pp ect t ons—support d by i ual a ds—of the d tu b nc nd r fug e m ements on both s de of the Punj b B u dary Much m dnight oil has be n burned to get the maps and flags n the c re t position t me for th morning meet ng Th e vas a som what nau p c us ta t to th proceed ng the unfortun te Lieute ant-C lo el d t il d t g e the s t at on report to the as embl d tables fa nted hile doi g so—undoubtedly from o erwork

My aft rno n g en ov r to the first me t ng of the Unit d Co cil for Rel ef nd W lf re— t ll r ed at in d nt lly only ft r p longed di cu n—which s des gn d to co ord nate the g o ng olum of v luntary rel f Lady Mountbatt n a in the cha r and h ndl d th s b dy of olunte rs a d nd d al ts ith a perfe t ble d of cha m and tr ngth They emerg d from the se s o a pot nt l t am vith a central purpose No f v r than fift en d ff r nt org n s t ons we e epresented t Go rnment Ho se to-day a d t s saf to say th t only d re em rg ncy t geth vith Lady Mountb tten s admin strative a d d pl matic skill ld have br ught them und r one roof to po l th r xper e c and eff rt

Pete Howes t lls me c d tally that am ng th many emerg ency duties f ll ng on Mo ntb tt n s Br t sh and Ind an A D C attend nce on Lady Mou tbatten s hardly th most popular For

in the course of her tours of hospitals it usually involves assisting her to bring in to the local infirmaries any bodies they may see in the streets She is not deterred from carrying out these errands of mercy even when passing through areas where sniping is going on

In the evening I had a long talk with the Nawab of Chhatari the Nizam's Prime Minister While anxious to be loyal to His Exalted Highness he is finding it hard to interpret the diverse instructions he receives Clearly his period of office and influence has not long to run He and Monckton who are both staying at Government House had a meeting with Mountbatten to-day

In the present emergency here in Delhi Hyderabad appears a less pressing problem which makes Mountbatten think that this may be the psychological opportunity to promote the verbal variant to accession At the Hyderabad end the Nizam in token of his desire to retain Monckton's services issued a week ago a strongly worded *firman* (or official statement) condemning the attacks made on the members of his delegation as damaging the interests of the State This he followed up with letters to Mountbatten confirming his confidence in Monckton and repudiating in picturesque terms the activities of the Ittehad and in particular of its fanatical president Kasim Razvi

But while the Nizam himself may be moving haltingly towards an accommodation Congress intelligence (which is remarkably well informed on States affairs) has been picking up disquieting data about the efforts of the Nizam's Government to place orders for armaments in Czechoslovakia and in general to build up its separate sovereignty Chhatari however is well aware that any such course would be disastrous for Hyderabad and India alike and the mood of to-day's meeting was one of genuine desire on both sides to break through the deadlock It has been conceded that the principals in the negotiations may not be able to agree on a formula at the first attempt and on this understanding it was decided that Monckton and Chhatari should return to Hyderabad in a fresh effort to narrow the gap

Just before turning in I looked out from my bedroom window towards the old city I could see several big fires raging and half expected to hear the wail of air raid sirens and the drone of aircraft or at least the shouting of mobs but whatever horrors and sufferings were being endured at that moment no sound of them reached out to me to break the sultry and sinister silence of the night In pursuit of feature epics there is a British Press report of half a million people fighting in the blazing streets of Delhi but this is manifestly gross exaggeration and gives a wholly misleading picture of the furtive hit and run character of so much of this arson and murder I want to try to see for myself what is really happening

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *T esday 9th September 1947*
To d y Mountb tten ha se n G ndhi wh ha j st arri ed in Delh fr m h m r cles n Calcutta about ι hı h h ıs haracter stı ally hy and s lf depr c t ng He c nf ssed to M untb tten th t he had h nged h s mind about G vernm nt H u e which h th rt he had den unc d s th symb l of al en nd fal p wer No h s glad to find that ıt h d b en k pt a u ı land n e f ıns cu ty He was on n ed th t the m rg ncy taff nd the Comm tt e wo king and del b ratıng fa r m d fr m publ c clamour m y ι ll h v s v d the C ntr l G rnm nt
Th m n ng Em gency C mm tte me t ng h d bef r t r po ts of a se o tuat n de elop ng ın Peshawa and oth r p ts f th N rth ι est F nt er P n e n w n P kı tan The mm d te m ıster l eact on t b lı e th ι rst There ar moments wh n n f el th t th se t ι o n w n t o a e ob e sed ι th s me o erwhelm ng d th w h nd th t th r ı no re l awaren s that t p rsue th c mmunal feud to ts end must m an s lf laughte

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Th sday 11th Septembe 1947*
V P t ld m b f e th Eme g cy Comm tt e m et ng th t the D lhı st at on ι s undoubtedly ımp ıng a d that the S kh w re n r ng P tel s ppeal But t th meet ng ıt elf I g t the ıp es n that I t l w changıng h s m d n the k p n ue Th ι s qu te a br sk ex h ng b twee the two st ng men of th G ernm nt Mu de ıd Nehru ı n t to be justified ın th n m of r l g n This s not faı Patel r to ted Th s o que tion of d ng s but the Governme t must spect all rel g ns
A D lh Eme gency Comm ttee ha n ι be n set up to deal sp c fically w th th s n the cap tal d to le v the Cabınet Emerg ncy C nm ttee fr m h h ıt d rı ts uthorıty free to de l th the de p bl m One f the mo t dynam mem ber of the C b et C H Bh bha the Commerce Mı st r t b ch ırma and H M P t l the Cabınet Secr t ry ha be e nded to h m It w ll subst nt lly tak o r th M n cıpal Admın trat o nd m t on the same day t -d y bas s th pa ent body ι h ch was ın d ng r of bec m ng l st ın jungle of l cal deta l
In ord r to br ng the em rg ncy home to us Lady Mount b tt n has ι ry ju tly ımpo ed tenty n Go rnme t Ho Kitch ns At dınn party fo ou dı t ngu sh d s tors Lord Lı t w l a d S r Gilbert La tl wait Thei Ex ell ncı and

The Earl of L st wel ucceed d L rd P th k Lawr ce s the last Secretary of State f r Ind a ın Aprıl and S r G lbe t La th waite wa then hıs Departm ntal chief

guests with customary ceremonial were regaled with a three course repast consisting of some cabbage water masquerading as soup one piece of spam and potato a biscuit and a small portion of cheese Listowel was impressed but not quite as it was perhaps intended he should be for he asked one of us afterwards whether this dinner had been specially laid on for his benefit!

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Friday 12th September 1947*

This morning s Emergency Committee was a bad meeting one Minister defeating its purpose by raising a whole series of low level departmental problems and another simply grinning at his Ministry s lack of office accommodation No sense of grip was conveyed It has for instance taken all day to get a loud speaker for the Purana Qila Fort which Moslem evacuees in their thousands have converted into a veritable ghetto From the account given at the meeting the Purana Qila situation is clearly very grave Nearly eighty per cent of the refugees there have been inoculated but there is hardly any food coming in to them and without loud speakers it is impossible to impose order upon the confusion or create confidence from the prevailing panic

This evening at six o clock Nehru addressed the Diplomatic Corps in the Map Room This was his first contact with them since the onset of the crisis He spoke with telling simplicity and frankness and m de no attempt to score debating points or hide behind apologies With the scholar s eye he related the immediate incidents of the tragedy to the deeper trends "The history of India he said has been one of assimilation and synthesis of the various elements that have come in It is perhaps because we tried to go against the trend of the country s history that we are faced with this It is for our common good that the situation must be controlled as soon as possible Otherwise tremendous injury will be done to both Dominions This is why we have had meetings at Ambala Lahore e c Of course it is easier to come to conclusions at the conference table than to put them into effect but still it is extremely helpful that we have a more or less common policy

The assembled Diplomats afterwards expressed their app eciation of his objective and moderate approach Hitherto they h ve been without reliable guidance and this should do mu h to restore their confidence in the regime

After the Diplomatic Corps had left I was called in for a talk with Nehru and Mountbatten on the subject of an alleged s atement by Tara Singh which was being given currency in Paki tan He is d scribed as u ing words to the effect that "This is war General Th mayya Area Co mander is to make a rep rt on what really happened Nehru is not undu y distu bed but

Mountbatten stressed the peril of letting inflammatory phrases or reports of phrases in the present crisis pass unchecked.

Nehru then said he proposed to give another Map Room talk this time to the Press and asked me for guidance on the points I thought he should make. I said that he should stress the scale of the administrative burden carried by both the central and East Punjab Governments, and that in urging on the Press the need to look at the problem in perspective he should himself help them to do so by providing as much authoritative data as possible.

While we were talking a telephone call came through from Liaquat asking him to come to Lahore for a meeting on the convoy problem. It was assuming serious proportions in view of uncertainty about the Sikh attitude to a very large Moslem convoy passing through Amritsar. Nehru at first was unwilling to go to Lahore, saying he could see no use in the visit, but Mountbatten pleaded with him that it was vital for regular contact between the two Prime Ministers to be maintained, and declared that the whole reputation of the Government was at stake in the successful clearance of this major refugee convoy. Nehru, convinced by the force of Mountbatten's argument, finally agreed to go and on my suggestion to say so at the Press conference.

Already at the end of the first week of its existence the Emergency Committee has launched a formidable administrative counter-offensive against the prevailing chaos. It has requisitioned civilian transport, dispatched to Provinces and States ready to receive them tens of thousands of non-Moslem refugees who had come to Delhi, arranged for special trains for Moslems to go to Pakistan, provided guards, called for volunteer constables, arranged for the saving and harvesting of crops from deserted land, given orders for the searching of passengers for arms on trains and for the stiffening of punishments for delinquent military and police guards of trains.

It has cancelled public holidays, including Sundays, helped to keep going the newspapers as well as All India Radio, arranged for Government servants to be brought to their work and for the telephone system to be maintained, provided guards for hospitals, arranged for the collecting and burying of corpses found in the streets, for the movement of food, for the broadcasting of daily official bulletins to the Provinces and for large scale cholera injections. This is but a random selection showing the variety and scale of its action.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Saturday 13th September 1947*

Nehru's Press conference was fairly successful but he spoke a little too long and was not quite so convincing as to the Diplomats yesterday. He included most of the points I was anxious for him to make but he did not punch them home quite hard

enough and gave the impression of being—as indeed he is—a very tired man

None the less to see Nehru at close range during this ordeal is an inspiring experience He vindicates one s faith in the humanist and the civilised intellect Almost alone in the turmoil of communalism with all its variations from individual intrigue to mass madness he speaks with the voice of reason and charity

The negotiations for the transfer of power between March and August did not seem to me to evoke his full powers A certain moodiness and outbursts of exasperation were the visible signs of overstrain but now somehow he has renewed himself and in this deeper crisis he is shown at his full stature—passionate and courageous yet objective and serene one of the enlightened elect of our time

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

SHADOW OF JUNAGADH

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Sunday 14th September 19 7*

MOUNTBATTEN HELD A Staff Meeting which was largely taken up with the discussion of the Purana Qila situation Patel is apparently on the verge of deciding to send in a battalion in order to round up Moslem arms Mountbatten argues that any such action would be disastrous and the surest way to provoke a massacre and he is at a loss to understand how any such order could be seriously considered

At the ten o clock meeting of the Emergency Council Patel mentioned prolonged gunfire from some Delhi houses and pressed for action to clear up resistance pockets General Lockhart since 15th August the Commander in-Chief said that he could clear up the whole of Delhi in three days if he could concentrate troops on this particular job

I had a good talk with Mountbatten and found him in his usual buoyant mood He has been seeing British troops awaiting repatriation who told him they hate to sit around and watch all this misery powerless to do anything about it So he suggested that N C O s and men should offer their help to organise the camps He adds that he hopes to phase himself out of the Emergency Committee in about three weeks first leaving the

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Their help proved invaluable and enhanced British prestige all round

meetings every other day and then handing over the chairman hip to Nehru He confessed that he is now thankful that he to k veryon s adv ce and d d not leave Ind a on 15th August

Ismay r b ck f om K rach I saw him just before he w nt in t eport to Mountbatten on h s v s t He told me it was lucky he went wh n h d d He found Jinnah claiming to have lost all fa th n the Go ernment of Ind a and on the po nt of bre king off d pl m t c relati ns th it Of the forty-e ght hours Ismay va the e he was clos t d with J nnah for no l ss th n ele en He v s incidentally th first g est at Gov rnment Hou e nce the 15th August He feel that h must have v on th c nfidence of Jinnah wh called him to hi face a g od fellow and issued him o dial n t t on t come and ee h m whenever he wanted to

Appare tly Ji ah as full of wr th against Congre s s y ng th t he ould n v r u de stand thes men s hatr ds and was now beg nn ng t f el that th re vas no alternativ but to fight it out Ismay aid he gr ppled v ith h m a s rt ng that he was not gi en to o er t t m nt but was re dy to take hi life if at th Govern ment of I d a v re dete m n d to put do n the troubl s to the be t f th b l ty They re s nc re m n and t the full st t h in th r effo t I m y th nks that he has c used Jinnah t pause n the br nk f prec pitate ction but th t hi v t v as only ju t in time

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Mond y 15th September 1947*

At th s m rning s Staff Meeting there was a ro nd up on th general ituat on a ing from I may s K rachi it Mount batt n s nalysis s that the Moslem and Hind s a e t lea t under th cont ol of the r resp ctive Go ernments in appro m t ly equ l ati but that the S khs are un ontroll bl and e en the r leaders afra d f th m V P v ew was th t there w s no immed at pro pect f h rmony between Pakist n and Indi Whereup n Mountbatt n v sual s d the wo st cas as w r be twe n the t Dom nions If harmony is imposs ble at least v e should try to ke p s far aw y from w r p ss ble V P f lt that e en this h pe was d ssipated w th J nnah in his pre ent frame of m nd

Mountbatten a ked bout S kh m ti es Was the obj ct e to set up a S kh State? V P r pl ed no Pol t cally they had lost out, and had not even g n d the J llund r d n The r m t ve w s almost ent rely re enge V P s s n was perat ng w th thre Sikhs h h d lost the r fam l s Their only obj ct e w s two Moslem l ves for every ne of the r relat es Tara S ngh h felt was essentially a f ight ned man

The Emerg ncy Comm ttee meeting was a l ttle better th n yesterday's but still f r too much t me was taken up on small

miscellaneous items Trivedi and the East Punjab representatives failed to arrive because of bad weather Nehru reported on his visit to Lahore yesterday and referred to the important decision he and Liaquat had taken to stop the hold ups due to the policy of searching refugees for arms before crossing the boundary But no sooner was the meeting over than Liaquat made a speech alleging that the Government of India was not carrying out arrangements agreed upon and asserting To day we in Pakistan are surrounded on all sides by forces which are out to destroy us

For the past ten days we have been completely absorbed in the Punjab cataclysm and the salvage of Delhi Now a new crisis is building up from a wholly unexpected quarter It has come to our notice that Junagadh one of the two hundred and eighty Kathiawar States failed to accede to either Dominion on 15th August and is now proposing to do so to Pakistan Jinnah con curring in the act It is fair to say that in the welter of great events immediately before and after the transfer of power Juna gadh was simply overlooked and as a result is now bracketed with the two major States of Hyderabad and Kashmir as being outside Patel s full bag

Junagadh itself is a veritable patchwork quilt Some three thousand three hundred square miles in area with eighty two per cent of its seven hundred thousand inhabitants Hindu and its Ruler and Government Moslem it is completely surrounded by States which have acceded to India Inside Junagadh are islands of territory from these States and inside these States islands of Junagadh territory Her railways ports and telegraphs are an integral part of the Indian system The Nawab is an eccentric of rare vintage whose preoccupation in life seems to be his pet dogs of which he owns eight hundred each with its own human attend ant On one occasion he organised a wedding for two of his dogs costing three lakhs of rupees (twenty-one thousand pounds) and a State holiday was proclaimed in honour of the event

How has all this confusion over Junagadh come about? At Mountbatten s meeting with the Princes on 25th July the then Dewan asked a series of questions none of which gave any sign of an intention to accede to Pakistan Indeed he went so far as to advise Mountbatten that he proposed recommending to the Ruler to accede to India The Junagadh Government had de clared that Junagadh would make common cause with the other Kathiawar States all of which have acceded to India On the 10th August however just five days before the transfer of power there was a *coup d'etat* A group of Sindi Moslems took over the Government Shah Nawaz Bhutto became Dewan and the Nawab a virtual prisoner in his own palace

It has been freely recognised that the act of accession is prerogative of the Prince But India s readiness to recognise

acts was governed by a t me l mit of 15th August wh ch was of cours the ba s of *M untbatten s urgent appeal to the P inces on 25th July* Mor ov r aris ng fr m th t peech two other p erful f ct rs h e alv ays been nherent in the ch ice of acce s on—first in M untbatten s ov n v ords certa n geo gr ph cal compulsions whi h cannot be evaded and econdly the communal majorit es of the Rul rs subjects

Although Junagadh has a s a bo rd and a sm ll port Veraval and ther by can claim direct access to Karach it s clear that any final decis n by the Pr nce to acc de t Pak stan w uld autom t cally be a d rect h llenge to th e sent al valid ty of th v hole access on policy w th d s strous effects both upon th Kathiawar States and upon the Hyderab d n got t ons wh re the Mosl m xtrem sts ould be g eatly encouraged Jinnah h s cle rly s en th wider possibilit e present d by the Junagadh error of om ssi n N) pre sur l s been put by the G vernment of I dia on Junag dh to acced but hen the lik l ho d of acce s on t Pakist n lo m d l rge tv o f rm l appro ch s v e e m de by Delhi t K ach for som d cla at n of Pak st n nt ntion No ply ha s f r been re e ved

Mountb tten call d me n f r me t ngs he s h ving ith Ismay and V P n th Junag dh s tuation V P s full of anx ty and tried t persu de M untb tten f the d s ab l ty of making a m l tary and n al d mon tr t n He has prepared a paper based o th assumpt on that Pakistan is ready t h lp Junagadh w th men and m n y

I w nt r und to ee I may at his house in th eve ng and f und him pe tu bed by the om hat f ve sh atmosphe e in duc d by Junagadh H cons d re l that th Informat on Report assessing Paki t n s l kely nterv nt on as a lo n f eight cr res rupees (som s x m ll on pound) for th de elopment of Juna g dh s port and a garrison of t nty fiv thou and tro ps o ld only b regarded a childish in the l ght of her current res urces and commitm nts

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Tu sday 16tl Septembe 1947*

We a e ad sed th t the Jun g dh Access on h s b en se l d s g ed and del ered to Karach but th s is n t yet an offi al certainty I as prese t at a further meet ng which Mountbatten had with Ismay and V P I may spok with great cogency about Jinn h s probabl tactics and strategy ov r Junag dh Cl arly on ts face val e th St t i worthl t him It i n imposs ble military l ab l ty By no stretch f the mag nat on is t h s pol cy to incorporate solated pockets f Mo lems f r the e ar alre dy some forty milli n of them out ide th Paki tan homel nd

Ismay s es the m e essent ally a one of traps and wa ngs on Jinnah s part H h pes by lur ng Ind nt a m l tant re-act on to secure a verd ct on legal po nts and to creat a valuable

precedent for any attitude he may care to adopt towards the far greater Princely objectives of Kashmir and Hyderabad For Junagadh is in some respects Hyderabad in miniature—a Moslem Prince and oligarchy ruling over a predominantly Hindu State in the middle of Indian territory

I have prepared the draft communique on the Junagadh situation The Indian case on paper is strong enough but as for possible Press reaction I have felt obliged to give this warning 'Although the above arguments are cogent in themselves I doubt whether they would outweigh the damaging impression that would be created with the Foreign Press by joining issue to the point of military demonstration at this time Any such action however justified would almost certainly be regarded as precipitate and aggressive The Foreign Press are very much on the *qui vive* for warlike policy on the part of the two new Dominions I urged that from the Public Relations viewpoint the immediate step should be no more than a straightforward non recognition statement the Government reserving to itself its future freedom of action but leaving open the possibility of full negotiation

On the Punjab sector of Indo Pakistan relations Nehru has replied with commendable moderation to Liaquat s stormy utterances in Lahore The Indian leaders he declared had sought to avert Partition but once it was decided upon the Government had tried to discharge faithfully all the obligations flowing from that decision He spoke of derelictions of duty on both sides of the frontier which he and his colleagues condemned and were resolved to eliminate

At the Emergency Committee to-day Mountbatten has gained his point and the Committee is now to meet every other day There was an important discussion on the Delhi refugees Dr Zakir Hussain chairman of the Moslem Refugees Committee gave a disquieting report on the current situation urging that the present influx of refugees into the camps must somehow be stopped Disease was breaking out there were some fifty thousand already in the Purana Qila sixteen thousand had been moved from the Ridge to Humayun s Tomb but ten thousand more had promptly turned up there

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Wednesday 17 September 1947*

Mountbatten had further talks with both Nehru and Patel prior to the crucial Cabinet meeting this afternoon on Junagadh He summoned all his powers of persuasion to head them off any decision which the world could interpret as putting India in the wrong or any commitment to an act of war against what was now Pakistan territory He reiterated Ismay s thesis that the whole manœuvre was almost certainly a trap and part of a wider campaign which Jinnah might be expected to launch for the express purpose of presenting Pakistan to the world as the innocent weak State threatened by the ruthless aggressor He

them to stand by the p inc ple of a referendum both t d cov r the peoples will and to d av any i itention of nnexing terr to y

Mountbatt n had no d fficulty in ca ry ng Nehru w th h m at once but t t k rath r longer to persuade P tel \ h se whole Acce ion pol cy as well s h per onal mot o s were more lo ely affect d by J nagadh Howev r he too was duly con vin ed by Mountb ttens a g ments and in p rt ula by the imp essions I m y had formed of Jinnahs mood nd motives Th y b th went tr ght i to the C binet to explan th ir ne v poi t of iew a d although th y m t ha t k n their colle g es by s p i e I unde tand tl ey oon gain d the day for a cautious ppr h Th ti o de isi n of subst nc t ken t the *meet ng* th t Ind n nd l l troops of ac eding Stat s hould b d pos d o nd Jun gadh but sho ld n t c upy it a d th t V P should st the State t expl n to the Navab nd Dev an the mpl ation f the cc ss on to Pakistan

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Frid y 19th S pt mb 1947*
Liaquat he g et f th Go rnme t of Ind It h s *been ag e d unde th* ew di pen t n th t d st ng ished Gov e nment gu ts ho ld st y ith the G v rn Ge r l

In th aft rn n B L Sha ma Unn N ya d myself m t Col el Maj d M l k to try t o k t ways *and m n of* imp ving P e fa l t e and l ai on n th Ea t a d West Pun j b No h nt va g n to s t th m eting th t Liaqu t had nvit d a mb r f F re gn r ep de t t m et h'm *after* dinne t n ght n h s uit at G ve nm nt Hou e I may ay that Lady Mo ntbatten ome hat sta tled by a *requ st for* d nks f r t nty Laq t s o m after d n had sk d me whether I had ny cl s to th eas n I c *uld thr no l gl t* on the mystery nt l a fe v mi utes later—B L Sh rma ra g me up n some g tat on f r deta ls ab ut L q t s Pres c fer ence

The Mo ntb tt n ve e on the po nt f g ing into d *nner* th the gu ts wh n l d d both N hr and Liaqu t *I* t once pushed thr ugh a u gent m s ge Sharma who i very w ried ad s me th t the meet ng *to be c nfined to Fo e gn* cor e po d nts He th nks t ll be exploi d by th I d n Pre s who ll ay th t the P me Min ter of *Pakist h s* made G er me t H s ba e fo p op g nda by inv t ng th Fo e gn P ss nd om tt g th m I al o d w *attent on t* the d ff cult es involved n tt g nd s lecting rep esentat es of th *Ind n Pres* at th last mom nt a d in k ping th c nf ence wholly off the record In fa a l c ns d r d the s tuat on t be most embarrassing and l ble to cause much m sunderstand

ing I felt the best solution would be to invite Liaquat to call his party off on grounds of pressure of work

This message brought the Mountbattens and Nehru straight out into the adjoining study, where with the zest of a schoolboy Mountbatten said he would tackle Liaquat over dinner if and only if Nehru would agree to play his part by converting the occasion into a joint off the record session in which case he himself was prepared to take the chair The meeting should be put back half an hour and I was to gather in a limited last minute list of Indian correspondents Nehru I think derived almost æsthetic satisfaction from the beauty of this plan and his usually sad expression gave way to a smile and the hint of a wink At all events he found Mountbatten s proposal irresistible as Liaquat did over dinner!

The conference itself was a tremendous success and although no word of it could be quoted it brought fresh hope and faith at a decisive moment to correspondents many of whom were seriously beginning to wonder whether any will to peace was to be found at any level with the two Dominions

Mountbatten got the proceedings off to a good start The two Prime Ministers he said had come together because there was much common ground between them 'That is not to say that either wants to help the other Dominion for its own sake but both know that unless they come to grips with the difficulties confronting them there is danger of anarchy that will be disastrous to both

Nehru stressed that in spite of all the developments of the past few months the main problem was economic The other trouble will pass but this we must solve or it will solve or dissolve us The talk of war that was going around was "completely wild and absurd If war should come all our dreams of prosperity would collapse for a generation

Liaquat was no less explicit "I agree that talk of war is absurd he said if war should come it would be ruinous to both India and Pakistan even more it would mean another world war None can contemplate that with equanimity Pakistan wants peace for all nations but especially with India We are after all two parts of the subcontinent We could never dream of waging war against India

Bob Trumbull of the *New York Times* asked Nehru how the immediate psychological problem was to be solved? 'The first thing Nehru replied is to reduce fear the most enervating of emotions Once we have done that we can get on with other things and the normal factors of life will resume operation Nehru was asked if he was satisfied that he had complete control of his Government for the implementation of his and if the British were doing all they could to help?

the P ime Ministers sat fed that th oth r Government was do ing ll in ts power to emedy the tuati n?

Nehru respo ded w th a b ef d s rtat on n London Scho l f Econ m c l I am n t satisfied th anything in Indi nd h e not been for thirty year Of co rse v m st me t the t t on n every way we can partly by psychol gy and partly by f c If I may draw on my Soci l st backgr und v hat s h ppening n v is to large extent an upheaval in the lower m ddl classe —the cl sses th t first supported H tler Wh n oc ety is p et str nge lements c me to the surf ce S m time th se ar f sc st f cist m l ned The groups take ad v tage f th s t t Undoubtedly there has b en a com munal t nd hat h s happ d b it the trend no v s ay fr m kill ngs and t ards i c a d lo t ng There a e nsta e f S khs loot g S kh shops H ndus l t ng H ndu property and Moslems l ting M lems In a sen th s i wors but n a other y t a hop t l gn It i meth g v ca deal v ith by per si n or fo nd that s the v ay we must d al th it

L aq at sh d h melf t b in gene l agr em nt w th this th s Th nly qual ficat n he m de was in reply t a q es t n t them b th t h w these brown shirt lement were to b mb tt d a d the i t at t ken b ck from them I dont ag ee Li q t d th t the young lements in the Moslem L g h the t t e Bes des v e t k ng steps to r store d c pl n in th L gu Th t the imp rtant po nt A k d f th two D m n v uld welcome fore gn ap t l and te h cal a t c the task f ec ry from this d r pt o Nehru repl ed Of u w sh lt el om f e gn c pt l a d t hn c l a t f o developme t but not for gn ested inte est T h ch Laq t dd d S me f us

F yo w t y feel ng th t the two Pr m Mi st r h d risen bo e pre l ng h t d and ho n th m l es to be m n f n truct utl k and comp t bl temperament In the l t analys they ere b th m d t s ho had d unk de p f W st ern th ght d wh e mor ff ct ely lat d tha ome of th r olle g es ag n t th mmunal us

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *S t day 20th Septemb 1947*

Constitut l Go err or G l h p b ngs no re p te and Mo tb tten e m f t d to ha e t juggl th th ee or four cr at o I th m dst f ll th preoccupat n th the Pu jab nd Junagadh W lt M nckt n h just rri ed at G rnment H s w th th t f the Hyd bad d leg t n— pokesm n f the N zam tr ng st t cr ft—f r f rther me t i g w th Mou tb tt n Th Itt h d i l M l me —the t em t M slem o g n sat n th State v h ch ha b n pl ying n ncrea ngly pow f l l n the f m t f Hyd ab d pol cy sin the tra sf r of po r—g t to work gain on the Nizam

while he was in a recalcitrant mood in a further effort to secure Monckton's removal. Monckton was in Delhi at the time, but after he had returned to warn the Council of the perils of a breakdown and of his own intention of leaving immediately for England the Ittehad at the last minute seems to have been somewhat frightened by its own handiwork, and to have pleaded with him in forcible terms that if he were to leave them now it would be a disaster Mountbatten is still hopeful that all will be well even though little more than three weeks is left of the two months extension

At to-day's meeting, which V P attended, the delegation stressed the importance attached by the Nizam to the distinction between accession and association Accession they felt would lead to bloodshed They were also frightened of interference from outside Both Mountbatten and V P gave assurances that their fears were without substance that the Indian Government had behaved correctly and that its resources were at the Ruler's disposal if required to deal with disturbances Mountbatten warned that unless agreement could be reached by the 15th October breakdown must be envisaged which would he thought be serious enough for India but even more so for Hyderabad The delegation has deposited some Heads of Agreement which are designed more to keep the ball in play than to decide the match

Monckton said afterwards that he felt there was no fundamental difference of approach between Mountbatten and himself He would continue to look for the formula which would allow statutory independence for Hyderabad and which while containing no direct reference to the word "accession" would incorporate it on a *de facto* basis Hyderabad he added was in no position to play the role of the fully fledged sovereign State Provided the negotiations do not break down completely he thinks that the Nizam will press him to stay on a little longer but his decision to do so or not depends upon whether he can see a reasonable hope of achieving a compromise If there is any such prospect he feels he ought to stay if only because peace and order in the State may largely depend on his availability But if not it would be useless for him to remain Both the Nizam and his Government are very volatile statesmen pursuing a very inconsistent and wavering line of policy

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Sunday, 21st September, 1947*

THIS MORNING AT 7.15 a party of sixteen left Palam airfield by the Governor-General's Dakota to make a round tour of some four hundred miles over the routes of the great refugee migrations between the East and West Punjab. The Government House party included the Mountbattens, Ismay, Vernon and myself. The Government partners were Nehru, Patel, Neogy, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, General Lockhart, H. M. Patel and Shankar. As we approached the Ravi we had our first real vision of the scale of the desperate exodus. We were looking down on one of the greatest mass movements of population in recorded history, and then only on a small fragment of it.

Hindus, Sikhs and Moslems have before now, in response to some crisis, gathered up their worldly goods and moved away, but the earlier trek was usually limited to one community, and there was always the expectation that the wanderers would ultimately come back to their homeland. To-day, however, there is this difference: the numbers on the move are immeasurably greater than ever before, and this time there will be no return.

We struck the first great caravan area between Ferozepur and Balloki Head and proceeded thence for across the Ravi. We flew in fact for over fifty miles against this stream of refugees without reaching its source. Every now and then the density of bullock carts and families on foot keeping to the thin lifeline of the road would tail away, only to fill out again in close column without end.

At Balloki Head, the actual boundary, the refugees waiting to cross the bridge overflowed and taken on the appearance of a squatter township. Here they had been brought to a standstill, but the general movement was very slow and we could see men on horseback passing up and down who seemed to be giving some coherence, if not command, to the closely packed mass. At the roadside some families were flanked by their cattle, in many cases their only worldly asset, but few if any would be able to pass the livestock across the bridge. Already the flow of human traffic across it was beyond any conceivable capacity for which it had been built.

As we flew back into India we came down low over the northernmost of the Moslem refugee convoys making its slow and

painful way along the main Lyallpur-Lahore road. Their exodus brought them across the Beas River and involved an elaborate detour to save them from passing through Amritsar. We estimated that it took us just over a quarter of an hour to fly from one end to the other of this particular column at a flying speed of about a hundred and eighty miles per hour. This column therefore must have been at least forty-five miles long.

At the conference on Sunday Nehru and Liaquat had told us how, to begin with, they had set their faces against any wholesale transfer of populations, but how events had rapidly become too large for them and had dictated the course of their policy.

To-day we saw for ourselves something of the stupendous scale of the Punjab upheaval. Even our brief bird's-eye view must have revealed nearly half a million refugees on the roads. At one point during our flight Sikh and Moslem refugees were moving almost side by side in opposite directions. There was no sign of clash. As though impelled by some deeper instinct they pushed forward obsessed only with the objective beyond the boundary.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Monday, 22nd September, 1947*

At this morning's Emergency Committee Cabinet Ministers took a rather firmer and more urgent view than hitherto of the need to defend refugee trains. In the past few hours reports have come in of no fewer than four serious attacks on refugee trains, two on Moslems in Jullundur and at the Beas bridge and two on non-Moslems in the Lahore area. There was anxious discussion on the measures needed to tackle these bestial outrages.

During his visit Liaquat had referred to one train starting off with two thousand passengers, of whom only seven hundred had arrived at the other end, and of another completely lacking in any water supplies for a three-day journey. As in all these train horror stories, there is the usual factual confusion and difficulty in securing reliable data. In the meanwhile rumours fan hatreds.

One encouraging factor is that both the Governments of the United Provinces and East Punjab are showing strength in their resolve to tackle the disorders. Collective fines on villages which are known to be involved in these attacks are being imposed and levied within twenty-four hours. Should night trains be abandoned? In the effort to provide protection for passengers at night sizable Army contingents were involved. During one of the incidents several officers and sixty-four men had been engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand struggle.

As the debate continued Mountbatten raised the wider issues—the need for establishing the proper priorities between the

g neral ma nten nce of law and order and the r p d mo ement of ref e H nt f rther nd asked what w s t b done after the fug e m ement wa over Mo e troubles m ght e s ly flo v from fa lur to ta kle the e quest ons ith the utmost urgency nd n an all Ind basis We must know n wh t the pl ns f r them re and planning m nt wh t is being done n t only f r t day but for n t w k nd far bey nd Where will they go? W ll it be an o derly settlement? Will it be dom nat ed by black ma ket corrupt n and squeeze? Th s ra sed ne of th gr test adm ni trat v p oblems in h story In a few day th head of the g eat fifty m le column would have cr sed th b de Th y e l v ng the rich c lony district of the Punj b They were not g ng to a Promis d Land Their new home w s s pen r only n th t it pro ided phy cal safety

M tthat s d th t th fi t t o ph es f th r fug e problem —*where to m e them on arr al and h v to feed th m for* the n xt s x months—were the m t diff ult The l nger te m plan n g he f lt s rel t v ly ea er Wh t arrangements h ask d had been mad for gett ng n the xt harve t? Neogy aid th t ma y ref gees had been ttra ted by the standing crops and were preading out t gather them S me fifty thousand h d already d ne o He dded that h v a draw ng up a sch me for coll ct farming B t M untb tten war ed there a e at least t hund ed th usa d f g s n th c n oy we saw y terd y a d immed t f d ng ang ment w ll b n ded for them Patel remark d th t th re wa thre months fo d in th Ea t Punj b but that the d tribut n f t w s the real p blem

During th s p longed di cussio Ism y wh spered to me th t all th s really should be th ash d ut in Cabin t comm ttee u der the Pr m Mi ter s ha rm nship but I must y that I am cl n d to think th t it t ll ne ds Mou tbatten s pr ence to pro ide the sens of urgency and est bl sh th correct priorities

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Tuesday 23rd Sept mb* 1947

To-d y b ggest d vel pm t has been Jinnah s appe l t th Commonw lth t nter n P k sta d sp te th Indi N hru h s app ently tten a mode t and t te man l Le eply As w th all Jinn h s majo pol cy d c s on it vould seem t be car fully t med nd to coinc de s gnific ntly w th reports that h ve been r ach g me fr m Fore gn corresp ndents of a up- s rg of anti B t sh f elinp d comment n P k t n The e include ne spaper ttacks on Briti h fficers n m h the s m l nes as in Ind a asse t ns th t the pr t tro ble re ma nly d t a B t sh B nya all nce and crit ci m f M u tb tte himself who i lleg d to b d gruntled t n t ha ing a h v d th double G vern Ge er l h p It is noted that these themes are n t d couraged in h gh pl ces and that the format n of

public opinion on such matters is in the hands of very few I get the impression that with his approach to the Commonwealth which can only be a source of embarrassment in all the Dominion capitals Jinnah may well be over playing his hand India however is in danger of doing just the same thing over Junagadh The Jam Sahib of Nawanagar has just indulged in a bellicose Press conference calling for coats off and no non resistance etc

The Amritsar situation is still very grave Cholera has broken out and the train attacks continue Yesterday s decision to cancel all trains passing by Amritsar has been discussed to-day at the highest level and Nehru after consultations with Mountbatten has confirmed that the decision is still in force Telephonic communication with Amritsar is very difficult but I succeeded on behalf of the Associated Press of India who had been completely baffled in their attempts to get through in securing from their local correspondent the text of a joint Peace Appeal from the two Sikh leaders Tara Singh and Oodham Singh Without Government House priorities the Appeal might have been indefinitely delayed but high importance was placed both by Mountbatten and Government circles on its rapid publication The tone of their language had in keeping with their patriarchal appearance much more of an Old than New Testament ring about it After boldly denouncing shameful attacks upon women and children they added fiercely We do not desire friendship of the Moslems and we may never befriend them We may have to fight again but we shall fight a clean fight man killing man

What effect this crude appeal will have on their followers it is difficult for anyone who has not made a close study of Sikh psychology to say Both are undoubtedly big men in the complicated hierarchy of Sikh religious politics The trouble is that the situation as at other moments of supreme crisis in Sikh history seems to have passed out of control of the leaders Billy Short explained to me how the essence of the teaching of Guru Nanak the founder of Sikhism was Where five of you are gathered together there am I The Sikh tradition accordingly is one of cell formation and spontaneous local leadership Here is the source at once of Sikh strength and weakness In the higher reaches of command the prevailing atmosphere is one of indiscipline and intrigue and Short considers that authority is passing from the older leaders such as Tara Oodham and Giani Kartar Singh to a number of younger men chiefly ex Indian National Army officers

The Sikh leaders are at great pains to describe the Hindus as their brothers but there are not many outward signs of brotherly love and Tara Singh has been almost equally
in his dissatisfaction with the East as with the West
Government If Partition has meant immense econom

fice for the Sikhs t l nt l pol t cal concentrat Lying th n e sy rea h f D lh they may mpr se aft the mass m g t n m fifty pe cent of the t tal popul ti n of th n E t P j b Prov nce

Inf rmed bservers s e th s tu tion all th ngred ent f a S kh nat n l t m m t d c ns der th t l e dy the l t n wh h h b n mo ted of creati g w I d an pr ince of S kh t n f l t me sure up to S kh demands On c m pl cation ho e r i th tt tud d t tus of the S kh P nces Led by th M h j of P t l they can be xp ct d to co-operate more illingly ith the Go ernm t f Ind and e f fr m thu t b ut the m f th S kh party l d s They may well hold the b l nc f pov er n th s ob u truggle

B lly Sho t has been orking ith the n rgy f be er to s cu e S kh M l m t nd th t b meeting at Lahore to morrow t h h t h p d T ra S ngh ill be p e s t I may ready to play a med ating r le sh uld the occa sion wa rant t

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *W dn sd y 24th S ptember 1947*

At t days Emergency C mm tt th r w ther g neral d c s n f p l cy f g m m ts Chetty u ged th t t p p ty h ld b g to the clea ng f D lh d we t f to ay that he w nted ef g t b topp d f m m g i to the c ty d ll n D lh f ges s—Mosl m nd non Mo lem— l eady in to b e uraged t l N h t d t th d for th rap d c e t n f th n w Ea t Punjab capt l city He as on d th t th r ere m ny wh w ld nt t g t d y a l g p op rt on f th m pe ple of s bst c

P t l the adm n tr t I st argued th t t p pri r ty should be g to k p g the train g ing and to the t n of th f g camps wh h h a d v ere ervoirs of d s t nt Mo ntb tt n b l ed that an ev n mor u g nt pr blem than th r mption of th t ns as the l w s of the p g f the refug e l mn and the need t get th m moving aga n H w t on to say th t th st ll f t h gh p mi m lawless ess W m t reassert th c sen As f r s he kn w th w s still n s gl i stance f t al e th for m der or arson comm tt d du ng th p esent tro bl s There v l h f lt the fa l r f the h th rt famo I tell g ce system Wh t t ps we be n t k n to em dy th s?

D qu ting ports h be n rea h g Mountb tt n bout th m le nd tr tment of Brit h off ce They have h d to tackle o rwhelm g d tu b ces wh l lack ng th m l t y p we o c l pp rt f m e th s de t ppre s th m The feel g has grown that the ff rt s e t ly unrecogn ed They h h d to s rv w th t the b s ament s p t l ly m il Mountbatten and I may h v both b p s g N hru d

Jinnah to issue statements paying tributes to their work. Jinnah replied frankly that he considered the reference he made in his speech at the banquet in Karachi on 13th August was sufficient.

The problem has now become acute as a result of a statement to-day made by the influential Liberal leader Pandit Kunzru who is reported as saying that had British officers acted impartially the situation would probably have been brought under control in the East Punjab. He also alleged that a British officer had been responsible for not preventing a large number of casualties in the Sheikhupura massacre at the end of August. Mountbatten rang Nehru at once about these grave allegations pointing out that the statement as reported was both untrue and libellous and that unless it was immediately refuted the position of British officers in the Indian Army would become unbearable. Nehru promised to make an early statement. Whereupon Gandhi intervened to suggest that perhaps a better way would be for Kunzru himself to make a public retraction. Ismay however is not satisfied with this solution which in his view meets the demand of Indian but not of British opinion, and he has persuaded Nehru to issue a statement based on reliable evidence which categorically denies that the culprit at Sheikhupura was of British nationality. The whole incident shows that goodwill is still a delicate plant but one which Nehru is always ready to nourish.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Friday, 26th September, 1947*

Unwittingly Gandhi seems to have added to the general tension, for during his Prayer Meeting this evening he made passing reference to the possibility of war with Pakistan in an address otherwise wholly devoted to his worship of God as truth and non-violence, but the phrase in question, 'If Pakistan persistently refuses to see its proved error and continues to minimise it the Indian Government would have to go to war against it', has touched a raw nerve and undoubtedly aroused intense and almost scared speculation among the Press, and will almost certainly find its way into the world's headlines tomorrow.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Saturday, 27th September, 1947*

Mountbatten received a letter the other day from a Mr Kardi pointing out the difficulties listeners to the All India Radio were experiencing in hearing the programmes and recordings of Mahatma Gandhi's words at his Prayer Meetings. This has led Mountbatten, who feels that these daily messages, with the exception of yesterday's on which he immediately tackled Gandhi, are one of the great factors for the creation of confidence ... tunity to raise the matter with Gandhi personally and to instruct me to follow it up in more detail. T[illegible] is

I have had a revealing and I think valuable talk with Gandhiji at Birla House this afternoon.

As I came into the room he was busy writing a note and did not look up. When he did so he coughed rather heavily. *See—this is how I greet you!* I had been told during the morning that this interview would have to be postponed. But he now explained that the message that I should not come had been sent without his authority and that he had it altered as he was *not so ill* that he could not talk to me. He said that Mountbatten had not actually discussed with him the possibility of his making a studio broadcast but had merely handed over *the letter* from Mr. Karda at the end of their last talk suggesting that I should explain the position to him.

I began by pointing out that the broadcast reception of his Prayer Meetings was by no means satisfactory. The great listening audience eagerly awaiting his guidance were not always hearing every much of what he said. Often not more than one word in five came through. A number of special problems were involved in maintaining the audibility of outdoor *broadcasts. There* was the extraneous noise of the meeting itself. No doubt it was necessary at times for the Mahatma to turn his head away from the microphone. I did not doubt that his voice was very low and his tempo very fast. I pointed out that although wireless was a tremendously powerful medium for direct contact with the masses, and indeed already very few of the world leaders had fully exploited it, I considered that it would greatly help in purifying public opinion if he could be prevailed upon to make a studio broadcast from All India Radio.

Gandhiji's initial reaction was against the idea. To make a set speech in a studio would be *for me* that all I had to express myself through a large audience whether it consists of fifty or five lakhs. I replied that it was not necessary for him to go to a studio and that the broadcast *could be made* just as well where he was sitting now in the form of a dialogue with his friends. He returned to his objection that the speech would have to be prepared in advance. This was *contrary to his* method of speaking spontaneously what was in his mind.

I replied that although a set script with no time limit was the normal procedure for recorded talks, *in his case* with his tremendous authority the deepest impression would be conveyed if he spoke extempore for as long as he liked. *He said he had* often passed All India Radio, which he understood was one of the most up to date even by European standards, but he had never been inside. He assumed that I had *in mind only one* special broadcast. I replied that I had not presumed to suggest more, but if he could be prevailed upon to speak periodically I was sure that the impact on opinion would be even greater.

I have never really given full consideration to talking over the

wireless he said I would like two or three days to ponder over the arguments you have put forward There are many hurdles to jump before I can make up my mind but I think you have jumped over the first of them

He then turned to wider themes He said that what worried him most was that the trouble here in Delhi and the Punjab seemed to be deeper He was unwilling to admit that his and Suhrawardy s influence had been decisive in Calcutta and would not in fact feel confident about his own influence unless he achieved a measure of success here He described in detail how he and Suhrawardy had started on their joint enterprise in Calcutta Suhrawardy had shown great courage and endurance His appearance in Gandhi s Ashram was a dramatic departure from the comfortable mode of life to which he was accustomed By pledging himself on behalf of the Moslem minority he had willingly accepted both discomfort and danger

I suggested that the difference perhaps between Calcutta and Delhi was that he had been present in Calcutta to grip the crisis at the outset whereas he had only arrived here when the troubles were in full flood He said that this was not wholly true There had already been quite a long sequence of disturbances before he and Suhrawardy set to work The fact was that somehow the atmosphere in Calcutta was favourable to his influence but here at present it was not He spoke of the angry man who had asked him the day before how it was that if he really was a Mahatma and a miracle worker he could not put matters right I dealt with him yesterday as you no doubt saw Gandhiji said he was profoundly anxious about the communal situation Unless checked the climax could only be that no Moslem could regard himself as safe living in India and no Sikh or Hindu in Pakistan

During the latter part of our talk Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and the famous Mirabehn (Miss Slade) came in and a young girl throughout took a full note of the conversation Of his Calcutta adventure—one of the most dramatic achievements of his life—he had spoken with real zest Clearly the incongruity of his association with Suhrawardy had appealed to his ever present sense of humour His eyes sparkled as he described the details of their joint bargain One does not come away with the impression of a very old man in his dotage or even anecdotage but of one who lives with the intensity of youth and retains the boyish sense of fun which tragedy and the passing of time cannot wither

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Sunday 28th September 1947*

Throughout my talk with Gandhi yesterday he showed himself to be wholly unperturbed by the stir which his Prayer Meeting reference to war had produced Speaking again last night he

I ha e had a reveal g and I think val ble talk with Gandhiji at Birla Ho th s ft rn on

As I came int th room he w s busy wr t ng a n t nd d d n t look up When h d d so he o ghed rather he ly S —th is hov I g eet yo I had been t ld during the m rn ng th t th interv w ould h to be p stp ned But he now plained th t the m ge th t I should not c me had be n t vithout his uthor ty nd th t he had t alt ed h n t so ill that he ould not t lk t me He sa d th t M nt batten h d not t lly d scussed w th h m the possib l ty of h s making a t d broadcast b t had merely h nd d over the letter fr m Mr Karda t th end of th r last talk s ggesting that I should expl in the po it n to h m

I b gan by p t ng t th t the br dcast recept on of h s Prayer M t ngs by no me n t factory The g eat liste ing d nce eag ly awa t g his gu d n e not lw ys h r g very m ch f hat he d Often n t m than one v rd in fi came thro gh A umbe f p tal problems were involved in m taim ng th aud b l ty f outside b dcasts Th r s th extr e s n e of the me t ng itself N doubt it w s ne e s ry at t m f the M h tma t t rn his he d y from th m cr ph n I d d t dd that h o c very lo d h temp ry f st I p nt d t th t lth gh w r I was a trem d ly p f l m d m t r d t nt ct th the m ss a d v d ls y fe of th rlds l d rs h d fully expl t d t I con d d th t t would g e tly help in pa fy g publ c p n on f h could b pre l d pon to make a t d o b ad c st All I d R d

Gandh nit I re ct s ag t the de To make a s t pe ch n t di ld b for m theatr cal I need to xp ess my lf th gh a l g a d ence whether t con ts of fi or fi e l kh I expl ed th t t was t necessary for h m to go t a st d a d th t the br dcast c ld be m d j t well whe h as tt g n w n the form of di logue with h f ds He r t rned t h s bj ct on th t the spe h w uld ha e to b p epa ed n ad Th as c ntrary t h m th d f spe k g sponta ously b t s m h m nd

I pl d th t lthogh a t cript with n a time l m t the no m l proced e f r do talk n h s c se v th h s t e me dou uth ty th d epe t impre s o would b con y d if h spoke ext mpore f r long h l k d He s d he had ft n pa ed All Ind a R d o h ch he und stood was one of th mo t up t d t even by E rope stand d b t he h d ne er been s d He s um d that I h d n m nd only o spec al broadca t I r pl d that I had t pres m d to ugg st m but if h ould be p ailed pon t pe k pe odically I as sure that the mp ct on p on would b ven great r I have n ver r ally given full consider t n to t lking over th

The first move was V.P.'s visit to the State ten days ago, which produced only limited results. He met the Dewan, who told him that the Nawab was indisposed and therefore could not see him. However, the Sheikh of the small State of Mangrol, which up to the transfer of power had been under the suzerainty of Junagadh, used the occasion of V.P.'s presence in the neighbourhood to get away from his own State and voluntarily to accede to India, thus following Babariawad, which had already acceded. But the Sheikh, on his return to Mangrol, which coincided with V.P.'s to Delhi, found himself obliged to renounce his accession. On the 22nd the Government of India decided that the circumstances in which the letter of renunciation was written were such as to justify them ignoring it. Junagadh followed up this bloodless victory over Mangrol by sending troops into Babariawad.

These developments were near enough to a checkmate to infuriate Patel, who considers that an act of war has already been committed by Junagadh in sending troops to Babariawad, and that India should take all the necessary steps to oust them. Indeed, unless there is a show of strength and readiness in the last resort to use it, he is ready to resign. Just as Kashmir is close to Nehru's heart, so Junagadh is part of Patel's homeland. It is easy to dismiss this as mere provincialism, but it is necessary always to remind oneself that the concept of India as a nation is by European standards of geography and population considerably larger than life.

Mountbatten wrote to Nehru yesterday making the distinction between the planning of and preparation for military operations and their actual execution, stressing that a direct conflict between the two Dominions would not only undermine their moral reputation but also put their physical survival in deadly peril. This advice is acceptable from Mountbatten. Unfortunately the three Chiefs of Staff, who are all British, in their appreciation of the Junagadh situation have quite independently underlined the Governor-General's estimate of the danger to a point where they have clearly overstepped the boundary between military and political advice. Thus further fuel has been added to Patel's indignation.

To avoid any further confusion of this nature, while at the same time to minimise the general risk of false decision and precipitate action by the Government, Mountbatten has recommended the establishment of a Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Within this context he has in mind ancillary committees, such as the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Intelligence and Joint Planning Committees, but he has at the same time propounded one vital modification of the British practice, in which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff is wholly divorced [illegible]ational Command. He has insisted that India would do [illegible] adopt procedure whereby from each of the three S[illegible] the

same officer should double the role of Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff. Nehru and Patel approved this idea and Ismay has been asked to draft a paper elaborating its organisation in time for tomorrow's Cabinet.

As for Junagadh, Mountbatten has urged an intermediate course which allows for military reinforcement to continue but only in undisputed territory around the State. He has also asked that Liaquat should be advised of the scope and nature of all impending troop movements to Kathiawar. Finally he wants a clear public statement that India will accept the verdict of the popular will in all States where accessions are in dispute.

He raised some big questions this morning. Translation from central to provincial spheres of duty may well have been behind his plea that 'No paper plans work out'. He says covered accommodation for at least five lakhs (five hundred thousand) will be needed this winter, and he posed the problem whether the covered accommodation should have priority over the use of colleges, schools and homes. Building resources do not allow for proceeding at full throttle with both. He wants the new East Punjab capital to be designed to hold a million people. He agrees that it should start from scratch. Mountbatten strongly advised that whatever land is selected should be frozen and no freeholds allowed, otherwise it would become a speculator's paradise.

Trivedi next turned to the security of the canals along the Indo-Pakistan boundary. The standstill agreement by which they have been controlled since 15th August is not working. Shots have been fired on workers. Who is responsible? Surely not the Pakistan Army? General Lockhart said the Pakistan Army was undoubtedly in a state of alert and expecting immediate attack from the East Punjab. Trivedi replied that he had been expecting an identical attack from the West. Somehow confidence must be re-established. The proposal is that there should be a twice-weekly meeting with Mudie, the West Punjab Governor, the two Prime Ministers and the Army Commanders.

The train situation was discussed. The trouble centre is now between Ludhiana and Amritsar, and there have been serious breakdowns along the main line East route. Some of the Sikh Princes are adding to Trivedi's difficulties. Kapurthala pushed a column of refugees from his State to the main column without telling the East Punjab Government, and there were heavy casualties from starvation, while there has been a similar ruthless removal of Moslems from Faridkot.

At lunch today Trivedi told us that Sikhs and Moslems pass each other on the road and show fraternal unity in criticising their own Governments! I sat next to Mr Thapar, an East Punjab Government official who has been making a close study of the whole casualty position. It is of course notorious that

refugees principal victims of atrocities, make very unreliable eye-witnesses Whenever it has been possible to check the facts the assessment of casualties by eye-witnesses has proved to be inflated more than a hundred fold.

In Mr Thapar's considered view it is most unlikely that the total casualties of killed and wounded will turn out to be more than one per cent of the total population in the area of disturbance

The troubles which had in fact started in Rawalpindi and Mooltan in March 1947 causing major migrations and continuing thereafter came to a head with the transfer of power Lahore was reported as out of control with one per cent of the town on fire by 14th August by the 15th twelve per cent was reported to be in flames The storm then passed to Amritsar

Under prevailing conditions Simla was wholly impracticable as the administrative centre so in spite of the lack of physical facilities he decided to move to Jullundur because the situation could be more easily controlled from there

The first policy concept was to try to stop mass evacuation His own tour between the 15th and 27th August had been devoted to that end By the 28th he had the feeling that the situation was in hand Then followed the massacre of Sheikhupura in the West Punjab There were varying estimates of the casualties there Mudie put them at three hundred but the Army situation report gave the minimum figures as between seven hundred and eight hundred There was a violent reaction in Amritsar With this Trivedi said the realisation came to him that a major transfer of population was inevitable From that day to this he has been trying to carry this policy through and to keep his Ministers up to the mark

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Tuesday 30th September 1947*

A meeting has duly taken place of the Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister Ministers of Defence and Finance and the Minister without Portfolio It described itself as a Provisional Defence Committee and then approved its own permanent composition and functions receiving full Cabinet approval later in the day The three Service Commanders in Chief who are now automatically Chiefs of Staff of their own Services as well are to attend all its meetings Mountbatten has been invited to take the chair in a personal capacity in view of his knowledge and experience of high military matters"

Whatever the risks of misrepresentation across the border this development is a notable victory for moderation and sane counsel The Defence Committee instrument and Mountbatten's guidance freely invited and informally given cannot fail to serve as a restraining influence at a time of great stress when passions are clouding judgement and the price of experience is high

For the past thre eeks th Emerg ncy Comm ttee of th Cab net servi g s the cho n instrument for immediate h gh le el decision h d rect d all the agen ie f th s ne born d str cken G ernment It has been tific al respir t on and not h lly c ent fic in m thod but th h rt of Ind has continued t be t Th after e h g ts peak in Delhi the East Punjab and Northern I d s whole slowly but surely begin to bb E ery mo n ng we ha e anxi u ly watched th flags in th M p Room t se f the rep rt d ten on in th Un ted Pro- inces in su h cit es as L kno nd C wnpore uld burst out into a f esh orgy of kill g but th firm act n f the Pro in l G ernment butt ss d by support t th C t e has s meho held th m ement of ref ge l g the Punj b United Pro inces der Th re has f u s been a wider dispen at n—the h ving p nt t fi t de tructi e fo ce—d a nd fa min by ll the la s of prob b lity h ld h ve exacted the penalty by the d p f s f p ovidence have so f r pa sed er thout do g s A far as hum n eff t i on e n d spe- ial cr d t s due to tho po bl for h lth and f od s rvices on both s des f the b rder A prod g ous number of cholera in je t ons vacc nat ons d th in cul t ha been carri d o t I dia h fl n large s pplies of choler vaccin to P k tan The rk f m rcy d heal ng hine out in the com- m al d rkness

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

REPORT FROM LONDON

GOVERN IENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Wed ie day 1st O tober 1947*
WE ARE LEAVING f Lo d n two d y t me In the meanwhi I m trying to g ther n as much backgrou d inf mation as pos ble to ensure that I am f lly br fed n th l test fa ts and op ion tr d

Th s morn ng I h d a most i form ti e t lk with P tel s pri t s cretary Sh ka at Au angz b R d We beg n by d scu sing P s p blems In spite of the *mod s* d secu ed t la t eek s Go rnm t H u meet ng with th Fo gn Pr s t i cl r th t the Sardar and h s c rcle are st ll full of res ntm t at Br t sh Press treatm nt of the Punjab tr bl H nt so far as to ask m wheth r thes w r ll the th nks Congress leade s ere to g t fo th co der ble pol t cal sk th y h d tak n in accept ng Domin on Status at all? I t ld Shankar that

I thought history would accord to the Sardar great credit for his part in the transfer of power, and that his realistic attitude on the three major issues—Partition, Dominion Status and relations with the Indian Princes—was statesmanship of a high order.

I came away with the firm impression that the Sardar was well aware of the solid and immediate advantages Dominion Status conferred on India. In the wider context of the world conflict he clearly appreciates that if it comes to a show-down India's interests are likely to be closely interwoven with those of the Western Powers. This being so, Dominion Status, or its equivalent, enables India to come within the orbit of Western good will without incurring the formal liabilities of a treaty relationship. It must be stressed that Patel has never actually intervened in external affairs, and that this field is Nehru's unchallenged responsibility. Moreover, the prevailing view-point of Nehru places higher hopes on India's capacity to stand outside the struggle of rival World Powers, and in the process to build up a neutral bloc in Asia which could play a constructive mediating role through U.N.O. and by other means.

Shankar said that the Sardar had met with great success yesterday at Amritsar. He had made a big speech to what was perhaps the most representative gathering of Sikh leaders since the transfer of power. Nearly all the Jathadars had been present, and had responded favourably to his call for moderation.

Liaquat is back in Delhi for to-day's Joint Defence Council. I understand that this morning's meeting was a very difficult one. At the small lunch party afterwards, at which Nehru and Liaquat were the two guests and Vernon and myself were the staff members, the atmosphere was still somewhat strained. Liaquat, who was in a pea-green coat and looked far from well, got involved in an argument with Nehru over the movement of Moslems from Ambala. It was one of those occasions when we would all have liked to change the subject but seemed powerless to do so.

The background to all this tense talk is the action of the

M untb tten and Nehru underlin d the clear r ght of both with th lapse of Paramountcy to a c d t Ind a Nehru called on Liaquat to order the withdr w l f Junagadh troops f om Bab ria ad J st a h w s d ing th s a telegram h nded in d t g th t J n g dh troops had nov ent r d M ngrol as v ell Nehru undertook not to allow Indi n t ps t enter either St te until the legal po ition of b th h d b n defin tely establ h ed by h gh th ty p o d d th Junag dh forces vere im med tely v thdrawn

Li q t attit d n this as reasonably conciliatory b t on the w d s e f P k st n pi ng J g dh s e s n in the fi st pla e h as adamant th t th y h d b n ght n d ng so H t kes h t nd o th legal grounds that the ruler ha th b ol te ght t c de w th t r f rence to the moral or ethnic aspe t of accession

GOVERN IENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thu day 2 d O t b 1947*
A few d ys g the *D ly T l g apl* p blished a s n ti n l rep rt t th ff ct that Auch nleck d ing h r cent v st to K hi h d stated Ref g t ffi ould be peaceably resumed n b th d rect if th S khs of the Punj b d th S kh St t co ld b ff ct ely d arm d N t nn t ally Pat l greatly d tu b d by the st ry and h dis ed ts mpl cat s at som l gth ith Mou tbatt I d r to f h t n s rm se d or espondence M ntb tt n ggested d Pat l agreed th t I sho ld t k th l t opp rtun ty t A h leck p ally a d h k n th story s uthent ty nd if poss bl secur hi ag em nt to a d scl mer
I ent nd t th S pr me Command hou th s ft r n n It m d ry qu et nd d t d The tr m nd acti t e of the p st x w k h e ind ssolubly l nk d Go nm t H th the n o der b t the t de of e nts has fl wed p t th s re idence f the C n C India so th t t n w okes ly th mem of former greatne Au h nleck glanced qu kly through the rep t d t on e pla ned n his us al measured b t i i e manner that he had n r collection what r of say ing the v rds tt but d to him e ther to Mr Jinnah w th wh m he had pr longed confident l d scussions b t the future of th S p em Comm nd r to anyone l e least f all th *Daly T l g pl* corresp d t whom he h d n t met and did not kn Aft r a f p thy rem rks on the s bject of Press en t o al sm he n ted me o er a cup f tea in the garden to dr ft a d s la mer with him Th s took only a fe v m nut s to ompo and w th n the ho I w s able to report M ss on complet d
Auch nleck s po t on as Supreme C mmand r is becom g d ly m r d ff cult His expe e ce prestige nd int g ity h ve bee v ry v luabl a sets in keep ng the part t on of the Ind an clear of the gr at pol t cal d pute from which

has sprung but already there are signs that the Supreme Command is being subjected to just the same kind of pressures which made the already baffling task of the Punjab Boundary Force finally impossible

Keeping in mind the tension engendered by the Punjab it is greatly to the credit of Auchinleck and his staff that they have been able to make such headway without so far attracting major controversy From the formation of the South-east Asia Command in the autumn of 1943 onwards I have watched Auchinleck play the role of self denial Now he is called upon to preside over the most painful task of all—the partition along communal lines of an Army the glory of which under British command had been its capacity to embrace the loyalties of all Indian races and religions in a common service

KARACHI *Friday 3rd October 1947*

Yesterday was Gandhi s seventy-eighth birthday For the first time the Court Circular on Mountbatten s instructions has referred to him as Mahatma Gandhi Hitherto it has always been the formal and largely meaningless Mr " The actual occasion of this change is the reference to Lady Mountbatten s birthday visit to him yesterday at Birla House I have written a note to Ian Stephens Editor of *The Statesman* who has for so long been pleading for this particular courtesy

On touching down at Karachi Ismay was at once driven off to stay the night with Jinnah the rest of us being billeted at the airfield Accommodation is desperately short but for all that Karachi is beginning to assume the cosmopolitan atmosphere of a capital city A growing Diplomatic Corps throngs the Palace Hotel where this evening I was given one of the best dinners I have had in all Asia

AIRBORNE KARACHI HABBANIYA *Saturday 4th October 1947*

Apparently Jinnah was in an angry and difficult mood He is utterly convinced that the Indian leaders real aim is to strangle Pakistan at birth that Gandhi has never accepted Partition and under the guise of religious teaching is all the time spreading Hindu poison and that Nehru, in spite of the appearance of moderation is not really master in his own house. [illegible] Patel as the real dictator who he alleges has [illegible] an unholy alliance with the Hindu Mahasabha and [illegible] ready to overthrow the Congress if it failed to serve as an appropriate instrument for his anti Moslem designs. [illegible] Jinnah living in almost total isolation both from [illegible] and the outside world is a far from happy [illegible] his fears by nourishing his [illegible]

LONDON *S t d y 11th Octob 1947*

I h t day sent off my first personal p gress report to Mountbatt n b g nning ith congratulat ons t h m on the birth f h first g nd d to the baby on st ting l fe in the best M untb tten style by t tte t n to pun t lty!

I ha e h d l n h [I ntun d] w th Clement Dav es who descr b d the p l t cal settlement of 15th August a miraculou ach e em nt wh h h d nhanced our prestig throughout th w ld and as n no ff t by s b q ent de elopments n the Punj b In h s e b th the Ru n and Amer can ca g in t o r mpe l m Ind we e for e er dest yed and no am u t f p cial ple d ng f om either quarter ld reinst te t The p e e t d tu bances nly b ght h m the full extent of our p t ch ev m nt b t Church ll I told you so line as eprehens bl nd in ny s f ll cio s We ould nly hav stayed aga n t w ld and Br t h op n on mor o er the com m nal expl on o ld in t bly h e ngulfed us f w had tr ed to stay

LONDON *S t d y 18th Octobe 1947*

In just nd f rtn ght I h h d n all om fifty nterv e two full l Press co f n —on t I d a H th the Ind n o re pondent Lo don a d the other w th F anc W ll ms in the ch to the Lobby C e pondents n the H use f Comm — hort t lk w th S St fford Cripps nd tw m t ng e ch w th Noel B k nd Patr ck G d n W lk r the ne Secretary nd Und r Secretary f Stat f r Comm n ealth Rel t

Cripps h p w and prest ge n the G m t enh ced by the cent Cabinet re huffle h s become coord n tor n h ef f the nat on s e t econom c eff rt h m s n b ing to pull th c ntry back from th p e ip ce confront ng t du ing the n vert b l ty i in the summe N one talking to Cripps can fa l to be mp essed by h s lucid ty f mind a d s re ty f m n r If he mewh t d dactic t s because he n a pos tion t b None the le s t s p ss bl to apprec ate that th s el m nt of cert t d n h s make up wh l f se ic to him in re ch g decisions f h gh p l cy may well have b en s u ce of we kne d ri g h s momento n got ations w th the Ind n l ders in 1942 d 1946 If ntellect could have scaled the problem h succes w ld h ve been assu ed

Noel B k and Gordon W lk r are clearly determ ned to br ng f esh ideas t this nev Departm nt which is a somewh t uneasy amalg mation f the old Ind a and Domi ons Offices Both sta t from scr tch as far s India is concerned but that sh uld not b a d sadvant g in the r case for Noel Baker s speci l knowledge of internat nal relations and Gordon Walker s f h story g ve them the right background

LONDON *Wednesday 22nd October 1947*

I have sent off my final progress report to Mountbatten before we leave for Delhi on Saturday.

Fleet Street [I wrote] finds genuine difficulty in adjusting itself to the transition of Congress from an anti-British movement into a Dominion Government, and there is a tendency to assume that Pakistan will inevitably have closer connection with Britain than India. On the other hand there is considerable suspicion of Jinnah's aims and motives. Nehru's stock is rising and he is most highly thought of in Government circles. Patel is still almost completely unknown.

In the interviews I have had with Cripps, Noel-Baker and Gordon-Walker I was questioned about the High Commission's organization both generally and from the Press viewpoint. I gave it as my personal opinion that its scope was inevitably restricted by your special status and influence, but that with your departure it would become one of the most important missions in the world. The objective should be to try to maintain through the High Commission the good personal relationships that you have been able to establish with the Indian leaders. Cripps said that if action was to be taken on this it would need to be done fairly quickly, and he hoped you would put forward your own views on this important matter when you return to London for the Royal Wedding.

Noel-Baker wondered whether India was giving consideration to the possibility of a new capital city. He realised that for the present Delhi had all the administrative facilities, but from what he had seen and read it would seem to be physically and politically vulnerable and too far removed from the heart of the Indian Dominion. Discussing Partition, he argued that from the viewpoint of international relations there was a *prima facie* case to be made out for it. A Central Government covering four hundred and ten million people was too large a unit for effective action or treatment through international agencies, and it was by means of such agencies, incidentally, that he believed British help and influence both in India and elsewhere might be most effectively brought to bear.

between over-emphasis on the sister Dominions theme and the appearance of neutral indifference to their problems

I was asked more than once about the prospect of Dominion Status and on the basis of my talk with Shankar I said that I had the impression that the matter was still being weighed in the balance I was also asked about the position of Patel After stressing his importance in Congress's three great decisions over Partition Dominion Status and the Accession of the Princes I said I felt that as the effective controller of the Congress Party his first loyalty was likely to be to that Party and to its future It was obviously in some danger of breaking up as it could no longer be held together solely by the anti British appeal He had already largely disproved himself of the Princes as an alternative issue and he must be under some pressure to substitute the Moslem as if only to avoid being trumped by the Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (R S S S) Cripps suggested that the relationship of Nehru and Patel was a normal one as between the statesman leader and the party second in command

Finally Noel Baker ... anxious to hear about your intentions and the likelihood of your being asked to stay on I said that I could not believe that you would easily sever your publicly declared intention of leaving in the spring but that there again the Indian Government had not acted and seemed to be shelving the matter for as long as possible

LONDON *Thursday 23rd October 1947*

Ismay asked me to invite John Beavan the London Editor of the *Manchester Guardian* to see him on the subject of a considered leading article published an early a fortnight ago entitled Retrospect It was the most sweeping attack on the whole of Mountbatten's policy that I have seen in a newspaper of this calibre The article spoke of the hostile with which the withdrawal was carried out and the tossing away of responsibility 'The British departure turned into cut and run It was alleged that no effective machinery for joint action between the successor Government of India and Pakistan was set up following the Partition announcement of 3rd June Why was no offer made to stiffen the Punjab Boundary Force with British troops? In fact all seems to have been staked on the gamble that if Partition was carried through at breakneck speed the turbulent and malignant would be too much out of breath to stir and the gamble failed

Ismay was an eloquent firm and in his answers to each point of criticism certainly succeeded in exposing the limitations of *ex post facto* arguments and assertions He explained that no amount of advance planning—and there had been plenty—could have wholly provided against the force of the Punjab explosion and

the particular form it took. He recalled the Punjabi saying "If one counts up to eleven one does not strike the man" but the people were simply not prepared to do just that. Civilised peoples tended to cling to false concepts in their attitude to acts of savagery. He recalled Winston Churchill's definition of fanaticism as applied to the 1880 war against the Mahdi. "Fanaticism," wrote Churchill, "is not in itself a cause of war but is something that can be exploited when war has begun. It is the outcome of oppression by the strong of the weak."

So when the *Manchester Guardian* complained of lack of foresight in setting up administrative machinery, it had to be remembered that not everything could be solved by Chiefs of Staff papers. Improvisation was necessary, and the Chiefs of Staff themselves had to be ready to deal with just such emergencies as they arose. With, for instance, Dunkirk, we had no idea where we would reach the sea. We might have gone back along our lines of communication.

India in March 1947, he said, was a ship on fire in mid-ocean with ammunition in the hold. By then it was a question of putting the fire out before it actually reached the ammunition. There was in fact no option before us but to do what we did. He would be frank and say that he had just spent the unhappiest six months in a long official life, so he hoped he would not be accused of false complacency in saying that if he had had the time over again he would have given the same advice.

KARACHI—NEW DELHI *Monday, 27th October, 1947*

We left Northolt on Saturday in a Lancaster, as the Governor-General's York was unserviceable and in process of a complete overhaul to be ready in time for the Mountbattens' return for the Royal Wedding.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

Events Mountbatten said h d taken a ser turn and three hundred and thirty m n f th F rst Sikh B ttalion w re flown i to bl ck m j in as on by North west Fronti r t besmen wh m g pdly on S i g the summ r c ptal He was e y nx us that I should b gin making my Press contact early in the m g but r l ed that it v s ssential that I h ld fi t b cq nted fully w th the l ent facts of cris s wh h came to a head hil e r ur journey fr m Londo I a aw ly th t e ly n Sept mber there h d been a h tch n th n wly establ shed relat ons between K hm r and Pakistan —th K hm G m nt cu g P k t n f failur t pr de suppl s f se e l es t l c mm d ties and p t t ng about a numb ot small border raids and Pakistan m k ng cou t r compl t

Thre day bef re the t n fer f p er and th Acces ion t me I m t th K shmir Governme t n d t ntentio of ng t d t ll g e m nt w th b th Ind a and P k t n Sub seq e tly th I d Go emm t p l cy h b en t refra fr m induc ng K shm r to ccede Indeed the States M stry und P t l d t n w t t f ts w y t t k n ction wh h uld b t p t d f ing Ka hm r s hand and t g e a s th t s o to Pak st n w ld n t b taken amiss by I d a Th Mah ja s chr n c d ci n m t b c c unted a b g fact n the present ris Alm t y of act on t ken q ckly w uld h d h St t fr m th t r m l P tin t n l w f t l but n ombat ng m jor t uld e m th t as w th the N zam th s s the only weapon n h s d pl mat c rm ury

The military and pol t cal mpl cat ns f to day s m g and Mountbatten is of cour e under n illus on ab t th t Alth gh h s role can only now n th l st resort be ad v ry I g t the firm impression that h s p es nc m y already h v h lp d t h s Go ernment o e burdened nd di tracted with the problems of the Punjab and J n g dh fr m the most d ger s p tfalls It as a sudd n emergency c lling at once for r tr t and q ck decision Mountbatten s extr ordinary v t l ty d can n s w re well adapted to the demands of th h r

I gath r from h m that it was last Friday n ght (24th October) t b ffet di in honour of the S ame e F gn M st r that Nehru first spoke of bad news and r po t d th t t ibesmen v ere be ng taken n mil t ry tr nspo t up th Rawalp ndi road State forces t seems ere absent a d lt geth r a most crit cal tu t n was d l p ng M ntbatten attended the Defence Com mittee on Saturday 25th at which Gener l Lockh t read ut a telegram from the Headquarters of the P kist n Army stat ng that some five thousand tr besmen had attacked and captured Muzaf farab d and Domel and that considerable tribal reinf rcements

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Wednesday 29th October 1947*

Mountbatten went round to see Nehru in his room this morning. Patel joined them and there was a frank talk about the general desirability of the Lahore visit. Mountbatten asked about going himself alone, saying he had no feelings of personal pride when the question of saving the two countries from disaster was at stake. Patel replied that he and the rest of the Cabinet were strongly opposed to either of them making the visit. Mountbatten then pointed out that Liaquat was also ill and another *meeting of the Joint Defence Council was in any case due to be held this week*. It would be a friendly gesture for Nehru and himself to go to Lahore for that purpose. Nehru agreed and Mountbatten returned to Government House where he at once made his telephone call to Jinnah, who expressed pleasure at this proposal. Five minutes afterwards Don Campbell rang me up to ask whether there was any truth in the rumour that Mountbatten had been speaking to Jinnah on the telephone.

Mountbatten had ninety minutes' talk with Gandhi today. At yesterday's Prayer Meeting the Mahatma struck an almost Churchillian note over Kashmir. He said the result was in the hands of God; man could but do or die. He would not shed a tear if the little Union force was wiped out like the *Spartans bravely defending Thermopylae*. Nor would he mind Sheikh Abdullah and his Moslem, Hindu and Sikh comrades dying at their posts in the defence of Kashmir. That would be a glorious example to the rest of India. Such heroic defence would affect the whole sub-continent, and everyone would forget that Hindus, Moslems and Sikhs were ever enemies.

The immediate military situation is serious. The Commanding Officer of the battalion flown in on Monday has been killed and there has been a withdrawal and fairly *heavy fighting is going on four and a half miles west of Srinagar*.

It is noteworthy that the situation in Hyderabad has reacted sharply to the Kashmir crisis. Only twenty-four hours after the Indian acceptance of Kashmir's accession and the flying in comes *the report of a dramatic hold-up of the Nizam's delegation by* Ittehad-inspired mob on the eve of its departure for Delhi to sign a Standstill Agreement. We are still awaiting the full details of this extraordinary development, but it is clear that the Nizam in his efforts to cling to his prerogatives is allowing himself to come increasingly under the influence of the Ittehad extremists.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday 30th October 1947*

Pete Rees kindly called in to see me after dinner to keep me posted with news. The situation in Kashmir, he said, was very obscure and there was no proper intelligence. He was convinced that if the tribesmen had followed their own looting instincts they

would have been in Srinagar by now but under the leadership of ex I N A officers they seemed fortunately to be more cautious

After a difficult Defence Committee Nehru's attendance at the Joint Defence Council in Lahore was formally confirmed and announced but he has since had to send a message to Mountbatten that the doctor had decided that he is still not well enough and so after all Mountbatten will go alone Nehru is also greatly distressed by a Pakistan Government statement issued with a sense of timing which seems to be Jinnah's stock in trade technique of applying diplomatic pressure It is in fact a method which makes diplomacy almost impossible In the statement the Kashmir accession is described as being based on fraud and violence and as such cannot be recognised There was it added conclusive evidence that Kashmiri troops were used first to attack Moslems in the State and even to attack Moslem villages in Pakistan near the border All this had provoked the Pathan raiders—and so on in terms which make it probably as well that Mountbatten cannot take Nehru with him

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Sunday 2nd November 1947*

Since the troubles began I have been cut off from my family I took the chance of a lightning visit by Peter Howes to Simla to see them for a few hours We left on the return trip to Delhi first thing this morning

All was quiet save for signs of recent communal troubles at Karnal We saw lorries bringing out Moslems from the walled township Moslem women were cowering against the wall As we rushed past the car radio was thundering out Bach's Prelude and Fugue in F minor The incongruity of sound and scene and circumstance stirred thoughts in me which went deeper than words What are the bounds of human experience? It was as if by one strange apocalyptic flash all the grandeur and misery of the world had been revealed

On our arrival at Government House I found I was due to dine with the Mountbattens The Maharaja of Bikaner was among the guests After dinner Bikaner gave a running commentary on a film describing his State's part in the movement and welfare of refugees By means of some fine colour photography the film told the story of how more than five lakhs of refugees had been phased through Bikaner They passed in their thousands over largely barren land imposing almost overnight an immense strain on the State's resources and limited lines of communication Yet throughout the whole operation only one hundred and fifty Moslems died on the way

Mountbatten who was in good heart told me he was very pleased with his three and a half hour talk with Jinnah at Lahore They were able to exchange views with rather more freedom

than if their respective Prime Ministers had actually been with them. Jinnah began by complaining that the Indian Government had failed to give timely warning to his Government of its intention. Mountbatten replied that Nehru's first action after leaving the meeting at which the decision to fly in the troops was taken was to telegraph to Liaquat. Jinnah then reiterated the published statement that the accession was not bona fide since it rested on violence and fraud and would thus never be accepted by Pakistan.

The argument then got into a vicious circle. Mountbatten agreed that the accession had indeed been brought about by violence but the violence came from the tribes for whom Pakistan and not India was responsible. To this Jinnah would retort that in his opinion it was India who had committed the violence by sending in the troops, and Mountbatten would continue to stand his ground that where the tribesmen were was where the violence lay. Thus it went on until Jinnah could no longer conceal his anger at what he called Mountbatten's obtuseness.

Mountbatten advised Jinnah of the strength of the Indian forces in Srinagar and of their likely build-up in the next few days. He told him that he considered the prospect of the tribesmen entering Srinagar in any force was now remote. This led Jinnah to make his first general proposal, which was that both sides should withdraw at once and simultaneously. When Mountbatten asked him to explain how the tribesmen could be induced to remove themselves, his reply was 'If you do this I will call the whole thing off', which at least suggests that the public propaganda line that the tribal invasion was wholly beyond Pakistan's control will not be pressed too far in private discussion.

On inquiry Mountbatten found that Jinnah's attitude to a plebiscite was conditioned by his belief that the combination of Indian troops in occupation and Sheikh Abdullah in power meant that the average Moslem would be far too frightened to vote for Pakistan. Mountbatten proposed a plebiscite under United Nations Organisation auspices, whereupon Jinnah asserted that only the two Governors-General could organise it. Mountbatten at once rejected this suggestion, stressing that whatever Jinnah's prerogatives might be his own constitutional position allowed him only to act on his Government's advice.

Jinnah's mood was one of depression, almost fatalism. He kept harping on the masochistic theme that India was out to destroy the nation of his making, and his attitude to every personality and act of policy across the border was coloured by that general assumption. Mountbatten, with Ismay, who was present for most of the conversation, did his utmost to reassure him. It is doubtful whether he made any headway, but at least they left good friends on the surface. Mountbatten says that as a military operation the speed of the fly-in on 27th October left

our S E A C efforts standing It certainly seems to have left Jinnah standing as well and to have been a performance wholly outside his calculations

In spite of Mountbatten s optimism and frankness the events of the past few days have inevitably caused a widening of the breach between himself and Jinnah which this latest meeting has by no means narrowed For Jinnah would seem to have judged Mountbatten by himself and assumed that he retains al most Viceregal powers This might well lead him to the further assumption that Mountbatten was the real author of the letter accepting Kashmir s accession, the directing hand responsible for the daring and dash of the fly in and in general the moving spirit in causing this serious setback to Pakistan s interests and aspirations

If this is so it is a tragic misreading of the facts Ever since the acceptance of the 3rd June Plan Mountbatten has regarded as the central feature of his mission the promotion of good will between the two successor States Jinnah is not insensitive to issues of personal reputation and it is strange that he cannot see that disappointment here would be likely to be regarded by Mountbatten as a measure of personal failure

Apart from his vexation over Kashmir it may well be that Jinnah does not consider that on wider grounds Mountbatten now enjoys the powers to serve as a restraining or mediating influence in India As we have seen Jinnah s concept of the proper functions of a Governor General were made plain enough when he at once invoked the special powers allowed under the Independence Act

Last but not least although the two men have a considerable personal respect for each other Jinnah is now wholly dedicated to the aims of his statecraft * Deeper fears and colder calcula tions which are beyond Mountbatten s means to penetrate seem to possess Jinnah at this time

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Monday 3rd November 1947*

With the Kashmir crisis holding all the limelight Hyderabad has escaped attention yet only yesterday—some two and a half months after Independence Day—Mountbatten found himself re

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* Just how deep was this regard of Mr Jinnah for Lord Mountbatten was revealed to me recently by a personal friend of Mr Jinnah s He told me that just before his death Mr Jinnah went so far as to say The only man I have ever been impressed with in all my life was Lord Mountbatten When I met him for the first time I felt he had nur (nur approxi mates in English to a divine radiance) He said that Mr Jinnah added that he had never doubted Lord Mountbatten s integrity the whole time he was in India

ceiving an ent rely new Hyderab d delegat on of th ee led by M n N w z Jung one of the str ng m n of the Ittehad and t would seem several stages f rthe way from s ttl ment th n on the 15th August I de d ft developments wh h most g n fica tly me t h d the ght after Kashm r accession and the fly n nd wh ch a only be descr bed a f Ruritan n m p b b l ty t is rem k ble that the neg t t ns hould b con t nu ng at all B t f r Mountb tten s a d Monckton s pe tenc and will p we they w ld h b ken down compl tely by n v As t is th N z m h s succeeded only in mpletely forfeit ng wh t er reserve of confidenc th G ernme t f I d — nd Patel n p rt l —h d in h m a d I d ubt h ther the r rel t n n e be th m g in

During Ismay d my vi t to Lond M untbatten used ll h r u a conc l ator to find the form l that w uld close the gap bet een a c n nd association He even went f r t c mm d l sh docum t— h nd ritt n vell m scroll perhaps— ith a he d g nfin d to som u h rcha m Kn w all men by th pr sents It uld then be a epted by both part e as an Inst m t thout uffix o p f x but m ng e n t the S rd r and as c at n t H s Exalted Highness!

In th b l ef that th N zam was u pt bl to moderat n flu es nly long M ckt n \ as at h s sid M untbatten w ked h rd t cure ag ment fo st from V P M n n *t th St te th t g t at o uld b cont u d Hyd a b d* Th d y bef re V P as d t l e—all th n c s ry clearanc h ng be n secu d t b th ends—th N zam turned th st do m on the g unds th t V P pe ence \ ould gi r se to d m t t ns d out demonstrations Th t f th efusal and of P t l s reply to t er s fficiently ffens ve to the s pt b l t e of both pa t t h e br ught the nego t t ns to a final h lt

At th stag M untbatten asked Monckton to c m to De hi s h s per onal gue t d M kt n p p d n th 10th Octo be a ye r St d t ll Agreement \ hich ould gi e Indi m t of th bstant al d ant g f a n wh l p erv ng the N zam s symb l t tus Mountbatten ucceeded n s cur ng an exte n beyond the t mo th f r nd cti g the discu ons n this b si Th f ll wed some nten d b tte b rgai ing wh once aga n the complete collapse of the negotiat ns se med imm ent b t n the 2 nd Oct b a dr ft St ndstill Agreem t \ s prepared w th various rev s ons wh h was c cept ble both t V P nd t th N zam s d legation

The deleg t on at once returned t Hyde b d to cl nch the m tter and n th same evening show d the draft to the N zam who d d not like the lo k of it and dec ded to ref r the whole te t to h s Ex cut e Council The E cutive Co c l w th th

delegation present to explain points of detail spent the next three days in discussing the draft and on Saturday the 25th October with a formal vote of six in favour and three against advised the Nizam to accept and sign the Standstill Agreement without further revision or delay The delegation duly reported the result of the vote that evening to the Nizam who indicated his approval of the decision The Nizam it seems spent most of the next day preparing two collateral letters which involved an undertaking on his part not to accede to Pakistan and covered his position in the event of India leaving the Commonwealth or war breaking out between India and Pakistan During the evening the delegation called for all the documents as they were due to leave for Delhi early the next morning But the Nizam without explanation excused himself from adding his signature that night

At three o clock in the morning a crowd estimated at about twenty thousand swarmed round the three adjacent houses occupied by Chhatari Monckton and Sir Sultan Ahmed There were loud speakers in the crowd telling them to remain orderly and to create no disturbance beyond preventing the delegation from leaving No Hyderabad police were seen at any time and the Ittehad publicly took credit for this militant challenge At about five o clock in the morning Chhatari ultimately managed to make contact with the Army authorities and the delegates and Lady Monckton were then safely evacuated to the house of an officer of the Hyderabad State Forces

At 8 a m the Nizam sent a message to the delegates that they should not leave for a few days He also advised Mountbatten by telegram that owing to unforeseen circumstances they could not return forthwith and trusted that the Governor General would not mind if they came on Thursday or Friday at the latest Mountbatten at once agreed When the Nizam actually saw the delegation in the afternoon of the 27th he said he wanted them to stay while he took final stock of the situation but he expressed complete agreement with his Council s decision He roundly denounced the Ittehad and Razvi who it seems was personally responsible for organising the opposition and asserted that he would force Razvi to accept the decision

The next morning at a second interview with the delegation the Nizam called Razvi in but far from converting him it was Razvi who dominated the Nizam spoke of the agreement as meaning the death of Hyderabad and pleaded for a chance to reopen negotiations in what he regarded as more favourable circumstances arising from the Indian Government s preoccupations with troubles elsewhere He proposed a new delegation ably of three dissenting voters in the Executive Council ton Chhatari and Ahmed all explained that any such

ction would be illusory and disastrous and thereupon tendered their resignations

On Thursday the 30th the Nizam had a last interview with Monckton and Ahmed before the former left for London and the latter for Delhi Ahmed who at once reported the whole of the above bizarre episode to Mountbatten fired a parting shot at his former master by saying in effect 'This will be the end of you and your money'

At the same time a telegram from the Nizam advised Mountbatten that owing to the changed political situation the old delegation had been dissolved and a new one created from the ranks of the dissenting voters within the Council Moin Nawaz Jung the new chairman is also a brother in law of Mir Laik Ali who has succeeded Chhatari as Prime Minister and who up to September was Representative of Pakistan in United Nations

The possibility that all this manœuvring may be the prelude to some attempt by Hyderabad to align herself with Pakistan cannot be overlooked and was very frankly dealt with by Mountbatten at his Lahore meeting with Jinnah There has been general contact between Karachi and Hyderabad both before and after the transfer of power but Jinnah was at pains to stress that he has had nothing whatever to do with the Nizam's reversed decision and had never discussed any form of agreement with him

Mountbatten began by taking a lofty line that the Nizam wanted Hyderabad to be an independent sovereign State in close association with the Dominions and with a foreign policy in general conformity with India's But Mountbatten has been extremely tough with him and his delegation which he met for the first time yesterday He told them that he had never in the course of his experience in international negotiations over some years come across so extraordinary a procedure as Hyderabad was now trying to adopt by reverting to a draft which had already after days of patient examination been rejected by the other party He has made it clear beyond all equivocation that the Government still abide by the final version of the Standstill Agreement which had when the previous delegation left Delhi was accepted by the Nizam Council and until his sudden *volte face* by the Nizam himself If the Nizam continued to repudiate his own decision the responsibility for breaking off the negotiation would be his alone and the Indian Government would make it clear to the world that this was

Nehru has made a big broadcast offering United Nations controlled plebiscite for Kashmir which Mountbatten raised with Jinnah on Saturday It was at the time he made all arguments and statement But Jinnah's objection which he made quite clear at the Lahore meeting was not to the idea of a plebiscite as such but to the presence of Indian troops in Kashmir while

it is being held which he claims likely to prejudice any chance of it being impartial Both Nehru and Patel seemed to think that a referendum could not be held during the winter months and would in any case take time to organise Mountbatten is concerned about the complacent assumptions in much of the thinking about Kashmir and has pressed for a military appreciation of just what a long term commitment over a wide front would mean

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday 6th November 1947*

I called round to see Alan Moorehead at the Imperial this morning David Astor the editor of *The Observer* asked him to undertake a series of special feature articles on India and Pakistan since Independence This is his first visit to India and already the vast canvas excites his imagination Even a short conversation shows him to be a most gifted impressionist with a particular forte for descriptive analysis

What I asked is your first reaction to India? It is rather like Spain he replied— men sit hating each other like the wrath of God—then because the sun is too hot shrug their shoulders and say what is the use? He thought the phrase India s pathetic contentment was the complete reverse of the truth On the contrary he felt their mood was one of apathetic discontent

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Saturday 8th November 1947*

The Joint Defence Council met this morning after prolonged and vain efforts by Mountbatten to secure the presence of Liaquat and Jinnah The Pakistan representatives were Nishtar the Communications Minister and Mohammed Ali who as Secretary General to the Government is already one of the most influential figures in the new regime Mountbatten invited Nehru and V P to join Nishtar and Mohammed Ali at lunch Afterwards he steered the conversation into two separate rooms Nehru and Nishtar talking politically and V P and Mohammed Ali considering the problem at the official level

For the first time the technique of broadcast invective and controversy has been temporarily set aside and a serious effo" has been made to seek a detailed working formula for a settl ment of the dispute There was a rather larger area of common ground than had been expected but diametrically oppose views were held about the withdrawal of forces Pakistan wante the withdrawal to be simultaneous by both sides while India w: adamant that withdrawal could be effected only after Kashm had been cleared of the raiders To encourage the Indians they are negotiating from increasing strength comes the that the offensive ordered on Tuesday has succeeded

Ba amula has been rec ptured Altogether the Mountbatt ns can lea f r London tom rr w w th easier minds about Kashm r than h d eemed poss ble f rty-e ght h u ago

On the other hand the Junagadh pr bl m c s re ewed rry At last Mo days Defence Comm tt e it w repo ted as l ttl more than r ut n tem that Ind n f rces had duly entered M grol and Babar wid on the 1st November and that *th occupat n h d* been carr ed thr gh peacefully It a re s ble to hope th t Patel would b sati fied for a decis n n the cc pat n of Jun g dh itself to l e n th *pending tr y* nt l greater pr blem were saf ly resolved

But t d y at about one in the morn ng the Dewan formally n ted the Ind n Government to take r the administrati *of Junag dh in ord r* to save th State fr m compl t b e k d wn pending an hon r ble settl m nt of the s er l ssues *invol ed in* Jun g dhs acce s on The D wan advised Liaq t th t he was cting with the support f publ c op n th uth ity f the State Co c l and of the Naw b h mself vh had sh t wh l *bef r* flo n t Karach The G rnm nt at once ac epted the req t auth n ing the R gi nal C mm s oner in Rajkot to mpl ment t

All th s devel pm nts wer only b o ght t M untbattens not c l te th n g It the first tim nce the tr fe of p er th t th Go *rnment* h e carr d out m j r act of pol cy w th t f lly con ulting o not fy g h m n d anc f the e nt He f ls th s m y be d to P t l s and VP s de to spa h m emb r assme t

F nally t complet the days nx t the Nizam klessly d a g on the l t reser s of go d ll tow rds h mself n Delhi s eks to buy yet m t me before gn ng th Standstill Agr e m t H s d l gat n wh ch left *D lhi ye t rday* has be brought by d nt f four d ys su t ined ff rt t the poi t he e t w s ready t ad i the N zam t accept the St dstill Ag e ment thout m ndme t Th *N zam* n the st ength f Mo ntbatt s forth m ng Lond ist has n w ask d for postpo ement u t l the *25th Nov mber* Mountb tt n after c n ltat on with the G vernment h repl d ag eing to th s p o v d d a settlem t ached by th end of the m nth

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *S nday 9tl No embe 1947*

We set o t ery e ly f Pal m to s the Mountbatt n ff n the first leg f ther fl ght to London R ght up to th l st moment M untbatten was f r from h ppy bout go ng t all but q ite apart fr m Princess Elizab th be ng *cous n the b id groom* Lieutenant Ph l p Mountbatten not only h s neph w but h s made his home with h m in England for the past e ghteen years

At 10 a m I attended the *Swearing In* of Rajagopalachari who in Mountbatten s absence will be acting as Governor General Since the transfer of power this famous elder statesman of the Congress Party has been serving with distinction as Governor of West Bengal The ceremony took place in the Council Chamber in the presence of the Cabinet C R as he is generally called dressed in his white *dhoti* and smiling benignly through his large dark glasses gave the Hindu salutation Everyone stood while Bannerjee the Secretary of the Home Department read out the words of the Royal Commission— To our trusty and well beloved Chakravarti Rajagopalachari greeting The Chief Justice Kania administered the oath to which only one alteration was made the substitution of the words affirm for swear

The ceremony was all over within five minutes but this was quite long enough to convey the full sense of its historic significance There were both fulfilment and dramatic irony in the spectacle of this Congress campaigner becoming the first Indian to act as head of State by means of the form and title of the Raj which it had been his life work to supersede

I attended the acting Governor General s first lunch party which he gave to members of his staff C R s married daughter Srimati Namagiri who is shy and retiring is acting as hostess The A D C s laid on the normal procedure for outside guests our staff party being lined up for individual introduction The ladies all curtsied but C R pleaded Don t do that for me!

After the lunch he called for Vernon and myself We expected little more than a few formal pleasantries but our talk was far more prolonged and illuminating than that We emerged from this encounter strongly impressed that when the time came here was the ideal successor to Mountbatten There could of course be no greater contrast between the two men s minds and outlook Mountbatten—dynamic extrovert tackling events at the surface with feverish activity C R —introspective essentially a scholar and thinker anxious primarily about the underlying causes

He asked about the scope of my work and then proceeded to analyse the role of the Indian Press which he said had a long way to go before it could achieve its full freedom I asked him what influence it had on politics and he said Very little The Congress had completely dominated the political scene and the Press instead of providing informed criticism was nothing more than a body of political propagandists If there were to be a change in the balance of power all the Press would do would be to follow suit and one lot of propagandists would succeed another He said he had just written to an old friend of his in Madras who was a critic of the Government saying that the essential,

nothing. His hesitation followed by the inability or unwillingness of Pakistan to prevent tribal incursions into the State have undoubtedly been the primary cause of the present *crisis*. *It is* probable that nothing short of a full-scale tribal invasion to the gates of his capital would have induced the hesitating Maharaja to accede at all.

I am convinced that the Government of India were absolutely right to accept his Accession before offering to give him military aid, and to regard it unilaterally as an interim measure until the destiny of the State can be finally decided by a confirming plebiscite. It should be stressed that the accession has complete legal validity both *in terms of the British* Government's and Jinnah's expressed policy statements. But just how narrow the escape has been *from* irreparable disaster is to be seen from Jinnah's dramatic invasion orders given at midnight on the 27th October to his Commander-in-Chief General Gracey and cancelled solely as a result of Gracey's feeling fit to refer the order to Auchinleck. Auchinleck's immediate intervention caused Jinnah to pause just long enough for second thoughts. Only thus were the two Dominions saved from being forthwith thrown into a state of open war with each other.

The Nizam of Hyderabad is undoubtedly playing for time to see how Kashmir develops before taking a final decision in favour of the Standstill Agreement. In the attempt he has embarked on what can only be described as a Ruritanian negotiations. The Ittehad which he originally encouraged has now become a veritable Frankenstein, and the whole issue now turns on whether the Nizam has the political and moral strength *to resist the opposition* to any form of agreement with India. If the Hyderabad problem can be solved I am confident that we shall be able to surmount the hump of the crisis.

At his meeting with Mountbatten in Lahore on 1st November Jinnah asked him *to believe* that he had at first been against accepting the accession of Junagadh and had demurred for some time, giving way *finally* to the insistent appeal of the Nawab and Dewan. But this was *not* the line taken a month earlier in Delhi by Liaquat, who gave no indications of any such misgivings. But whatever the *motive or* explanation, by accepting Junagadh's accession in the first place Jinnah was inevitably inviting a sharp reaction.

Patel has responded to the challenge in a way which, if it raises domestic morale, is hardly calculated to win over world opinion. But although the *Government's* action in occupying the State will provide material for the superficial and ill-disposed to summon up analogies with recent European history, it can still be claimed that there has strictly been no violation of law. It is perhaps worth *noting that the* invitation from the Junagadh Premier to administer the territory in the Ruler's absence does not in the Indian Government's view *prejudice the* Accession issue

Nehru has offered early discussion of the whole problem but Pakistan demands what it calls the restoration of the Nawab s administration before such discussions can begin India points out that it was the Nawab s administration and nobody else who decided to call in their troops All this however leads into a labyrinth of detail and a web of propaganda and it is important not to get lost in the one or entangled in the other

Taking the larger view of developments to date Kashmir Hyderabad and Junagadh are essentially one situation and react on each other A move towards agreement in any one of these three States would ease the situation in the other two Accession has been amply vindicated All the acceding States have held firm and in the three cases where there has been trouble the Ruler has each time been of a different community from the overwhelming majority of his subjects If the Accession policy had not been duly sponsored and pressed home by Mountbatten and Patel there would undoubtedly have been complete chaos As it is the scale of the consolidation is indeed impressive In so far as the Princely States before the transfer of power formed no part of British India their accession now means the incorporation into the Indian Union of larger territories and populations than have been lost to it by the creation of Pakistan

Mr Churchill s recent speeches in Parliament during the Debate on the Address on Burmese Independence and on the Punjab troubles have aroused old phobias In two respects I feel that what he said should not be allowed to pass unchallenged First although we are admittedly wallowing here in a statistical morass all the data available to us suggest that his round figures of the number of people who have lost their lives in the recent disturbances are an inflated estimate Secondly the implication of his speech on Burma that Dominion Status is something less than Independence should surely be taken up at once by the British Government as being false in political fact and legal theory and in any case completely contrary to its declared policy

My own impression which has been confirmed since my return is that the Government of India will not force the pace on withdrawal from the Commonwealth and if they can find a suitable excuse for letting the matter remain in the pending tray they will do so I have for some time felt that one of the major objectives of Jinnah s policy has been to keep this issue at the boil and if possible to tease India out of the Commonwealth leaving Pakistan as the Northern Ireland of the sub continent Mountbatten as a cousin of the King by his continued presence in Delhi as Governor General of India inadvertently makes it difficult for Jinnah to promote this concept

Be that as it may evidence is accumulating that Mountbatten is to be made the target of a fairly heavy propaganda from Karachi The first salvo was an article in the

T m s to day a cu ing him of being in active command of the Kashm r operat ns H s turn t London for the R yal Wedd ing sh uld be the b st ref tat on of this fantastic charge But the depress ng truism rema ns—the bolder th l the ider the credence f om which it oft n follows that to deny an untruth is simply to spread a susp cion

CHAPTER TWENTY

PROGRESS AND RELAPSE

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *T esday 11th N emb 1947*
TO-DAY IS THE g eat H ndu elebrat on f Deepa v li A w th our Ch tmas the emphas s pl ced on the fam ly and part cularly on the h ldren All the h use ar bedecked th l nt ns f r t the fest al f th l ghts C R called me in th m rning saying he had c mpo d sh rt De p li g eeting wh h h thought m ght pp pr tely be h fi st m sage s Go ern r Gene l The me age ddre ed t th peopl of I d h d pecul r rhythm b uty f r l ke N hru C R is a mast r f E gl h pr e

We may t he r te h e the m nd to ind lge in festive r jo ng when e ar rro nd d by d ff lt es and deeply imme s d n nx t a t day b t De p wal is a gre t nat al day a s ted w th hope a d j y from t m immemorial in Ind a Th l ght th t re l ghted o th t day al o rep es nt the hope for m re nd m e nl ghtenment nd the holy a oint ng d ne n the m r f the f t al a s i t d th the le s ing of the sp t ymbol cally all d the Ga ga Shan May th Deepawali n t pu ify th h t nd nl ghten the m nd f pe pl ev ryw he n Ind r espect e f ca te r re d r s call d ace

OBSERVATORY HOUSE GOVERNOR-GENERAL S LODGE SI ILA
W edn sd y 6th No n b 1947

On all s des the e s gn f *d te te* g v ng se to the hope that the storms h ch h e thr atened to o e wl lm the s b c tinent f llow ng th tr n fer of power m y at l t b s bs ding All Ind Rad o pr ded pe h ps the m st pr m ing er es of news items t be he d in a y n e n ng s n e th t a fer of pow r F rst there is the Stand till Agr ment w th Hydera bad Mountbatten n his return from London has—as Patel

announced in the Legislative Assembly yesterday—seen the Hyderabad delegation for the last time and precisely the same Agreement is being taken back for the Nizam s signature as a month ago

Secondly Nehru has made an important statement on Kashmir which while it once more accuses Pakistan of conniving at invasion indirectly repudiates the recent dangerous suggestion of Sheikh Abdullah that there might now be no need for a referendum If Nehru had not done this promptly Mountbatten s own position would have been very difficult Nehru has simply repeated the terms on which Accession had been accepted—that is an Interim Government followed by reference to the popular will under an impartial tribunal He rejects the doctrine of a simultaneous withdrawal of troops as providing in itself mere confirmation of Pakistan s connivance

The third item of good news is a Joint Defence Council meeting with Liaquat coming to Delhi to morrow for it This will be the first personal encounter between the two Prime Ministers since the Kashmir invasion

Finally from Karachi comes the official announcement of the intention to disband the All India Moslem League and to confine the operations of the League to Pakistan This is an enlightened decision which will help to free many of the forty million Moslems living in India from a difficult double allegiance As such it is a powerful and timely contribution to peace in the sub continent

OBSERVATORY HOUSE GOVERNOR-GENERAL S LODGE SIMLA
Saturday 29th November 1947

The Nizam has signed at last and Patel has made a good statement paying tribute to Mountbatten for his decisive role in the negotiations Certainly patience has been called for in dealing with the old Nizam who adheres stubbornly to the methods of traditional oriental diplomacy Wholly divorced from the developments of the outside world he seems incapable of taking any *decision until he has enmeshed himself in the webs of his own* intrigues

It has been a niggling operation until the last When the delegation had their final meeting with Mountbatten on Tuesday they began pleading for very minor amendments such as the substitution of will for shall and finally even a semi colon for a comma in a desperate effort to justify their existence and make good the assertion that the Government of India had agreed to changes in the text approved by their predecessors It was for this reason that Mountbatten was at pains to stress that he would not agree to the change of even a comma Some small amendments in the collateral letter were accepted but here India

firm in ref sing to allo Hyderab d to h ve its own d plomat c ep nt t n

The Ittehad a d its xt m st leader K sim Razvi— h was i cidentally in D lh during the l st bout f negoti t n—can l m n mo th n that the Stand till Ag ement has b n br ught ab ut by a purely Hyde b d d l g t on But th f ce saving dev ce has b n eff ct d only t the expe s of P t l confiden th Nizam d h s ntentions For all th t the Standst ll Agr ement llo s a bre thi g sp ce of year f r heads to c ol and heart t fte

OBSERVATORY HOUSE GOVERNOR-GENERAL S LODGE SIMLA
Mo d y I t Decembe 1947

The L nd n P ess s b g nn ng to comment on th cent s g s *of an I do Pakistan d t t F rst fr t f the St nd t ll Ag ee m t th Hyd b d th N zam* dec s on to release the l cal Congress pol t cal prisoners Most of th k y m n l d ng Sw m R m d Tirth th P d t f the State Congre s have been under arrest during the negotiations

OBSERVATORY HOUSE GOVERNOR-GENERAL S LODGE SIMLA
S t d y 6th D mb r 1947

Nehru h m de a m j r tatement n F re gn p l cy to the Leg slat ve As mbly Th s th field in wh h h s m d n spread t lf and I p ct that h g t the deepest t sfact on fr m be ng th F re gn Mi t h o n G rnment He is mak ng determ ed b d to keep I d ut f the scramble of power pol t He hotly de th t his a m is ne t al ty b t it broad eff ct ll be som th g ry l k t He call f co operat n w th b th th U t d States f Amer ca d Russ a and m kes no ref r t B t n the Common ealth b y nd ying th t he hopes to mp I d s l t ns th *m* Com mon ealth memb wh h w ld eem to mply a fl nk att k on So th Af

In a ref r to th de n t k by the Un ted N t on over th part t n f P le tine Neh *c mm d d the Ind an* propos l for t o autonomous States w thin f d rati This h a serted r g ded in United Nat ons c cle s w r th n part t n h ch h d already led t s mu h trouble a d would l d to m e I d a he added would g in n p st ge by tak ng n indepe d t l ne th s w y on major es f wo ld pol cy He m d the p nt that p l t c lly Foreign pol cy depe ded n econom c trends th n a country I d s m pol c es wer not yet fixed b t had b n d erted by the press g needs of the immediate internal cris s

At the same time Asaf Ali Nehru's first Amb... to the United States bids in Washington for American f... urging that India was solvent and a good market. Asked ab... Indo Pakistan relations he replied he expected they would be close—at any rate at the economic level

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Thursday 11th December 1947*

I have been acquainting myself fully from th records and from a long talk I have had with Mountbatten on the ... and often dramatic developments in the Kashmir situati... the past fortnight during which time there seems to have be... almost a year of diplomatic effort Mountbatten has ... with what I can only describe as heroic zeal to close th... and prevent the whole sub continent falling apart from a ... maniac obsession over the political future of a single ... State important enough in itself but containing only fou... out of its four hundred million inhabitants

One of Ismay's most important contributions to peace was ... part he played both early in November and during the ... talks between Liaquat and Nehru in Delhi only last week ... again Mountbatten had great difficulty in bringing the leaders together as yet again Liaquat prefaced the meeting with a tel... gram designed to infuriate Nehru to whom it was th... directly addressed He has once more described Abdullah as a Quisling has accused the Indian Government of attempting to eliminate the whole Moslem population of the State and repe... his demand for setting up an impartial independent administra... immediately

Nehru fortunately is not the man to let his justifiabl indignation degenerate into false pride and Mountbatten duly pre... on the two Prime Ministers to have their first man to-man talk on Kashmir since its accession After a long preliminary ... sentation of his case by Nehru Liaquat who was obviously very tired and weak after his recent illness managed to ask a number of pertinent questions and to put forward proposals which Neh... promised to consider Ismay with his own outstanding skill and experience in the drafting of high level formulæ and with the support of V P and Mohammed Ali on behalf of the two Governments at once put these proposals into more formal shape and they provided the basis for four further meetings during the next two days

Briefly the proposals were that Pakistan should use all her influence to persuade the rebel Azad Kashmir forces to cease fighting and the tribesmen and other invaders to wit... Kashmir territory as quickly as possible and to prevent incursions India shoud withdraw the bulk of her ... ing only small detachments of minimum strength ... disturbances The United Nations Organi...

to send a commission to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir and to recommend to India, Pakistan and Kashmir before it was held steps which should be taken to ensure that it was fair and unfettered. Certain steps which it was intended to take towards this object, such as the release of political prisoners and the return of refugees, should be published straight away.

With Ismay's help the position reached at the end of the talks was that while there was no definite agreement, Nehru's criticisms were confined to detail. Liaquat for his part, who came to Delhi insisting on the complete withdrawal by both sides and an impartial administration before a plebiscite, and an impartial plebiscite, only fully gained the latter and partially gained the first of these conditions. He thus showed himself ready to make concessions of principle. Ismay left quite convinced that the formula was both on political and administrative grounds a workable solution, and the only one that has so far been propounded. The atmosphere when Ismay left was promising. It seemed that the foundations had been well and truly laid, but conciliation is heartbreaking work.

Two days ago, and only two hours after Mohammed Ali, who had stayed on in Delhi, had been for Karachi, Mountbatten was presented at what he had described to me as one of the most depressing meetings that has ever been held at Government House, with the President, Patel and Baldev Singh appeared before the Defence Committee as men of woe. They had just returned from the front and the reports they brought back together with independent information reaching Nehru had decided the Cabinet to set against agreeing to the immediate plebiscite or even for the present to continue negotiation. The grievance was threefold. First, reports of large concentrations of invading tribesmen in the West Punjab; secondly, the allegation that Liaquat had no sooner left Delhi than he had done all in his power to encourage the invaders and to throttle the State; and thirdly, and perhaps more emotionally disturbing, continuing stories of ghastly atrocities, including the wholesale murder of non-Moslems and the selling of Kashmir girls.

Contact was finally resumed as a result of Mountbatten placing a discrete suggestion with Liaquat that he should telegraph Nehru confirming the date for a resumption of negotiations. Liaquat did this, urging that the only way for bloodshed to be stopped was for the representatives of the two Governments to continue to meet together. Nehru at once responded to the spirit of this message and accompanied Mountbatten to Lahore for last Monday's Joint Defence Council.

The discussion on Kashmir lasted, with a break for a dinner party, from three in the afternoon until midnight—seven hours in all. This meeting took place in a generally friendly atmosphere with only occasional outbursts. None the less it convinced

Maulana Azad, a great scholar and a man of retiring disposition, has during the past ten years been a central figure of controversy. As the leading Moslem Congressman and a President of the Congress throughout the war he was titular head of the movement during the negotiations with both the Cripps and Cabinet Missions. He embodied in his position and person perhaps the most important symbol of the Congress aspiration to be a national as against a communal party. His stature was thus the focal point of Gandhi's clash with Jinnah, who always maintained that politically no one but a member of the Moslem League could represent Moslem interests.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Monday, 22nd December, 1947*

I had a most revealing talk today with Robert Stimson of the B.B.C., who has just returned from a fortnight's coverage based on Karachi. During his stay he had an important interview with Jinnah, who covered the theme of Pakistan's grievance in the Commonwealth and deliberately complained of British neglect. From what Stimson tells me there can be little doubt but that Jinnah himself is the pivot of the anti-Mountbatten campaign which is now being developed in Pakistan. The attack is not concentrated on any single grievance or criticism, but is designed to exploit over a wide front Mountbatten's vulnerable position as Governor-General of only one Dominion and to create the general impression of a man who is anti-Moslem and pro-Hindu.

Although it is privately recognised in responsible circles there that Mountbatten is a moderating influence, Jinnah seems to have reached the firm conclusion that Mountbatten's continued presence as Governor-General is operating against Pakistan's interest, particularly in her relations with the rest of the Commonwealth. Stimson suggests that Jinnah's attack on Mountbatten are the corollary to his reproaches about British neglect. The criticisms are being duly reflected at lower levels and among European old koi-hais. Complaint were directed in particular against Mountbatten's reference in a speech during his recent visit to London to only three per cent of the Indian sub-continent being affected by the recent disturbances. This is not surprising, for perspectives are rarely acceptable either to the purveyors or consumers of prejudice.

Stimson's general impression was that subject to four great queries Pakistan was perhaps a stronger entity than some of the critics recognised. Those queries were whether she could avoid war; whether Jinnah had long to live (in Stimson's opinion he looked fitter than in August and he was himself at pains to say that he hoped to be operating for at least two years); whether he could secure economic support; and whether he could retain any of her Hindus.

He thought that the Sindi Moslems were not so bitter as those in the West Punjab and although Karachi was safer for Hindus than Delhi was for Moslems the Hindus there were under a constant cloud of threat and petty persecution A good deal of the rice crop had not been gathered in There had been a wholesale exodus of bank staffs and a complete breakdown of the Hindu economy on which so much of the State depended

Stimson was astounded at what he called the fantastic optimism of the old guard but there was as well a core of young efficient and incorruptible Moslem leaders imbued with a sense of mission who were determined to make the new State work Everything depended on whether they could succeed

On Saturday the Indian Cabinet finally decided to appeal to the United Nations accusing Pakistan of helping the raiders Liaquat and Mohammed Ali have been in Delhi since last evening but nothing has emerged from yesterday s or to-day s discussions which makes it possible to cancel or postpone this sombre decision Most of the time has been taken up by the usual atrocity claim and counter claim Nehru to day handed in the official letter of complaint which is a necessary preliminary to a reference to the United Nations Liaquat promised a reply in due course So ends the first phase of the political and diplomatic struggle over Kashmir

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Friday 26th December 1947*

Following the failure of the Delhi talks with Liaquat earlier in the week a very critical situation has developed both over Kashmir and the payment of the cash balances Mountbatten s warnings about the dangers and limitations of Kashmir as a battleground are being all too quickly borne out Indian troops in Kashmir suffer a similar handicap to the Russian forces in Finland during 1939 when Russian superiority in man and weapon power was largely offset by the nature of the terrain

The full weight of Mountbatten s military authority is against any extension of already vulnerable and tenuous lines of communication Already the outpost garrisons are in trouble The garrison at Poonch is completely cut off save for air supply Two infantry companies at Jhangar attacked by a force of some six thousand invaders have suffered heavy casualties and a relieving force has had to turn back

But perhaps the most serious news is of a concentration of another formidable enemy force estimated at six thousand in the Uri area Uri is the farthest point so far reached in the advance towards Domel Withdrawal from Uri would renew the threat to Baramula Srinagar and the Vale all over again In [illegible]batten s view the fall of Uri might well give [illegible]ng [illegible]petus to the argument stressed with ever increasing [illegible] Government circles that the only way to deal effectively

by Brigadier Desmond Young who was for some time in charge of Public Relations at G.H.Q. India when Lord Wavell was Commander-in-Chief.

'The impact,' he writes, 'of Lord Mountbatten's forceful personality *and astonishing energy produced electrifying results.* He swept the Indian Leaders along at such a speed that they had no time to draw breath to quibble. In this highly charged atmosphere Partition was rushed through before the Hindu hatred of the idea had time to gather weight.' He then turns to what he calls Mountbatten's two mistakes. 'First,' he asserts, 'he [illegible] not only to consent to splitting the Indian Army but also to insist on accelerating the process. The ideal would have been to set up the Army intact under Field Marshal Auchinleck for two years from Independence Day to assist the *two Governments impartially in the maintenance of order.* His second mistake was to accept the Governor-Generalship of the Indian Union when Pakistan refused a Joint Governor-General. His acceptance, perhaps under pressure from His Majesty's Government, inevitably put him in a false position in the eyes of Moslems when the trouble started.'

In view of the nuance and possible currency of these two particular criticisms I have written to Joyce in London as follows:—

I need hardly stress that Mountbatten and I myself would have *fervently welcomed any practicable arrangement for Auchinleck* to stay on, but it was Jinnah who was most insistent of all in refusing to have anything to do with the retention of a joint military system after the transfer of power and in demanding the immediate creation of the Pakistan Army. The break-up of the Supreme Command was expedited not only at the request of the Government of India without whose goodwill Pakistan's interest in the matter would not have been served, but also at Auchinleck's own recommendation. In any case Pakistan's objection, as stated by Liaquat to Mountbatten, was based on a completely inflated concept of the Command's real powers.

As for the second mistake, after referring to the highly embarrassing implications of Jinnah's last-minute rejection of the Joint Governor-Generalship, I have pointed out:—

'The Congress offer to Mountbatten was made without any *strings attached to it and quite apart from possible Moslem* reactions. It is certain that Congress opinion would with far more justice have objected to his refusing their offer simply because the Moslem League had not invited him as well. But the true position about the Moslem attitude is that a dominant factor in Mountbatten's decision to accept the India invitation was the pressing plea of both Jinnah and Liaquat made in th

own and Pakistan s behalf that he should do so There is no reason to doubt but that their request was made in anticipation of trouble ahead So if Mountbatten is now placed in a false position with Moslem opinion the remedy rests with those responsible for guiding it in Pakistan

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Wednesday 31st December 1947*

1947 ends in foreboding over the future of Indo Pakistan relations generally and Kashmir in particular It is difficult to stand back and assess the credit and debit balance of our last nine prodigious months in India The immediate situation seems always to overwhelm our thoughts and attention The occupational risk is to be preoccupied with the daily task

Over Kashmir at least we go forward into 1948 with some clarification of the crisis Attlee has as Mountbatten anticipated turned down the proposal of a lightning personal intervention feeling that there is no specific role which he would be able to play save that of conciliator in general terms and he prefers to rely on the proper channels of the United Nations He has however sent an excellently worded message to Nehru urging caution

On receipt of his reply the Government have decided to proceed with their appeal to the United Nations without waiting any longer for Liaquat s reply The wording of the complaint which has been drafted while Mountbatten is still in Gwalior is moderate in tone save for one disquieting phrase which reserves freedom of military action to the Government if the situation requires it Mountbatten has pointed out that the Security Council Committee cannot be expected to react favourably to a threat or even the hint of one

Mountbatten has done everything in his power to urge on Nehru what an invasion of Pakistan territory would mean particularly as the whole problem at India s request is *sub judice* Quite apart from the catastrophic effect on word opinion it would involve the automatic departure of British officers serving with both Dominions This in itself might well I suppose work more immediately against Pakistan s interest than India s but in any case I think Nehru is well aware that any such move would mean that Mountbatten s mission would be at an end

Liaquat s reply to Nehru s formal letter of complaint came in just after the dispatch of the Indian reference to the United Nations It is a lengthy catalogue of counter-charge deliberately not confined to Kashmir but ranging over the general theme of India s refusal to accept Partition and resolve to destroy Pakistan He wants the intervention of the United Nations to ext from Junagadh to genocide so that all pending differences be possibly resolved

As a footnote to the current military developments it is encouraging to learn from the situation reports that no attack has developed on Uri and that the Indian troops there have made no contact with hostile forces. For Mountbatten I continue to feel that this would be the event which might well touch off the wider conflict. My new year motto is always 'Patience and proportion'. Clearly we shall need more than our ration of both in the coming year.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

CALL TO REPENTANCE

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Wednesday, 7th January, 1948*

WITH THE WILLING concurrence of Patel, the Minister for States, Mountbatten is meeting the major and minor Princes in two separate conclaves at Government House this week and once again is trying to provide them with the impetus which seems to be so sadly lacking from within their own ranks. He urged upon the major Princes to-day the desirability of forming a committee of privileges to regulate the conduct of their dynastic affairs.

During the general discussion Alwar alone saw fit to remain truculent. In high-pitched and querulous voice he observed that if the people wish to live in hell, one should not compel them to live in paradise. When Mountbatten was trying patiently to explain the advantages of the Princes and their families entering the Indian Union Diplomatic Service, Alwar interrupted him to say, 'This should not be a favour. If Menon can be States Secretary, why not Bikaner?' Mountbatten replied sharply, 'I am not here to dispense favours. I am just trying to make common sense of the situation.' I noticed incidentally that at the morning meeting Bhopal gave V. P. a brotherly embrace which is usually reserved for a salutation from one Prince to another.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Friday, 9th January, 1948*

Patrick Maitland, editor of *The Fleet Street Letter*, whom I met on my last visit to London, has written asking me a number of questions for background guidance. Seeking my views on the prospects in Kashmir, he asks: 'Is this conflict going to drag on for many months and even for years? Does the Indian Government honestly suppose it will gain anything by going to the Secu-

rity Council or are the Indian forces in such an unfavourable military position that the Indian Government has taken this course in desperation?

I have replied The general perspective in which I see the conflict from here is that Kashmir is really the last major outstanding issue between the two Dominions If one could achieve the basic solution here everything else would fit into place The battle ground is not of India s choosing is at the end of long and bad lines of communication and is one in which it will always be difficult for her to deploy her full strength Therefore from the military point of view we could anticipate a protracted struggle The problem however is essentially political and centres round the will and capability of both sides to give effect to a cease fire In this respect it is somewhat similar to the Indonesian dispute

I think it would be quite wrong to indicate that India is appealing to the United Nations as the result of military desperation On the contrary India feels that she has a very strong case both morally and in law and that the Security Council is the proper forum in which to present it Perhaps the most dangerous feature of the situation is unwillingness to recognise what the cost of failure would be or to appreciate that a war on this issue between the two Dominions would surely bring the sub continent into the vortex of the world power politics struggle

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Saturday 10th January 1948*

This afternoon Mountbatten completed Part Two of his exhortation to the Princes This time he spoke to some fifty of the minor brethren or their representatives arguing once more the wisdom and virtues of mediatisation and urging again as precedent the example of the German principalities and the settlement they made with Napoleon s Confederation of the Rhine Many of the rulers whose knowledge of history and political theory had been severely taxed came away from the conference blinking as though having looked too long at a bright light But I think it is fair to say that a few of the more discerning members are alive to the sense and value of his advice

To night the Mountbattens gave a dinner party to the Princes It is good to find His Highness of Dholpur at Government House in the thick of all the discussions for when I last saw him in July he had given me the impression that he would retire to his State and never be seen in Delhi again I had a talk with him after dinner and he is worried about agitations which he feels the Congress are inspiring in his and neighbouring States When I asked him whether he had any details the only instance he gave was a recent inflammatory speech by Dr Lohia in Gwalior Dr Lohia however is one of the leaders of Jai Prakash Narain

Soci l st wing f the Cong ess which may s on be splitting off alt g ther fr m th C ngress mo ement They ha e in fact been opposed to M untbatten s and Patel s Access on policy and by no stretch f m g nation can they be reg rded as agents of Patel or the St tes Ministry

GOVERN IENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Mo day 12tl J n ry 1948*
Th first nev th t G dh s to beg n an th r of h s m jor f st unto death cam th ugh to me at a P ess p ty at th Delh Gymkhan Cl b The st rtl ng s ddennes f th a n uncement t b Prayer Me t ng made its ntend d mpact on all of us I pa ticul ly rpr sed a earlier in the e en ng t rning from a g m f squash th Verno I h d pas d the french d w f Mountbatt n s study and could ee Gandhi the w th him f r an int rv ew \ hich I w s aware had been ged at short not but d d not understand t have any special s gn fican

He h d in f ct me rou d to see Mountb tten immed ately after h s Pr yer Meet g at \ hich he had declared th t the f st w uld end if d when I m satisfi d that there i a r un o of hea t f ll comm t es bro ght about without any o ts de pressure b t f m an aw kened sense of d ty W th God s my s preme d le couns ll r I felt that I m t take th d ci n w th ut any oth r ad iser I d ed prior t the Pray r Meet ng h h d been ob ing a day of il nce \ ith the esult th t ne ther N hru or P tel was inf rmed in d nce of h pr p ed c urse of act He then went n to l y bare his p f nd unhapp s at the continu ng bad communal atm ph re in D lh wh ch seemed to pre a l t all le els of l fe d hi es lve to m et th s s tu t on by his own chosen act of atone m nt

D ring th t lk w th Mountb tten Gandhi went o t of h s way t k for a fr nk op nion about Ind r f l t pay to P k tan the fifty fi cr res f m the cash b lances wh ch M unt b tt n d d n t hes tate to gi e h m saying th t he c der d th step to be b th un tat manl ke and unw se G ndhi sa d th t h proposed to take the m tter up with Nehru and Pat l d dded th t h w ld m ke it clear to them it w s he wh had in t ted the inq iry d so ght M untbatten s v ew

As for th f t M untbatten t o ce r l d th t t uld be impo s ble for h m to challenge the d ctates of G ndh co sci ce a d t ld h m w th t h s t t th t he welc med h s b e m e and earn tly hoped that it \ ould serve to creat the n w sp rit th t was so badly need d On th note f f l lowsh p and understand g G ndh left to g e effect to h great d cis on The f st s due to begin at l en o clock to-morrow morning

At the Gymkhana Club the party fairly quickly dissolved as various correspondents went back to file their reports and interpretations of the act The general impression was that the fast was well timed and that nothing less drastic would regain for the Mahatma the psychological ascendancy achieved in Calcutta Much would turn upon the attitude of the Sikhs over whom Gandhi had so far been unable to exercise the same measure of influence as over Hindus and Moslems Throughout his stay in Delhi there had of course been the ever increasing pressure of Sikh refugees from the East Punjab upon the capital

There was also considerable speculation about the meaning and effect of Gandhi s move in terms both of his own and Nehru s relations with Patel Gandhi s intervention over the unilateral proposal to impose a sanction against Pakistan by withholding the fifty five crores under the partition of assets is likely to give edge to a Government crisis For he has clearly reacted very strongly against this move and seems to be prepared to face a head on collision with Patel about it

Nehru and Patel have undoubtedly been drifting apart a process which has a cumulative effect as an ever growing number of followers hitch their wagons to these two major stars in the political firmament The rivalry is thus intensified by their respective satellites Gandhi may well hope by a supreme effort to heal the breach between the two great men in the Indian Government realising that he alone has the status to do it and that if he fails not only the Congress Party but the entire regime would be placed in deadly peril

You have to live in the vicinity of a Gandhi fast to understand its pulling power The whole of Gandhi s life is a fascinating study in the art of influencing the masses and judging by the success he has achieved in this mysterious domain he must be accounted one of the greatest artists in leadership of all time He has a genius for acting through symbols which all can understand Fasting as a means of moral pressure and purification is part of the fabric of Hindu life There is the unmistakable sense of everyone being drawn out of his preoccupations to share in a painful responsibility which no man can wholly ignore

GAJNER BIKANER *Wednesday 14th January 1948*

In spite of Gandhi s fast it has been decided not to cancel Mountbatten s long awaited visit to Bikaner but as a mark of respect for the Mahatma there will be no State banquet

Just before our departure Patel and Nehru came along separately to see Mountbatten Their immediate reactions to Gandhi s decision are perhaps the best summary of the two men s divergence of opinion and outlook at this time Patel complained that the timing of the fast was[illegible]sly wrong and that it was

t have the oppos t ff ct to wh t the M h tma hoped from it \ her N hru co ld not c ce l h s ple ur and dm ration t Gandh s acti n

LALLG H PALACE, BIKANER Frid y 16th J n ary 1948

On ur r t n t the P lace wh le wa t g t go into lun h I had an ll m t ng talk with P kkar ho st ll s r n th M h raja s Dewa He ptimisti bout th outcom f G ndhi f st h ch t h v ew s undo btedly d r cted at Pat l He dd d th r a d fin te clash b t een P tel and Gandhi when G dh r d n Delhi th e months g Gandhi d then V ll bhbh I lw ys thought you nd I \ er one I b g n to th t re t\o P tel \ as in tears r h s m sund tand ng w th Bapu

P n kkar int prets th lat onsh p thus Pat l lthough con troll g th m ch n s are th t G ndhi is t ll mast of th masses d th t he could er hope ev n f he so wished to break th Mahatm infl en G ndh on h de is ut t st ength N hru s h nd y t d es n t t t br ak P tel in th p cess but ly to bri g h m t heel

Th l d P n kka t p y tr but to G dh pol tical cume H sa d h h d j t h d h fi st meet ng th h m fter a g p of m tw ty y ar and h d u g d him t go slow i h cam p gn f co t t t l de l pm nt w th n the States G dl pr test d Yo ar k g me to cryst ll r ct n I had no ans r t th s d P kkar It as true G dh s h b t he add d s t speak the l gu g of h s a dence Th t w s th t h ca h s Prayer Meeti gs wer d cept in th ir impl city In priv t n t n h w s e t m ly cute He l t ed th t G ndh s b cked by what he called a r ma kabl int ll g nce system Perso l lett rs om po ng n to h m from all p rt f I d r p rt g o the state of the t

We heard th ft th t th Cab t de ded t tra sfe th fifty fi e crores to Pak stan as a g t r of g d ll Aft r the film h w t ght Mountbatten sa d th s wa the best new n three m ths B t P kk xp d concern to m ab t P t l po s ble react on to the dec s on

M untb tt pent v ry u f l d h lf h s n co sat on th Pan kkar th s *aftern on Th s I bel e e i the first* full l gth meeting they ha e had for s me t me The mo I see f Pan kka the m e mp es ed I m by h i t ll ctual pow r and pol t cal shrewd s He i the ra e blend of th s h l r d man f affa rs who can b ng h s pr f und knowledg of h t ry to th erv ce f c t mporary e ts He i o of

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Bapu me ning Father—a te m f e d rm nt us d t d cribe M hatm G dh by ma y of h f ll wers a well as n th Ind an Press

about half a dozen men who may well have a great influence in the shaping of Indian policy at home and abroad He has his enemies and there are some who assert that he is ambitious and untrustworthy but I suspect that he suffers from the jealousy of those who resent being confronted with a superior intellect It is the occupational risk of very clever men to be regarded as dangerous by their less gifted brethren

Panikkar tells me that his advice was that Mountbatten should give top priority to the wider problem of Indo British relations rather than to the specific Dominion Status issue He stressed that Nehru was now more firmly persuaded of the need for Indo-British understanding He hoped that Mountbatten would not be leaving until the broad principles had been settled Mountbatten has suggested that Panikkar should accompany Nehru on his proposed visit to London in February and should remain as a constitutional adviser to the Central Government rather than leave for China * His instinct however is to leave India for a couple of years and not get too closely caught up in the political imbroglio

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Saturday 17th January 1948*

We left for Delhi first thing in the morning duly impressed by this example of Princely hospitality Bikaner blends tradition with reform and is setting a good example to his fellow rulers in promoting his subjects social solidarity among themselves and their political loyalty to the new dispensation

Shortly after our return the Mountbattens called on Gandhi at Birla House He is by now very weak After he had greeted them with the words 'It takes a fast to bring you to me' they had a brief discussion on the possibilities of breaking it Gandhi said he had laid down seven conditions all affecting the basic security and civil rights of Moslems both in Delhi and India as a whole which would have to be implemented before he could be induced to call it off

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* Panikkar duly became the first Indian Ambassador to China originally to the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai Shek After its overthrow on the Chinese mainland Panikkar's general prestige was such that Nehru was able to send him as first Ambassador to the Chinese Peoples Republic where he presented his credentials to Mao Tse Tung In this position he was destined to act as a vital link between East and West both [illegible] and during the Korean crisis

MAHATMA S MARTYRDOM

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Su day 18th J ary 1948*
FOLLOWING TI E CABINET S decis o er th fifty five cro es an nter-c mmun l Pea e C mm tt e s t up und r the d recti f Prasad d M l na Azad It cted w th comme d ble n gy nd th morn g u ded n conv cing the Mah tma th t the ess y h ng of h t h d t ken pl in Delhi t nable him t break his f t h h h d l t d f r hundred and t enty one d h lf h u and h d dr wn deeply upon th f ul l ttle m n s rv t st ength

Th fast h s und btedly done mu h to r se M slem m l b t the we gns f S kh st n a d ba d of S kh carrying black b ne p ss d tsid B l Hous chanting Let Gandhi de S kh r p ese t ti e hov r d ly t k the r part on the P a e C mm tte

In a m sage h sent t h Pray M et ng this e n ng h decla d that f the pl dge w f lfill d it v ld r i w th do bl d f e h nten ish nd paper befo God to be abl t l e th full pan f l fe d ngs rv to h man ty t the la t m m nt Th t span ac rd ng to learn d opini n t least hund d a d t ty fi ye r s m ay one hundred nd thirty th ee

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Monday 19th Ja ary 1948*
Vinc t She an who n spe l t h re f a umber of Am rican pape n h f m e h story a d B b N lle the Delh orr pond t f *T m d L fe* h d l n h w th us to-day Discu ng the f t Sh ean wh cle rly e els n rig l theo es th nks G dh ga e t up—alth ugh he w ld n er consciously adm t t—b cau e f th h ng the weath r Th un d d not h e and Gandh h d b en g ng ut a d su bathing Th wo ld b God y of tell g h s r o ce to le t and b eak f t Ther has l ys b n lose rel t n h p betwee myst cs d meteo logy He s ys he told Ed Sn w bout th bef th i t d d B th greed that Gandh f t s a phe men l nt wh h g e th t l pow f r l g on Nev lle tres d h R osev lt always tri d to bring rel g n into h p l t cs

Th y were both ye w t es e f ncid nts wh h mu t s rely place Nehru m g th m t formal and delightful of th

world's great men Neville told how Nehru disposed of a man who was lying down in the road in front of Birla House and stopping all the traffic from coming or going The man described himself as the voice of Krishna After some fruitless argument Nehru picked him up by the feet and pulled him away rubbed his hands and walked off as if nothing had happened!

Sheean in the course of an interview at the Prime Minister's house was taken into the dining room by Nehru to see a Chinese painting While groping about for the light Nehru stumbled over the body of a man asleep on the floor Someone is asleep here he said and proceeded to carry on the rest of the conversation in whispers!

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Tuesday 20th January 1948*

Rejoicing over Gandhi's survival from his fasting ordeal were marred to day by a bomb incident in the garden of Birla House The bomb a home made affair went off during the first Prayer Meeting which Gandhi has attended since the ending of his fast The force of its explosion however was broken by a wall which was slightly damaged No one was hurt and there was no panic Gandhi continuing to conduct the meeting without showing any sign of awareness that anything untoward had happened Indeed Lady Mountbatten who went straight round to visit him found him wholly unperturbed He told her he thought that military manœuvres must have been taking place somewhere in the vicinity

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Monday 26th January 1948*

The injection of the United Nations into the Kashmir crisis has slowed down the tempo of the political dispute almost as effectively as the weather has blanketed the military operations The first session of the Security Council did not take place until the 15th January After full length statements of case and a series of private conferences a preliminary resolution setting up a commission was passed on the 20th It has always been Mountbatten's hope in supporting a reference to the United Nations that it would lead to the earliest possible dispatch of a commission—certainly by the end of January—to the scene of the conflict but it now seems that the Security Council are settling down to seek an agreed resolution on the general issues of principle beforehand If this proves to be the case then a big political opportunity may well have been missed and a serious psychological blunder committed

The Indian and Pakistan Heads of Proposals bring out two main points of difference in their answers to the questions what of any troops are to remain in Kashmir before the plebiscite is

held and should the existing dministrat n b chan ed? Ind \ ants th pr ent admin strat on to b tran form d int council of M ste unde Abd llah le dersh p This Council hould then con e e a Nat o al Ass mbly elect d on Prop rtion l Re p esentat n Th A mbly should then elect a n w Gov rn ment whi h sh uld hold a pl biscite u der United N t ons con t ol Ind a in ist on the omplet emoval f th t b smen and the d nial to them of P k tan b ses before being ready t on der the ithdraw l f Ind an troops

Pak tan s po t o is q te s mple H dem nd i for multa n ous a d c mplete ithdrawal of all forces a d a n utral Ad m nist t o At Lake S c s th the i is the e sier e of th t o t p es t nd cert ly for the del g tes se er l of whom unt l a few w ks go had prob bly ne r h ard of K hm as a l h h liday ort to und rst nd But unl ss I d a can stabl h m e ly f rm l e ogn t n f her leg l title and moral g v ce s pl nt ff e can t c pate an arly d s ll s onment n Delhi w th th proc s s of th ne ter t on alism

AGRA *T sday 27th Janu ry 1948*

Kingsley Mart ed to of *The New St t m d N t on* nd hamp n of the I d Leag days s paying h s fi t t to I d th g t f N hru h i a v ry old f i d of hi At th m m nt Kingsley s stayi g w th us at th C mptrolle s Hou During the l ll pro ded by the M tb tte s to of N gpur I h d the d a of tak ng him n s ght eeing tour of Ag a d the Taj M hal but th sa eas er s d th n d ne as ne rly all th G ve m nt House t an port w s t mpo r ly I d p N hru n he ng of ou d lemma t once p t ca t r d po l nd w d o off down the hot nd dusty road on ur p lgrim g to the h nes of M gh l gr atn ss

A j n y w th K ngsley n t lf an ed cat on He has t cked away in h s mem ry a wh le l br ry of gn fica t facts and expe en es to h h h n ef at a moments notice B t in sp te of many y s of h rd ed tor l ffort he r ta n a w der f l boy h ze t I suspect that we t rted out w th a certain prej d ce aga n t the T j j st for b ing as f mous s t is I had seen it ce b fo f m the a when it looked l k som m ture of itself in ga cing white on gr en

On reach g Agra ft r pa s g n th way the m ghty t mb of Akb e w re pl r bly su pr ed to find th t the T j was ff the be t n to rist tra k and that its actual env ns were l tary d u ulled by comm rcial ta t Like all the g e t M ghul mau leums it enclo ed a d l k Humayun s tomb in the Lod Garde s at Delhi th t mb itself i c mpl tely in bl unt l you pas through th o te e tra ce Th n t th first sight the whole image is t tally reveal d Crit cal j dgm nt is sus-

pended and as one walks from shade into light along the formal line of cypress trees the serene splendour of the place takes possession of the senses

For me the contrast with the aerial vision was complete from within it looms very large and the dazzling whiteness is shot through with exquisite inlay which includes words from the Koran engraved in black marble We first saw the Taj in the glow of late afternoon and then returned after dinner to see it under the full moon We both felt that the romantic haze and the blurring of outline and detail meant some loss of the æsthetic magic of the daylight vision There were no crowds of sightseers to disturb the stillness and only the lights of Agra and the bend of the River Jumna below recalled us to the world of life and movement

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Friday 30th January 1948*

Mountbatten arrived back by air from Madras early this afternoon with his two daughters Lady Mountbatten having stayed on to complete engagements They have had another very arduous tour where it seems they once more received an overwhelming welcome from vast crowds that lined the streets wherever they went At about ten to six I ran into George Nicholls who told me that there had been an attempt on Gandhi's life and that he had been hit in three places Half and hour later I heard from Pearce Mountbatten's driver that Gandhi was dead He had heard the news over the car radio and told me that His Excellency was going round to Birla House immediately

While I was standing by the car Mountbatten came out and motioned me to come with him He was very tense and spoke in short staccato sentences He said that Rajagopalachari had rung through from Calcutta impressing on him the need to take the utmost precautions about Nehru Only two days ago while in Amritsar two men had been arrested carrying grenades while he was addressing a public meeting

Mountbatten thought this was a most grave development and that Nehru was now entirely alone and politically exposed Everything depended upon his capacity to keep a grip on the situation in the next few hours It was absolutely essential that he should speak to the nation at the earliest possible moment but at the same time should give himself the chance to think out what he was going to say because the nation would inevitably take its lead from him

By the time we had reached Birla House the crowd had gathered and was peering into the windows of our car only a few recognising Mountbatten in the dark All was confusion Young men were milling around in the grounds and pressing against the french windows Inside most of the members of the

a d leading Congres men we e tand ng v th the l stles ness of gri f We m de our way to wh t I bel e e was Gandhis bed oom The e was a sm ll f ncense In de the oom v er abo t forty pe ple n l ding Neh a d P tel E ry ne w s in tears Just o tside v re numer s s ndals hich pe ple had taken off b fo e e te ing the o m

In the far orner was the body of Gandh j At fi st I thought t was mplet ly c v red in l ge bla ket but then I eal sed that his head being held up by on of ab ut doz n women who e e seat d ound h m ch nting praye s and obb g n pl int e hythm Gandhi f ce v as t peace and looked rathe pale in th b ght l ght Also th y had tak n a ay the st el mmed glasses wh h had become lmost an integral p rt of h feature The sm ll of th ncen e the sou d f the womens vo ces the f a l ttl body the leep ng face nd the lent wit nesses—thi s pe h p the most emot nally ha ged mom nt I ha e e er exper enced As I st od the I felt f ar for the fut r b w lderm nt t the act b t al o a se e f v ctory rather than d f t that the st ngth f th l ttl man id as and ideals f om the very for e of the de t n he a command ng here and now w uld p ov t tro g f r the ss ss n bull ts a d th idea they repre ent d

Afte standing f r some tim n ile t homag w mov d ut nt the main h ll As th even ng d ew on th crowds ut id m ltipl ed ne co ld ee th r f ces p e ed aga n t th wind ws and they bang d n ist ntly up n the gl ss Membe s of the Cabinet w e one room and M untb tten w nt in t talk to them

I hea d Mountb tten y ng th t t the r l st nt rv ew G ndh had s d that h d ar t h wa t b ng about f ll re oncil t n betw en N hru d Patel On hea ng th s th y dramat cally mbraced each ther He cam ut f m m nt l te say ng that h h d ucceeded n g tt g P tel to b oadca t at the same time as Nehru to n ght Th b f lt—w th j st ce—v s a mo t importa t po nt to hav ga ned H e t r ted that e erything t rned on Nehrus g pp g th tu t n immed tely

The tens n is uch th t one careles v o d nd rumou w ll spread l k a fo est fir E en on ou arr al Mountbatt n was gre t d by a scaremo g r wh t ld h m It was a Mosl m ho d d it At that m ment we st ll d d n t know the rel g n and n m of the ass but M u tbatt n appreciating that if it w a Mo l m we we e lost anyhow and th t noth g c ld then av rt the most d sa tr s ci il wa replied in a fla h Y u f ol don t y u kno t was a H nd

I learnt from V P Menon a few m nutes later that th assa s n was apparently M hratta who fi ed three t mes t po t-blank r g j st as G ndhi w s lea ing to tte d h s Pr yer Meet ng I *also spoke w th the Doctor wh was s mewh t dishe ell d nd*

who had attended Gandhi in his last moments He complained that there had been no medical stores in the house but admitted that they would have done no good Gandhi had just had time to sip a little water before losing consciousness which he never regained

There was a considerable discussion about the funeral arrangements It seems that Gandhi has left the most explicit instructions through his Secretary Pyarelal and others that his body is not to be preserved or embalmed On the contrary in accordance with Hindu practice it is to be cremated as quickly as possible Gandhi was strongly opposed to any special worship of his remains

Mountbatten had rather favoured allowing at any rate some twenty four hours for the funeral to be properly arranged but it is clear that it will have to take place to morrow and will impose a very heavy strain on the Delhi administration At Mountbatten's suggestion Nehru agreed that the whole thing should be taken over by the Defence Ministry and that all available troops in Delhi should be on duty Mountbatten has put his own Body Guard and the Government House Gurkhas at the disposal of the Area Commander

As the moments went by with people standing or sitting about in various parts of the house—some like Maulana Azad in silent contemplation others like K M Munshi acting as self appointed organisers and trying to take charge of things—the crowd outside was steadily growing in numbers and in its insistence on seeing the Mahatma's body Hundreds of eyes seemed to be peering into the house from all sides and there was some anxiety whether the french windows could much longer take the strain of the throng pressing against them

I warned Nehru of this danger of a mass invasion He looked inexpressibly sad and careworn but talked quite quietly and with amazing self discipline saying that all was arranged The body would be taken outside and placed on a table to enable the crowds to night to file past and pay their last respects As the clamour of the crowd increased he himself went out into their midst without any form of protection and spoke to them H V R Iengar his secretary told me that he is really worried about the Prime Minister's safety and Mountbatten spoke earnestly with Indira and H M Patel stressing the need for taking the utmost precautions

We left at about twenty to eight taking Maulana Azad and Devadas Gandhi back with us When Devadas remarked that it must have been a madman Mountbatten replied that if that was all to it he for one would not be worrying but that there were all too many signs of its being the outcome of a calculated conspiracy Maulana who does not allow himself to speak in English though he can do so nodded his head in

M untbatt n thought t wa great cat st ophe and only hoped and pr yed th t by Ga dh bec mi g a ma tyr it v uld make v ry ne n Ind th k ser ou ly and wher n ces ary mend the r ay

Ba k n th A D C r om I f nd K ngsl y Marti Gord n Walker who rr ed y st rday a d V P Menon V P said he was t ll too st nned t hav any re ct on b t believed that it could o ly h e go d effect n all th be t minds f Ind a Wh le e v peaking the Jam Sahib cam in told us that he had flown speci lly to Delhi to-d y in order t meet Gandh j t 6 p.m Only thi morn g I myself had b n in t uch w th Py relal a d arrang d fo Go d n W lke t see Gandh ji to morrow e en ng

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *S t day 31 t J y 1948*

Thr ugh t the ght the cr d fil d p st th body for the l st *d r ha* r show g H s sons h d u d rt k n th cere m n l wa h g Aft r br kf t th Mountbatt n —Lady Mountbatt n ha ng fl vn b k n the night—and m t f h staff repaired to B l Ho t b p s t f r th d partu of th fu l rtege o ts i m l j urney through Ne a d Old D lh t the Raj Ghat n mm n e open p e by the banks of the J mna M l ta y c nt ngent f ll thr Serv e vere mo d br kly to t k up p t on th o te nd t was lear th t b th the m l tary and c l tho t e h d d n pl nd dly in m t ng the alm st mpo s ble dmin tr t e d m nds mad upon tl em

Of o nx ety at le st they e e r l d Wh n the fir t ne s f Gandh s ass s i t on brok ther was mom nt ry f unexpr ssed dr ad th t th as a n m ght h be n a Moslem nd f ich had be n the cas th omm l c ns q e ce v uld inde d h be n per l s It s qu kly a n u d th t the s s n God v a M h att nd a m mb r f the H du M h bh The ff ct f th s n ws w ll b t ca se deep st rring of the H d consci nc

O r ch ng B l H se we were ll jamm d nto e en a den r crowd than l t n ght Th cortege o s st d f f er l car ge draped v th th Cong fla ered th fl wers a l d a n by pa ty of s l r Th G ern r G n l Body Gu d w s th c s sort M n te s d G ner l j stl d f p st n by the f n ral c teg w th th huml l st tizen a Gandh v ld h e w h d Th f ur na Co g s men ho h d be n sold s n his m ny b ttles v e e the e r fo c The b dy was b ught d wn fr m the balc ny d pl ced upon the b e

O ce ga n I v a de ply mp es d by the seren ty f h face The h d s u h on d n fl we A o nd th body sat G ndh j son and gr rdd ught s th g rl t ll we pi g nd gently st oki g h s head Patel al o at imm b le b s de the

body pale and weary and looking straight ahead of him He took no part in the strenuous efforts which both Nehru and Mountbatten were making to impose some order on the surrounding chaos and clear a way for the cortege to start upon its long slow journey

The speeches of both Nehru and Patel last night were very moving and gained in strength from their lack of preparation Apart from the personal loss the blow smites Patel with particular severity There were first of all the reports of differences between himself and Gandhi then as Home Minister in charge of internal security he was officially responsible for Gandhi's safety It is true that after the bomb incident ten days ago Gandhi specifically refused police protection, but there is clear evidence that the two attacks are part of one conspiracy and the fact remains that the police were unable to track it down before the fatal shot was fired Indeed Gandhi's last interview had been with Patel and it was in hurrying from this talk a few minutes late for his Prayer Meeting that the assassin crossed his path Patel resolved to undergo the immense physical ordeal for a man of seventy two of accompanying the body all the way to the burning ghats

At last the cortege began almost imperceptibly to move It was now nearly eleven o'clock and immense crowds had gathered all along the route Indeed they were far too great for either the police or military to hold in check Their constant pressure kept the pace of the procession down to little more than a mile an hour The slowness of the advance encouraged those spectators watching it pass by to try to accompany it which meant that in due course the hosts following along behind were almost as overwhelming as those ahead

On our return to Government House we climbed up to the dome of the Durbar Hall and looked down on the cortege now some two miles away from us on the great open Kingsway We could detect no visible movement and the crowd seemed to have settled round it like some vast swarm The commentator's voice over a portable radio we had brought up with us told us that some headway was being made Whether seeing it from the middle distance or hearing of its progress close at hand the strange irony of this scene impressed itself upon me

We were watching I suppose Gandhiji's first and last *darshan* along this Imperial avenue Now the man who more than anyone else had helped to supersede the Raj was receiving in death homage beyond the dreams of any Viceroy Gandhi dies one evening and is taken for cremation the following morning Here is no long heralded State funeral all the same the people have flocked within the hour and by the hundred thousand to have one last glimpse of him Who in the face of this overwhelming tribute can honestly assert now that Gandhi had no genuine mass following?

The Mountbatt ns th r staff nd guests includ ng most of the Gov rno s who have ar d for a onfer nce wh ch it was too late t postpo e set out f r the Raj Ghat Great care had been t ken t avo d the o te of the fun ral proc ion but i w approach d the b nks f the Jumna ur cars became swallow d up in the m lt t de all pressing t ward the cr mation ground and ur speed as d ctated by thei s

As the Gove n r G n al d hi party ome twenty of us in all made th ir w y int the g at b ren ar n it w difficult t the fi t gl ce to pp ate the full mmen ty of th cr wd f th g o nd w s too flat to g v a real ual ind cat o f the B t as we v lked t in lonely minence tow rds the small br ck platf rm nd th piled logs whe er w l oked r ho iz cl ely pack d hum nity and I becam opp essed w th m ch the sam nse of laustr phob as in B rla H u e l st night H e ll that tood b tween us and a m ss vas n f this r rved terr tory w a don of Ind n Air F rce m n holding th l ne t int rvals f three o f r ya ds who t seemed w ld b n m effect th n the f h wind ws of Birla House i h ld ng b ck dete m ned rush A a preca tion g nst th dang of ll our party be ng pu hed on t the flame M unt b tten d cided th t and the neare t s ct on of the rowd sh uld s t d n on th du ty g o nd

As th tim pas d and the t on mou ted l se disciples f the M h tm s t qu etly round the fun l pyre thread g g r l ds f mall wh't flowers therw e th e w s n sen e of cerem l p par t n seq ce Ther w *gh* for k ndl ng the fi b t t w st ll in l rg tin wh ch h d b n opened w th a t n opener holy water was in a zinc buck t

Wh n th cortege t last eached th field br nging with t y t the v st m lt tude ise nd confus n burst ll bou ds nd s w had fear d s me en hund d th us d people relent les ly c erg d up n th sacred pot E ery e wi hed to carry o t m l t act f d ot on St tesmen nd s e pe Governo a d peasant w men mingl d t th w fl wer petal er the b dy b for the l gs w re p led h gh Th p e ts re d f m the h ly b ks W th pre re f th people threat n ng to crush u g nst the py e the ceremon al rite t ok a terrify g long time t complete

When finally the fire was k ndled great cry went up f Gandh is mmort l a d the cr wd now t ok compl te posse n. Th desperate ttempts of me f us to make a small nner c don h ving d ly f led Mountbatt n g t up nd scan ning the crowds as though apprais g a mil tary s t t n, d q tly "We must g now Linked t gether in h ma chain we did o best to follow him H s d part re d d mu h t s an ugly situat f r it started an xodus just wh re and when the pressu e was most intense The cr wds q ickly picked him

out in his distinctive Naval uniform and did their best to make way As we slowly extricated ourselves the flames and smoke of the pyre billowed upwards

It would be idle to say that the mood of this vast assembly was particularly mournful It left much more the impression of a demonstration arising from the desire to witness a memorable spectacle Judging by this afternoon grief does not seem to be by any means the sole response of Hindus to a funeral and their belief in immortality would seem to be rather more robust than ours when it comes to the test of ceremonial self-expression

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Monday 2nd February 1948*

Bob Stimson called round to see me this afternoon By his accidental presence at Birla House when the fatal shots were fired he was able twenty five minutes afterwards to broadcast in the B B C s one o clock news an eye witness report which beat the entire world s Press There can surely be few precedents for such a scoop in the history of broadcasting Undoubtedly this first intimation of the event must have done much to enhance its dramatic impact on the British public Bob tells me he had no intention of going there for himself but had at the last minute accompanied Vincent Sheean who had particularly wanted to attend a Prayer Meeting Vincent Sheean on witnessing the tragedy was so deeply affected that he was unable to cable back any immediate account of it to America

Bob tells me that an American Embassy official was the unsung hero of the occasion He was the first to realise what had happened and to leap forward and grip the assassin by the arms There was great discipline among the crowd and no one ran away Everyone s first thought, he said was for the old man s safety Bob tells me he has seen the assassin the Mahratta Vinayak Godse He is by no means uneducated and edits a small provincial newspaper His attitude was completely intransigent Cut me into little pieces he said and I will still maintain I did right

Nehru has spoken with great frankness in the Assembly to day The Government, he said must bear responsibility for not en suring the safety of Gandhi s life and of thousands of other lives Bob feels that the spirit of assassination may well have been en couraged rather than exorcised He is off to see a mass memorial meeting and is wondering whether there will be any further attempts on leaders lives He described the situation as Grand Guignol in the open air

Mountbatten s meetings with the Governors of the new India have of course been completely overshadowed by Gandhi s death but it has been decided to proceed with them and the Governors have been able to strengthen the administration in its resolve to put down communal violence C R in his capacity

a Go erno of B l advocated immed ately the suppress on of all pol t cal org n t ns th commun l bject es nami g n pa t cular the Hind M ha abh nd its milit nt ing, the RSSS

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Tue day 3rd Feb uary 1948*
The volume f the o ld eaction to Gandhi de th has frankly exceeded my e pectat n F om e ery corner of th earth have ome tr'but nd appre i t n wh ch how that his nfl ence ha re h d out fa beyo d the bou da ies f I d The full m aning of h l f may not be cle t m ny but the impo t nce f ts mystery r c g sed A Kingsl y Martin who has been h re w th s for th vh l dr ma put t to me the world is not d g so well w th the t ch q s of m te ial m nd pov er poli t cs It rec gn s d that G ndh st od fo mething differe t nd in iew of h s mpha s on sp tual val es pr bably better He has mping d p n the o c c of mankind
In th wo d f the *New Y k T m s* He tro e for pe fec tion as the men st e f p e nd posse si ns th power of his ben gn ty gr st nger as his pol tical i flue ce bb d He tr ed in the mood of th N Te tament to lo e h s enem es and do g d to those who d sp tefully used him No v he be- lon s t the ag s
The *Cl r t S Mo t* es h m the s pr me n d dal st of r t mes He th s b c me mo e than a leader of Ind n t n l m He a ldwid symb l Th paper the m kes sh ewd po nt wh h may b at the ro t of m ch of th m u de sta d ng b t h s a ms and d al per nalty Hi f th th art cl cont n es th t the nd id al co ld mo e m unta through m al suas n lacked the g eat c ntr but on f w t rn thought a sen e f Law Lo s Fis he had sa d t most pe ple p l t cs me n go rnme t t Gandh t mean men B t th t g e nm nt m n l cks the me e f h s own deal nd h n e it th t the world f und n Gandh blend of tly sh ft ng p l t an with g lel s unsh k ble saint He p oved the moral f rce f a s gl m
Attlee ha b o d a t to th Trum n h s poken of a g eat int rnat n l t agedy the hol d Smuts calls him Pri e amo g fo hi d ser be him as one of the g eat c d by t du c m m ty and a lead r wh r uni nfid nce and r spect
Yet u d of the Hind th t h been taken the m mor l have bee w th

three full page portraits of the Mahatma leaves its leader page completely blank save for this one paragraph in bold type
Gandhiji has been killed by his own people for whose redemption he lived This second crucifixion in the history of the world has been enacted on a Friday—the same day Jesus was done to death one thousand nine hundred and fifteen years ago Father forgive us

CHAPTER TWENTY THREE

CONFLICTS CONTINUED

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Wednesday 4th February 1948*

I HAD AN interesting talk this evening with Nye * who wanted to see me on some publicity problems He said he was very impressed with Patel who was a real leader in the military sense Once decisions had been taken there were no vain regrets and the objective was wholeheartedly pursued He also had that second great gift of leadership the power of delegation V P had been given the job of organising the States Patel was hardly aware of the details In Nye s view this was the sign of a big man

He spoke of Communist progress in Madras They were cashing in on local divisions inside the Congress There was a big feud going on between Brahmins and non Brahmins and the Prime Minister a non Brahmin was currently taking it out of the Brahmins The Communists too were exploiting the failure of the monsoon by urging the suspension of harvesting operations in order to secure new relations between landlord and tenant The Communists contained a great many young men with genuine idealism and sense of mission Their fundamental mistake both here and elsewhere in the world he feels lies in their contempt for and breaking of the law If they operated more within the framework of legality they would indeed be formidable

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday 5th February 1948*

I have been talking to Norbert Bogdan Vice President of Schroeders Banking Group of New York who is making a detailed survey of financial prospects and economic trends both in

* Sir Archibald Nye Governor of Madras and after Mountbatten s departure United Kingdom High [illegible] New Delhi

India and Pakistan. He is an experienced traveller and I should say a shrewd analyst making his first visit to India. For all the tragic convulsions following on Independence he is deeply impressed with the achievements and potentialities of the two new States.

He is just back from Karachi and had an interview with Jinnah yesterday. He found him in a far more accommodating mood than he had been led to expect. Jinnah was clearly disturbed about the implications of the Kashmir situation and spoke of Gandhi in much more generous terms than he saw fit to use in his message acknowledging to Bogdan how great was the loss for the Moslems. Jinnah added that he was reputed to have said that certain men in responsible position in India were plotting the economic and political destruction of Pakistan, but he was ready to give them the benefit of the doubt. The real trouble was with the extremist groups, and he had been favourably impressed by the Indian Government's firm handling of these following on Gandhi's assassination.

There is one other man who seems to have found the events of the last few days too great for him, and that is the Socialist leader Jai Prakash Narain. The Congress is now an elderly Party which has won its principal victory and thus a democratic constitutional Socialist movement has the chance to build up a powerful following for itself in the next five years. Gandhi's death left the Socialist with only two profitable choices—open opposition to the Congress or reconciliation with it and its capture from within. Narain gave a Press conference which did neither of these things. He urged the need for unity while at the same time denouncing Patel, thus rendering any *rapprochement* with Nehru almost impossible.

Kingsley Martin tells me he had a long talk with him yesterday which he found rather disappointing. Although he was still emotionally and mentally numbed by Gandhi's death, there was—Kingsley said—a certain lack of firmness in his pursuit of power which is the failing of so many social democrats of goodwill. He also detected a disquieting indifference to the interests of his followers or to the tactical question whether or not his aims should be to join the Government.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Saturday, 14th February, 1948*

Against the background of mourning for the Mahatma we celebrated another day of national Independence. This time it was in honour of Ceylon's assumption of full Dominion Status. The violence and civil disorder disfiguring many of the manifestations of rising Asian nationalism have been noticeably absent from Ceylon. The whole operation has been an accurate reflection of the people's sunny and happy-go-lucky temperament. Liberty

has come smoothly because life for all its grinding poverty comes easily To-day the Ceylon flag with its golden lion was unfurled on the flagstaff by Mr de Silva their Special Representative in Delhi and got stuck on the way up It would surely have remained permanently at half mast but for the obvious concern of the Diplomatic Corps some of whom were shaping to put the flag on top of the mast themselves This encouraged the cheerful Mr de Silva to make one final and successful tug at the rope

Both Mountbatten and Nehru spoke—Nehru in the most informal and paternal mood calling the island by its Indian name of Lanka and stressing the deep ties of religion history and culture After the flag hoisting and the speeches there was tea—Ceylon tea Nehru gave clear signs this afternoon that he is beginning to recover from the stunning impact of Gandhi s death and the pall of national mourning which has lain heavily upon him He came up to us and after we had made some remark about the excellent quality of the tea we were drinking he waxed eloquent on the æsthetics of tea making commending the artistry of the Chinese who he said were reputed to infuse their tea with dew collected at dawn from the lotus leaf

The subject of tea recalls a revealing comment made to us by Oleg Orestov the other day He represents the Tass Agency here and is due to return shortly to the Soviet Union He has for some time been the Honorary Secretary of the Foreign Correspondents Association continuing to live with his family in the poorer part of Old Delhi throughout the troubles During lunch with us he discussed the transfer of power quite frankly In an appreciation of the persistent strength of British influence he cited in all seriousness and some dismay the Indian attitude to his tea drinking habits 'How do you like your tea?' they would ask By itself he would reply at which the Indian would invariably exclaim But that is not the correct way to drink it The British drink it with milk and sugar Nearly all influential Indians with the attainment of Independence show themselves in his view to be quite unconsciously the exponents of the British way of life This he implied was the ultimate victory of the imperial system —to ensure the continuity of your own thought processes and behaviour patterns among an alien people to whom you have voluntarily liquidated formal power

Narain among others has had his answer Nehru broadcasting to night over All India Radio declares himself distressed beyond measure by whisperings about differences between Patel and himself Of course he said there have been for many years past differences between us temperamental and other in regard to many problems but India at least should know that these differences have been overshadowed by the fundamental agreements about the most important aspects of our public life and that we have co-operated together for a quarter of a

r mor m gr at undertaking Is t l kely th t at th cr s s m u nat n l d t ny the f t s should be petty mind d d thi k of nything b t th nat nal g d?

So an e d s p t t speculat o and th l e d rect g n to tho ho had doubted whether the two bi men f th G e n ment w re b g no gh to hold to th On th r sol da ity t this time the fut re of the ent re r gime depend

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *T e day 17tl F b uary 1948*

At o r Staff M t g t day M untbatten rev w d the di quet g Kashm r s tuat on The ef re e of the dispute to the Unit d Nat on h t least off et th mm d te risk of war but ne *d nger s r ep ng up th l ty f wh h t i e te fo us here* n Delhi than for the G e m nt n L d n or the delegates at Lake S cc s to d ce n Var ou susp ons are se p ng to the mind of th I d n G ernm nt and the pol tically consciou p bl wh h tak n tog th could ll de lop nto a m jor fro tal att k n I do Br t h g od ll

In the fi st pl the e b ldermc t t the delay of the United Nat on c pti g I d s ba c omplaint th t an act f aggres n h s t ke pl c in Ka hm r Th regard d h r as no m r f rm l ty but s b s p t f g e an e inv l ng a th eat to pe ce wh h the U t d Nat n v spec ally cre t d to r d ss H n g ow th p cion that the Un ted N t on be ng m d th f m fo th p m ti n f nt rn tional pov r pol t cs As e de ce f th s the publ h d att t d of the Amer can nd B t h d l gat s W e Austin d N l B k r cit d B th r w ldly a c s d of b ng unasham dly pr P k tan f r ety f ned fying ea o

As a t ral react on fr m th d s llu onme t wh h r g n u nely and nat n lly felt th b l f s also sp d ng that Ind h s most to hope wheth r n term f med ati n r en of the et f m Sov et Rus a nd h s tell te S m f th s t oubl his spru g from th fa lur f th Ind n d legat on to make t ma k A ek ag N hr o der d its call for o ultat n d t i to be h ped r onstitut on

On th P blic Rel t ns td I d f red e en so se than I had fea d he ld Even the Ind an P e s obl ged t p int larg d g t ble h ks f Ayyengar spe hes three or fo r days ft they h d been del e ed Th pers nal ty f Sh ikh Abd ll h a l th p ocedure of Lake S ces uld not be reconciled d the Ind an a suffe ed a co dingly Mo e ve th Pak stan delegat was the F gn M n ter Zafrull h Khan an pe enced and popula practit ne in Un ted N ti d lectic who was a ua e and m oth the I d n delegates w re awkward and angular

Mountbatten is worried because he feels that Attlee and Noel Baker do not seem to be showing themselves sufficiently alive to the psychological influences of this dispute and that their attempt to deal out even handed justice is producing heavy handed diplomacy The crux of the problem as seen in London is India s unwillingness to recognise that a plebiscite carried out under the auspices of Abdullah and with the sole support of Indian troops even with Security Council backing would not be regarded as fulfilling the condition of its fair conduct In Mountbatten s opinion the United Kingdom delegate could with advantage take a less unfriendly line towards India by supporting the view that the first step should be for Pakistan to stop helping the raiders The question of superintending the plebiscite without interfering with the legally constituted Government deserved he felt more sympathetic discussion and treatment than it has yet received

In an appraisal of Attlee this morning Mountbatten stressed first his absolute intellectual honesty—perhaps his greate t source *of strength—secondly his status as a liberator and finally his* profound personal affection for and interest in India These were assets which must not be squandered Mountbatten finds his present constitutional position of friendly adviser irksome at times He can no longer step in between London and Delhi and his only link now is with the King who strictly separates his various sovereignties

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Sunday 22nd February 1948*

Walter Monckton has just arrived here following a week s stay in Hyderabad We were aware that he was due to see the Nizam during the middle of February and Mountbatten had accordingly written off to His Exalted Highness urging that he should seize the opportunity of Monckton s visit to come to a general settlement with India

Rather to Mountbatten s surprise the Nizam at once agreed with him I say surprise because some of the Nizam s privately expressed opinions of Mountbatten recently have been far from flattering We are aware that he has been describing him as no friend of Hyderabad as anyhow without power and has been asserting that it was immaterial whether Mountbatten helped in future negotiations or not But now he replies expressing the hope that Mountbatten as a member of the Royal Family of England will give your invaluable help and support to Hyderabad *in* the long term agreement which may be in keeping with the high position Hyderabad occupies in the eyes of the world It is interesting to note that he always invokes Mountbatten s Royal connection as if it endowed him with some special virtue and status in negotiating with Hyderabad

For a month after the signing of the Standstill was almost complete quite but shortly after the New

was an incident to show that the calm was deceptive. A trivial but none the less significant dispute arose over the allotment of accommodation in Hyderabad for K. M. Munshi, India's newly appointed Agent General. The house already earmarked for him was not ready. So it was suggested that he should go in to one of the vacant Residencies for the intervening eleven days. The Nizam at once protested against the proposal, seeing in it a sinister plot to re-instate Paramountcy. The Indian reply was simply that if Munshi was not to be allowed proper and adequate accommodation, neither he nor any other Agent General would be sent at all. At this stage Mountbatten's good offices were invoked, and as a result of a brisk exchange of letters and telegrams the Nizam was induced to give way, and Munshi duly left on the 5th January to take up his post.

By the end of the month relations between Hyderabad and India had declined to the point where it could be said that the whole Standstill Agreement was liable to be denounced by both sides. There was a dangerous increase in the number of border incidents. The policy of pinpricks was leading inevitably to widespread irritation. The Hyderabad Government began by imposing some restrictions on the export of metals, and followed this up by withdrawing recognition of Indian Dominion currency in all normal transactions within the State.

More provocative than either of these moves was a loan of twenty crores of rupees (or fifteen million pounds) as understood to have been made available by Hyderabad to Pakistan. The circumstances of this deal were obscure and disquieting. Mountbatten has been very carefully into the matter, and from the evidence at his disposal it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it was arranged by Moin Nawaz Jung, the present Minister for External Affairs and Finance, while he was actually a member of the delegation negotiating the Standstill Agreement. This provocative move was made just when the Indian Government was considering withholding the fifty-five crores of assets from Pakistan. On the Hyderabad side came detailed complaints of economic blockade.

On the day of Gandhi's cremation Mountbatten had his first meeting with the new Ittehad-sponsored Prime Minister of Hyderabad, Mir Laik Ali, and advised him frankly that his Government should mend their ways and generally try to work in a spirit of friendship with India. Mountbatten doubts, however, whether he made any deep impression. Behind a suave outward manner he detected in Mir Laik Ali that blend of fanaticism and cunning which we have been led to regard as the dominant characteristics of the Ittehad and its leaders. Much now depends on the ability of Monckton to persuade the Nizam and his Government to adopt more constructive policies and on Mountbatten to prevent Patel and the Indian Government

losing their patience before the resources of negotiation have been fully worked out

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Monday 23rd February 1948*
Walter Monckton and V P were both guests at one of Mount batten s informal Staff Meetings this morning We burst the bounds of our agenda and indulged in reminiscence about Kash mir s accession and speculation about Commonwealth citizenship On Kashmir Monckton said that frankly the issues were not understood outside the sub continent V P Stressed that Nishtar s* agreement to the accession policy on behalf of the future Pakistan Government was in fact secured before the trans fer of power and that Pakistan Ministers had subsequently ad mitted that the Junagadh accession was essentially a violation of the agreement When Kak† came to Delhi in July he saw Patel who told him that he did not want the accession of Kashmir against the people s will Through Mountbatten s good offices he also saw Jinnah at this time

Discussing problems of Commonwealth status Monckton drew attention to the importance of the Nationality Bill in Britain which was it seems in some measure the outcome of a letter he had written to Cripps He explained that the position now is that one can be a subject of the King without owing allegiance in the citizenship sense On the general issue of India and the Com monwealth Mountbatten is preparing an *aide memoire* which he wants to have ready in time for Gordon Walker to see and to study After his stay at Government House at the end of January Gordon Walker went down to Ceylon He is now back in Delhi at a crucial moment in the Kashmir dispute With the stalemate on the fighting front and a hiatus at Lake Success the physical opportunity arises for renewing informal and indirect diplomacy

My memory of Gordon Walker goes back to my undergradu ate days at Christ Church when as a young History don there he guided me through the intricacies of seventeenth century Europe He seems to me to have all the qualifications for high office the lucidity of the scholar s mind a strong but attractive personality and administrative grip He is one of the younger Labour intellectuals treading the Attleean way of Fabian mode ration

* Sardar Rab Nishtar Pakistan Cabinet Minister whose port folios included the Pakistan Ministry of States He was a Moslem League representative along with Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan at the decisive meetings with Lord Mountbatten on the 2nd and 3rd June 1947

† Pandit Kak the last Prime Minister under the old order in Kashmir who had been responsible for the arrest of Nehru on his visit to Kashmir in 1946

H sees the central ssue b tween the t v Domin ons n the K hm r d sput as b ng n v the v thd al of t oops and h feel it e sie to e i age the po s bil ty of comp m e both on the plebi ite and the Interim G ernment H has I th k been able to e for h mself that M untbatten s not exaggerat i g th b d impre io c used h r by th Brit sh attitude t the Un ted N tio s

In th c u of a l ng talk w th S r Girja Shankar Bajpa Nehru s a c mpl shed S retary f r External Aff rs he has I unde sta d stre sed q te firmly that friendship w th Russ a obta nable o ly at th p ic of s bserv ence nd that Russ n any cas h s no b c int rest n I d I al o he r incid nt lly that Bajpai has take p the que t on f Kore w th the Am r an Ambass d r Grady W th th d m rcation f S v t and Amer can nflue e lo g the 38th P rallel the s t t on between N th nd S th Kore s ve y m la to th t b twee East a d West G rmany B jp arg m nt s it United States t ops not le g K r hy sh ld Ind n t oops b call d upon t l a e K shmir?

At th s m rning s me t ng I u ged that G rdon W lker should b pre s d to tay n nt l 9th Feb u ry th d te f a pos ble i t fr m L aqu t I f l str ngly th t Br t h M n sters pr s nce du ing the n xt d cu ns b t e Li q t a d N hru ld rve n d c m nt to mod r t n and comp om N ffect m d ti g nfl e ce h been av lable n the r ght pl ce t th r ght t me

Mountbatt call d for a p st m tem from me on the f ilu e of th I d a ca t bl h t lf th wo ld op n n at th Un t d N t ns I pl ed that q t ap rt f om it tu l mer ts t h d be ab m n bly p es nt d a d th t nea ly e ery canon of P bl c R lat o s pr c d e h d the been v ol ted r neg lect d M e e I f lt th t t e o gh tte t n h d b e p d t an w r ng P k t s ca e aga st I d in particul r the lle g t n f C gress c spr cy to sec e th Maharaj b m s n thro gh Abd ll h ju t to g or such ch rg s was not wi

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *W dn day 25th Feb uary 1948*

M ntb tten *d m m* on I d nd the C mmonwealth wh ch sets o t t make cert in tentat e suggest ons a to how the structure f the Commonwe lth o ld perhap be alt red part cula ly n nom clat to allow As n countr e t r m n mo e easily associ ted th t is n w r ady for G rd n Walke Although th re h s been a l t of staff d scus on a d th nki g on th s bject t i ery much Mountbatten s o n d cume t cha cteri t cally bold d ect nd rigin l It i al o well tim d for th Go ernment f Ind due to release th d aft f the ne Indian Const tuti n to the P e s tomorr w After c rcula

tion of the draft to Members of the Constituent Assembly whose comments are required within a month a revised draft will then be formally submitted to the Constituent Assembly for final approval

Mountbatten says frankly that although individual Indian leaders are alive to the advantages of the continued Commonwealth connection their political position has been weakened and the attitude of the Government adversely affected by the policy adopted towards Kashmir by the British delegation at the Security Council This he puts forward as a political fact and not as something over which he is trying to moralise He said he would like to see the word Republic expunged from the Indian Constitution in favour of Commonwealth but without promising to be successful in achieving this amendment he adds I think there can be no doubt that there is room for a Republic within the Commonwealth

He points out that the word Dominion is not in any case an easy one for India to swallow after the Congress resolution in favour of a Republic It still has a debased meaning here whether of domination or of status short of full freedom He also urges that the term Commonwealth citizen should be considered as a desirable alternative to British subject although both terms could be used on occasion with advantage His final point of substance is that in any arrangement made about the future structure of the Commonwealth it would be best if possible to leave the question of the formal link with the Crown unstated

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday 26th February 1948*

Vernon has asked me to comment on a draft memorandum he is preparing giving a brief survey of the Accession policy to date with particular reference to Junagadh and Kashmir After covering some points of detail I have made the following brief distinction between these two events Quite apart from the test of majority populations the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was in violation of the principle of geographical compulsion to which the Pakistan leaders had themselves subscribed The accession of Kashmir was not Moreover from the strategic and economic points of view while Pakistan had no interest in Junagadh India had considerable interest in Kashmir There were two further special factors involved in the case of Kashmir but absent from that of Junagadh—the use of force by tribal invasion to overthrow the Maharaja s regime before accession and the presence (also before accession) of an important inter-communal political organisation in the State

Taking into account all these other factors the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was wholly frivolous while that of Kashmir to India was definitely arguable It was just because of all the special circumstances attaching to both accessions that

strain and inexperience it is easier to give instructions than to ensure that they will be carried out Patel however (perhaps from fear of implying the wider admission) was not even prepared to state in a communique that the goods due to Hyderabad which it was claimed were held up should be released Monckton is extremely upset and Mountbatten on his return from a dinner party has spoken to him over the telephone promising to follow the matter up personally to morrow

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Friday 5th March 1948*
Monckton left for Hyderabad early this morning and Mountbatten pursued his inquiries about the communique in his absence He talked with Nehru who was very reasonable and sympathetic but anxious that the question should be settled with Patel as the Minister responsible for handling the Hyderabad question Mountbatten was due to see him this afternoon but during lunch Patel had a heart attack and nearly died He is completely laid up and has been forbidden by his doctor to do any work whatever for an unspecified period which may well cover the remainder of our term here

I think he overtaxed his strength at the time of Gandhi s death by his determination to ride on the funeral carriage throughout the six hour journey When I saw him at the Raj Ghat he looked drawn and ill and seemed as if in a trance The whole tragedy has hit him heavily and he has undoubtedly carried more than his fair share of the burden of criticism as Home Minister for the failure to see that Gandhi was properly protected His illness now is a serious blow for the Government at a critical time in its affairs at home and abroad and it serves to underline how dependent the regime is upon its two key men

In the immediate context of Hyderabad and the communique there is no one to be found who will assume responsibility for reversing his last decision So Mountbatten has had to write off to Monckton that no Press statement should be issued for the present

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Saturday 6th March 1948*
Mountbatten has seen K M Munshi India s Agent General in Hyderabad who is active purposeful and I would guess ambitious He is moving up in the Congress hierarchy although lacking the particular Congress badge of honour prison service in resistance to the Raj This not unnaturally only enhances the vigour of his nationalism to day

In his memorial broadcast on the Mahatma he presented himself as the student of *ahimsa* or non violence who was ready to grapple with Gandhi on the failure of civil disobedience in 1942 because it did not stand the scriptural test of *ahimsa* as

ev k d vrath in the enemy and not love From v h t he h d to s y to M untbatt n t day it i clear that he s not plac ng ex ce s r li nc n *ah ms* for dcal ng th Hyderabad If the act t e of the Razakars a e not qui kly r strained he ad ocates sending i the Ind an pol ce to d so v h ch by h s own legal nterp et t n h c ns de s would come within the te m f the St ndst ll Ag e m nt He already c nvin ed th t the Razaka s cannot and will not b re tr n d by th p esent r gime

M u tb tt n poke firmly of India need to adopt ethical and correct b ha i u t wa ds Hyde bad and t ct n s ch a way s uld be def nded b fo the b of v orld p nion In the present t te f g ti tions Munshi s prop sal for police ction a b l t ly wrong M r Laik Al must be g v n a f r chance t d l th the Razak rs t impl m nt th Sta dst ll Ag ee me t nd ntr d ce a mea ur of respon ble go ernm nt

Mountb tten told me ft rw rd th t v h le he h s no d ubt about M n h s dr e and abil tv h i fa f om h ppv heth r h s temperam nt r polit c l outlook fit him f r th s particul rly del cat stag i the handl ng of th N zam wh h calls for un usu l d pl m t c pat e e d n mmu al obj ct v ty

M n kt h s ow l ft Hyderabad f r L nd n a d w ar fraid m y well b ready t thr w n his ha d from the b l f that further negot ti ns n th pattern of th s w eks perf rmance ar a wast of h tim and w thout M n kt n the m rgin f Mountbatten s d plomat c i ti t v w ll be further narrowed down

CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR

BURMA REVISITED

GOVERNMENT HOUSE CALCUTTA *Mo day 8tl March 1948*

WE ARE OFF on the grand tour nine d ys n all to Calcutta Ori sa R ng on and A s m The Mountb tte s schedule is fe rsome even by their h gh pow ed standards and s s t out in f ur slim bo kl ts produced i four d ff rent colo rs by the Military Secr tary s indefat gable staff Travelling a l ght as possible the p rty including servants st ll compri e v r f fty pers ns and is n small exercis in cerem ni l logist cs I shall be taying on in C lcutta d ring the visits to As m and Ori sa, h ch will enable m to me t the Calcutta ed tors We l ft Palam at 8 45 a m re ch ng Dum Dum a rfield at n o clock where the venerable C. R as Governor of West Bengal, come to meet us

After the speeches were over and most of the guests had left C. R. came to my table and spoke about nearly everything with the devastating frankness of the really wise man He said he was deeply worried about Kashmir The country s resources were being squandered It was like trying to mend a broken tea-cup at this party and forgetting all about the guests He feared that Mountbatten might not be giving enough unpalatable advice Panditji he said is capable of hearing profoundly unpleasant things I replied that Mountbatten with only an advisory role left to him did not want to reach the stage where he could only irritate but not influence

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA *Tuesday 9th March 1948*
The Mountbattens after a full morning programme—Lady Mountbatten s first engagement being at 7 30 a.m.—lunched with the Bengal Press Advisory Committee at the Calcutta Club The President of the Committee Tushar Kanti Ghosh who is also editor of the well known Calcutta daily *Amrita Bazar Patrika* gave a short but highly polished chairman s introduction which was well above the average in expression and content for such occasions Mountbatten took trouble over his reply which he delivered with hardly a glance at his notes It was an opportunity well taken to establish cordial relations with a very powerful section of the Indian Press upon whom much depends for the creation of communal confidence in the partition of Bengal

In addition to providing such important pro-Congress papers as the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* Calcutta is the main headquarters of *The Statesman* Ian Stephens has invited me to lunch with the editorial staff and to go over the office As Mountbatten pointed out in his speech it was from *The Statesman s* office that with Stephens generous co operation two newspapers were simultaneously produced—*The Statesman* itself and *SEAC* under Frank Owen s dynamic editorship which for nearly three years was one of Mountbatten s major morale raising contributions to the Burma campaign and post war activities

During the brief intervals between engagements I have among other things been discussing with Mountbatten a further outburst by Nehru on the Foreign Press It is disquieting and may well jeopardise the good will agreement achieved under Mountbatten s chairmanship in November

Mountbatten tells me he had a most illuminating talk to-day with C R who had given his candid opinion that if Mountbatten had not transferred power when he did there might well have been no power to transfer It might in fact have been impossible to produce any Plan at all and then the British would have been left with the whole burden and odium whether they stayed on or moved out

RANGOON-CALCUTTA *S t d y 13tl M cl 194*

I just ma ged to g t to th Un te l Servic Club n t m fo the nnu l d n r f th M n ng Ge l g cal nd M t llurg cal I t te of I d and s t a y hard ch r th o gh v l ngtby pro d g Th as o mem ble mom t how e er p o d d by n mpromptu t bute t Mountb tten f C R A ther ppar tly Pr s epre tat e p eser t tch h d I hu dly oted them do n the b ck my m d

H b g n by y ng that h d d n t h t mph e M batten rv ce to I d t h ch ampl test m ny had al d b g n b t t t r ther h ces to B t n Ch rch m ght f l th t wh t H st g d Cl e h d won M tbatte h d th w y B t th t t e ly in uperfi l sens Th deeper r l ty w th t f r the ll d sp c b ttern a ll ll that p led d g th y Mountb tt n ha c eeded n b t t t g unqual fi d g d ll betwe n Ind a n B t H t L rd M tb tt n th n d greate rv c t B ta th H tmg nd Cl F th th g eat s rv ce f ll In t m t c m t ll n t b Emp res tha t It g d ll th t t The f I say th t h h d m f B t th n ny ne el

The exampl f b ty t by M tbatten who pok fo l ttl m th thr m t d by C R h mself w n t f t t ly f ll w d by all th th pe k The We Beng l M n t f C mme ce attl d th o h t ghtly packe b ndl f not s f ly th q ters f n hour Ther em d hy h should e er end u t l s ddenly lm n the m ddl f t ce h m d *d m t c pa d a* ced I h e g od ne vs f r yo I have fim hed —at nc s tt ng do n to the armest appl e of th e g

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, C LCUTTA *S d y 14tl M cl 194*

I m de ply mp es d by C R He has imm e mora uthor ty wh ch t d w th t y tw rd gest re Ther s n r ng f th e r h ughtness of m er H ha th true tr gth of th humbl h t He s I s ppo e o f th ld t f G ndh s campa gning d c ple a d th re i ls f m ly link, f G dh n De d s m d to a d ght of C R Only a man of C R.s pow rful cha act r a d de ons ction uld h d d t es t G ndh s w ll n 1942 b d cat ng th acc pt f th Cripps Pl d en p om t n h wn part t on formul t th t m ment of infl ted expecta t on He ret r d f r e t th w ld rne yet n er wh ll lo t h s i fl nce

It was G ndh wh pe f rmed th m cl of C lcutt l s September b t it i C R. wh Go ernor h s consol d te

the communal good will which Gandhi engendered The minorities here have looked on him for fairness and friendship and he has not failed them To place a Madrassi Liberal to preside over Bengal s fanatical and factious politics was a calculated risk His popularity to day is good to see and the communal quiet in this seething over populated hunger ridden and revolutionary city is in no small measure a reflection of his benign authority

I went in to see him this morning and said that as far as I could tell I alone had taken any record of his tribute to Mountbatten at last night s dinner I told him I would like to release the text of what he had said to the Press He agreed adding in characteristic fashion that he hoped particularly that I think it

DEFINITION AND DETECTION

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *F day 19th Ma h 1948*
ONCE MORE WE re b k in harne n Delh To d y the has be th first m t g between L q at nd N hru f r two m ths M tb tten has h d me d fficulty in br g ng them tog th u d r the æg f the Jo nt D f nce Council They hav d c ded that thi h ld be its l t form l s ssion It was in a y ca d to close dow n the 1st Ap l but Mo ntb tten h d n m nd to t n t n its e i ting form (nder h s ha r m h p u t l he left and th n success ly und r the Prime M ster of th D m n n n h ch t met) for furth r y r w th v w to th id n g f ts function due cours to c fi l d econom q est commun cat ns d e ternal ff Alth gh th s co ept d d n t comm d itself t e ther s d th tw P m M t rs recogn d the val of the J nt D f nc C l p t t d cove f r regul r pe s l cont ct and Mo tbatten h d no d fficulty n g tt ng th m t g e th t they should cont nue to m t at pproxim tely m nthly int rv l t d uss m tt f c mmon inte t nd c ncern

Not the l st rem kable feature of the past s x months of b tt nes nd fru trat on ha be the l fe l ne of sanity thrown out and gr ped by b th Nehru and Liaqu t O e lways f el that f matters ould be left t th two d the pressures a d str to h ch they re both subjected removed a firm settl ment of all o tst d ng differences would s on be s gned e l d nd del vered

D g th s part cul r d cuss on wh l the was am cable agre me t n numbe of c ndary problems n me tion wh tever wa mad f K shm r Th w n t f r lack of b ck gro d devel pment Th Ch ne e delegat Dr T ang—th present h rm n f the S cu ity C l—h n his wn n tiat e put forv d p pos ls wh ch are t l t b cally s t s f ctory t Ind B t f rt n t ly D T ng ha n t wa t d t g n wid sponso h p the Security Co l f r h s pla W th th esult th t t i f m l kely to pro oke b tterne s and narrow the al eady lender m rg n f neg t at n d good w ll. Someth ng s seri ly wrong w th the pr dures f Lake Success Oh for retu n to s m n ter secret d pl macy t co nt ract the effect f these publ c d sag eements publ cly arrived at !

The new Indian delegation has I am glad to say been reinforced by B L Sharma who is to cover the sadly neglected Public Relations side of their efforts He was only asked at the last minute and hardly had time to pack his bag I managed however to send him a number of personal introductions and am confident that he will do well Sheikh Abdullah has not rejoined the party His particular brand of self assertive oratory bludgeoned the United Nations delegates and the American public without persuading them He generated more heat than light

Perhaps the most disquieting though far from unexpected development in the propaganda campaign over Kashmir at the United Nations has been the attempt by Zaffrullah Khan to offset India s complaint by widening the area of grievance on Pakistan s behalf and in the process to indulge in what the Americans call character assassination He has now introduced Mountbatten s name at a moment when it is impossible on constitutional ground for Mountbatten himself to make a public reply

We have had full staff discussions of the problem and Mountbatten has wisely decided to ensure that his answer to the allegations together with the relevant facts should be placed on the records of the Joint Defence Council before it is disbanded so that it should be brought to the notice of both the Pakistan and Indian Governments and that the British Government should be fully briefed in so far as the attacks on himself as Viceroy would almost certainly implicate them as well

Zaffrullah s two main charges were that as Viceroy Mountbatten knew of a Sikh plan from the beginning of July and that knowing it he failed to take effective action in the form of arresting the leaders and crushing the trouble makers despite previous assurances that he would

Mountbatten s memorandum makes it clear that while no one in the higher spheres of Government was under any misapprehension about the scale of the Sikh problem and the urgency of solving it neither he nor anyone else was aware of any specific Sikh master plan There was indeed no hint of such a plan prior to the meeting with the British Intelligence officer on the 5th August nor did the meeting itself provide conclusive proof of the plan s scale or operational significance * Mountbatten takes his stand on a letter of admirable lucidity dated 9th August from Jenkins which forwarded the unanimous view of all three Punjab Governors—Jenkins himself and the two successor Governors designate—that nothing more should be done

* See p 128 for reference to Mountbatten s acceptance [of] the risk of driving in state with Jinnah on 14th August foll[owing] the threat of an attempt on Jinnah s life during this State

bef re actu l tr nsfer of po er th n to m ke pl s for the Sikh leaders ar est which c ld b mplem ted q kly n either sid f th bound ry requ d
It is t t g to ote f m th o that Mud the Gov ern -el ct of th West Punj b d as s h th pr pal poke m n f r P k tans int st ged th t unl th West Punj b could b qu te ce ta n f the ult m t tt tude of th Ea t Pu j b n th m tter th c nfi m nt of the S kh le d not on cr mi nal charges b t nde J nk n m rge y p m ght b mo t emb ing It ot l M d dded where the l d rs ld be confin d w th ut caus g t ble—Jenki co ld hardly end th m t h t w uld n a f day be a pa t of P k t n on th ther h d if they left n th East P njab they ould be a t c f g tat
A f rther P k tan h ge h bee b ught nto the open ith th all gat n that th B und ry C mm on award s ch g d t th d ad ant ge f P k tan e lt of impope pr e f m V oy H u j t b f p bl cat n Her th d l tt r d ted 8th A g t se t by Abell t J k s stat g th t th nt t n f r th Bound y Comms n Aw d t b p se t d the 11th d t n g n o tln f th g d Aw d wh h sh w d th *I I* (b d tr cts) f F z p r d Z g g to P k t n
Ab ll n f t h t tly p n l f ecat t ly R d lff s t ry h ch h se t t Je k wh metim bef h d a k d that f y rt f d ce i f m t n ld be g h m t h uld b pr d d a t bl h m t d s po pol ce d t ps t th best d tage Th forec t pro ed lt mat ly to be w ng t th t nt of t *t l sl* a d tw d y The f ct m les t t th n th t
Th wh le b le p opo t s of se rend d pl us ble by pres t g th b ld d nc f Ab ll s l tt but f th e va y reas f J nk t h been c et e ab t ts te ts at th t me w ld h h e be o azy to le t f r h cce s t Lah r O deed if M d had th ught th t h s B t sh c lleagu h d been pl y g d h ble g me it oncen bl th t h uld h e l t th letter le h s po c s ? Q t p rt f om th h ll nge to M tb tte h n o wh ould da t a c s m n f R dcl ffe leg l i tegrity and pe s l p tat f ha g bm tt d to xt rn l pr s re from a y q rter befo h ng jud ci l dec s on?

NEW D LHI *S d y 21 t Mar h 1949*
The Ind an nd Pak tan P s h eacted t the Ch nes Pl along expected l e Th *H d t T m s r g rd t s* the first seri us att mpt t sol e the d p t a rea onabl and practicable b sis adding th t it main pro ons a e s ch

as can and should be accepted by self respecting and peace loving nations *Dawn* on the other hand ventures to hope that the Security Council will show the same sense of realism as it did before and in that light view the Chinese attempt at compromise by granting one party almost everything and the other party nothing The Pakistan argument is still that the status of the administration must be decided after and not before a free and unrestrained verdict of the Kashmir people

The only new element in this depressing debate is a suggestion in the *Hindustan Times* yesterday—and in view of Devadas Gandhi s and G D Birla s connections it is always advisable to pay some attention to *ballons d'essai* released from this quarter Discussing terms of reference open to the Kashmiris in a plebiscite the paper states We think it would be wrong and unjust to call upon them to vote only for accession with either Dominion They should be given a free choice to accede to either or to be independent

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Tuesday 23rd March 1948*

Mountbatten continues to take a close interest in the whole question of India s future relations with the Commonwealth and has asked us to prepare a short situation report There is not of course much initiative that he can take His views are known both here and in London Decision as to India s role and title now rests with those who frame and approve the Indian constitution But clearly we are approaching a climactic moment in the history of Commonwealth relations when it becomes necessary to re define a concept so largely indefinable I recall from my school days the dictum of the wise historian that to define the faith is to limit the faithful The Commonwealth has certainly prospered to date on an instinctive understanding of this principle

I have just been reading a most interesting article in the January issue of *International Affairs** on The implications of Eire s relationship with the British Commonwealth of Nations It is by Nicholas Mansergh † who incidentally visited India—and Viceroy s House—last summer In this paper he advocates the doctrine of external association as being the most promising formula for the future development of the Commonwealth and as being applicable both to Eire and India

External association involves no formal constitutional link and as envisaged by de Valera under it Commonwealth citizenship would be discarded and citizenship of reciprocal rights substituted Eire s position in the Commonwealth Mansergh points out,

* Quarterly publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs

† Abe Bailey Professor of Commonwealth Relations at the Royal Institute of International Affairs

has only been mainta ned o far b c use while de Valera has stead ly pur ed th doctrin of external ssoc t on the rest f th Commonwealth has n less tead ly r fused t take ogn sa ce f his act ons N w w th only one more link rem n ng to be brok nd E res declared nnte t n be g to b eak t the ag ement t d ffer c n no longer be sust ned

In a n te to V rnon bout th Staff paper I have wr tten 'To my m nd the k y q e t n h ther or ot the ncept of the Comm w alth to b w den d beyond the terms en i ged in the Statute f We tm nster My per onal v ew is th t the I dian dec n h n t is r ched w ll prob bly be pol t cally mb g ous as th Ir sh n was and that it will then be up to the ther m mbers t dec de whether th terms of memb hip need to b lter d t ncl d Indi or re vid nough s th y sta d Befo p epa ng any paper on th ubject I think we would b ell ad d t ch ck up w th B N Rau hether th any p ct tion th t some n w o er all oncept f Com monw lth ll b l b rat d *p pa s* w th Ind a s own ch ged p s ti n I w Rau at the Nepal pa ty the ther evening and said w w uld pprec ate n e ly talk w th h m

G n dj stm t t wo ld n t necessarily f ll w that the Ind n Head f State uld need t b n minated by th Crown f r the Comm ealth l nk to be mai t d Some formul for confirm g th pp ntm t f n elected P d t m ght pe h ps b evol ed wh ch w uld n ble the dr ft t tut on to go th gh un m d d C t sh p m y ell pro to b the key test a d the i s w ld be n t th per ess on of Ind a s Comm n ealth t tus by m form of c tizenship but mmon c tize h p comp ing Commonwe lth stat s

GOVERN IENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *W ed d y 7tl April 1948*

The pa t f rtn ght h b comp rati ely r t Go ment Ho se The M ntb tt h bee m t f the t me on tou h ng bee w y f m D lh on fo cc o s nce the 20th March They h e t d K p thala at last completed the t ce po tponed t ur of Trava r d Co h n th far outh pe t t enty f h ur t Uda pur th ts art fi ial l k s and sla d pal e nd finally ha ju t t rned to-d y fr m a weekend s rest t M h br

There h been mom t f l ght el ef t seems n t r s when the M h raja f Kap rthal now se nty s x y rs old—the last se enty n f wh h he ha been on the *gad*—refer ed to th Mo tbattens d r ng his spee h of w lc me s Lord and Lady W llingd n

S r Be egal R u now the Ch ef I d an Delegate to the Un ted Nat ns was the Sen C i il Servant pr m ly respo s'bl f r the drafting and preparation of the Indian Con t tution

Coherent conversation with the Maharaja of Cochin who was in a very feeble condition proved difficult as the only political question he put to Mountbatten was to ask him whether he had ever met Stalin Otherwise his sole topic of conversation was his family which numbers in all four hundred and sixty one members In Travancore and Cochin the dynastic system is on a matriarchal basis the sons of all the female members of the ruling family succeeding in strict rotation according to age It is thus a matter of chance if the ruler of the day is the brother or third cousin twice removed of his predecessor In a family the size of the Cochin dynasty the system inevitably means that a series of very old gentlemen follow each other on the throne in rapid succession

Mountbatten has come back to meet an immediate crisis over Hyderabad On our return from Burma there was a letter awaiting him from the Nizam As he was due to leave Delhi again and wished in any case to phase out of the controversy acting in his constitutional capacity on advice he asked the Ministry of States to reply on his behalf and advised the Nizam accordingly This States Ministry letter drafted originally by V P heated up by Patel and cooled down by Nehru was not seen by Mountbatten until after its dispatch when it was still very stiff and threatening in tone It openly accused the Nizam s Government of breaches of the Standstill Agreement and called upon it to fulfil its obligations and ban the Ittehad and Razakars

Monckton who had previously indicated that he would be washing his hands of the whole matter has now returned to the scene reaching Hyderabad on the 28th March The effect upon him of the States Ministry letter and the general situation which he has found in the State has been profound Usually calm and affable he arrived in Delhi last night in a mood to do battle with all comers the Governor General included He brought back with him the Nizam s reply a skilfully drafted document which scores several points off the Indian *demarche* and has all the hallmarks of his own inspiration The opening paragraph of the letter speaks of information reaching the Nizam which has given him reason to regard the letter from the States Ministry as being in the nature of an ultimatum and a prelude to an open breach of friendly relations He therefore makes a final appeal to Mountbatten to exercise his good offices and prevent such a contingency

As the result of a very frank talk to day based upon their firm friendship and deep understanding of each other s mind and motive Mountbatten has succeeded in reassuring Monckton that the Government of India envisage no ultimatum and that they are no party to blockade Nehru came along shortly afterwards to confirm this in person

Another l ge r k has been thr wn int the pool h we er ith th p bl cat n to-day in numbe of Ind n papers n l d ng the *H d t n Time* of a blo dth rsty pe ch alleged to have b en deli r d on th 31st M ch by the fanatical Itt had le de K m R zv t the i a gu t on of Hyderab d v e pon ve k A reported R z u g s the M slems of Hyderab d not to sheathe th r w d u t l t e r obj ct e of I l m s sup macy h b h v d One of th m t s nist r phrase q oted s o r Moslem b th n th I d an U n w ll b ur fifth l m t Lang ge of th s natur f co r des g d t nd ce c mmunal st f th gh ut the wh l of south I di wh h h f by me c f l d spen t n rema d mmu e fr m the deadly pa s ons of th th

GOVERN IENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *S d y 11th April 1948*

The Raz pl t th kens M kt n left y t d y f Hyd r b d t ly c n n ed of the need f th N zam t i tr du e r po bl d p nt t e g nment t early d te but l firmly ntend g t p ffe the d that h sh uld der th ly t of Raz But t d y t l gram arri d from Mon kt d g M ntbatten th t th Hyder b d Go rnment s sat sfi d th t th ll g d Jeh d spe h f 31st Ma h f ct d l d d th t ccord gly t l ks l ke cal l t d tt mpt to pre e t th mpt f fr dly r l t

M tb tt n call d m n t ce k ng m a m tt r of urg cy t f d o t th l bl fact S l h ffect don ed my de t lk h t d m n w b b d n l g th my t y f the Ra v t It w ll n d ll Sh l ck H lme po e s of d d ct n f I m t ft my w y through the contrad t ry b t inco l d ce s rround ng th s p d t s I sh r Dr W tson b wild rm t Th fi t t ng fe ture of c e s th t d n ry del y f eek bet een th p bl ca ti n f the addre th Ind P m h of t d rect speech th f e to the a d ence s enthu iast c i te ject s a d ts alleg d del ry th 31 t M h

Tw d y g in the Leg sl t e As embly Nehru n descr b ng th speech d ect t ment t ol nce d m dcr p k of it l o s n f th ma y fl mm torv pe ch s f Mr R zv Y st rday in confi m t on of th s th *H d ta T m s* d th r papers d ly q t d from caref lly ch en l st f s m lar tt ranc s by Raz i some of which I h d not s n b f r b t all f hi h r co ted for as ha ng been made from S ptember o w rds N v u d th t t A c ted P ess f Ind dat l n Raz i seems to h ve perpetrated e en more grot que v b l gg e s n th n th o I am tryi g to track dow For now he is report d as demand ng noth g les than the return of ceded territory in Madras and as rting with

the bravura of a Moghul Emperor The day is not far off when the waves of the Bay of Bengal will be washing the feet of our sovereign

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Friday 16th April 1948*

Part of Mir Laik Ali s and Razvi s denial is that there was neither a rally nor a weapons week on the 31st March at which the alleged speech could have been made but this is not correct Eric Britter* was there and I have now checked on the facts as far as he knows them He tells me that he was present at a parade between eight and ten on the morning of the 31st and that Razvi took the salute at a gathering of between four and five hundred Razakars but that there was definitely no speech made while he was there He heard the parade being dismissed and stayed on for some twenty minutes afterwards returning to a house with a veranda room where about twenty or thirty other people were also present Tea and cakes were handed round and the conversation was confined to small talk Britter adds that Razvi came to the door with him and saw him off but he is naturally in no position to say whether Razvi held any meeting afterwards So the element of mystery remains

What information I have been able to collect from the various sources suggests that Razvi s meetings public and private are regularly attended by agents both of Munshi and the Nizam No doubt to complete the circle of hide and seek the Nizam s and Munshi s sayings are being reported back by agents of Razvi The reality of these shadowy figures is anyone s guess but I am ready to believe that Razvi is providing them with ample source material and is engaged on a political campaign which if it succeeds can only end in the bloodshed it constantly invokes and in a final rupture between India and Hyderabad

Britter while certainly holding no brief for Razvi considers that India is in danger of unduly forcing the pace in its Hyderabad policy He believes that time is needed by which he means freedom from Congress or Communist pressure for some five years during which the transitions first to a Government of communal parity and then to one of Hindu majority rule can be effected Under these conditions he considers that the forces of moderation and reform would prevail but that present impatience must induce the violent answer The obverse to this image of peaceful change is that the record of the Nizam over the past quarter of a century encourages the belief that if left to his own devices and in possession of a sovereignty which he never enjoyed under the paramount power he will continue to reinforce the prerogatives of himself and of the communal oligarchies around him

* Delhi correspondent of *The Times*

say f w v o ds f gr t ng to the S rdar wh bolstered nd blanketed recli ed n a sof He was look ng very frag le a ndeed he still s but th hole o c s on e ed a a g tle r mind that execut e a th r ty st ll flo s f m h m Th Mou t battens spent about quarter of an h ur with h m a d he was ob ιou ly h ghly grat fied t ee them

T -d y s tea party a at V P hom to ab t a doz n jo rnal sts I d an d E rope t intr duce th m to H s H gh n f K hmir v h l ok d ry ll t ase a d said ry l ttle I d ed when q st e e a k d bout h s d pa t e fr m h cap tal t s left t the J m S h b t g v e u hom ly on h s br ther Pr nce ou g d gen ral d oti n t d ty I came w y f ling th t the hite h h d pe h ps been l d n t th ckly The Mah j wh s a b ke man nd m some what p th t pl ght ha b e mpl n ng b tt lv ov r th treat me t m t d t t h m H hom h been mm deered C b n t act t k n th t h b ng gi ny ad anc n timat n H w nt t kno her th uthor ty l es to p otect h m f om thes nd g t M u tb tten h s b ght the m tt up w th P t l h n his t h p m sed to d cuss it v th N h

Mo tb tt n t ll m h h d a ery t est g p tm rtem with the Mah j yest d y pb d ng h m fo n t t k g th d ce h h d pr ff r d t h m J t cc d y th ther by th 15th A g t At fi t th M har j l n d t d f d h d by y ng L k t the trouble that b led p when I d d ced nd th nk what w uld h hap- pe ed f I had do e l B t M tb tten po ted o t th t f h h d c ded t Ind o t me Pakistan s mply co ld not ha mo ed d f t P ki ta I d ld n t h e d s P t l pl dge n th h d be categ cal

CHAPTER TWENTY SIX

STALEMATE

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Satu d y 24th April 1948*

MONCKTON LEFT FOR Lond n on the 19th d w t t M nt b tten f m Karach porti g n th lts of his c n rs t n w th the Nizam H warned th t of the four po ts greed t n Delh th one most l kely to cause tr bl i Hyd b d a d t stand in the w y f q k s ttlement wa the p bl m of pro- v d ng mach nery for the int od ct n of respon ble gov rnm nt The format on f Con t t ent Assembly n a s mpl pop l tion

basis giving the Hindus the overwhelming majority within a week would simply not be feasible for the Nizam Monckton stressed however the need for the Nizam to insist upon a reconstruction of his Government to make it more genuinely representative of all shades of communal opinion The Nizam had wanted Monckton to stay but he refused to do so on the grounds that he was sure he could not remain on in the State without compromising himself unless and until a new Government had taken over

The expectation has been that the Nizam would implement the four point programme through one of his decrees or *firmans* The *firman* was duly issued yesterday and the expectation duly disappointed Nearly all the psychological value of its practical concessions to the need for implementing the four points has been wantonly thrown away in a phrase

After an expression of hope that those political parties which are not represented in the present Interim Government in Hyderabad will join and take a proper share in shouldering the responsibility of the Government the *firman* with the dialectic of the death wish continues I have felt apprehensive that mere imitation of a form of Government elsewhere might poison the atmosphere of our country in the same way as it is doing in other places The readiness to lose so much in order to score so little baffles the best mediating intentions

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Wednesday 28th April 1948*

Fay and I dined to-night amid fairy lights on the lawn of the Delhi Gymkhana Club Our host was Shri Krishna * who had collected an interesting party The principal guest was Dr Ambedkar the Minister of Law the leader of the Untouchables and a colourful personality in Indian politics over the past twenty years He is now one of the principal figures associated with the preparation of India s new Constitution which finally removes the stigma of untouchability from the Statute book As part of his emancipation Ambedkar himself an untouchable has only recently married a lady doctor who is a Brahmin The custom of centuries cannot be uprooted overnight and the event has caused quite a stir His wife was with him this evening but as is the custom with so many Indian ladies on social occasions had little to say

Ambedkar himself was in expensive vein and gave us a revealing analysis of some of the features of the new Constitution He pointed out for instance that the special powers reserved to the judiciary under its provisions were greater than those enjoyed by the United States Supreme Court As evidence of the enduring quality of the 1935 Act he said that some two hundred and fifty

* Shri Krishna well known Delhi political correspondent

of it cl u es had been embodied as they stood into the new Co t tut on

We had d cuss on on Cabinet g vernm nt Ambedkar re-f r d to the compl t that th p esent sy tem was working too slo ly in Ind He tho ght that wh a matt r of pol cy ffect g two departm t w in l d the is u should at once be ettled as b tw n th Min sters con d H c mmended the G ddes p p l and th y tem f non d partme tal Cab net ch f th gr ps f dep tme tal d put e und r them He s d he w ery rry M ntbatten a l g b fore the Const tu t n va fi lly pa d The Common ealth i he f lt \ as l kely to b decided ut d the C nst tuent Assembly

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *T d y 4tl May 1948*

The Hyd rab d tal m te has b u g M untb tten m ch n ty H an b th n pe l d publ gro ds t br g th n g t t on to h ppy end g P pe ly pl t d h b lı th t th sh rt t me—n w l ttl mo e th n ix w k—*before he ha d r th G ern r G l h p to C R shoul* erve s an d cem t t b th des to ir n ut th r d ffer c B t t no mean pr blem t decid j t when d h w h s in flu n can b b ght to bear w th th maximum eff ct part cu larly n M kt n b ence

M ntb ttens p p l has b n t send a l st w n ng letter t th N zam now nd d ft has be n ct e pr par t on but I ha e w gh d n hea ly rg ng him not to do th unt l l oth r r med es b e bee t ed My c s is th t the letter a drafted n t p esent form psychol g cally the wrong appr h

As I put it in a n t t Ronn e N d ubt t ll r d w ll or the rec d n t n years t m but the judgem nt f h story w l b not only wheth r th d ce as go d but lso whether i was o p t d t the N zam th t h p esent mood and s tu t on he would be l k ly t ccept t A letter f th s n ture h ld ly b eleased in the l st r rt fter e ery th r v ped ent h s f led wh n t h uld be lodged s th fin l fr endly plea H E greate t g ft ndoubtedly d rect diplom cy by pe onal t t The bject t h s ting Hyd rabad a e very we ghty a d w ll b pr ed by th G ernment th u wh se a th ty he cannot n w g My subm s n the ef re s that the prim ry m h uld be to get th N zam to D lh th n str g atta hed t th is t, b t s mply for the purpo e of pro d ng M tbatten vith n opport n ty of talki g t h m as man to man

At a me t ng t ten o lock th s m n ng at wh h V P Ro n Vern n and my lf ere pr se t Mountb tten agr d th my vi w V P r ed the po t that the N zam wo ld prob bly reply by re ew ng the nvitation f Mou tb tten to go to Hyd ra

bad but he agreed that this difficulty could be overcome on the grounds of Mountbatten s limited time here

A general talk followed on the Princely situation The process of the States integration which began with the group in Orissa and Bihar and which has been driven forward on Patel s behalf with dynamic energy by V P himself has for the time being at least reached saturation point

The covenant for the largest union yet created was signed on the 22nd April It is called the Malwa Union and comprises the Gwalior Indore Malwa group of States twenty in all covering an area of forty seven thousand square miles and involving a population of more than seven million There has been some delicacy in naming the Rajpramukh or Constitutional head of the Union nominally elected by a Council of Rulers Gwalior who is a twenty-one gun Prince is to have the position Even more difficult was the choice of a capital city Here the compromise is Gwalior for the winter and Indore for the summer capital Bhopal has reiterated his desire to remain out of the Malwa Union but has gone quite a long way to make his peace with the Government and has announced his intention to introduce responsible government in his State

Only to day another type of merger takes place The State of Kutch is to be merged direct with the Government of India This I understand is being done primarily because of Kutch s important strategic position There are other variations of the pattern The Rulers in the Deccan States and the Gujerat Rulers —over one hundred of them in all—have both merged under separate agreements with the Bombay province East Punjab and Madras have entered into similar arrangements with adjoining States One of the most comprehensive self supporting mergers has been the formation of the Saurashtra Union of the two hundred and seventeen Kathiawar States The Rajpramukh here is the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar who has entered whole heartedly into this new dispensation and promises to play an increasingly important part in Central politics These Unions are to be governed through popular ministries

To morrow yet another covenant will be signed this time for the union of the Sikh States Negotiations here have hinged round the attitude of Patiala He was entitled to remain out on his own but without him the other Sikh States could not achieve a viable union V P told us that he has now definitely decided to come in on the understanding that he and his State are given a position in it commensurate with their relative importance so he is to be Rajpramukh and Kapurthala his deputy This is certainly a great victory for V P and should undoubtedly turn the balance of power in Sikh affairs in favour of the Central Government and against the ambitious exponents of Sikhista— separate Sikh State carved out of the East Punjab

Another remark bl development h s been the format on of a U on f R jput n Pr nces It beg n as me ger of th maller States but then took more s gnificant sh pe as a result of Udai pur d cis n t j n n When M untbatten v sited Udaipur H H ghness told him th t he h d decided of h s own free w ll to t k th t p as be ng in the high t interests f h s pe ple The Uda pur dyn ty f the most august in Ind a a d the Rule entry s l kely to h v a con d ble effect n th th r maj R jput na St te wh ch v abl un ts have their i d v d al rep nt t n th C nt t ent A embly Of the n neteen States enjoying this init al right s ven h e now jo n d ne or other of the Un on

It s h gh st te m h p th t ca v r a revol t on ry act in th m ntl f tr d t n l form V P was s y ng th s m rn ng th t th ins of the f the had ndeed be n t d upon the son It w the fa l f the ld P t la and B ka er to accept th 1935 Fed l Pl th t ne ly b ke up th wh l structure f the Ind n Stat O ly M u tb tten s l t minut ponsorship f cces on s ved the d y thu enabling th p t P t l and B kan r t pl y a v tal pa t n c s l d t g th n w l t n h p

M untb tt n f ly c nfes d th t he d d n t foresee wh n h neg t ated the I t ment f A ce s n last year th t th e t s n of subjects w uld b demanded r granted so s b t he ment oned an t e t ng p n n expres d by Nye that th s i u nes f th St t p bl m h d n t be app c ted at ll o t d I d d w f ct graver in its mpl cations than the problem f deal g th the Co g s Mo lem Leag e or Sikh leaders Ny d th t h had pract cally despa ed f any fr nd ly settlement with the P inces d had v sual sed trouble of in calculabl dim n after the 15th A gu t He would not h e b en s rpri ed if t had tak n at least a generat n to reach th pos t n h d by May 1948 nd he felt that h tory would recall th s as a m t m kable feat

Just h v m h the clim te ha hanged can b een with the entry of H s H ghnes f Dholpur into the scheme of th ngs Last August h m d was such that any conc pt of merger beyond acces on wo ld ha b n wh lly u acceptabl but h r he to-day his Prin ly tat s d ly ackn wledged Rajpramukh of the Un t d St te of M tsya

Mountbatten ls ra sed at this morni g s Staff Meeting the problem f the Defence Committee Pol cy i still unrelated t m l t ry capab l ty Mountb tt n reminded V P that he h d agreed to th in t al ma ch into Kashmir s an acceptable military risk, b t now the t at on was d fferent As c mmander w th some experience in log tical pr blem he felt that Nehru and P tel were not f lly f cing up to the m l tary mpl cations of the pos ti n Mountbatten said h was very d appointed th t the Defence Committee proced re was not be ng properly adopted

He only hoped that when he phased out it would be kept up and begged V P to back it

Before the meeting broke up he recapitulated the revised approach to Hyderabad He said that my proposal to try first of all to get the Nizam up to Delhi should be regarded as firing the right barrel The left barrel of a final appeal and remonstrance he would charge to meet all eventualities but not fire

In the afternoon I went round to Hyderabad House an impressive residence at the far end of Kingsway and the vista I was shown into a large drawing room where most of the blinds were drawn In the middle distance I could just see large photographs of the two handsome daughters in law of the Nizam who are also the daughter and cousin of the last Caliph and thus in themselves the symbols of His Exalted Highness s religious and dynastic aspirations Zain Yar Jung duly appeared with his son to whom he introduced me and we all took tea together He conveyed an impression of suavity and polish without any trace of the fanatical streak I find it difficult to believe that he can have much in common with the Ittehad clique Their trust in him and his influence over the Nizam are factors that must no doubt be assessed with some reserve at this time

I broached the whole question of a possible visit from the Nizam He felt that His Exalted Highness would only come up if transport was made very easy for him It was a long journey and a special air cooled compartment would be needed He hated flying and even the idea of it was utterly repugnant to him He still drives about Hyderabad in his 1910 Rolls Bombay suggested itself to Zain as a possible compromise meeting place He also felt that Monckton would have to approve and come out again from England to hold the old man s hand He said finally that he was not wholly unhopeful that the Nizam might agree

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Sunday 9th May 1948*

After seeing a somewhat tiresome film at the Government House cinema called *Copacabana* Vernon told me of talks between Mountbatten Zain and V P and subsequently with Zain and V P alone Zain only got back this evening from Hyderabad He had carried Mountbatten s letter of invitation and has brought back the Nizam s reply It merely confirms the counter invitation which Mountbatten was not wholly surprised to receive in the first instance by telegram on the 6th May For the purposes of the record Mountbatten s letter and the Nizam s telegram crossed In the reply which Zain has just handed in the Nizam gives as one of the reasons for saying no that any such move is certain to give rise to grave misunderstanding both inside and outside Hyderabad which I am bound to avoid Vernon

me h wever that Mountbatten was bubbling o r with opt mi m wholly unv lling to adm t d feat and c nfident that if he could m et the N zam face to f ce he could yet pull off an acces on greement

Zain war ed th t th re is m ked deter rat on in the local ituation Some G rnm nt s pp rters ha e swung o er t the Razak rs deed a N co fidence vot n Mir Laik Al a o ly j st vert d a d Za ys there a e m n about now who ega d even Razvi s mode te V P va very c lm and s ble nd re dy t ffer nom con ss ons as well s acc s to a port

V rn n r ports h we e that w re getting da gerously n ar t the point h e the w ll only be two alt rn t es l ft—f ce or the thre t f fo I sa d I f lt that the crux of th m tt r now as to know vhere the al power lay What w the exact tatu of the N zam? Much would depend on th appre c ation h had f rmed f his own pos t n both fr m ithin nd fr m w th ut Th Nizam hims lf must n t b und r estimated I w nt n to ee M ntbatte ho th nks that the Nizam s at last r lly fr ght ned Appa ntly v h n Mir Laik Al s posit on a Pr m M n t was r sed w th h m he w not nd gnant b t at onc asked Wh d th y vant?

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *W d ie day 12th M y 1948*

It s ge rally greed that I sh ld s t Hyderab d as soon as poss bl w th the bj cts of meeti g the Nizam face t fac on M untb tt n s b half f forming a per onal up-to d te impres s on of the s t at on and if p ble ind cing suffic ent se se of urg ncy in the Nizam and h s advi ers for them to reopen neg tia t ons a d in g er l m ke the b t use f Mountb tten l st few eeks h e At a Staff M ting th s morn g V P who warmly appro d my pr posed t sa d th re was nov d finite evid nce th t the C mmuni ts and the Razaka were ctually combi ng together and th t th s v not being suff'c ntly stressed M unt b tten found it d ff'cult to b l e th t such n l gnment c uld be tak ng place but V P was stent r g rd ng t as indeed the cent l fact n the s tuat on

Mountbatten began the m t ng by asking fter Patel s h alth V P repl ed that he a b t w rr ed b ut th rr gul r ty of h s puls and l ck f leep One f h s ento ge doctor w constantly talk ng to him about h s pul e v hich only incre s d its irregular ty

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Th day 13th M y 1948*

Before the Defence Comm ttee (wh ch as result of M t b tten s n tiat ve has at l st been called) Mountbatten b tto holed Nehru to get him to confirm in my presence wh t be h d

said to Mountbatten yesterday—namely that he welcomed my going to Hyderabad and that if the Nizam acceded the Government of India would do all in its power to accord him full physical protection In my briefing the possibility has not been overlooked that he is no longer master in his own house and that some smooth and secret Palace revolution has been or is about to be put into effect

After the Defence Committee I saw Nehru again and drove off with him to receive further guidance He said he wished only to make some general observations with regard to my visit His philosophy in the matter was that to try to avoid trouble was often the best way of inviting it It was not possible to go on just watching shooting incidents and other disorders that were taking place daily on the Hyderabad border

After leaving Nehru I returned at once to Government House to find V P still with Mountbatten They seemed quite pleased with the Defence Committee which had been discursive but had enabled the military and political leaders to form a more sympathetic understanding of each other s viewpoint Mountbatten professes himself to be optimistic about my mission It was agreed that I should go completely under the auspices of the Hyderabad Government At five o clock I went round to Hyderabad House for a further talk with Zain and his son Ali Khan Zain s plea was If only the Government of India would not press too hard all would be well

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI *Friday 14th May 1948*

I have had a final run through with Zain I am to be the personal guest of Mir Laik Ali No exact time limit has been set for the trip It is agreed that I should be free to decide on the spot but Zain himself hopes to reach Hyderabad before I leave it

The letter I am conveying to the Nizam expresses disappointment at His Exalted Highness s refusal of the invitation to visit Delhi and doubt as to whether it will be physically possible apart from other considerations for Mountbatten to come to Hyderabad in the limited time now left to him However Mountbatten writes Before I leave I am most anxious to establish some form of contact with you over and above the formal negotiations and exchange of letters

I am then duly introduced as one who has by now served with Mountbatten longer than any other member of his personal staff and *who has been throughout intimately acquainted with all the* high level developments in his Commands particularly during this present appointment He knows my mind completely and enjoys my fullest confidence 'I may say Mountbatten concludes that I have been extremely disturbed by reports have been reaching Delhi with regard both to the

ight brown cotton socks lying loosely about his ankles He wore a brown fez which was perched on the back of his head He is a small man with a pronounced stoop his mouth is loose and his teeth are in a deplorable condition His hands shook and while talking he fidgeted and knocked his knees together in such a way as to give the observer the impression of incipient palsy or St Vitus dance But his whole personality is held together by the intensity of his expression and the vehemence of his high pitched voice

I could not ascertain whether the Prime Minister proposed to stay or leave for the interview but on presenting Mountbatten s letter to the Nizam which he opened and read slowly an opportunity clearly presented itself for him to see me alone if he wanted to but he quite deliberately refused to take it and Mir Laik Ali stayed stolidly on Having read the letter the Nizam turned on me quite fiercely and said that he was well aware of Lord Mountbatten s limited time and powers out here What could he hope to do in a month? he asked He said that he trusted that Lord Mountbatten had clearly understood that it was quite impossible for him the Nizam to leave Hyderabad and if Lord Mountbatten was not free to come and see him well then (and he gave a gesture of farewell) he was sorry for it and would say good bye and God speed to him

The Nizam said that as far as his relations with the Government of India were concerned they had his terms He acted through his Prime Minister and his Constitutional Adviser and he had nothing more he could say to any other party even on a private basis I said that Lord Mountbatten was naturally deeply concerned to do all in his power to achieve a settlement before he left but time was short and it was for His Exalted Highness to consider whether there was any way in which the Governor General s good offices could be used He was I believed aware of Lord Mountbatten s general approach to the problem and if there were any points of detail or emphasis that I could fill in I would be only too happy to do so

I referred to the special status that Mountbatten had had in effecting the Standstill Agreement That is all over now he replied I tried tactfully to explain how Mountbatten believed accession or its equivalent was in the Nizam s best interests but he dismissed the whole subject with a wave of the hand Laik Ali intervened at this point to say that he would be quite ready to take a plebiscite on the issue if only it could be organised peacefully but the law and order problem involved in carrying it out had compelled him to turn it down to which the Nizam added Quite right quite right

I was unable to draw him out on the question of his reaction to the Communist threat in Hyderabad It was he said matter of detail which you can discuss with my Prime

He s d that the f t and policy of the other Princes in India ere no c nc rn f h s and th t he r garded th-m merely as *nobl m n to v hom s m co rtes es v er d e*

The em nder of the i terv ew v as l gely dev ted to the N zam g ing m a lect re in f rcible terms n the M slem phil ophy f life the b s s of h h v as th t our end are pp nted He rem mb red d scussi g th s matter th Loth n th B tish R de t who t th t me was n athe st and h held som op n s t th eff ct that th re as a me sur of *ch nce in ur l es s n a r ce cou e*

It the N zam s w th t w e ther had a go d r a bad fat H s d th t th st t o m ght mp ve n th next t o or th days t m ght g t bett r l ter on he could t ay But he p pa d f h te s ppo ted f h m He the i ked me f I had h d of M hurram i the M lem Calen d r nd I repl d p l t ly th t I h d Ah he s d but y u *d n t kn h t t m n It th ommem r t n of the d ath* of th Pr ph t g d on A d th accept ce f d th and loss an nh ent p rt f our f th (In th r spe t t sh ld be n ted th t th N zam ts d p ys t the gra e of hi mother e y even ng t st o l ck)

On retu ng t th subj ct f M untb tten inter t n the s rv l f the N zam dy sty I e pla d that Mo tb tt n s a firm b l e r i co t tut nal mo rchy t h ch th N zam t k me up and s d veh mently That s where I jo n iss with h m C st tut n l mo rchy m y be ll ery v ell n E ope nd the t th s n mea ing n th E st

The n e sat on was teer d by Mir La k Al t th Com *mo w lth ss Th N zam a int rested n know ng h t* ch nce ther s of India rema ng w th n the Commonv ealth I sa d th t th s m tte w s ery mu h under cons der t on at the m m nt and that there ere i fl ent l forces ho c ns dered that Ind hould stay At th s p int I s d I co ld perhaps m ke an ob erv t h h had no relation to my be ng a member f Lo d M untbatt n s staff which as that whether *Ind a rem ed w th n r went out B t h op nion s repr* sented by th present Governm nt, w ld b most averse to on part f th Ind b tinent r cei ing more fav urable tr at ment th n a ther s mply as res lt f Common e lth mem b rship Any lculati made on th s bas s w uld l as s re be *illus ry Th s po nt I think we t home*

After a fe ge er l em rks on the troubl d wo ld tuat on and the N zam express n of con rn ov r th l t t de elop- ments in Pal stine th co ers t n end d v th him con eying h s most cordial compl me t a d wi hes t M untb tten

The interv ew wh ch lasted nea ly an hour was not a part cularly e sy on to handle in vie f th Nizam s somewhat dis oncerting appe rance and m nner b t a prov ding an p-

portunity to study his personality and mind it was revealing Although he may be physically decrepit he is obviously mentally alert and in full command of his faculties I was in fact left with the impression that I had been spoken to by an eccentric elderly Professor on his special subject He is a Prince of the old school—arrogant and narrow but on his home ground formidable His mood throughout was one of aggressive fatalism

I saw no evidence of the Nizam being a prisoner There was quite a large number of police at the entrance and by the road but there is nothing abnormal in this bearing in mind the attempt on the Nizam s life in the autumn and the lack of any real frontage to King Kothi which was not much farther off the main road than an ordinary house in Delhi Mir Laik Ali incidentally stayed on after I left

On my return to the Prime Minister s residence Moin came round to see me

We discussed treaty or accession and Moin indicated that what they really feared was that accession might be changed so that it meant in fact accession not on three but thirty three subjects involving uniformity of laws and loss of internal autonomy which the Nizam would never give up Moin also gave me to understand that the free movement of Indian Defence Forces through Hyderabad territory would be unacceptable

I then left to dine with Munshi I may say that travelling in a fast car it took me forty minutes to reach Munshi s house which is at the far end of Secunderabad fairly near the air field In this place he is of course completely out of touch with the life of the city and can only see those who have the time petrol or political inclination to visit him

I found him somewhat baffled and depressed He said that he had lost faith in Mir Laik Ali as the result of what he termed a completely bogus report the latter had given of an interview he had had with him He told me that the position as between *Moin and Laik Ali was somewhat ambiguous Although they* were brothers in law they did not see eye to eye but Laik was definitely on the crest of the wave as far as influence with the Nizam was concerned

Munshi said that he did not think that anybody meant business either with regard to responsible government or to accession but he agreed with the preliminary view I had formed that the Nizam was politically master of the situation I reassured him that my trip was personal and informal and that I had come with the full knowledge and approval of the Prime Minister and V P He seemed quite happy to return to Bangalore tomorrow morning saying that his wife no longer liked living in this place and that his relations with the Government were so that he had virtually lost all contact with them

HYDERABAD *Sunday 16th May 1948*

I have completed a crowded day talking and being talked to in unending flow. I told Mir Laik Ali that it would certainly be interesting to meet Kasim Razvi privately if there was no publicity for the meeting and it was understood that I was only seeing people whom he himself particularly wanted me to see. He replied that he would definitely like me to meet Razvi and that the latter would be calling on him this morning prior to a tour he was making. I was advised to drop in.

I did so, and after a few minutes of small talk the Prime Minister left me alone with Razvi. In my opening remarks I said something about feeling depressed at the turn of events, to which he at once retorted that he was not a bit depressed. He was just desperate. He wished me to understand that his sole purpose was the defence of the Moslems; to them only did he owe loyalty. I asked him whether there was any truth in the report that the Communists had been approaching the Razakars with a view to common action. 'When you say the Razakars,' Razvi replied very fiercely, 'you mean me. I tell you the condition of the Moslems here is such that they are themselves rapidly becoming Communist. I have warned them [he did not indicate exactly whom he referred to] that this was likely to happen.'

He then categorically asserted that he was quite prepared to work with the Communists and had taken preliminary action to that end. To make doubly sure that I had not misunderstood him I said that I presumed one difficulty in his way would be the direct challenge thrown down by the Communists to the Nizam himself—i.e., the Communists' warning that there was to be no truck with the Nizam. Razvi paused for a moment and said yes, that he appreciated that difficulty, but later when I returned to the subject he made it quite clear that both the dynasty and the Government were secondary considerations to him if the Communists proved to be the only allies he could use to save the Moslems from destruction. 'If only India will leave us alone for two years I promise that I will create something they will envy. Hindus already are joining the Razakars.' I asked whether without a political settlement there might not be the same crisis at the end of two years, and all he could say was yes, but he added that for one thing he did not believe that the Indian Union would survive for more than two years.

He said that he had absolutely no expectation of a peaceable solution and showed great intensity of racial hatred in discussing the Hindus. He thought that Gandhi's death was symbolic. 'Hindus always kill their Gods to make them into super-Gods.' I asked him whether he did not consider that the Communists as at present organised were predominantly Hindu. He said that that was so, but that they were less communally minded than other parties.

I said that it was widely held that he was the real strong man in the State and asked him what his views were on that He said Don t believe all the slanderous reports about me as a wire puller and maker of Governments I am the least person here I am simply the champion and servant of the Moslems cause on behalf of which I will stop at nothing The Government call me in for my views on occasion which I give to them with complete frankness He told me that to save Moslems from death and Moslem women from being ravished he was ready to die The Congress representatives in Hyderabad were men of straw Let me look after the Hindus he said smiling for the first time

Razvi is the complete fanatic He stares with eyes that bore holes into you and would strike terror into his friends and enemies were it not for a streak of absurdity and charlatanism about him which even while he rants gives him away making it difficult to take him completely seriously and conveying the firm impression that his megalomania has far out run his real power In appearance he is slight and dapper sporting a beard of Mack Sennett proportions beneath a fez worn at a rakish angle As he walked briskly away he looked like a blend of Charlie Chaplain and a minor Prophet

Having disposed of Razvi my next appointment was with General El Edroos the Commander in Chief of the Hyderabad Army a tall handsome and I can well believe very able officer of Hashemite Arab stock He served in the field in the Burma campaign under command of Mountbatten for when incidentally he has the highest respect He said that there was some trouble in the Sholapur area that Indian troops had been helping ruffians to make their way over the border and that Indian aircraft had been making reconnaissances He was writing to Bucher and Elmhirst* privately on this subject He referred to the ordinance position He said he had made a frank offer to Himmatsinhji† (without of course conceding him any right of inspection) to see things for himself which he had done and he understood that he had been satisfied He said that the Communists were very well armed and that the economic blockade was virtually complete

He stressed the intensity of the political suspicions of both sides and said that although he was a soldier he could not help asking why the Central Government were pressing so hard I said that he must appreciate that with the creation of Pakistan a strong Centre for the Indian Union was essential Cannot

* General Sir Roy Bucher and Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst Commanders in Chief of the Indian Army and Air Force respectively

† General Himmatsinhji Indian Army Adviser on States

they see he said that Pakistan was their own making and that the pressure they are putting on here causing a crisis and a growing Moslem fanaticism? With this pressure he went on (he clearly was referring to Munshi) Hyderabad in my view would have fallen like a ripe plum. He said that now a serious position was growing up which was taking more and more the form of guerilla activity. I said I had just seen Razvi and that he was physically smaller than I had expected. El Edroos who is something of a giant himself replied with a laugh, It is the little one that is dangerous.

I went straight from my talk with General El Edroos for a very long session with the Prime Minister. We had lunch together alone and talked for almost two hours.

Mir Laik Ali began by explaining that he was putting forward proposals for representative government. He would not just get rid of the Legislative Assembly, so he had in mind to set in motion electoral procedure for a Constituent Assembly to be elected in addition to it (I assume ultimately to supersede it). He said that he had discussed the matter with the leaders of all parties and he left it to them the choice of the electoral procedure they wished to adopt, which was either to use the existing vocational roll (clearly heavily weighted in favour of the Moslems) or to make a fresh electoral list the preparation of which together with the conduct of the election itself could not in his view take less than eighteen months.

He said that his dilemma was that the Congress boycott of the new two-year-old Legislative Assembly meant that he had literally nothing but their own word to go on for the political basis of their popular support. They were not, he pointed out, like the Congress elsewhere which was genuinely elected before it carried out its boycott policy. He said he was awaiting the reaction of the parties and hoped to make an announcement by the end of this month.

He then repeated Moin's views on the accession issue and said that his basic objection was that there were not just three subjects but that under those headings there were ninety-one as defined under the Indian Constitution. He said that the internal identity of Hyderabad would assuredly be blotted out. He therefore favoured a special treaty which would be exclusive to India and which would include a common Foreign policy, a defence agreement (Hyderabad having an army of twenty-five thousand, some ten thousand of which would be put at the disposal of the Indian Union) and a communication agreement in which he foresaw no special difficulty.

I told him the form taken by my interview with Razvi and asked him for his reactions. He told me that he thought Razvi must have meant that he would ally himself with the Communists only as a very last resort and after the collapse of the Nizam

and Government I replied that this was not clear from what Razvi had said to me and told him that if Razvi were to go unchecked much longer the Nizam and the Government might find themselves literally as the nut in the nut cracker

This conversation did not represent any major advance so far as I know on any of the previous views Laik Ali has held either on responsible government or accession

At 7 30 I went round to General El Edroos house for a second talk He told me that one of the reasons why the Nizam had refused to come to Delhi was the fear that he would not be able to get back and that I might well be advised to check on this He pointed out Hyderabad s strategic importance While recognising their military weakness he said that should the worst happen they could and would cut off India from the South He believed an agreement was possible if the politicians allowed a Treaty giving India control in External Affairs administration over Defence and Communications What more could they want? he asked If India pressed this matter too far he went on resistance was certain Scott had said this as well

HYDERABAD *Monday 17th May 1948*

At 8 p m I had a last talk with the Prime Minister I told Laik Ali that I wanted to be sure that the Nizam s refusal to visit Delhi was not based on any fears as to his personal security He said that there might have been some such doubt in the Nizam s mind but that the dominating and compelling motive was that if he had come his move would have been seriously misunderstood in the State I told him that I had been frankly worried by the reliance that seemed to be placed on Opposition support in England I said that I was sure that this was a most dangerous illusion For Hyderabad to become a Party issue in the British House of Commons could not serve the real interests of the State Laik Ali told me that he entirely agreed He personally had the greatest admiration for Mr Attlee and he did not want Hyderabad to be bandied about in Party debate anywhere He said that he was not pleased that I had made the visit which he felt had been helpful in every way

After I had had a quiet dinner with Zain s son and beautiful daughter in law Zain himself who had arrived that afternoon asked to see me and I went along to his house at 11 p m He said that he had seen the Nizam alone He had again been very vehement But added Zain he always is He was very firm on the issue of his Legislative Sovereignty but Zain had told him that it was quite essential for him to form a new Government on a much broader basis than the present one He gave me to understand that the Nizam and Laik Ali had at last agreed to do this The Nizam then apparently raised the question of my interview saying that he had spoken exactly

as in h s mind to me thout any reservations The Nizam bel d *that* there was a t n per c nt chance th t Mountbatte n would e en no come himself and ked Z n h t he f lt *Zain said* that it m st to some xt nt depe d on the kind of *report* I s nt in The N zam then began to sk quest ons abo t me Wh exta tly vas I what ere my pol t s etc.

Za n thinks that sol t n is po ble if the Legisl t e r serv t *on is made* He ven went t r as to f el that the v o d ac ess on m ght b b ought b ut H s proposing in h s talks with the N zam on Tu d y and W dne day (the N zam h d a k d h m to st y and have an ext day for n extr talk) to see f this v *ould* be acceptable p vided t w str ctly limited to three s bj ts He said th t he w s propo ng *to speak fr nkly* ith *El Edroos* who w s lleged to be g ng milit ry as stance t the Razakar This was caus ng c ns derable disqu et i Delh F lly *Za* n h ped that I would be able to *postpone my* ist to S mla nt l he g t b ck n Thursday en ng when I ould gi e Mountb tten the latest inform t *on*

HYDERABAD NEW DELHI *Tu esd y 18th May 1948*

After an early breakfast and a fin l ourte y good bye *to* M r La k Al I cc mpan ed by Capta n Baig on the lo g dr ve to th *rfeld Capt in* Ba g tal nts n A D C ha been fully tested nd h has been to endle t bl in steer ng me fr m pl ce t p ce on t me throughout my fanta t sch dule I lea th kn wl *dge th t everything p s ble* has been don to throv open the g te to me From the Nizam do nward I get the imp ess c *that ev ry* h s spoken with the maximum fra kne s of which *he is c pabl* and th h ve been surp is ngly f v a on If D en *Yar Jung* as et ent he was at l ast recept e As for r y nt bution I hope and bel e th t I m y h b n *nstrument* l t mpering the pe l de th or glory att tud I f u d n my r al

The return fl ght th a cr ft wa my first chance to com po my th ughts My main impressions are —

The N zam s the k y ma in th t at on As reg rds the major issue of relati ns v th the Ind a Un on noth ng i being do e v thout h s *pp* al o conni ance Moreov I con der that any agre m nt he finally *ente s int* w ll be honou d in the s se that hi g m strong enough to w thst nd nternal oppos t on from any q rter

He i n mood of *ggre ve fata sm* and in my judgm nt is ready and ha the st ngth t try t perform a Samson Act on th Go ernment *of India* in other v ords if he goes under f ll *preparations* have been mad to ns r that the poli t cal nd social structure of th State should go under with h m Razv s *role* in *this* scheme of things to ens re that th s pro-

cess of disintegration is completed and that a mere military victory will not suffice to solve the problem

On the other hand the Nizam is searching furtively and anxiously for an honourable settlement He is a ruler of the old school he has no liking for the trappings of the Constitutional Monarch and will put up the same kind of resistance to that status as Queen Victoria did *The tighter the corner the more* he will fall back on prerogatives I do not believe that he will voluntarily accept an accession solution which makes him anything other than the official fountain head of law and custom inside his own State

Any appreciation of the *Nizam s attitude* must take into account that the prospects and policy of his fellow Princes do not interest him at all—he regards them merely as impotent noblemen—and that he is obviously a deeply religious man In times of trouble the Nizam is liable to lean heavily on his traditional Islamic beliefs and I am sure he spoke to me with complete sincerity on this

In this political bargaining no great advance has been made *since Laik Ali s speech to the Hyderabad Legislative Assembly* on 27th April It seems likely however that the Nizam will take a final stand both on the accession and the representative Government issues by the 1st June

With regard to Mountbatten s position there is a very widespread *feeling that the only chance of a settlement will be through* his good offices and influence But the Nizam is clearly sceptical whether either can turn the scales in time A position however may conceivably be reached in the course of the next fortnight in which the differences of detail and interpretation are narrowed down sufficiently for Mountbatten to provide the final pressure For the moment there is no more to be done with the Nizam the differences need to be ironed out between Zain and V P

CHAPTER TWENTY EIGHT

FAREWELL PHASE

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Thursday 20th May 1948*

I SPENT ALL yesterday cut off from the world in a stern effort to complete my report for Mountbatten to read a day in advance of my own arrival in Simla

This afternoon I had an hour s interview with Nehru and ran through my general conclusions with him He considers that the Nizam may have been deliberately giving me the works and in view of his refusal to enter into any discussion with

t onal part es he would n turally r ly on general t es He agreed w th m that Deen Yar Ju g h as the re l found r of the R zakars as tr ng e gh t f ce up to the mpl cat ons of di b nd ng th m

The P me M n st r sa d th t the h story f Hyde abad as not glo us and th t they had nearly always g ven way to pres s ct ng tl r collap befor the Mah attas

He real s d that tl N z m s ge nely ncerned ab ut his trea es nd p r nal p gat s nd h s ready to g ve nces on th se H s d he had no intent on of forc g ac ce s on t m of th Ind an C nst tution n Hyd bad Any f th r subjects w uld be a m tter of parate negot at Nor h d he any int t on of ll ng up the Hyd abad Army

He f ed t the N zam s relig n and s d that h empha s s n M hur m n h s talk w th me as s gn fic nt as it com mem rat d th event h h marks th break bet een the Sh a nd S nn Sects of the Mo lem f th Th Hyderab d s were Sunni M l m and t w spected th t the N zam h mself a rypto Sh a

I said I h ped he had n t be n und ly d turbed b ut the publ city and e pl d that it as pr mar ly d t the zeal f Mu h t ff I h d d my be t to k ep it d r con trol (I und t nd there w m cr t c sm fr m e or t o memb f the Cab t b t t d d n t m from N hru or Pat l who w not wor d) N hru said ag n th s ft n that t d d n t matt r or aff ct th l e of the t

N hru s ys he fi ds th N zam s attitude h rd t understand as h do n t bel e e that he s at ll cut ut for a her r le

After some init al ce ta nty s to whether they r go ng to meet Za n w nt u d t V P s ho se at 9 p m and I join d them l rtly after ds

W th th b kg d f g n l b d r tension V P w str gly f the opin on th t the present u cert ty cannot be ll wed t l g on d ft t te t t e pr gramm s had b en con dered and ejected a compl cated seq nce of meet ngs as o k d t n ol g a in t t t Mir Lak Al to e n Delh n the 2 nd a v s t by Nehru a d V P to Patel n M s and Mountbattens partic p t on at a deci s e poi t i the d s ss ns and in d c f y firm dec s n

The con ersat on ltho gh some hat ncoherent d pr tra t ed was fra k and c d al Th gr ity of the s t at on a re c gn sed n the l ght of border nc de t d the Sardar s ews Za h mself ga e n nd cat on whate er of th N zam s att tud on ny of the ma n subjects nder d cuss on but V P r a r ed h m n the l m tat n f acces ion to th ubj cts—a yth g more t be n g t ated the dent ty nd ntegrity f the Hyd ra bad Army nd the N zam l g l t ve powers (Th l st l a most tricky con tit t onal nd pol t cal i s e n wh h we w ll

need to brief ourselves carefully) Laik s position and the reconstitution of the Government were considered Zain stressed the difficulty of Laik dismissing the whole Cabinet except him self and re forming it but this matter will be frankly discussed at the forthcoming meeting The possibility of Zain himself taking part in the new Government was considered He said he would prefer to serve as Deputy to someone else but was ready to co operate provided his appointment came from the Nizam direct and not as a result of pressure from the Government of India

Zain seemed to feel that V P s proposals on all these subjects were being made in a more palatable form than before but so far as I know there was no change of ground on the Indian side V P however spoke in the most fervent and emotional terms of his esteem for Zain and of his wish for settlement and the understanding that clearly exists between the two men is encouraging The situation now largely revolves round the Mus soon meeting with Patel and the measure of discretion V P can get from that meeting V P anticipates that it will be no easy encounter

Both V P and Zain were good enough to say that my visit to Hyderabad had been helpful

GOVERNOR-GENERAL S LODGE SIMLA *Saturday 22nd May 1948*

To complete this crowded week Fay and I set off on our last trek to Simla The Mountbattens and nearly all the Staff have been here ever since the beginning of my Hyderabad trip So much has happened since I left and I have been so absorbed in my own activities that it seems almost like a return from exile

I have had two long talks with Mountbatten alone He says he only wishes now that he had sent me down earlier as the value of my report to him is in its objectivity He has found it very hard in view of his own friendship for Monckton and his personal desire to achieve a settlement before he leaves to avoid a subjective approach to the problem In this connexion I gave him my frank opinion that the Nizam may well be placing more reliance on C R—a Southern Indian and a Madrassi—than on himself as Governor General Mountbatten was not worried about the Nizam s negative attitude The vital objective of stirring up a sense of urgency among the ruling group in Hyderabad and of causing a renewal of negotiations has he feels been secured For he says until I went neither side seemed prepared to make a new move

GOVERNMENT HOUSE NEW DELHI *Tuesday 25th May 1948*

I left Simla on Sunday morning with Vernon after little than thirty six hours there I am surfeited with travel

logistics of my last week are a serious challenge to constructive or sustained thought. We returned to the furnace in Delhi as advance guards to Mountbatten, who has spent the last twenty-four hours in Patiala. We were able to advise him on arrival that Mir Laik Ali, who reached here on Sunday, has apparently come in completely the wrong spirit and so out of touch with reality that he claims that the crisis is now past. Mountbatten therefore got to work on him to-day in what I believe is the longest interview he has had with anybody in the present emergency—five hours in all.

Mountbatten began by giving him with brutal frankness a picture of what would probably happen if no settlement was reached and Hindu blood began to flow in Hyderabad. If after his departure in a few weeks India were to decide upon armed intervention, what could be done by the Hyderabad army? Laik Ali said he fully appreciated the military position, but that he considered accession ten times worse than paramountcy. He explained that while he was personally in favour of democratic institutions he was opposed to the introduction of responsible government in Hyderabad simply because it would without doubt lead to accession. When V. P. entered the room Laik Ali proposed a long-term agreement for fifteen or seventeen years covering the three central subjects.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Wednesday, 26th May, 1948*

Discussion between V. P. and Laik Ali *ad de x* went on far into the night, and V. P., with his prodigious powers of drafting and formulating, has produced comprehensive Heads of Agreement. They are divided into two parts and cover eleven principal items, Part I dealing with the basic relation between Hyderabad and India and Part II with the interim measures to implement Part I. V. P.'s Heads of Agreement met Laik Ali's request to be able to present to the Nizam, as the alternative to accession, one which ruled out anyhow and a plebiscite.

Mountbatten himself is strongly of the opinion that a plebiscite would be the best solution, as the Heads of Agreement open up another depressing vista of protracted and niggling negotiation over detail. Laik Ali's personal view would seem to be in the same sense, for he said that he thought a plebiscite would save the face of both sides. At the Indian end the plebiscite finds favour in particular with Patel, whose blessing is indispensable, even though there is recognition that it would not automatically lead to accession.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Saturday, 29th May, 1948*

This is the most critical moment in the tantalising Hyderabad negotiations. V. P. has been to see Patel at Mussoorie and has returned from him with a constructive but strongly worded mes

sage Patel comes down once more in favour of the plebiscite As for the Heads of Agreement, he accepts the basic relationship in Part I without amendment but would tighten up the interim measures of Part II by shifting the balance of control more in favour of the non Moslems The final paragraph of Patel s message written in his own hand urges that if Laik Ali means business he should come up with plenipotentiary powers from the Nizam. It is no use he writes discussing with a person who has to go back every time for instructions

He wants a telegram with a twenty four hour time limit to be sent saying that if Laik Ali cannot return with authority and agreement on the fundamentals within that deadline the Government of India would draw the conclusion that Hyderabad do not want to continue the negotiations and are merely playing for time His last words are finalise within a week Nehru has expressed great distrust of Laik Ali Intelligence about his activities confirms that we are dealing with a very sly procrastinator but his—or the Nizam s—response cannot be delayed much longer

On the credit side is Monckton s decision to come out again Mountbatten has expressed his delight at the news saying that he will try to hold the position until his arrival but pointing out that powerful influences—growing stronger every day—are at work militating against the settlement which they both want

Monckton however is not due in India until the 3rd June which happens to be the day when I and my family are due to leave Bombay by sea for home It is thus possible for Monckton s and my paths to cross in Bombay on the morning of the 3rd without undue administrative inconvenience or danger of breach of confidence As Monckton is arranging to fly straight on to Hyderabad and has not been fully in the picture on the developments during the period of my own visit onwards Mountbatten sees in my presence a providential opportunity to brief him before he is called upon to give what may be the decisive advice to the Nizam So there will be no fading away for me until I am finally aboard the ship

This evening there was a farewell Staff party to Fay and myself in the Panelled Room We do not actually leave until Tuesday morning but this was the only time that the Mountbattens could come and characteristically they wished to be there It was a very pleasant family affair I am very sorry to be leaving before the final curtain I would have liked to have been present for the *denouement* over Hyderabad and to have witnessed the series of ceremonies of formal farewell which I am sure will burst the bounds of formality But there it is The phase-out programme was arranged some time back and it would be very difficult to amend our plans During the party there was much -

amusement at my alleged likeness to a large portrait on the wall of the renowned Tippoo Sahib. The picture shows a man of dismal and almost morose countenance and the comparison did little to raise my morale!

Afterwards Mountbatten presented me with a silver cigarette box generously inscribed. We were much moved by these tokens of confidence, appreciation and friendship. For myself my biggest reward has been the privilege of serving a great man on a great mission.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *Sunday 30th May 1948*

We have this evening been to a large reception given by V. P. at the Delhi Gymkhana Club, which attracted so far as I could see nearly every celebrity in Delhi. For the Mountbattens it is the first in a formidable sequence of farewell parties during the next three weeks. Through the middle of the milling throng a messenger brought in no fewer than three letters from the Nizam which immediately absorbed the attention of host, principal guest and Prime Minister. Most of the Indian and Foreign Press were present and it did not take these intelligence experts long to recognise that important and far from favourable information had come through as Mountbatten, Nehru and V. P. moved into a corner, put their heads together and talked in anxious undertones.

At first sight it would seem that hopes of settlement under Mountbatten's auspices have received a severe setback. In the first letter the Nizam's reaction to the Heads of Agreement was simply that he could do no more than await Monckton's arrival. In the second he rather turned a brusque 'no' to the discreet suggestion that he might consider appointing a new and more acceptable Prime Minister—a suggestion which Laik Ali himself, with what degree of candour it is difficult to say, had expressed himself as ready to sponsor if it would serve the cause of good will. The third is simply a renewed invitation to Mountbatten to visit him in Hyderabad. Here again the terms of the invitation are singularly lacking in warmth or even courtesy of expression.

Mountbatten decided—wisely I think—to reply only to the first letter expressing regret at further delay and the hope that when Laik Ali comes to Delhi the next time he would be allowed to bring with him plenipotentiary powers to reach a settlement.

In addition to these deplorable notes of negation from the Nizam, Laik Ali has weighed in denying the accuracy of V. Menon's notes on his meeting with Mountbatten, Nehru and V. P. on the 26th and asserting that he had never agreed to India's declaration of right to overriding legislation in the three central subjects. Everyone in the room at the time has never been so quite certain that he did agree. This letter only seems to reinforce Nehru's warning

that Laik Ali is not to be trusted and that his sole objective is to delay matters Monckton s intervention assumes hourly more decisive importance

In spite of the current tension Zain Yar Jung creates calmness and confidence with dinner parties at Hyderabad House Almost our last engagement before leaving was to dine with him and his family and entourage As we sat out in the gardens after dinner one of the Hyderabadi ladies exchanging polite conversation put such small items as Standstill Agreements Instruments of Accession and Paramountcy into their proper perspective Delhi she sighed is not what it was There are no Moghul Emperors now!

M V CALEDONIA *Thursday 3rd June 1948*

As my last official duty before boarding the ship I reported back to Mountbatten by telegram that Monckton at the outset was clearly in a state of doubt and despondency and unaware of the by now crucial importance of his advice in swaying events favourably He felt the chances of the Nizam agreeing to anything were a hundred to seven against and if he was over pushed he himself was ready to suggest that he should fight it out I stressed the reality of the political tension and the urgency of the time factor and was able to say that I had left him in a much more constructive and hopeful frame of mind than I had found him

Monckton urged that he must have time to handle the Nizam in his own way for he was hardly ever susceptible to direct assault in one interview However if and when a point of decision was really reached he would come to Delhi immediately After advising him of Mountbatten s and Patel s support for a plebiscite I was relieved to hear that he had already of his own accord arrived at a conclusion firmly in favour of this solution He thinks that the Nizam s sharp reply about Laik Ali s possible replacement as touching his prerogatives might have been the outcome of some mishandling in the original transmission of the proposal Monckton intends to tackle this problem himself and considers Zain to be the only feasible alternative

Apart from the customs interruption I was well satisfied with this meeting It helped to confirm my own belief that in politics much turns on the art of being available in the right place at the right time Monckton for his part said he was most grateful for it as he confessed that while it would not have been desirable for him to stop off at Delhi first on this visit he would have been at a disadvantage in going straight into the Nizam wholly un briefed on the situation from the Indian end

LONDON *Wednesday 23rd June 1948*

We reached Liverpool yesterday after twenty days at sea. The cyclone duly met us one hundred and fifty miles out of Bombay and remained with us all the way to Aden. I was back just in time to watch the Mountbattens and all the rest of the party touch down at Northolt, the same journey having taken them forty-eight hours by air.

Both the Duke of Edinburgh and Mr Attlee were at the airfield to greet this homecoming with unique distinction, for I doubt whether a Royal Duke and a Prime Minister of the day have been present together before to greet a Viceroy or Governor-General on his return. There were other Ministers, high officials and senior officers, B.B.C. Newsreel and Press representatives out to meet him, photographers in large numbers, and last but not least a Guard of Honour of a hundred Indian sailors from their new cruiser the *Delhi*, which is still in Portsmouth.

Attlee's presence there was particularly appropriate, for the transfer of power in India may well be regarded as the most momentous policy decision of his Premiership. In its conception and implementation—he has throughout carried a special responsibility—history will undoubtedly link Attlee and Mountbatten in much the same way as it has Morley and Minto, Montagu and Chelmsford.

While we were all in the ante-room having tea, Mountbatten, who was discussing the Hyderabad situation with the Prime Minister, called me over to say a few words about the impressions I had formed of the Nizam on my visit. Mr Attlee listened carefully to the brief picture I drew, then said that he was quite satisfied that everything humanly possible had been done to secure an honourable settlement for the Nizam, and that we could all go away with clear consciences in the matter. I did not as yet know the details of the breakdown, having only heard over the intermittent ship's radio that attempts to reach an agreement had failed.

It is strange to think that the Mountbattens and their Staff party, who for the past fifteen months have worked in such close unity, are now dispersing for the last time. The more intensely you live in the vortex of great events the harder it is to break away and accept normalcy as your lot. As we go off into the soft summer evening most of us will be taking a spell of leave, if only to learn over again how to cope with the daily round, the routine pace.

LONDON *Monday 28th June 1948*

In spite of the lures and distractions of Bradman's farewell Test Match at Lord's I have now had time to piece together the drama of Mountbatten's last three weeks in India. The ship's radio had reported only the briefest statement of the Hyderabad breakdown together with short reports of Mountbatten's final

broadcast and some indication that the farewell scenes in Delhi had been no less heart warming than those of the 15th August and in many ways even more remarkable, in so far as they were now simply expressions of personal gratitude to the Mountbattens

From long talks I have had with Ronnie and Vernon and one or two with Mountbatten himself since their return and from notes which were maintained right up to the day of their departure it would seem that the course of events after my meeting with Monckton was briefly as follows

Monckton stayed for three days in Hyderabad returning with Laik Ali to Delhi At first the discussions were stormy and the negotiations more than once on the verge of complete collapse Nehru refused to see Laik Ali Monckton threatened to leave for home Mountbatten at one point saved the day by telephoning Nehru to say he was quite sure he could find a satisfactory solution when in fact he had no idea how or where to seek it But somehow a life line was maintained Nehru made a helpful speech on the 8th June posing and answering the question for his critics as to why the Indian Army had not already marched in He replied that whenever force was employed it created more problems than it solved The storm subsided and Mountbatten was left with effective control over the negotiations

Monckton for his part recognised that something more than a long term plebiscite was required to restore the situation Patel from his sick bed still wanted unqualified acceptance of accession He now urged that no more formulæ should be provided from the Indian side This was acceptable to Monckton who put up two documents—a draft Firman to introduce responsible government establish a Constituent Assembly early in 1949 and reconstitute immediately the existing Government The second document was the first part of V P s Heads of Agreement in full Laik Ali once again played for time saying he must return to the Nizam On the 9th June rumours reached Delhi that a Pakistan representative was in Hyderabad but Laik Ali denied this on oath and agreement was reached that he should return to Hyderabad for consultation

On the 12th June Monckton reported getting the proposals past the Nizam and through the Executive Council except for two points—the issue of overriding legislation and the composition of the Constituent Assembly This led to further difficult discussions first between Mountbatten Monckton and Nehru in Delhi and then at a meeting with Patel and most of the Cabinet at which Mountbatten was present in Mussoori But the proposals were agreed as modified by the Nizam subject to the deletion of any direct reference to parity in the composition of the Assembly and the substitution instead of the words in consultation with the leaders of the major political parties in Hyderabad

On the 13th June Monckton strongly urged Laik Ali to come up with plenipotentiary powers this time but once again he was limited in his discretion both by the Council and the Nizam himself. On the 14th June Laik Ali asked for four new amendments to the Heads of Agreement. These were first that the Government of India should only request Hyderabad to pass legislation similar to that in force in India and not peculiar to Hyderabad; secondly that Hyderabad should be allowed to maintain eight thousand irregulars; thirdly that the Razakars should be disbanded gradually and not all at once and fourthly that the state of emergency under which India might station troops in Hyderabad should be defined under the Government of India Act. Mountbatten felt there was little hope of getting these additional points past the Government of India but much to his pleasure and surprise Nehru was ready to agree.

On the 15th June Mountbatten saw the Hyderabad delegation and reported this unexpected success. Laik Ali at once raised two new points. He wanted declarations of economic and financial freedom to be included. Once again the Government of India agreed to give sympathetic consideration and suggested that these could be stressed in a collateral letter. Mountbatten said that on this point Nehru went so far as to propose the inclusion in the collateral letter provision of facilities for joint collaboration in the economic development of Hyderabad. Laik Ali apparently not realising that he meant actually asked for this to be deleted! Only on Monckton protesting that it would be most unwise for Hyderabad to oppose this offer and Mountbatten explaining that it had hitherto only been conditional upon full accession and was thus a further example of good will did Laik Ali withdraw his request. But as Mountbatten pointed out the incident was typical of his exasperating obtuseness at this time.

Laik Ali left for Hyderabad with the final document and all the amendments, Monckton stressing upon him the need now for total acceptance or total refusal. An answer was awaited at 7 30 that evening but no message came through until 9 40 when the Nizam regretted his inability to give a final word without taking the opinion of his Council. This was physically not possible until the next day. The delay was accepted in Delhi.

On the 16th at noon Mountbatten and Monckton were informed that the Nizam had been *strongly recommended not to accept the proposal* on four new grounds which Mountbatten and I understood even Monckton considered so unjustifiable and ridiculous that it was decided that Monckton should fly down to Hyderabad during the night to read out and underline Mountbatten's reply.

His most serious objection was the deletion of the words 'on basis which I shall consider later' in a sub-paragraph of the Firman referring to the setting up of the Constituent Assembly. The deletion had already been agreed to by his delegation and could

by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as a major point of substance Another objection was his unwillingness to allow the economic agreement (which in any case had only been offered by India at the last minute) to be settled by a collateral letter He now wanted it in the body of the agreement

By midday on the 17th there was a telephone message from Monckton with the one word lost By the evening a completely new point had been raised by the Nizam which he had never mentioned before concerning India s right to station troops in the event of emergency He asked for the negotiations to be con tinued Nehru and V P waited for Monckton and then held a Press conference releasing the terms that had been made available to the Nizam

Even now Nehru promised to leave this present offer open for acceptance and impose no time limit Monckton told Mount batten that he had been particularly disappointed to find that Laik Ali had spent three hours with Razvi before even seeing the Nizam He also gave his view at an informal Press confer ence that the so called blockade of Hyderabad had not been im posed by the central Government and probably not by the Pro vincial administrations either but rather by the individual action of low level officials

Mountbatten now withdrew officially from the negotiations but made one last effort in a long persuasive telegram a revised left barrel which was supplemented by a message from Monck ton Both told him to have the courage of his convictions and not allow himself to sacrifice the interests of his State at the be hest of the Ittehad clique The Ittehad extremists made it quite clear that they were not prepared to enter into any concessions which would limit their control over the State and when it came to the crisis the Nizam lacked the will to assert himself against this group

Mountbatten feels that the main reason for failure is that the principals on either side have never been able to get together throughout the entire eleven months of negotiation and he is still confident that if the Nizam had come to Delhi and he could have acted as mediator agreement could have been reached Similarly if the Hyderabad delegation had had more negotiating powers and ability to appreciate Monckton s magnificent negotiat ing skill and fundamental personal loyalty to his client the Nizam the outcome might well have been favourable

The prolonged Hyderabad negotiations with their crescendo in the last two weeks of his term of office made it impossible for Mountbatten to effect any last minute act of mediation over Kashmir In March he had secured the agreement of the two Prime Ministers to meet each other at roughly monthly intervals But two months had passed without any action on this and Mountbatten suggested that Nehru should write to Liaquat to

propose a meetıng prefer bly ın Delhı h ch uld enable Lıaquat to say good bye to M u tbatten before h l ft But tl e attempt had first to be p tponed ow ng to Hyderab d nd then aba doned o ng t Lı qu t s llness

The g und had been prepared for d ta led dıscus on of varı ous solut on The Ind n Cab net although ery b tter abo t reports of the part cıpatıon of large regular Pak t Army unıts were still ın a comparatı ely receptıve mood f r ttl ment Whe Nehru sent det led ıden f the P k t n A mv s nterven t on t w s gnificant th t L qu t n h reply d d not spec fically d y the charge but stressed real st cally the danger to the s c r ty f P kı tan As the Ind an Army approaches the North west Frontıer he d cl r d the trıb smen feel d rectly thre tened It Mountbatten s p n n th t here ag n th ı b l ty of th two prın ıpal to come together t th s part cul r moment as p l t cally and psy h log cally most unfortunate

B t frust at on w th the N zam nd o e Kashm r e but n dental wh et ag nst the Mountb tten d cıs ve v ctory over the hearts of the I d n people The Mountbattens last d y n I d a wa I h r f om all s des a tr mph beyond contrı a ce or ım gı tı n It w b ı up n them w th rwhelm g emph sıs th t Ind pe ple and Governm t had recogn sed the mean ng f th m ss on d th ıncerıty f th r e d r and e haıl ng them l b t and f nd

There was f t f ell address by th Delhı Mun c pal ty To rece e th th y dro e th ugh den ely p cked streets al ng th Ch nd Cho k the g e t h gh v y f Old Delh d wn s h ch V ceroy h d pa ed s nc th assas nat n attempt on H rd ge n 1911 They e mobbed h ed and garl ded all th w y to the G ndh g ound wh re a cr wd of a qu rter of a mıll on h d g thered and wh re a further quarter f a m ll n v er tryıng to ga n ent nce

In the even g t the l t of the g t State b q ets g ven th s t me by the Cab t Nehru poke n m morable t rm pay ı g heartfelt tr b t s to th Mountb ttens n t forgettıng Pamela wh com g stra ght f m s h l and pos essıng all th h rm she doe d d gro n up person rk ın th s troubled scene of Ind a Of Mo ntbatten h m elf he d clared Y u came here sır v th a h gh r putat b t m ny a rep t tıon has found ed ın Indıa You l ved h re thr gh a pe d of g eat d ffculty nd

It ıs ınterest ng t note th t the M tbattens them l through ut th r fifteen m nth ın Ind carried thr gh on t p of ll the r othe act vıt es a prod g us p og mm of e t rt n ment at Government Hou e which pl yed no small part n the pr mot n of g od will Altogeth th y ent rtaıned 7 605 g ts t lun h on 8,313 t d nner and 25 287 to ga den partıes t hom s and tea part es

crisis and yet your reputation has not foundered That is a remarkable feat

He next spoke of Lady Mountbatten as possessing the healer s touch Wherever you have gone you have brought solace you have brought hope and encouragement Is it surprising there fore that the people of India should love you and look up to you as one of themselves and should grieve that you are going?

Referring to the wonderful demonstration of friendship and affection by the common people of Delhi four hours before I do not know' Nehru said how Lord and Lady Mountbatten felt on that occasion but used as I am to these vast demonstra tions here I was much affected and I wondered how it was that an Englishman and Englishwoman could become so popular in India during this brief period of time A period certainly of achievement and success in some measure but also a period of sorrow and disaster Obviously this was not connected so much with what had happened but rather with the good faith the friendship and the love of India that these two possessed You may have many gifts and presents but there is nothing more real or precious than the love and affection of the people You have seen yourself Sir and Madam how that love and affection work

Mountbatten and Lady Mountbatten visibly moved replied with the eloquence of the heart At the end gifts were exchanged the Government presenting the Mountbattens with an inscribed tray bearing the signatures of all the Governors of the Provinces and Cabinet and Mountbatten handing over on behalf of the King the gold plate presented originally by the Worshipful Com pany of Goldsmiths and Silversmiths to King George V for use in the State dining room of his Viceroy in New Delhi This he did at the King s express wish as a symbol of the friendship of all English men and women and indeed of all the people in the United Kingdom to the people of India After the dinner there was a glittering reception which was attended by no fewer than six thousand guests

Among Lady Mountbatten s last public acts was to visit the two great refugee camps of Kurukshetra and Panipat where some three hundred thousand refugees still shelter One of the Indian A D C.s with her reported that he had never visited scenes like it in India The refugees gathered round her in their thousands in tears at saying good bye to her In many other camps re fugees collected their pice and annas to buy a railway ticket for one of their members just to carry some small gift to her as token of gratitude

It was at another unique gathering—a dinner given to the Mountbattens by the entire Diplomatic Corps at the

PRINCIPAL PERSONALITIES

IN THE course of this narrative more than two hundred and fifty names of prominent personalities are mentioned Many of the references are only incidental and most of them self explanatory Footnotes have been kept to a minimum With the coming of Independence the functions and duties of many of the leaders and officials either changed or were terminated The following are some of the principal *dramatis personæ* with (where applicable) their official position before and after 15th August 1947 (Inde pendence Day) within the period covered by this book Cross references are provided wherever Christian names or abbreviated titles have been used It should be noted that C O H Q and S E A C refer to Combined Operations Headquarters and South east Asia Command (Lord Mountbatten s two major War Com mands)

Abdullah Sheikh Leader of the National Conference Party in Kashmir State After accession to India was appointed Prime Minister by the Maharaja of Kashmir Member of Indian delegation to United Nations January 1948

Abell G E B (later Sir George) Private Secretary to the Vice roy (P S V)

Ali Mir Laik President of the Nizam s Council from November 1947

Amrit Kaur Rajkumari Mahatma Gandhi s Secretary Minister for Health in the Government of the Dominion of India

Auchinleck Field Marshal Sir Claude Commander in Chief in India until 15th August Supreme Commander administering partition of Indian Army until 30th November 1947

Ayyengar Gopalaswami Minister without Portfolio in the Gov ernment of the Dominion of India Leader of Indian delega tion to United Nations in January 1948

Baldev Singh Sardar Sikh leader Member for Defence in the Interim Government Minister for Defence in the Government of the Dominion of India

Bhabha C H Member for Works Mines and Power in the Interim Government Minister for Commerce in the Govern ment of the Dominion of India

Bhopal The Nawab of Ruler of Bhopal State Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes until May 1947

Bikaner The Maharaja of Ruler of Bikaner State

Brabourne Lord and Lady son in law and elder Earl and Counte s Mountbatten of Burma

Bro kma Captain (S) R. V R N Personal Secretary to V ceroy Pri ate Secr tary to the Gov rn r General of In f m 15th August 1947
Cl l tar The N w b of Pres dent of the Nizam s Coun In M y 1947 to November 1947
C R refers to C R j g p lachar
E k *Crum* Lieutenant Col n l V F Conference Secretary th Vic r y nd t th Go ernor G l of Ind a
Gandl Mahatma Father of th Nation
G dl Dev d s M ging Editor f the *H ndusta Times* s n of th M h tm
G g refers to S r Georg Abell and t Command r Nich acc rding to context
Hyd b d The N zam of R l f Hyd b d St te
Ism y L rd Ch f f the V roys St ff and of the G ert Ge er l of Ind s Staff ntil De mber 1947
J nk Sir Evan G nor of the Punjab until 15th Aug 1947
J h M h mm d Al (Q id-e Azam) P es dent f th Ind M l m League fi st Gov nor General f th D m of P ki t n
Kasl mi Th M ha j of R l r of J mmu and Kashm r St
Krip l ni Ach ry J B P dent of Co gr ss
Li q t Al Kl an Gene l S cretary f th All Ind a M s Leag e M mber f Fin nce n th Interim G rnm Prim Min ster of th G rnment f th Domin n of Pakis
L khart Lieuten t General S r Rob General Officer C manding in-Ch ef Southern Command Ind Governor of N rth est F nt Pro nce fr m Jun to 15th Aug t 19 Comm nd r n Ch ef I d n Army Domin on of Ind I A gu t 1947 t J nuary 1948
M tthai Dr J hn Memb r for T n port and Ra l ys in Inter m G vernm nt M n st r for Tr sport d Ra lways th Go ernment f th Dom of Ind
M V K K ishna H gh Comm oner for Ind a n Un ted K ngdom fr m August 1947
M o V P Reforms C mm ner to the Viceroy and fr J ly 1947 Secret ry f the Stat Department Government the Dom n n of Ind
M es lle Sir Eric Principal Sec t ry t the V cer y
Mohammed Al F nancial Ad i er n the Military F nance partment of th Go ernment f I dia Memb r of the St r Comm ttee of th P rt tion Counc l Secretary G l of Dominion of Pakistan
Monckto Sir Walter C nst t tonal Ad iser to the N zam Hyd r b d
M tb tten of Burma Rear Adm l the Vi count (cr at d E August 1947) la t Viceroy of Ind a 2 nd March to 14th Aug